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1. Introduction 
 
India’s nuclear build-up, which culminated in the 1998 nuclear tests and India’s subsequent 
self-declaration as a nuclear weapons power, attracted a large amount of academic research 
trying to explore the motives behind these striking developments. The focus was thus 
placed upon the strategic environment of the South Asian region, which determined the 
security imperatives under which India’s nuclear armament took place. Right from the 
beginning, the academic discourse on the pros and cons of nuclear weapons for India’s 
security was polarised, sharply divided between advocates and opponents of the nuclear 
bomb. 
 
The major flaw inherent to these numerous strategic analyses is their general assumption 
that strategy and security considerations alone matter in India’s nuclear decision-making. 
Those analysts making the case for India’s nuclearisation assume that the Indian 
government acted along these arguments when it decided to openly go nuclear. However, in 
view of the pre-test nuclear discourse such assumptions appear flawed, as they retroactively 
construe India’s motives in an ex post fashion. Conversely, those scholars taking a negative 
position on the strategic value of nuclear weapons for India’s security hardly consider it 
worth while exploring in detail the reason for the suboptimal outcome of India’s nuclear 
decision making. 
 
The main objective of the present study is to remedy this shortcoming of the nuclear 
discourse by providing an in-depth analytic account of the motives and dynamics of India’s 
nuclear policy making. The question here is not whether nuclear weapons improve India’s 
security. Instead, the central interest in this study is to what extent security considerations 
factored in to India’s nuclear policy development. 
 
The necessary prerequisite for the development of an appropriate explanatory model is a 
theoretical approach which allows for the coexistence of security related and non-security 
related motives of state behaviour in the international arena. Neorealist theory, commonly 
applied to conventional explanatory models of nuclear competitions, defines security–
maximisation, equated with relative power-maximisation, as the singularly relevant 
national interest on top of the lexicographic preference system of any state. As such, 
Neorealist theory appears insufficient to provide a stringent explanatory model to the 
present study. The analysis instead falls back upon the classical Realist concept of power 
politics, in which states’ international behaviour is determined by their satisfaction with 
their position in the international system. States satisfied with the current balance of power 
act as status quo powers, increasing their respective power capabilities only in reaction to 
the disruption of the current balance by other states. Those powers dissatisfied with the 
present situation actively increase their power capabilities in order to improve their 
respective position within the system. 
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On the basis of this classical Realist concept of power-maximisation, an explanatory model 
is developed which allows for the existence of various interrelated interests. The overall 
compound of national interests determines the degree to which a state acts either as status 
quo power or as a dissatisfied power seeking a system change. Thus, the model combines 
explanatory factors on the structural level (power) as well as on the unit-level (interests). 
This refined Realist approach is referred to as the Balance-of-Interest Theory (also known 
by the ambiguous term ‘Neoclassical’ Realist Theory)1. 
 
Within the model, the structure of the international system in South Asia sets the 
framework for India’s international action. Two major structural factors reflect India’s 
nuclear calculus, one being the threat emerging from a nuclear armed China, and the other 
rising from Pakistan’s nuclear and missile programmes. The so-called “China factor” is 
largely considered by strategic thinkers as the most clear and convincing incentive for 
India’s nuclear build up. After the Indo-Chinese war of 1962 and China’s first nuclear tests 
two years later, the countries’ bilateral relationship remained largely hostile, giving impetus 
for India to engage in strategies of balancing China’s superior military power. In its 
relations with arch rival Pakistan, the introduction of nuclear weapons was, in contrast, 
strategically counter productive for India, as the equalising effects of these weapons 
diminished much of India’s superiority in conventional weaponry. 
 
Within the model, these structural conditions of India’s regional security environment were 
permissive to India’s nuclear development but not sufficient to make India’s nuclearisation 
imperative for maintaining its self-preservation. The model therefore includes explanatory 
variables on the unit-level which are outside the classical strategic realm. Such unit-level 
interests were generally related to political, less strategic values attributed to nuclear 
weapons. Such values played a significant role within India’s domestic political party 
competition, among certain pressure groups, and impacted India’s relationship with other 
countries on non-proliferation matters.  
 
The interplay between security-related variables, such as the ‘China factor’ and unit-level 
variables, account for India’s dissatisfaction with the existing international nuclear order. 
These factors determined India’s policy to seek a system change by building up nuclear 
arms.  
In contrast to its nuclear armed neighbours China and Pakistan, India’s nuclear policy 
making is taking place within the country’s democratic framework. This structure allows 
for an exceedingly intensive, protracted, and emotionalised debate on the nuclear issue. 
This sensitivity of the nuclear debate explains how values other than security, especially 
those related to the country’s status and prestige, are attributed to the nuclear issue. While 
status seeking is accommodated in the model as a national interest in its own right, the 
policy of prestige, defined by Hans Morgenthau as instrumentality aimed at displaying 
rather than using military force to impress other nations with one’s power, is the means 
                                                 
1 Schweller, Randall L: Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler’s Strategy of World Conquest. New York: 
Columbia University Press 1998. 
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through which status increase is sought2. The concepts of ‘status’ and ‘prestige’ are socially 
constructed and exist only because actors attribute a certain meaning to them. Within the 
context of India’s developing post-colonial society, the norm of equity in the international 
system has proved to be the crucial element in its socially constructed understanding of a 
country’s status in the world. This strong sense of equity collided with the global nuclear 
order and its formal manifestation, the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), which 
explicitly restricts official nuclear status to only five powers and thereby denies late-comers 
international standing. The strong presence of the equity norm within India’s society and 
the inherent perceived injustice with regard to the international nuclear order constitute a 
major driving force in India’s quest for the nuclear bomb.  
 
The scope of the present study is limited to the identification of the main actors within 
India’s nuclear policy making as well as the basic rationales behind their action. This 
approach contrasts to studies based on institutionalist explanatory concepts, which stress 
the emergence of military structures and institutions that develop an interest of their own, 
thereby making security policy shifts towards reconciliation and cooperation in the 
international arena more difficult. 
 
India’s democratic set-up has further amplified its effect upon the country’s strategic 
decision making process. The interaction between the elected leaders and the public is not a 
direct one but occurs through the intermediation of a limited number of strategic thinkers 
and opinion leaders, referred to as the strategic elite. This group of strategists has managed 
to monopolise the nuclear discourse, thereby determining India’s nuclear course directly 
within the government’s advisory bodies. More significantly, they indirectly dominate 
opinion leadership through their extensive media presence and newspaper publishing. The 
elite’s perceptions do not differ from the overall normative disposition of India’s society 
but rather represent a cross-section of it.  
 
The main fora in which the elite’s strategic debate on the nuclear issue took place were 
India’s major English speaking daily newspapers. Thus, in order to assess the motives and 
dynamics behind India’s nuclear course, this study focuses on the analysis of nuclear 
related articles published therein as its units of analysis. The data collection is limited to the 
five most relevant English speaking daily newspapers. These are: The Times of India, The 
Hindustan Times, The Hindu, The Indian Express, and The Statesman.  
The sample allows for basic quantitative methods of analysis, which give empirical 
evidence to some general trends within the nuclear debate over time. Quantitative methods 
alone, however, fail to detect the nuances of the emotionally driven nuclear debate that 
occurred mainly along intangible arguments based on normative concepts like prestige and 
status considerations. Understanding these norms and their significance for the process of 
India’s nuclear policy making is the main focus of this study. For this purpose, interpretive 
methods of content analysis are applied.  
 
                                                 
2 Morgenthau, Hans J.: Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, revised ed.. Boston: 
McGraw-Hill 1993. 
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Conventional studies on security-related motives for India’s nuclear build-up have usually 
found the 1960s to be the crucial decade within which the strategic parameters for India’s 
nuclear course were set. Several events like the Indo-Chinese war of 1962, the Indo-
Pakistani war of 1965, and above all, the first Chinese nuclear test of 1964, caused a 
significant deterioration of India’s strategic environment. Surprisingly, the nuclear debate 
emerging in India during this period was not so much triggered by these events but was 
instead focused on the international negotiation process on the Nuclear Non-proliferation 
Treaty, which concluded in 1968. Overall, the disposition among India’s strategic elite in 
this period remained rather dismissive towards the bomb. Policy-makers continued to 
abstain from any clear-cut decision on the nuclear weapons issue, keeping the nuclear 
programme in a state of indecisive equilibrium, which was euphemistically labelled a 
strategy of ‘keeping the nuclear option open.’ Even the nuclear test of 1974 did not disrupt 
this course. It was not until the late 1980s that external pressures mounted to such a point as 
to finally end this state of political indecision. These pressures triggered an intensified 
debate on India’s nuclear future among its strategic and political elite. Taking this delayed 
debate into account, the period of analysis of this study begins in mid-1986. At this time, 
the so called Brasstacks Crisis emerged between India and Pakistan and converted the until 
then modest debate on intangible, moral, and philosophical aspects of nuclear weapons into 
a debate on more palpable aspects of warfare and strategy. This discourse gradually 
intensified, reaching its peak in May 1998 when India conducted several nuclear tests and 
subsequently declared itself a nuclear weapons state. In the years following the nuclear tests 
of 1998, India’s strategic elite turned their attention away from the previously dominating 
disagreement regarding nuclear weapons states and the unjust non-proliferation regime. 
After 1998, the international status gained through the acquisition of nuclear weapons was 
considered a fait accompli. The strategists turned their focus to more tangible aspects of the 
nuclear issue, such as doctrine formulation, institutional reforms, and strategic planning. 
This phase of India’s nuclear course, during which the debate converged to the nuclear 
discourses in other nuclear weapon states, is termed the period of nuclear consolidation. 
The period of this analysis ends in mid-2003, five years after the nuclear tests. At this time, 
the process of ascertaining India’s strategic thought regarding the nuclear facts established 
in 1998 was largely concluded.  
 
The study is structured into three main sections. The prime objective of the first part is to 
develop an explanatory model of India’s nuclear policy making on the basis of the Balance-
of-Interests Theory. Therein, all key variables are introduced which contribute to the 
general understanding of the dynamics of India’s nuclear course during the crucial period 
from 1986 to 2003. A quantitative analysis of the 705 editorial and opinion articles on the 
nuclear issue selected from India’s five major national newspapers is to provide empirical 
evidence for testing the main hypotheses. Rather than being a self-contained analysis, the 
quantitative section further aims at informing and, to a certain extent, guiding the 
interpretive content analysis of parts two and three. In addition, an extended account of the 
historic development of India’s nuclear programme prior to 1986 is given, which is the 
necessary prerequisite for understanding the dynamics of the debate during the critical 
years between 1986 and 2003. Finally, the first part concludes with an assessment of the 
 4
dynamics and particularities of India’s domestic policy arena, as well as the institutional 
and infrastructural premises in which the nuclear programme is embedded. 
 
The second part of the study deals with the central questions which conventional studies on 
the topic address, specifically, India’s security and the role of nuclear weapons therein. A 
broad picture of the security environment in which India is placed is thus drawn. 
Furthermore, the analysis includes an assessment of the role of the two major adversarial 
powers, Pakistan and China.  
 
Finally, the third part of the analysis explores those motives of the key actors of India’s 
nuclear policy making which are not directly related to security but originate from distinct 
values attributed to nuclear weapons. The motives are identified by means of combined 
quantitative measures and interpretive methods of content analysis. Above all, these values 
of acceptance are based upon the country’s prestige and its standing within the international 
community of states. These intangible motives behind India’s nuclear policy making stem 
from the strategic elite’s perception of the international nuclear order. Three different 
aspects of this normative driven dynamic are illuminated. First, those elite analyses which 
explicitly address status seeking as the main motive for India’s nuclear weapons 
programme are assessed. The starting point of the prestige-related discourse is the general 
consent among the strategic elite revolving around India as a rising power (for example, its 
international status is gradually rising). Disagreement exists about the appropriate means by 
which India could achieve these gains in international status and prestige. While Nehruvian 
traditionalists suggest seeking international reputation by heralding global disarmament and 
peaceful coexistence, others consider nuclear weapons as appropriate devices to arrest 
international attention and increase the country’s standing in the global arena. A second 
aspect of the normative driven debate is the role the United States played in India’s nuclear 
calculus. America was not considered an immediate threat to India’s security (despite 
sporadic reference to the ‘Enterprise’ incident of 1971) but rather as the ringleader of the 
group of Western countries that were perceived to misuse nuclear technology to create, or 
rather maintain, a discriminatory world order. Consequently, the United States became the 
prime target of the anti-colonialist sentiments still omnipresent in the political discourse 
among India’s elite. Thirdly, the study evaluates the international nuclear regime as the 
agency by which the West allegedly maintains its supremacy. The international nuclear 
regime was created in 1968 by the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, giving those five 
powers official status as nuclear weapons states which conducted nuclear tests prior to the 
treaty’s conclusion. In turn, the treaty excludes India, despite its nuclear tests only six years 
later in 1974. 
 
The rationale and dynamics behind India’s struggle for international recognition and the 
strong, often obsessive sensitivities of India’s strategic elite with regard to perceived acts of 
discrimination or ignorance by the West towards their country, proved to be one the pivotal 
driving forces behind India’s quest for the nuclear bomb. Despite the obvious importance of 
these dynamics, they are largely overlooked in the academic appreciation of India’s nuclear 
programme, and a stringent and comprehensive model to incorporate these dynamics into a 
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general explanation of India’s nuclear course is so far missing. The ambition to overcome 
this academic deficiency is the primary motivation for conducting this study. 
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The Model: Nuclear Weapons and National Interests 
 
 
 7
 
 
 
 8
 
2. Theory: Balancing Interests 
 
2.1. Defending the Old-fashioned 
 
By drawing on classical Realist theory as the basic underlying theoretical concept, this 
study might provoke criticism by those who consider the application of a theory, which was 
laid down more than 60 years before by Hans J. Morgenthau, as outdated and unable to 
describe interstate relations in the 21st century. Such criticism can be invalidated by 
pointing to the core nature of Realist Theory, that is, its attempt to make general statements 
on human nature and basic human interaction. These basic principles of human interaction 
have not changed since ancient times, and their basic ideas were identified by Thucydides 
more than 2,400 years earlier. According to Morgenthau, “novelty is not necessarily a 
virtue in political theory, nor is old age a defect.”3 
 
By developing the modern Realist Theory, Morgenthau conceptualised these ideas into an 
analytic framework, fully aware that this framework was not static but had to be adaptive 
for new developments. 
In his seminal work, Politics Among Nations, Morgenthau begins by reminding the reader 
that the test by which the realist theory of international politics: 
 
[M]ust be judged is not a priori and abstract but empirical and pragmatic. The 
theory, in other words, must be judged not by some preconceived abstract principles 
or concept unrelated to reality, but by its purpose: to bring order and meaning to a 
mass of phenomena which without it would remain disconnected and unintelligible.4 
 
Since then, the most significant change in international politics has been the introduction of 
nuclear weapons and the emergence of the bipolar global balance-of-power system. In 
Kenneth Waltz’ words: 
 
[B]ig changes in means of transportation, communication, and war fighting, for 
example, strongly affect how states and other agents interact. Such changes occur at 
the unit level. In modern history, or perhaps in all of history, the introduction of 
nuclear weaponry was the greatest of such changes.5 
 
The adaptation of these changes led to the development of the structural variant of Realism, 
termed Neorealism. The prime task of the following section is to debate the question of 
whether Neorealism, which had been developed in order to describe the nuclear 
confrontation of the two superpowers during Cold War, is equally suitable to explain the 
                                                 
3 Morgenthau, Hans J.: op.cit.; p.4. 
4 ibid.; p.3. 
5 Waltz, Kenneth N.: Structural Realism after the Cold War. In: International Security 25, 1, Summer 2000; 
p.5. 
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Indo-Pakistani nuclear competition, or whether it requires further refinement to adapt these 
new developments. 
 
 
2.2. The Structural Causes of Nuclear Arms Races 
 
2.2.1. Structural Realist Paradigms 
 
Structural theories of International Relations such as Neorealism explain the outcomes of 
state interaction by focusing on systemic or structural causes. Only broad assumptions are 
made on unit-level variations in state behaviour as intervening variables. Within his 
structural realist approach to nuclear deterrence, Kenneth Waltz lists seven major motives 
for states to develop nuclear weapons: 
 
First, great powers always counter the weapons of other great powers, usually by 
imitating those who have introduced new weapons… 
Second, a state may want nuclear weapons for fear that its great-power ally will not 
retaliate if the other great power attacks… 
Third, a country without nuclear allies will want nuclear weapons all the more if 
some of its adversaries have them. So China and then India became nuclear powers, 
and Pakistan will probably follow… 
Fourth, a country may want nuclear weapons because it lives in fear of its 
adversaries’ present or future conventional strength… 
Fifth, some countries may find nuclear weapons a cheaper and safer alternative to 
running economically ruinous and militarily dangerous conventional arms races… 
Sixth, countries may want nuclear weapons for offensive purposes… 
Finally, by building nuclear weapons a country may hope to enhance its 
international standing. This is thought to be both a reason for and a consequence of 
developing nuclear weapons. One may enjoy the prestige that comes with nuclear 
weapons, and indeed a yearning for glory was not absent from de Gaulle’s soul. But 
the nuclear military business is a serious one, and we may expect that deeper 
motives than desire for prestige lie behind the decision to enter it.6 
 
The third point of this account provides a simple and seemingly convincing reason for 
India’s nuclear weapons programme. In fact, most of the strategic analyses on India’s 
nuclear motives focus on the ‘China factor.’ The case appears to be clear—India’s defeat 
by China in the war of 1962 highlighted the conventional superiority of its adversarial 
neighbour to the north. Furthermore, China’s first nuclear weapons test of 1964 provided 
the compulsion for India to build up its own nuclear arsenal. This main course of 
explanation is occasionally supplemented by motives falling into the fourth category. 
According to this rationale, the prospects of a future nuclear armed Pakistan to India’s West 
appeared to be a major incentive for India to take precautions by developing nuclear 
                                                 
6 Waltz, Kenneth: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better. Adelphi papers, Number 171. 
London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981; pp. 7-8. 
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capabilities first. This argument was particularly popular in strategic assessments 
throughout the 1980s. 
 
Waltz’ disavowal of the seventh point is noteworthy, as the idea that explicates the arming 
behaviour of states may be guided by motives of prestige. Obviously, for Waltz this idea 
appears to be too absurd to explain such dramatic and far reaching decisions such as the 
acquisition of nuclear weapons. His mentioning of the French case reflects more about the 
general image of France in the minds of Anglo-saxon military and strategic thinkers than 
about Waltz’s confidence in the prestige argument. Waltz’s disregard of prestige as a 
motive of arming behaviour, which contrasts to Morgenthau’s emphasis on the relevance of 
the ‘policy of prestige’ in international relations, marks a major inconsistency with the 
central paradigm of his own theoretical approach. The main raison d’être of (Neo-)Realist 
Theory is based on its claim to reflect the world as it is, not as it should be. By dismissing 
motives of prestige as inappropriate to guide such important decisions like the acquisition 
of nuclear weapons, Waltz describes how arming decisions should be made and less how 
they are made in actuality. Despite such flaws, Waltz’s emphasis on security maximisation-
-the self-preservation of states--as the first preference within a state’s national interest 
formulation, is widely accepted as the main motive for its nuclear proliferation in the 
mainstream theoretical approaches to the issue. 
 
Most criticism of Neorealism is not aimed at the above mentioned motives but on the 
underlying assumptions of the Neorealist model. Three core assumptions can be 
summarised as follows:  
 
(1) states are the most important actors (the state-centric assumption); (2) they act 
like rational individuals in pursuing national interests (the unitary rational-actor 
assumption); and (3) they act in the context of an international system lacking 
central government (the anarchy assumption)7 
 
Among these, the anarchy assumption attracts the most criticism. According to Waltz, 
“(s)tates coexist in a condition of anarchy. Self-help is the principle of action in an anarchic 
order, and the most important way in which states must help themselves is by providing for 
their own security.”8 Critics usually question the validity of the anarchy assumption, which 
is particularly difficult to uphold in an increasingly globalised world and with the 
emergence of international non-state actors. When it comes to the South Asian strategic 
arena, however, the case of these critics is rather weak. In fact, the South Asian strategic 
set-up can truly be described as anarchic. Broad security architecture as well as any 
substantive regional security agreement is missing. Neither India nor Pakistan is a member 
of the main international nuclear regimes, the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The UN is largely discredited due to its clumsy 
mediation attempts with the Kashmir question. The agenda of the South Asian Association 
for Regional Co-operation (SAARC) as the only institutionalised platform for regional co-
                                                 
7 Goldstein, Joshua S.: International Relations. New York: HarperCollins 1994; p.47. 
8 Waltz, Kenneth: op.cit. 1981; p.4. 
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operation explicitly excludes addressing any bilateral security issues. Intra-regional trade 
remains minimal so far, mainly due to the similarly structured, non-complementary nature 
of the economies of the South Asian countries. Further, the state-centric as well as the 
unitary rational-actor assumption are useful to describe the rationale behind India’s 
acquisition of nuclear weapons. 
 
In sum, most of the core features of the Neorealist approach are adequate in providing the 
theoretical framework of the present study and are therefore adopted in its explanatory 
model. The only major Neorealist assumption which is explicitly abandoned within the 
theoretical framework is the assumption of security maximisation as the top preference of a 
state’s lexicographic preference system per se.  
Before turning to potential non-security state interests, the effects of nuclear weapons on 
the security of a state are addressed by introducing the concept of deterrence. 
 
2.2.2. The Concept of Nuclear Deterrence 
 
Within the Realist theory of International Relations, deterrence is commonly defined as the 
threat of military retaliation to prevent another country from using military force in pursuit 
of its foreign policy. Deterrence can be directed at a threat of attack against the state’s own 
territory or that of another state. In regional strategic set-ups centering on territorial 
disputes between neighbouring states the concept of direct deterrence usually applies. An 
example of this scenario is deterrence directed at an attack against a respective state’s own 
territory only.  
 
Deterrence has three key aims. First, deterrence intends to prevent the emergence of crises. 
A second goal is to prevent existing crises from escalating into war. In the case of an 
existing territorial dispute such as the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan, 
deterrence is applied to the latter. A third aim of the concept of deterrence is to prevent the 
adversary from forcing maximum demands upon the state in the course of bilateral 
bargaining. The crucial element of nuclear deterrence is the threat potential inherent within 
nuclear weapons.  
 
Decision-makers select the option with greater expected utility in a clearly defined matrix. 
According to Realist theory, the matrix usually contains three main sets of variables: the 
balance of power in the international system, the interests at stake, and the bargaining 
behaviour of the states. Deterrence threats are meant to reduce the expected utility of going 
to war for the adversary by increasing the potential costs of doing so. However, deterrence 
threats pose the dangers of not only reducing the adversary’s expected utility of war, but 
also reduces the utility of inaction and retaining the status quo, in which the deterrence 
devices are perceived as potentially offensive weapons. In this scenario, pre-emptive war 
necessities emerge. 
 
Generally, four different types of deterrence failure and outbreaks of war can be 
distinguished: inadvertent war, war by miscalculation, war by calculation and, catalytic 
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war.9 According to the Structural Realist approach, the introduction of nuclear weapons as 
deterrence devices significantly changes the way in which states seek to provide security 
but does not transform the nature of the international system itself. All basic Neorealist 
assumptions about the way in which states act in the international arena remain untouched, 
especially the assumption of anarchy. 
 
Deterrence stability generally requires four key elements: a sufficient number of nuclear 
devices to conduct a second strike, survivable C³I structures to maintain the second strike 
capabilities, a pre-planned targeting and deployment strategy and a credible, communicated 
deterrence threat towards the adversary.10 The fourth element is of particular relevance. In 
order to gain the maximum utility from its deterrent device, a state is required to send 
powerful signals to its adversary. To make its threat more credible and to distinguish it 
from bluffing, the resolved defender needs to engage in ‘costly’ signals, signals which 
increase the risk of escalation as well as the costs of backing down from a deterrent posture. 
However, if signals are too committing, the defender faces the risk of losing domestic 
political backing. Furthermore, strong threats increase costs for the adversary to give in 
thereby closing the door for deescalating measures. An effective way of transmitting 
signals is the strategy of reciprocity. It combines the negative form of leverage as 
deterrence threats of punishment with positive forms of leverage as promises of rewards.11 
Reciprocity is effective because it is easy to understand. 
 
Finally, domestic political factors play a crucial role in the policy choices of states in 
deterrence situations. They determine state behaviour by influencing a state’s response to 
deterrence as well as its deterrent response to an evolving threat by another state. The war-
prone record of bilateral relations between India and Pakistan leads to the question 
regarding the role of reputation in the course of mutual nuclear deterrence. Scholars 
disagree on whether one state’s past behaviour influences the opponent’s perception of its 
intentions and resolve, or whether the deterrence outcomes are exclusively determined by 
the present balance of power and interests at stake. 
 
The most severe challenge to deterrence stability is the existence of a territorial dispute 
between the two adversaries. Deterrence is most likely to fail when the potential attacker is 
seeking to seize disputed territory. If the challenger state is viewing the disputed territory as 
an integral part of its national homeland, the status quo is most likely perceived as costly.  
This perception thus makes the relatively higher utility of conflict escalation appear as a 
tempting option. If the expected utility of not using force is deteriorating, deterrence is 
likely to fail. In contrast to conventional deterrence, nuclear deterrence in regional 
territorial disputes is not primarily directed at preventing a limited military attack to seize 
the disputed territory but to instead prevent a large-scale military attack to occupy the 
disputed territory after decisively defeating the opponent’s military forces. Generally, 
                                                 
9 Kahn, Herman: Thinking About the Unthinkable. New York: Horizon Press 1962; pp. 40-44. 
10 for details, see Tellis, Ashley J.: India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture: Between Recessed Deterrent and Ready 
Arsenal. RAND Publications 2001; p.19. 
11 Keohane, Robert O.: Neorealism and Its Critics. New York: Columbia University Press 1986. 
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nuclear weapons are designed to deter either a nuclear attack or a full-scale conventional 
attack. They prove useless, however, as a device to deter low intensity conflicts such as 
border skirmishes, as well as conflicts with sub-national actors. This conclusion is of 
particular relevance in the South Asian case. The hopes of many in India that the 
acquisition of a nuclear arsenal might deter Pakistan’s low key military action in Kashmir, 
as well as its assistance to Kashmiri rebels, soon proved to be an illusion. Due to the 
enormously destructive potential of nuclear weapons, nuclear deterrence only works on the 
national level but not on a limited regional level. As recent studies pointed out, the effect 
might even be converse to deterrence. Knowing that mutual nuclear deterrence prevents the 
outbreak of a full-scale war between two adversaries, the inferior power might be 
encouraged to take advantage of this deterrence stability by launching a limited, low key 
military attack on the regional level without risking defeat. This strategic dilemma, which is 
referred to as the ‘stability-instability paradox’12 might have been in place during the Kargil 
war of 1999. 
 
2.2.3. The Emergence of Nuclear Arms Races 
 
Generally, International Relations theory distinguishes three options which a state has to 
achieve its international goals according to its national interests and to match a perceived 
threat: (1) building alliances against the potential aggressor; (2) cooperate with the potential 
aggressor; and (3) strengthening its own military capabilities by building up arms. An arms 
race emerges when two or more states interactively decide that their international interests 
are best served by building up arms. A state’s decision to engage in an arms race is 
therefore not only determined by the state’s own national interests and power capabilities, 
but also by the perceived interests and capabilities of the adversary. According to this basic 
assumption, the states engaging in an arms race interactively respond to shifts in their 
relative power equation. 
 
The action-reaction phenomenon which constitutes an arms race is implicitly explained by 
external causes, the perception of threats from other states, for example.13 According to 
defensive Realist theory, states engaging in an arms race are motivated purely by security 
considerations. Security is exclusively gained by improving relative power capabilities. 
When both states convincingly signal the defensive nature of their respective capabilities, 
the emerging arms race might increase both states’ security.14 
 
The logic of nuclear arms races differs significantly from the logic of conventional arms 
races. The difference stems from the enormous destructiveness of nuclear weapons:  
 
                                                 
12 For details, see Krepon, Michael / Chris Gagné (eds.): The Stability-Instability Paradox: Nuclear Weapons 
and Brinkmanship in South Asia. Report No.38. Washington D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center, June 2001. 
13 Buzan, Barry: The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism. New York: Columbia University 
Press 1993. 
14 Van Evera, Stephen: Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict. Ithaca: Cornell University Press 
1999. 
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It is by virtue of that destructiveness that a quantitative increase in nuclear weapons, 
in contrast to conventional ones, does not of necessity signify a corresponding 
increase in national power. Once a nation possesses all the nuclear weapons 
necessary to destroy all the enemy targets it has chosen for destruction, taking all 
possible contingencies, such as a first strike by the enemy, into consideration, 
additional nuclear weapons will not increase that nation’s power.15 
 
Once the potential destruction of the adversary is assured by a state’s nuclear arsenal, the 
state should - at least in theory - have no further incentive to continue the nuclear arms race. 
Empirical evidence from the Cold War, in which both superpowers tried to establish 
strategic superiority despite its (theoretical) meaninglessness in terms of security and 
deterrence, disproves this logic. Reason for this deviation from what theory suggests was, 
in Morgenthau’s view, the intellectual inability of the strategic thinkers to treat nuclear 
weapons differently than conventional elements of power.  Morgenthau writes: 
 
Kissinger and others have admitted the meaninglessness of the concept of 
superiority in the conventional military sense while endeavoring to give it a new 
political meaning. Once a nation has attained the nuclear optimum in terms of 
assured destruction, so the argument runs, additional nuclear weapons can add 
significantly to its political power, if what counts in the power calculus is not only 
the actual power available, but the perception, by other nations, of the power 
available… . The argument, left at this point, is incomplete: it lacks a qualification 
centered on the people who are doing the perceiving… . For only ignorant people, 
unaware of the distinction between conventional and nuclear weapons, will attribute 
significance – military or political – to the possession of nuclear weapons in excess 
of the military optimum.16 
 
The model of the present study may provide another, yet interrelated motive for states to 
establish nuclear superiority despite its military-strategic meaninglessness: the quest for 
status and prestige. 
 
2.2.4. Opacity and Transparency in Nuclear Proliferation 
 
The two-class system of nuclear proliferators created though the NPT in 1968 limited the 
number of acknowledged nuclear weapon states to those five countries which conducted 
nuclear tests until 1964.  This forced the second-generation proliferators of the past three 
decades to develop their nuclear programs in opacity in order to avoid international 
sanctions.17 The main feature of nuclear opacity is the denial of the possession of nuclear 
weapons, while, at the same time admitting the capability to develop such sophisticated 
                                                 
15 Morgenthau, Hans J. :op.cit.; p.137. 
16 ibid; p.284. 
17 The concept of ‚opacity’ was first introduced to the theoretical debate by Benjamin Frankel (Frankel, 
Benjamin: Opaque Nuclear Proliferation. London: Frank Cass 1991). 
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weapons in a short range of time.18 The distinction between ‘possession’ and ‘capability’ is 
thereby purely political. In this light, the revelation of both India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear 
capabilities in 1998 can be described as a political act, underscored by the technical act of 
nuclear testing. 
 
The core theoretical question about opaque proliferation is how nuclear weapons can play 
their assigned role as deterrence device if their possession is denied:  
 
A deterrent capability to be effective cannot be kept secret. A certain amount of 
knowledge about it must be communicated to the adversary. If one side deploys 
additional weapons or modernizes its weapons arsenal in total secrecy, then it has 
not really upgraded the effectiveness of its deterrent force.19 
 
Opaque proliferators usually refrain from openly threatening their adversary with the use of 
nuclear weapons and do not directly engage in any debate over the costs and benefits of the 
programme. Moreover, information about the nuclear programme is distributed in a 
subliminal manner in order to benefit from the expected deterrence security, and, at the 
same time, avoid international sanctions. Accordingly, threats are formulated in a vague 
manner to leave the door open for continued denial of possession on one hand, but leaving 
no doubt about the seriousness of the situation on the other. 
 
The theoretical approach best suited to describe the nature of opaque proliferation is the 
concept of existential deterrence.20 Existential deterrence is based on the mere uncertainty 
about the adversary’s nuclear capabilities. Along this concept, the risk that any military 
action might escalate into nuclear war poses an incalculable factor for political decision-
makers, and as such, inherently creates a very strong deterrence power. In McGeorge 
Bundy’s words: 
 
These terrible and unavoidable uncertainties have great meaning for the theory of 
deterrence. They create what I will call existential deterrence. My aim in using this 
fancy adjective is to distinguish this kind of deterrence from the kind that is based 
on strategic theories or declaratory policies or even international commitments... . It 
rests on uncertainty about what could happen, not in what has been asserted.21 
 
                                                 
18 In the concept of opaque nuclear proliferants developed by Peter Feaver, the term also includes those states 
that do not have any nuclear weapons program, although they have the basic nuclear knowledge, research 
facilities and nuclear reactors to build nuclear weapons (Peter Feaver in Carranza, Mario E.: An Impossible 
Game: Stable Nuclear Deterrence after the Indian and Pakistani Tests. The Nonproliferation Review, Spring-
Summer 1999, pp. 11-24). 
19 Dougherty, James E. / Robert L. Pfaltzgraff: Contending Theories of International Relations, 3rd ed.. New 
York: HarperCollins 1990; p. 396. 
20 Bundy, McGeorge: Existecial Deterrence and its Consequences. In: MacLean, Douglas (ed.): The Security 
Gamble: Deterrence Dilemmas in the Nuclear Age. Totowa: Rowman and Allanheld 1984. 
21 ibid.; pp. 8, 9. 
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A state benefits from the deterrent effects of its mere capability to deploy nuclear weapons, 
not from the number of actually deployed devices. In this context, quantitative arguments 
become less relevant, and “its deterrent power is unaffected by most changes in the arsenals 
on both sides.”22 Nuclear asymmetry is not determined by the number of nuclear devices 
the two rivals deployed but by the perception of whether a state is considered nuclear 
capable or not by its opponent. Accordingly, the risks of preventive war diminish as soon as 
both rivals consider each other to have passed the nuclear threshold. Conversely, the risks 
of pre-emptive war, the escalating effect of a mutually feared surprise attack, emerge in a 
state of crude nuclear arsenals without credible second strike capabilities or at least 
incalculable first strike uncertainties. Generally, the logic of existential deterrence suggests 
that the overall deterrence stability between India and Pakistan was high even before the 
1998 nuclear breakthrough of both states.  
 
Another striking feature of opaque nuclear proliferation is the insulation of the nuclear 
weapons programme from conventional military command and control structures as well as 
from transparent decision-making by the political leadership. As proliferation pessimists 
suggest, this thin chain of command and control increases the dangers of ill-advised 
decision-making and unauthorized use. Contrastingly, deterrence theorists suggest the 
prevailing secrecy actually reduces the problem of ‘loose nukes.’ These theories can only 
be answered individually by a case-study approach. 
 
 
2.3. Power Politics and the Balance of Interests 
 
2.3.1. Power, Security, and Interests 
 
According to Neorealist theory, states place security maximising on top of the 
lexicographic preference system, trying to improve their security through relative power 
gains vis-à-vis their counterparts within the international anarchic self-help system.23 
Interaction between states is determined by their relative power capabilities as well as their 
mutual threat perceptions. In the case of India’s nuclear build-up, assuming security 
concerns as the only interest involved would generate more questions than answers. Why 
did India develop a nuclear weapons capable infrastructure before 1964 in the absence of 
any nuclear threat? Why did India wait 34 years before it responded to the Chinese nuclear 
threat which emerged in 1964? Why did India develop the bomb first and only thereafter 
contemplate how to deploy it and which delivery vehicles to use? Why did India accept the 
equalising effects of nuclear weapons vis-à-vis Pakistan which voided much of its 
conventional superiority? These questions cannot be answered by looking at security 
imperatives alone. Rather, a variety of other national interests determining India’s nuclear 
course must be taken into account. 
 
                                                 
22 Bundy, McGeorge: op.cit.. 1984.; p. 9. 
23 for a debate on this assumption, see: Van Evera, Stephen: Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1999. 
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To reiterate, security-related motives are considered a crucial determinant of India’s 
nuclearisation. This study departs from conventional explanatory models only with regard 
to the assumption about the absolute dominance of security in the process of national 
interest formulation. Instead, this analysis considers a range of interrelated interests at work 
with security as a primary interest. Its high position within the state’s preference system is 
not assumed a priori. 
 
Before addressing various possible factors which might determine a state’s decision to 
acquire nuclear weapons, three interrelated core concepts need to be laid down and put into 
context: national interest, national power, and national security. 
Hans J. Morgenthau defines interests as power and the international politics in which states 
try to pursue their interests as a struggle for power.  He writes, “[i]nternational politics, like 
all politics, is a struggle for power. Whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, 
power is always the immediate aim. Statesmen and peoples may ultimately seek freedom, 
security, prosperity, or power itself.”24 This abstraction solves the problem of having to 
deal with the vague, volatile, and inscrutable concept of interests which guide the foreign 
policy of states. Yet,  
 
the kind of interest determining political action in a particular period of history 
depends upon the political and cultural context within which foreign policy is 
formulated. The goals that might be pursued by nations in their foreign policy can 
run the whole gamut of objectives any nation has ever pursued or might possibly 
pursue. The same observations apply to the concept of power.25 
 
This abstraction is insufficient if, as it is assumed in the case of India’s nuclear build-up, 
the compound of several interrelated national interests is crucial for the state’s acquisition 
of certain elements of national power, such as nuclear weapons. In this case, a closer 
analysis of the major interests at stake appears worth the effort. This need further arises 
from the very special nature of nuclear weapons as an element of military and political 
power. 
 
On the distinction between military and political power, Morgenthau writes:  
 
In international politics in particular, armed strength as a threat or a potentiality is 
the most important material factor making for the political power of a nation…. . 
The actual exercise of physical violence substitutes for the psychological relation 
between two minds, which is of the essence of political power, the physical relation 
between two bodies, one of which is strong enough to dominate the other’s 
movements. It is for this reason that in the exercise of physical violence the 
                                                 
24 Morgenthau, Hans J.: op.cit.; p.29. 
25 ibid.; p.11. 
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psychological element of the political relationship is lost, and that we must 
distinguish between military and political power.26 
 
Quantitative increase of military power does usually increase a state’s political power 
proportionally. In the case of nuclear weapons, this proportional relationship does not exist. 
If a state has acquired a second strike capability and the ability to threaten its adversary 
with assured destruction, additional nuclear weapons are unlikely to increase its political 
power.27 While conventional military power is measurable in a metric scale, the measure of 
nuclear weapons power takes the form of a dichotomous scale.28 
 
Nuclear weapons as elements of power bear a further paradox: due to their destructiveness, 
these weapons are frequently described as unusable weapons. As nuclear war cannot be 
limited but always implies the total destruction of the adversary, it reduces the leverage of a 
state in its interaction with the adversary to an all-or-nothing option. If dealing with issues 
of less than existential importance, the political power of these unusable weapons decrease 
to zero. This phenomenon can be seen clearly in India’s bargaining strategy with Pakistan 
on the Kashmir issue. In the course of negotiating, India’s strategy was to keep nuclear 
weapons out, using only its superiority in conventional military power as bargaining 
leverage. 
 
 
2.3.2. Status Change and Reputation of Power 
 
According to Realist theory, the action of a state within the international balance-of-power 
system can be distinguished in two fundamental patterns: first, the state is satisfied with its 
position in the international system and seeks to preserve it, and second, the state is 
dissatisfied with its position and tries to increase its relative power internationally. To these 
two patterns of state behaviour, Morgenthau adds a third pattern, which is the acquisition of 
power for mere demonstration: 
 
All politics, domestic and international, reveals three basic patterns; that is, all 
political phenomena can be reduced to one of three basic types. A political policy 
seeks either to keep power, to increase power, or to demonstrate power. To these 
three typical patterns of politics, three typical international policies correspond. A 
nation whose foreign policy tends toward keeping power and not toward changing 
the distribution of power in its favor pursues a policy of the status quo. A nation 
whose foreign policy aims at acquiring more power than it actually has, through a 
                                                 
26 Morgenthau, Hans J.: op.cit.; p.31. 
27 As previously shown, this assumption is challenged by the proponents of the concept of strategic 
superiority, among them most prominently Henry Kissinger. 
28 As the further study will show, the dichotomy is defined between possession and non-possession of a 
second strike capability only if security and deterrence stability are considered dominant interests of the state. 
If the value of nuclear weapons is further defined by prestige or status, the dichotomy is defined between non-
possession and possession of a whatever crude nuclear device. In this case, nuclear second strike capaility 
becomes less relevant as element of political power. 
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reversal of existing power relations – whose foreign policy, in other words, seeks a 
favorable change in power status – pursues a policy of imperialism. A nation whose 
foreign policy seeks to demonstrate the power it has, either for the purpose of 
maintaining or increasing it, pursues a policy of prestige.29 
 
The state which considers its present position in the international system as optimal is 
referred to as status quo power. It does not actively increase its national power but only 
reacts to the increase of power by other states in order to re-establish the previously held 
power ratio.  
 
Conversely, a state dissatisfied with its current position within the international balance-of-
power system actively pursues an increase in its power capabilities. Morgenthau refers to 
this state behaviour as imperialism, which is defined “as a policy that aims at the overthrow 
of the status quo, at a reversal of the power relations between two or more nations.”30 While 
this study adopts the above definition, the use of the expression ‘imperialist power’ appears 
problematic in the context of the postcolonial states of South Asia and is therefore dropped. 
Instead, the term ‘dissatisfied power’ is used to describe a state which seeks international 
status change. Further, the term ‘imperialism’ is misleading because, as this study will 
show, the status change which India sought within the international nuclear order was itself 
done in the name of anti-imperialism. Morgenthau notes that the paradox of anti-
imperialism is an often used ideological tool used frequently to justify imperialist state 
behaviour: 
 
A policy of imperialism is always in need of an ideology; for, in contrast to a policy 
of the status quo, imperialism always has the burden of proof. It must prove that the 
status quo it seeks to overthrow deserves to be overthrown and that the moral 
legitimacy which in the minds of many attaches to things as they are ought to yield 
to a higher principle of morality calling for a new distribution of power... . The most 
widely practices disguise and justification of imperialism has, however, always been 
the ideology of anti-imperialism. It is so widely used because it is the most effective 
of all ideologies of imperialism.31 
 
Next to the preservation of the international balance of power and the change in the relative 
power equation, states often demonstrate power in order to enhance their prestige. The 
acquisition of national power for prestige purposes is frequently ignored in International 
Relation theory, particularly within the Neorealist realm. The emphasis within the present 
study on prestige as one major pattern of state behaviour in the international balance of 
power system is based upon the nature of nuclear weapons as particularly ‘prestigious’ 
elements of power. 
 
 
                                                 
29 Morgenthau, Hans J.: op.cit.; pp. 50,51. 
30 ibid.; p. 57. 
31 ibid.; pp. 104, 106. 
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2.3.3. Bringing Morgenthau’s ‘Policy of Prestige’ Back In 
 
As this study will show, throughout the decades-long incremental advancement of India’s 
nuclear programme, the discourse on the nuclear issue among India’s strategic elite focused 
much less upon the deterrence value than on other, more intangible values attributed to this 
weapon system. The development of adequate deployment strategies, delivery systems, and 
other components necessary to make these weapons ‘usable’ was long neglected. Even after 
India finally set up its missile programme in the 1980s, it was more characterised by well-
staged testings than by effective development of applicable delivery vehicles. According to 
the widely accepted and officially announced Indian position, this neglect was justified by 
the nature of nuclear devices as unusable, symbolic elements of political power. Inherent to 
this attributed symbolism of nuclear weapons is the conceptualisation of nuclear weapons 
as devices to demonstrate national power and less as elements of military power in the form 
of force. This conceptualisation is referred to by Hans J. Morgenthau as ‘policy of 
prestige:’ 
 
The policy of prestige has rarely been recognized in modern political literature for 
that is: the third of the basic manifestations of the struggle for power on the 
international scene. The reasons for this neglect are threefold. The policy of prestige 
shares this neglect with the subtle and intangible relationships the understanding of 
which, as we have seen, has suffered from the predominant theoretical and practical 
concern with the material aspect of power in the form of force, actual or threatened. 
Furthermore, the policy of prestige has used as one of its main vehicles the 
aristocratic forms of social intercourse practiced in the diplomatic world… . Finally, 
prestige, in contrast to the maintenance and acquisition of power, is but rarely an 
end in itself. More frequently, the policy of prestige is one of the instrumentalities 
through which the policies of the status quo and of imperialism try to achieve their 
ends. This makes it easy to conclude that the policy of prestige is not important and 
does not deserve systematic discussion.32 
 
The distinction between the pattern of demonstrating power and the two other main 
patterns, the use of power to maintain the status quo of the international system and the use 
of power to change a state’s position in the international system, is the dependence of the 
former upon the latter. Demonstrating power is hardly ever seen as an end in itself but is 
used by a state to either try to preserve the status quo, or, much more frequently, to seek a 
system change. 
 
The policy of prestige is as integral within states’ interactions as it is between individuals in 
everyday life. This view is reflected within the following statement: 
 
It is ... a necessary and important task to see to it that the mental picture other 
people form of one’s position in society at least represents faithfully the actual 
situation, if it does not excel it. This is exactly what the policy of prestige is about. 
                                                 
32 Morgenthau, Hans J.: op.cit.; p. 84. 
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Its purpose is to impress other nations with the power one’s own nation actually 
possesses, or with the power it believes, or wants the other nations to believe, it 
possesses. Two specific instrumentalities serve this purpose: diplomatic ceremonial 
in the widest meaning of the term, and the display of military force.33 
 
Within India’s discourse on nuclear weapons, neither its relationship with China nor its 
relationship with Pakistan figured prominently, despite their being the two major strategic 
targets of India’s nuclear deterrence capability. Instead, India’s nuclear debate focused on 
Indo-US relations and, above all, the international nuclear regime which was vehemently 
dismissed as discriminatory and imperialist. Using Morgenthau’s dialectics, India’s ‘desire 
for social recognition’ proved to be a ‘dynamic force determining social relations and 
creating social institutions,’ as they were now recognized as a nuclear weapons power and 
as a member of the exclusive ‘nuclear club.’ 
 
Next to diplomacy, gains in international prestige are sought mainly through 
demonstrations of military power.  Subsequently, “[s]ince military strength is the obvious 
measure of a nation’s power, its demonstration serves to impress the others with that 
nation’s power.”34 In the case of India, next to the afore mentioned occasional missile tests, 
the ultimate demonstrations of power had been the country’s nuclear tests of 1974 and 
1998.  
The policy of prestige, which values the reputation of power more than its substance, aims 
at influencing the international perception of the particular state’s power within the existing 
balance-of-power system.  The policy of prestige is explained by the following: 
 
The function the policy of prestige fulfilled for the policies of the status quo and of 
imperialism grows out of the very nature of international politics. The foreign policy 
of a nation is always the result of an estimate of the power relations as they exist 
among different nations at a certain moment of history and as they are likely to 
develop in the immediate and distant future… . It is the primary function of the 
policy of prestige to influence these evaluations… . Whatever the ultimate 
objectives of a nation’s foreign policy, its prestige – its reputation for power – is 
always an important and sometimes a decisive factor in determining success or 
failure of its foreign policy. A policy of prestige is, therefore, an indispensable 
element of a rational foreign policy.35 
 
It is important to note that the policy of prestige is not driven by mere arrogance or craving 
for recognition. Rather, it is pursued in a rational and systematic way to achieve its 
designated objective. India’s long-held disregard for aspects of military applicability, which 
was often perceived by outside observers as irrational policy, clearly followed a rational 
foreign policy. According to Morgenthau, the ultimate success of the policy of prestige is 
the actual avoidance of employing military power: 
                                                 
33 Morgenthau, Hans J.: op.cit.; p. 84. 
34 ibid.; p. 90. 
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A policy of prestige attains its very triumph when it gives the nation pursuing it 
such a reputation for power as to enable it to forgo the actual employment of the 
instrument of power. Two factors make that triumph possible: reputation for 
unchallengeable power and reputation for self-restraint in using it.36 
 
The major obstacle to the successful pursuit of the policy of prestige is the degree to which 
it is used. As India’s nuclear policy during the mid-1990s illustrates, its excessive use bears 
the risk of reversing its effects and leading to an erosion of the state’s security, or, as it was 
in the case of India, its international isolation. Such ‘overdosing’ of the policy of prestige is 
likely to occur when the political leaders’ policy making is too susceptible to public 
opinion: 
 
For a nation to pursue a policy of prestige is, however, not enough. It can do too 
much or too little in this respect, and in either case it will run the risk of failure. It 
does too much when, insecure in the awareness of its power, it invests a particular 
move with a measure of prestige out of all proportion to its actual importance... . 
Nations must take care not to confound ephemeral fluctuations of public opinion 
with the lasting foundations of a nation’s power and prestige. Prestige in a particular 
instance, then, like the power in mirrors, must be seen in the context of a nation’s 
over-all power and prestige. The greatness of the latter is reflected in the former, 
and the deficiencies of the former are compensated for by the latter.37 
 
2.3.4. The ‘Neoclassical Realist’ Approach 
 
The reintroduction of a state’s dissatisfaction with its position in the international system is 
one central motive for its arming behaviour. This insight requires a modification of the 
above outlined Neorealist explanatory model of the emergence of arms races caused by two 
security-seeking states which try to improve their security through relative power gains vis-
à-vis their counterparts within the international anarchic self-help system,38 thereby causing 
a security dilemma in which arms races emerge. Instead of the symmetric model of the 
arms race, the interaction between a dissatisfied state and its status keeping opponent is 
one-sided in the sense that the status keeper is reacting to preserve its relative power, 
whereas the dissatisfied state is actively building up arms. 
 
In an explanatory model which explicitly accepts the existence of interests other than 
security, the Neorealist exclusion of such interests appears sufficiently adaptive. The 
‘Neoclassical’ variant of Realism seeks to overcome these short falls. Within this realm of 
Realism, the equation of power-seeking and security-seeking is dropped and replaced by 
the Classical Realist concept of power-seeking as the ultimate means by which states 
pursue their national interests. 
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Neoclassical Realism gained some popularity in the post-Cold War era among those 
international relations scholars who perceive the conventional contemporary Neorealist 
variant as a step backwards.  They instead revived the classical Realist ideas that states’ 
interactions determined by the two patterns of status keeping and status change. 
Randall L. Schweller39, who refers to the term ‘revisionism’ instead of Morgenthau’s 
‘imperialism,’ defines the two main patterns of states’ interactions:  
 
[R]evisionist states seek to undermine the established order for the purpose of 
increasing their power and prestige in the system; that is, they seek to increase, not 
just to maintain, their resources.... . Revisionist powers are typically those states that 
lost the last major-power war and / or have increased their power after the 
international order was established and the benefits were allocated.40 
 
This definition provides a suitable frame for the explanatory model of the present study. 
Since 1968, when the international nuclear order established by the NPT allocated the 
benefits exclusively to five specific powers, India had significantly increased its power. In 
this context with the revisionist incentive whereby India demands a fair share of power 
within the nuclear competition, there appears to be an inevitable outcome of a rational and 
coherent foreign policy. This study uses the term ‘dissatisfied power’ as synonymous with 
Schweller's definition of the term ‘revisionist power’ and adopts Schweller’s and 
Morgenthau’s definition of ‘status quo power’ as a state trying to preserve the current 
international system to best match its national interests.41 While status quo powers are 
primarily motivated by preserving the level of security achieved through their relative 
power, the policy of dissatisfied (or ‘revisionist’) states are much less concerned with 
national security.  Schweller states: 
 
Preventing relative losses in power and prestige is sound advice for satisfied states 
that seek , above all, to keep what they have. But staying in place is not the primary 
goal of revisionist states. They want to increase their values and improve their 
position in the system. These goals cannot be achieved simply by ensuring that 
everyone else does not gain relative to them. They must gain relative to others; and 
throughout history states striving for greater relative power, often driven by prestige 
demands for their rightful ‘place at the table’ or ‘place in the sun,’ have routinely 
sacrificed their security in such a quest.42 
 
                                                 
39 Schweller, Randall L.: Deadly Imbalances. New York: Columbia University Press 1998. 
40 Schweller, Randall L. in: Feaver, Peter D.: Brother, Can You Spare a Paradigm? International Security, 
Vol. 25, No.1, Summer 2000; p.177. 
41 The distinction between satisfied and dissatisfied powers was originally introduced by E.H. Carr. (Carr, 
Edward Hallet: Grundlagen eines dauernden Friedens. Zürich: Steinberg 1943.) 
42 Schweller, Randall L.: op.cit.. 1998.; p. 21. 
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It is important to note that the incentives for dissatisfied powers to seek a chance in the 
international order are not necessarily predatory. Rather, alterations might be regarded as 
necessary to enhance a state’s defensive goals within its strategic environment.43 
Schweller replaces the structural Realist single-dimensionality, in which the state’s 
international action as security seeker is solely determined by the structure of the 
international balance-of-power system. He instead uses a two-dimensional model in which 
state behaviour is determined by both power and interests: 
 
To some readers, it may appear that the pairing between security-maximizing and 
power-maximizing is illogical, for power is a means to security and other goals; so-
called power-maximisers are really maximisers of prestige, economic wealth, and 
other values parallel to security. Further, as realists correctly point out, the logic of 
anarchy that power is the fundamental feature of international politics; it is the 
ultimate basis for any state aim, whether it seeks world mastery or simply to be left 
alone. I fully concur with the notion that power and security are often 
complementary goals; but sometimes they are not. Excessive accumulations of 
power can make a state less secure, and too much emphasis on security can weaken 
a state’s overall power. The distinction I am trying to make between power-
maximizing and security-maximizing is a traditional and commonsense one; it is the 
difference between the goal of making gains and that of avoiding losses. 
By elevating the concept of state interests to an equally prominent position as that 
occupied by the distribution of capabilities, the model more accurately reflects the 
twin-pillared of traditional realist theory – its equal focus on both the power and 
interests of states. Unlike Waltz’s theory, which is all structure and no units, the 
revised theory contains complex unit-structure interactions, such as predictions are 
codetermined by the power and interests of the units and the structures within which 
they are embedded. Because neither level is ‘ontologically primitive’, the theory 
offers a partial solution to the agent-structure problem raised by Wendt.44 
 
Schweller’s power-interest model is indeed well suited to solve some of the difficulties 
conventional international relations theories have with the integration of both structural and 
unit-level factors of state behaviour. However, Schweller fails to follow his model through 
and develop an elaborate approach to the incorporation of unit-level factors. Instead, he 
conceptualises state interests as ordinal variables in which five categories are arranged 
according to the state’s degree of satisfaction within the international system, ranging from 
‘strongly support status quo’ to ‘unlimited-aims revisionist.’45 
 
For the purpose of the present study, this concept of state interests is insufficient, as it is 
defined as an attribute rather than the characteristic of the subject. Instead, the present study 
focuses first on identifying the qualities inherent to the respective interest and only 
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44 Schweller, Randall L.: op.cit.. 1998; p. 25. 
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thereafter analyses the effect of the respective interest on the state’s satisfaction with the 
status quo.46  
The composition of the overall national interest thus determines the strength of revisionist 
or status-quo oriented incentives of state behaviour. If those interests which favour a 
change in the international system outweigh the interests satisfied by the status-quo, the 
state acts as a dissatisfied power.  
 
The model provides the frame for the proper appreciation of unit-level factors next to the 
structural factors as determinants of the state’s international behaviour. This is possible by 
dropping the single-dimensionality in which Neorealist approaches conventionally define 
national interests and instead assuming the existence of a compound of various interrelated 
and often contradicting interests which determine whether a state acts as status quo power 
or as dissatisfied power. 
 
The relevance of unit-level factors in explaining India’s nuclear course is pointed out by 
George Perkovich:  
 
The history of India’s nuclear policymaking suggests that Structural Realism points 
in the right general direction by predicting that states in an anarchical international 
structure in which major rivals possess nuclear weapons will likely seek such 
weapons for themselves. ... . To answer not only why states seek nuclear weapons 
but also when and how they will do it requires greater sensitivity to ‘unit’ or state 
preferences in time than structural theory allows.47 
 
Structural theories do not dismiss the relevance of unit-level factors in international politics 
completely but rather account these factors for several deviations in a states’ foreign policy 
formulation from those patterns which are set by the structure of the international system. 
In the Indian case, however, the continuous appearance of such deviations suggests that the 
systematic incorporation of unit-level factors is necessary in any useful explanatory model. 
In Perkovich’ words:  
 
Again, theorists such as Kenneth Waltz have acknowledged the need for state-level 
analyses to explain specific policies, but this has not prevented loose assumptions 
that the international system decisively shapes the formation of particular policies. 
To be useful, theorists and analysts must specify more accurately how key 
                                                 
46 This broader definition of interests circumvents Schweller’s problem of incorporating ideology as a state 
motive into his model. Schweller describes this problem as follows: “To the extent that ideology overrides the 
logic of structure and interests, my hypothesis will fail to accurately explain and predict national policy” 
(Schweller, Randall L.: op.cit.. 1998; p. 169.). Within this study, this problem does not materialise, as the 
particular ideological motive of a state are themselves defined as an interest, which is part of the overall 
compound of national interests determining the state’s international behaviour. 
47 Perkovich, George: India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation. Delhi: Oxford University 
Press 1999.; p. 453. 
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individuals and groups in India have identified, constructed, and followed the state’s 
‘national interest’ in nuclear policy.48 
 
Neoclassical Realist theories generally accept the supremacy of structural factors, the 
distribution of relative power for instance, over domestic factors as the main determinants 
of state action within the international system. However,  
 
[T]he impact of such power capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and complex, 
because systemic pressures must be translated through intervening variables at the 
unit level. ... . Neoclassical realists argue that relative power establishes the basic 
parameters of a country’s foreign policy; they note, in Thucydides’ formula, that 
‘the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must’. Yet they point 
out that there is no immediate or perfect transmission belt linking material 
capabilities to foreign policy behaviour.49 
 
In short, the structure of the international system sets the framework of a state’s long-term 
foreign policy, whereas unit-level variations in state behaviour can be described as 
interfering variables therein.  
 
The crucial question is thus whether the existing international system is accommodative 
towards the particular unit-level interests or whether the interests drive the state to pursue a 
policy of system change. 
The interrelation between power capabilities (structure) and state interests (agency) and 
their link to foreign policy decisions of the respective states as well as the way these states 
interact are modelled along the Balance of Interests theory:50  
 
The concept of balance of interests has a dual meaning, one at the unit level, the 
other at the systemic level. At the unit level, it refers to the costs a state is willing to 
pay to defend the status quo relative to the costs it is willing to pay to modify it. At 
the systemic level, it refers to the relative strength of status-quo and revisionist 
states.51 
 
Schweller’s approach is explicitly designed to integrate variables both at the structural and 
unit-level of analysis. In his model, structural conditions are permissive and not 
deterministic to state behaviour. Structure provides “the conditions that ‘let’ rather than 
‘make’ things happen.”52 In contrast to mostly systemic theories of International Relation, 
the Balance of Interest approach allows the combination of both unit-level variables and 
structural variables.  This is explained by the following: 
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This theoretical approach departs from the conventional international relations 
wisdom that cautions against integrating variables at different levels of analysis. ... . 
The objective ... is to break out of these strictures and develop a theoretical 
framework that recognizes ‘the necessity of both certain predisposing conditions 
and the actions of certain individuals’ – that is, the complex interrelations between 
structure and agency.53 
 
Chart 2.1.: Patterns of Balancing Interests  
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Schweller: op.cit.. 1998; p.7.  the relative power distribution among 
haviour occurs.  The stability of the 
existing international order is not primarily determined by structural factors but instead by 
the unit-level incentives of the state to seek a system change. according to Schweller,  
 
[a]t the systemic level, balance of interest theory suggests that the distribution of 
capabilities, by itself, does not determine the stability of the system. More important 
are the goals and means to which those capabilities or influence are put to use: 
whether power and influence is used to manage the system or destroy it; whether the 
means employed to further such goals threaten other states or make them feel more 
secure. In other words, the stability of the system is a function of the balance of 
revisionist and conservative forces.54 
 
Within Schweller’s approach, determining a state’s power capabilities is mainly done by 
measuring its military strength, thereby implicitly accepting the supremacy of military 
power within the national power composition. Accordingly, the main focus of the 
respective research design is laid on recording and classifying military hardware.  
 
The fact that the present study focuses upon nuclear weapons as specific elements of power 
somehow reduces the relevance of the measuring of power capabilities within the research 
design. The specific of nuclear weapon capabilities as a unique category of elements of 
power is twofold.  First, their measure is largely dichotomous (non-possession / 
possession). The second aspect is their ‘unusability,’ which implies a strong political 
connotation, next to its meaning in terms of military power. The combination of political 
and military values attributed to nuclear weapons places them outside the realm of 
conventional elements of military power. 
 
 
2.4. Foreign Policy and Domestic Government 
 
According to the concept of balance-of-interest, state behaviour in the international arena is 
determined by the pursuit of national interest (satisfied/dissatisfied power) and the state’s 
respective power capabilities. It does not, however, preclude the relevance of additional 
factors in a state’s decision to build up arms, like domestic politics. The entrance of 
domestic factors which originate from the interaction within the domestic polity causes a 
state to pursue suboptimal foreign policy choices. Foreign policy is regarded as suboptimal 
when it differs from the policy that decision-makers would “prefer if maintaining power at 
home were not a constraint.”55 
 
In the case of India’s nuclear decision making, two specific factors seem to be of particular 
relevance, and are therefore addressed separately in this section: first, the role of 
psychological dynamics leading to suboptimal policy decisions and, second, the role of 
public opinion in India’s democratic policy process. 
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2.4.1. Psychological Factors in Nuclear Policy Formulation 
 
Among the realm of psychology, Morgenthau distinguishes four basic phenomena which 
play a crucial role in the foreign policy formulation of states:  
 
When the human mind approaches reality with the purpose of taking action, of 
which the political encounter is one of the outstanding instances, it is often led 
astray by any of four common mental phenomena: residues of formerly adequate 
modes of thought and action now rendered obsolete by a new social reality; 
demonological interpretations of reality which substitute a fictitious reality – 
peopled by evil persons rather than seemingly intractable issues – for the actual one; 
refusal to come to terms with a threatening state of affairs by denying it through 
illusory verbalization; reliance upon the infinite malleability of a seemingly 
obstreperous reality.56 
 
Evidence presented in the further course of this study will reveal three different types of 
psychological phenomena which played a major role in the Indian context, each of which is 
placed in one of the above categories, the first, second, and fourth, respectively. 
 
The first phenomenon constitutes the recurring sense of India being discriminated in the 
international arena. This phenomenon stems from a more basic perception which persists 
particularly in democratic societies, that is the idea of equity. The role of equity as a main 
theme in India’s polity is noted by George Perkovich: 
 
Most polities, but especially democracies, insist on equity in their international 
relations, at least among states that they regard as their peers. This is particularly 
true of large postcolonial democracies whose purposes and internal legitimacy were 
founded on the achievement of independence and equity... .The downplaying of the 
equity dynamic in nuclear politics is doubtly ironic insofar as American foreign 
policymakers promote democracy precisely because equity is seen as a good – 
because they believe that states that achieve relative equity will be more stable and 
peace loving.57 
 
Within the Indian nuclear debate, the Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime became the 
epitome of international inequality, as it allocated power to only five specific states while 
explicitly excluding the others. Inequality is actually the rule rather than the exception 
within the international arena, and India too, defines the regional set-up of South Asia in 
unequal terms with itself as the dominant power.  However, it was the explicitness of the 
unequal design of the NPT as a political institution that caused so much resentment in 
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India’s polity. The conflicting relationship between the idea of equity and the reality of 
unequal institutions is described by Morgenthau: 
 
On the international plane it is no exaggeration to say that the very structure of 
international relations – as reflected in political institutions, diplomatic procedures, 
and legal arrangements – has tended to become at variance with, and in large 
measure irrelevant to, the reality of international politics. While the former assumes 
the ‘sovereign equality’ of all nations, the latter is dominated by an extreme 
inequality of nations… . It is this contrast and incompatibility between reality of 
international politics and the concepts, institutions, and procedures designed to 
make intelligible and control the former, which has caused, at least below the great-
power level, the unmanageability of international relations.58 
 
The perception of America’s role in moulding the unequal international structure proved to 
be most conducive to these psychological dynamics, thereby causing the second, 
interrelated mental phenomenon, which is the demonological phenomenon. This 
phenomenon was particularly dominant during the high peak of India’s nuclear debate 
between 1993 and 1996. In this time period, major sections of India’s political spectrum 
perceived India’s international interaction on the nuclear issue as a titanic struggle of the 
righteous underdog against the evil oppressor, with the latter being identified as the United 
States.  
 
This strongly distorted substitute for reality detached itself from the actual policy of the 
perceived demon. American non-involvement in the region was considered as arrogant 
ignorance of the neo-imperialist, reinforcing demands to acquire the bomb in order to 
receive the kind of attention India deserved.  At the same time, American involvement was 
similarly perceived as an act of neo-imperialism, similarly reinforcing demands to acquire 
the bomb in order to fend off American hegemonic aspirations. The distorted perception of 
reality, particularly during the mid-1990s, leads to the third major psychological 
phenomenon influencing India’s nuclear decision making which Morgenthau describes as 
the “reliance upon the infinite malleability of a seemingly obstreperous reality.”59 This 
phenomenon is the direct outcome of the generally inward looking, isolated nature of the 
policy debate within India’s polity.  
 
2.4.2. The Problem of Public Opinion 
 
Within the present study, public opinion is defined as an aggregate of individual views and 
attitudes either shared by a majority (‘general public’ or ‘mass public’), or more frequently, 
a concerned minority (‘special public’ or ‘issue audience’) among India’s population. As 
the further course of this study will show, the general public was concerned with the 
nuclear issue only in the aftermath of flashy demonstrations of power, such as nuclear or 
missile testing. Only a special public, mostly among the urban middle and upper classes, 
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had a permanent interest in the nuclear issue and its implications for the course of the 
country’s security and foreign policy. The strategic elite play the role of agents instrumental 
in the creation of public opinion in the field of nuclear policy. The strategists’ appreciation 
of the role of public opinion became apparent in their frequent calls for a ‘national 
consensus’ on the nuclear question. These calls were explicitly substantiated with the 
Lockian concept of public opinion as the standard against which government performance 
could be measured within the social contract between the state’s citizens. However, the fact 
that an involvement of the general public into the nuclear policy making process was 
mainly invoked by those strategists taking a pro-bomb position based on affective norms 
might suggest that the implicit reason for these calls were rather Machiavellian, defining 
the role of public opinion as a means to achieve power either by accommodating or 
manipulating it.  
 
In the case of democracies such as India, one of the major factors distorting the process of 
foreign policy formulation towards suboptimal outcomes is referred to by Hans J. 
Morgenthau as “the problem of public opinion:”60 “[e]specially where foreign policy is 
conducted under the conditions of democratic control, the need to marshal popular 
emotions to the support of foreign policy cannot fail to impair the rationality of foreign 
policy itself.”61 Decision makers face the problem of pursuing two fundamentally different 
interests, one being the formulation of an optimal foreign policy and the other being 
individual political self-preservation which is assured through the seeking of popular 
support. To reconcile these two interests is the main task of any democratic government. 
The government must thereby  
 
secure the approval of its own people for its foreign policies and the domestic ones 
designed to mobilize the elements of national power in support of them. That task is 
difficult because the conditions under which popular support can be obtained for a 
foreign policy are not necessarily identical with the conditions under which a 
foreign policy can be successfully pursued. As Tocqueville put it, with special 
reference to the United States: ‘Foreign politics demand scarcely any of those 
qualities which are peculiar to a democracy; they require, on the contrary, the 
perfect use of almost all those in which it is deficient.62 
 
The successful administration of foreign policy requires a certain degree of long-term 
strategic planning, the consideration of a complex array of options and conditions, as well 
as pragmatism and self-restraint. These qualities prove to be incompatible with the 
dynamics which guide public opinion: 
 
Thinking required for the successful conduct of foreign policy can be diametrically 
opposed to the rhetoric and action by which the masses and their representatives are 
likely to be moved… . The popular mind, unaware of the fine distinctions of the 
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stateman’s thinking, reasons more often than not in the simple moralistic and 
legalistic terms of absolute good and absolute evil.63 
 
Throughout India’s post-independent democratic history, a certain interrelation between 
governmental instability on one side and the likelihood of the government’s foreign policy 
decisions causing volatile sentiments in public opinion could be observed. The peak of the 
nuclear debate in India in the mid-1990 coincided with a period of highly unstable 
governments. Between 1993 and 1998, India witnessed four changes of government. Some 
analyses on this causality even go as far as to suggest that the last change in government 
after the elections of 1998 was brought about to a great extent by the populist nuclear 
policy of the victorious party. The existence of such complications generally leads to 
suboptimal outcomes of foreign policy decisions, which are often diametrically opposed to 
policies aimed at pursuing the genuine national interests. According to Morgenthau, 
 
[a] foreign policy that is passionately and overwhelmingly supported by public 
opinion cannot be assumed for that reason alone to be good foreign policy. On the 
contrary, the harmony between foreign policy and public opinion may well have 
been achieved at a price of surrendering the principles of good foreign policy to the 
unsound preferences of public opinion.64 
 
Next to the afore mentioned negative effects of public opinion on foreign policy, India’s 
post-independence history also offers evidence as to how these negative effects could be 
successfully minimised. One obvious option the government has is to influence public 
opinion rather than being influenced by it:  
 
[T]he government must realize that it is the leader and not the slave of public 
opinion; that public opinion is not a static thing to be discovered and classified by 
public-opinion polls as plants are by botanists, but that it is a dynamic, ever 
changing entity to be continuously created and recreated by informed and 
responsible leadership; that it is the historic mission of the government to assert that 
leadership lest by the demagogue who asserts it.65 
 
The second option the government has is to institutionally isolate foreign policy making 
from the direct influence of public opinion. It is one of the ironic features of India’s nuclear 
path that the BJP-led government from 1998 to 2003, which might have benefited most 
from its populist nuclear decision making, made the strongest efforts to reform India’s 
nuclear decision making structure in order to isolate it from short-lived sentiments in public 
opinion. 
 
 
 
                                                 
63 Morgenthau, Hans J.: op.cit.; p. 161. 
64 ibid.; p. 161. 
65 ibid.; p. 164. 
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2.5. Nuclear Arms and the Risk of War 
 
The scholarly debate on the effects of nuclear proliferation in the Third World in general, 
and the nuclear developments in South Asia in particular, oscillates between the two 
orthodox positions of proliferation pessimists.  This group believes that that the spread of 
nuclear weapons increases the likelihood of nuclear war, while deterrence theorists stress 
the stabilizing effects of nuclear weapons. This polarised debate is drawn from the Cold 
War experience and the U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms race and has been modified along the 
specific historical and geopolitical circumstances in which the nuclear arms build-up of the 
so called second generation proliferants takes place. 
 
The main feature of the process of nuclear proliferation in countries other than the five 
recognized nuclear powers is the opacity in which it occurs. Prior to 1998, both South 
Asian governments denied the possession of nuclear weapons while, at the same time, 
admitting the capability to develop such sophisticated weapons within a short range of 
time.66 The distinction between ‘possession’ and ‘capability’ is thereby purely political. 
Immediately after India and Pakistan conducted the nuclear tests in May 1998, both 
countries moved from their stance of denying any possession of nuclear weapons towards 
an open acknowledgement of being a nuclear weapons state. The concept of existential 
deterrence which had prevailed the strategic thinking of both countries so far was replaced 
by the strategic concept of minimum deterrence.67 This deterrence posture implies the 
deployment of “the minimum number of nuclear weapons necessary to inflict unacceptable 
damage on its adversary even after suffering a nuclear attack”68 and generally suggests a 
‘countervalue’ instead of a ‘counterforce’ doctrine. However, both states failed so far to 
outline how many weapons they actually consider as being the ‘minimum’ number of 
devices. 
 
Due to the geographic proximity and the extremely short warning times, aircraft are of little 
use as secure second-strike delivery vehicles and rather contribute to deterrence instability 
by increasing the dangers of pre-emptive strikes. Both states therefore foster the 
development of mobile land-based ballistic missiles. The Indian programme of developing 
submarines as the potentially best delivery system to secure a second-strike capability is 
decades away from completion. 
 
The war-prone common history of India and Pakistan, the ongoing dispute over territory in 
Kashmir, their long common border, and the unstable political set-up in Pakistan as well as 
the ongoing ethnic conflicts within India are several factors which, according to most 
                                                 
66 In the concept of opaque nuclear proliferants developed by Peter Feaver, this term also includes those states 
which do not have any nuclear weapons program, although having the basic nuclear knowledge, research 
facilities an nuclear reactors to build nuclear weapons (Peter Feaver in Carranza, Mario E.: An Impossible 
Game: Stable Nuclear Deterrence after the Indian and Pakistani Tests. The Nonproliferation Review, Spring-
Summer 1999, pp. 11-24). 
67 see Kampani, Gaurav: From Existential to Minimum Deterrence: Explaining India’s Decision to Test. The 
Nonproliferation Review, Fall 1998; pp. 12-24. 
68 Nicholas Wheeler in Carranza, Mario E.: op.cit.; p.14. 
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international strategic analysts, severely aggravate the risks of a nuclear exchange in the 
region. For proliferation pessimists, the development of nuclear capabilities in this unstable 
environment “poses perhaps the most probable prospect for future use of weapons of mass 
destruction, including nuclear weapons.”69 Deterrence theorists instead point to the fact that 
no major war was fought between India and Pakistan since both countries started their 
nuclear programs.70  In fact, all three wars between the two regional adversaries were 
fought prior to India’s first nuclear tests in 1974. 
 
It is noteworthy that many western scholars who acknowledged the stability of U.S.-Soviet 
nuclear deterrence deny these stabilising effects in the South Asian case, whereas many e 
South Asian strategic scholars who bitterly criticise the Cold War nuclear rivalry in best 
Nehruvian tradition now seem to be much more confident about the peaceful effects of the 
nuclear competition in South Asia.71 However, only very few advocates of deterrence 
theory go so far to suggest that nuclear weapons should be diffused to stabilise the region, 
and, on the other side, the vast majority of proliferation pessimists acknowledge the 
existence of a variety of factors other than just the quantity of atomic bombs which increase 
the danger of nuclear war. 
 
Following are the two diverging logics contrasted along five sets of arguments:72 
Quantitative arguments: The debate over the significance of quantity in nuclear 
competitions is embedded between the pessimistic ‘nth country problem’ and the rational 
choice approach of deterrence theory. 
The ‘nth country problem’ stresses the increased number of potential adversarial pairs of 
nuclear-weapon states. If only two nuclear-weapon states exist, there is only one pair of 
rival states to fight a nuclear war. With three nuclear weapon states, the number increases 
to three potential pairs, four states can form six pairs, and so forth.73 According to this 
approach, the recent increase in the number of nuclear weapon states from five to seven74 
more than doubles the pairs of potential nuclear rivalries from 10 to 21, thereby increasing 
the risks of nuclear escalation correspondingly. This outcome, however, seems doubtful as 
it ignores several important factors. First, the importance of the geo-strategic set-up must be 
considered. The emergence of India and Pakistan as nuclear powers definitely increased the 
chances of nuclear war between the pairs India-Pakistan and India-China, and the threat by 
other potential pairs such as Pakistan-UK or India-France is much less obvious. Second, the 
approach ignores the significance of asymmetries in the arsenals of nuclear competitors. 
                                                 
69 Testimony of CIA Director James Woolsey before Senate Governmental Affairs Committee on February 
24, 1993. (In: Perkovich, George: India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation. Delhi: Oxford 
University Press 2000; p.335). 
70 A controversy  among historians exists whether the Kargil Conflict of 1999 was actually a war or not. 
71 the most prominent being K. Subrahmanyam (for an overview of the debate between Nehruvian 
traditionalists and deterrence theorists see: Poulose, T.T.: Viewpoint: Indias Deterrence Doctrine: A 
Nehruvian Critique. In: The Nonproliferation Review, Fall 1998; pp.77-84). 
72 Hagerty, Devin T.: The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons from South Asia. Cambridge, Ma.: 
The MIT Press 1998. 
73 The formula being n(n-1)/2. 
74 The USA, Russia, China, UK and France plus the two self declared nuclear weapons states of India and 
Pakistan. 
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Third, the implicit paradigm that nuclear weapons of one state pose a threat to nuclear 
weapons states only is at least questionable. 
 
The diametrically opposed concept to the above outlined pessimistic logic is the approach 
developed by Bueno de Mesquita. Here, the main emphasis is laid upon correcting nuclear 
asymmetries as the major threat to stability. A strategic set-up in which all nuclear-capable 
states are deterred by their equally nuclear-capable neighbours leads to the most stable 
situation and is therefore desirable. However, the necessary conclusion that in the ideal 
scenario all states would deter each other with nuclear weapons is disturbing and is 
somehow terrifying to most analysts. 
 
In sum, no clear assumption with regard to the quantitative arguments can be made. Neither 
the oversimplified statement that ‘more nukes cause a greater risk of nuclear war’ nor the 
exclusive emphasis on nuclear symmetry seem reasonable. 
Geopolitical arguments: The main argument in this category focuses on the political 
instability which is attributed to the Third World. Several studies on relationships between 
types of government and chances of war suggest that a crisis between two democracies is 
most likely to be solved peacefully, whereas adversarial relationship between a democracy 
on one hand and an authoritarian state on the other is the most unstable.75 Proliferation 
pessimists assume that military-led states are more likely to engage in a nuclear arms build-
up with an emphasis on offensive options, thereby neglecting adequate safety systems. 
Recent empirical studies have shown, however, that in contradiction to this opinion the 
‘positive mechanisms of civilian control’76 are much less obvious. In fact, it appears that 
the democratic state usually takes the more confrontational stance in this scenario and is 
more open to the nuclear option rather than the authoritarian state.77 In this respect, the 
constellation in South Asia seems quite unfavourable. However, the empirical evidence in 
this case is weak, as a deeper analysis of the interdependence between civil-military 
relations and the course of nuclear proliferation is lacking. 
 
Deficient Command and Control Arrangements: The debate on deficient command and 
control structures among Third World proliferants emphasises two major dangers: first, the 
danger of pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons when reliable second strike capabilities are 
missing, and second, the problem of ‘loose nukes.’ The danger of pre-emptive war is 
downplayed by deterrence theorists by referring to the concept of ‘first strike uncertainty’ 
instead of ‘second strike capability.’ As in a nuclear competition among Third World 
proliferators, neither side usually has the precise knowledge of how many devices the 
adversary has and where they are deployed. The chances of launching a successful pre-
emptive first strike against the opponent’s installations then appear minimal. The logic of 
reciprocal fear of surprise attack leading to a ‘use them or lose them’ situation would not 
apply in this case.  
                                                 
75 see Müller, Harald et.al.: Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Global Order. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
1994. 
76 Scott D. Sagan in Carranza, Mario E.: op.cit., p.13. 
77 e.g. a study by the Heidelberg Institute of International Conflict Research 1998. 
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The problems of ‘loose nukes’ or the danger of nuclear accidents, weapons theft, or 
unauthorized use can hardly be denied, and pose a significant threat, especially in Third 
World countries with crude command and control arrangements. 
 
‘Undeterrable’ leaders: One argument of proliferation pessimists stresses the logic of 
deterrence as applying only to rational leaders, emphasizing immunity to this logic by 
certain ‘irrational’ leaders in the Third World. This orientalist argumentation is not 
sustained by serious research and can be dismissed in the further course of analysis. 
Preventive war imperatives: In contrast to the dangers of pre-emptive war along the logic of 
surprise attack, risks of preventive war apply to scenarios of asymmetrical nuclear 
proliferation. Nuclear capable countries might consider a preventive strike attractive in the 
period prior to the full-fledged nuclearisation of its adversary. In the case of South Asia, 
such a scenario was developed (although officially denied) by the Indian military during the 
Brasstacks crisis in 1987 but categorically rejected by the political leadership78. 
 
The effects of nuclear proliferation on the strategic set-up remain ambiguous and elusive to 
any generalization. In the case of South Asia empirical evidence suggests that the nuclear 
capabilities of India and Pakistan deterred full-scale war but obviously failed to deter minor 
skirmishes and low profile war between these two rivals along their disputed Kashmir 
border. However, any conclusion about if and how deterrence worked remains vague. As 
Hagerty pointed out, “[s]ince successful deterrence results in non-events, i.e. continued 
peace, it is logically impossible to prove that nuclear deterrence has worked in any given 
situation.”79 In contrast to this dilemma stands the unambiguous conclusion about the non-
strategic danger of ‘loose nukes’ posed especially by the crude nature of the nuclear 
arsenals among newly emerging nuclear powers. 
 
According to several studies on the relationship between arms races and war, the 
probability of war is especially high at the beginning of an arms race. Regular increases in 
military capabilities over a long period of time tend to become accepted by both states and 
do not further increase threat perceptions, thereby even becoming a stabilizing factor in the 
bilateral relationship. Empirical research has shown that almost every arms race in recent 
history resulted in war within five years, with the only exceptions being arms races related 
to the Cold War and long enduring disputes.80 
However, this explanation neglects the fact that arms races are not phenomena which 
independently exist but rather outcomes of a certain bilateral competitive interaction. Thus, 
arms races have no effect on the probability of war independent from the deeper causes of 
the bilateral rivalry from which both, the arms race and the dangers of war, arose. The 
outcome, whether war or peace, cannot  be attributed to the arms race itself but rather to the 
conditions which initially induced the states to engage in the arms race. 
                                                 
78 see Bajpai, Kanti P. et.al.: Brasstacks and beyond: Perception and Management of Crisis in South Asia. 
New Delhi: Manohar 1995. 
79 Hagerty, Devin T.: op.cit.; p.37. 
80 Sample, S.G. in Glaser, Charles L.: The Causes and Consequences of Arms Races. Annual Review of 
Political Science, Vol.3, 2000; p.264. 
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3. Model: Elite Perception, National Interests and India’s 
Nuclear Policy 
 
 
3.1. The South Asian Security Environment 
 
National interests are the independent variables and nuclear policy outcomes are the 
dependent variables of the model. Thus, the model departs from conventional explanatory 
models by not considering security seeking as monocausal variable for a state’s arming 
behaviour, but instead including a range of other independent variables, defined as national 
interests. Further, it distinguishes between nuclear weapons as specific element of power 
and other elements of power. As such, those national interests determining a state’s nuclear 
arming behaviour are not necessarily identical with those national interests determining the 
state’s acquisition of other (conventional) elements of power. As the core hypothesis, the 
structure of the international (sub-)system accounts for the basic preconditions underlying 
India’s nuclear build-up, but does not account for its immediate incentives to acquire the 
bomb.  
 
The structural incentives for India to build-up nuclear weapons are commonly explained by 
either the compulsions of the regional strategic subsystem of South Asia - dominated by 
India’s competition with Pakistan and China—or the global context, namely India’s status 
as an emerging major power. Both approaches are backed by empirical evidence, but 
neither is able to fully and comprehensively explain India’s nuclear policy. 
 
Assuming that both the global nuclear order as well as the regional strategic system matter 
for India’s nuclear policymaking, the question of interrelation arises. Is the regional 
strategic matrix a subsystem of the global nuclear order?  
According to Hans Morgenthau, the global international system is subdivided into several 
regionally confined subsystems: 
 
We have spoken thus far of the balance of power as if it were one single system 
comprehending all nations actively engaged in international politics. Closer 
observation, however, reveals that such a system is frequently composed of a 
number of subsystems that are interrelated with each other, but that maintain within 
themselves a balance of power of their own.81 
 
Morgenthau clearly defines these subsystems in geographic terms (i.e. their geographical 
proximity to the dominating system): 
 
It is not by accident that the autonomy of such local balance-of-power systems is the 
greater and their subordination to a dominant system the less noticeable, the more 
                                                 
81 Morgenthau, Hans J.: op.cit.; p.213. 
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removed they are physically from the centre of the struggle of power – the more 
they operate at the periphery of the dominant system, out of reach of the dominant 
nations.82 
 
With regard to India’s interaction with other states on the nuclear issue, this classical 
definition of balance-of-power systems appears somehow inadequate. Within the nuclear 
order, the dynamics of state interaction appear detached from compositional shifts in the 
balance of power system. In other words, the global nuclear order is less defined in terms of 
geography, but rather in terms of power, its determining element. Naturally, the ‘nuclear 
subsystem’ is still closely interrelated with the dominating balance-of-power system as 
defined in general national power terms (see Chart 3.1.)83.  
 
Chart 3.1.: The ‘Nuclear Subsystem’  
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Within this global nuclear order, India is placed into the regionally defined South Asian 
strategic subsystem, in which India is neighboured by two nuclear powers in China and 
Pakistan. The two factors that distinguish power arising from nuclear weapons as unique 
are its dichotomous character (‘possession’ / ‘non-possession’) and nature as an ‘unusable’ 
weapons power. This definition basically divides the world in nuclear ‘haves’ and nuclear 
‘have-nots’. However, the dichotomy is imperfect due to the widely accepted84 dominance 
of the USA within the group of ‘haves’. 
 
This simplistic, quasi-dichotomous nature of the ‘nuclear subsystem’ dominated India’s 
mainstream strategic thinking until 1998. India perceived its pre-bomb position as that of an 
empty-handed pushover. Within the regionally confined subsystem, the structural causes 
for India’s nuclear build-up are twofold: 1) India’s estranged relations with nuclear-armed 
China and 2) India’s antagonistic relationship with Pakistan85. 
 
With regard to Indo-Pakistani relations, a clear distinction needs to be made between the 
conventional arms race and the acquisition of nuclear weapons by both states. The main 
distinguishing factor between the conventional and the nuclear bilateral competition lies in 
their underlying impetus. In the conventional realm, Pakistan’s dissatisfaction with the 
status quo operates as the driving force while in the nuclear realm, India’s fulfils the same 
function.  
Pakistan’s revisionist goals towards territory in Kashmir have been one of the major factors 
in Indo-Pakistani antagonism since independence. Until 1965, Pakistan considered the 
existing order, in which India holds most of Kashmir, as intolerable, and it was willing risk 
much to improve it. After the war of 1965 and especially the secession of Bangladesh in 
1971, Pakistan, though still a dissatisfied power, became too weak to push its revisionist 
goals through by military means. While Pakistan’s conventional arms build-up along the 
disputed border in Kashmir and assistance to Kashmiri rebels are caused by its revisionist 
goals, nuclear proliferation is not. Nuclear weapons are considered to be of little use for 
Pakistan in the limited territorial dispute in Kashmir, as they would ravage the territory 
before it could be seized. Rather, Pakistani military planners consider nuclear devices as 
defensive weapons for deterring the superior Indian military from a large-scale (nuclear or 
conventional) attack. The main obstacle to the Pakistani nuclear programme is not strategic, 
but economic: its scarce resources are overburdened by the extreme costs of development. 
Thus, in contrast to its conventional incentives for arming, within the nuclear arms 
competition Pakistan qualifies as status-quo power. 
 
For India, the strategic value of nuclear weapons vis-à-vis its troubled relationship with 
Pakistan is doubtful. At first sight, the introduction of an overt nuclear arsenal appeared 
                                                 
84 Within the nuclear discourse among India’s strategic elite, the recurring call for India to join the ranks of 
the nuclear haves did not imply the drawing level with the USA, as its supreme position was implicitly 
recognised. 
85 Some writers add the potential threats by outside powers as a third structural cause, taking reference to the 
‚Enterprise’ incident of 1971 as historical evidence. 
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rather disadvantageous for India. It obviously neither deterred the insurgents in Kashmir 
nor their Pakistani backers. In contrast to conventional deterrence, nuclear deterrence in 
regional territorial disputes is not primarily directed at preventing a limited military attack 
to seize the disputed territory, but to deter a large-scale military attack to occupy the 
disputed territory after decisively defeating the opponent’s military forces. Due to India’s 
overwhelming superiority in conventional weaponry, the scenario of a large-scale Pakistani 
attack on India appears unrealistic. The introduction of such immensely destructive devices 
into the bilateral strategic relationship has had an equalising effect on the Indo-Pakistani 
balance-of-power, overruling much of India’s conventional superiority. 
 
In view of the limited value of nuclear weapons for India in its strategic relationship to 
Pakistan, the introduction of nuclear weapons into bilateral relations appears to be more a 
strategic by-product of India’s nuclear programme than its incentive. Throughout the four 
decades of India’s nuclear build-up, Pakistan only displayed prominently as causal factor 
over two brief periods: The first period lasted from 1980 to 1982, when efforts on India’s 
nuclear programme were intensified after rumours spread about Pakistan’s progress in the 
field. The second period commenced with the Brasstacks crisis in 1987 and lasted until the 
end of the Kashmir crisis of 1990. In this time, overstated fears among the Indian public 
about Pakistan’s looming nuclear threat were fuelled by A.Q. Khan’s, Pakistan’s leading 
nuclear scientist, blatant remarks86. While India’s nuclear build-up was not primarily 
caused by Indo-Pakistani antagonism, its consequences were nevertheless felt most 
severely within the bilateral interactions of the two South Asian states. 
 
This causality suggests that the nuclear competition between India and Pakistan is 
asymmetric in the sense that the incentives for India’s nuclear build-up were extra-regional, 
while Pakistan’s incentives were regional, stemming from the Indian threat. While the 
impetus for the regional nuclear competition was inducted from outside, it triggered an 
intra-regional action-reaction process between the two adversaries. Within the global 
nuclear arena, India acted as a dissatisfied power trying to improve its status by building up 
a nuclear weapons arsenal. Within the regional nuclear competition, Pakistan acted as a 
satisfied power, reacting to the impetus from India’s global nuclear ambitions. Thus, within 
the model India is a priori marked as the dissatisfied, and Pakistan as the satisfied power 
within the intra-regional nuclear competition. India is seen as the prime actor in 
determining the course of the South Asian nuclear arms competition. Pakistan is left with a 
secondary role of a reacting power. 
 
Determining the relevance of the ‘China factor’ as incentive for India’s nuclear build-up is 
a much more challenging task. After the Sino-Indian war in 1962 and the first Chinese 
nuclear test in 1964, most Indian strategists felt the need to balance the Chinese threat by 
equally proliferating nuclear weapons. The Indian government, however, never followed 
their suggestions and refrained from openly treading the nuclear path before 1998. The tests 
of 1998 came after a period of significant rapprochement between India and China initiated 
                                                 
86 At other occasions, like President Musharraf’s nuclear threatening in the 2001 crisis, strategic analyses 
dealt with the consequences of Indo-Pakistani nuclearisation, not with its causes.  
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by Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to Beijing in 1988, culminating in two border agreements signed in 
1993 and 1996. Furthermore, prior to the tests the Chinese government sent out strong 
signals that its strategic interests were limited to the Taiwan and the South China Sea 
issues, and that it had a strong interest in preserving the status quo at its south western 
border to India.  
In view of these realities, evidence suggests that the ‘China Factor’ might have accounted 
for India’s long-term decision to keep the nuclear option open and tacitly develop 
capabilities. Nevertheless, it fails to explain India’s shift from opaque to overt nuclear 
proliferation in 1998, as well as the particular time in which India decided to test and to 
declare itself a nuclear weapon state. 
 
Thus it can be said that while India’s conventional arms build-up is mainly driven by 
security considerations towards Pakistan and China (the exception being the acquisition of 
‘prestigious’ weapons systems like aircraft carriers), the major driving forces behind its 
nuclear weapons programme, particularly in the crucial years during the 1990s, appears to 
originate from outside the region. 
Correspondingly, the following working hypothesis applies:  
• The two strategic compulsions posed by the nuclear threats of Pakistan and China 
did influence, but not decisively determine India’s nuclear course.  
 
Those studies driven by purely structural theories of international relations would end at 
this stage, without comprehending the much more complex, unit-level incentives behind 
India’s nuclear programme. Within India’s strategic thinking, both Pakistan and China are 
not exclusively perceived as threats to its security, but also as factors in international status 
ranking. In particular, the role China plays in India’s nuclear calculus appears to be less 
defined in terms of actual security threats across its common border, but rather by China’s 
membership in the prestigious, exclusive nuclear club. Pakistan, on the other hand, is 
perceived as the main hindrance to India’s rise above the regional limits of South Asia and 
to joining the ranks of the major powers.  
 
 
3.2. Status Seeking as a National Interest 
 
According to the working hypothesis developed in the previous section, structural factors, 
defined in terms of India’s regional security environment, were permissive but not 
imperative to the development of India’s nuclear bomb. Therefore, a comprehensive 
explanation of the motives behind India’s nuclearisation must go beyond the narrow focus 
on security and further incorporate other factors determining the national interest 
composition87. 
                                                 
87 Avoiding the concept of ‘national security’, and referring to the broader defined concept of ‘national 
interests’, which includes non-security interests, is further allowed for the post-modernist criticism of the 
conventional concept of ‘national security’. Post-modernists consider this concept as a social and political 
construction, and the determination of what issues are included into the sphere of national security itself as a 
political act.  
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According to the theoretical approach outlined in section 2.1., a state’s foreign policy is 
determined by a compound of various interrelated national interests. National security is 
considered one of these interests but, in deviation from conventional explanatory models, is 
not seen on top of a lexicographic preference system per se. 
 
Due to the previous classification of the international nuclear order as a certain subsystem 
defined along its distinguishing element of power, a model can be constructed which goes 
beyond the impact of national interests on a state’s general foreign policy, thus further 
relating the existence of particular national interests to the state’s quest for very specific 
elements of power. That is to say that, while some national interests might cause a state to 
improve / maintain certain elements of power, other interests might cause a different policy 
concerning other elements of power. In the case of India, the dominant interest behind its 
acquisition of conventional weaponry is obviously that of security in general, and its 
security towards Pakistan in Kashmir in particular. In the case of nuclear weaponry as an 
isolated element of power, the dominance of security motives is questionable. Status 
seeking is therefore introduced as a second basic national interest next to security. These 
two fundamental interests, status seeking and security seeking, are closely interrelated. As 
defined in section 2.1.2.3., a state’s policy of prestige aims at pursuing the reputation of 
power (status) in contrast to security seeking and its pursuit of the substance of power. 
While the former is aimed at demonstrating (military) power, the latter aims at actually 
using it. The ultimate goal of the policy of prestige aims at avoiding the employment of 
military power. As such, status seeking and security seeking cannot be looked at separately, 
as the one is an indirect mode of the latter. Furthermore, both national interests are closely 
interrelated to further national interests downstream on the state’s preference system, such 
as welfare. 
 
Within the discourse of India’s strategic thinkers, the proper appreciation of the 
prestige/security aspects of nuclear weapons was largely prevented by the all-dominant, 
polarising debate between idealist (or: Nehruvian) and realist worldviews. The 
idealist/realist divide, however, fails to explain why Nehru, who is usually referred to as the 
mastermind of India’s idealist approach to foreign policy, actually paved the way for the 
country’s development of nuclear weapons by creating the necessary infrastructure. The 
answer to this puzzle is quite simple: no direct causality exists between the government’s 
idealist approach to foreign policy and the extent to which it is satisfied with its position in 
the international system. Throughout India’s post-independence history, all of its 
governments--‘idealists’ as well as ‘realists’--regarded India’s position within the 
international system as lower than it deserved. Although the moral high ground inherent in 
Nehru’s idealist foreign policy unquestionably prevented India’s early nuclear 
breakthrough and protracted its nuclear programme for some years or decades, it always 
considered the nuclear option as a vital instrument to ensure India’s international status. 
Among the very few Indian scholars appreciating this continuity in India’s prestige oriented 
foreign policy was Raja Menon: 
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The division of national interests into status quo powers and revisionist powers is 
too well known to merit repetition here. But it is important in one context: No 
matter how idealistic a government is it will find itself automatically in one or the 
other camp. Nehru’s idealism would not prevent New Delhi from seeing the world 
in 1947 as an unequal place with residual colonialism, ideological imperialism and 
Cold War power politics. In looking at the world and assessing its political state, the 
idealists and realists don’t disagree. They both see it as a place that needs some 
rearranging; the idealists may believe that the rearranging can be permanent, but this 
is likely to be a subjective view. Other power who would like some more 
rearranging will always be a permanent phenomenon, and in that sense, the tussle 
between the status quo and revisionist powers is the heart and essence of power 
politics... . Nuclear weapons are all about power politics, and it is most unsettling to 
any strategist to see the contortions that the Ministry of Defence (MOD) put itself 
through shortly after Pokhran II in trying to justify the tests on the basis of threats. 
The USA is today the only pole in a unipolar world with no country actually 
targeting it with nuclear weapons, but there is no talk of retaining the residual 2,500 
nuclear weapons on the basis of threats, for the threats have disappeared. The 
arsenal is now required for influence and prestige.88 
 
Mohan defines nuclear weapons less as devices aimed at enhancing the country’s security, 
and more as instruments of influence and prestige aimed at enhancing the country’s 
international status. 
In the following section, this fundamental insight about the nature of nuclear weapons is 
incorporated into a general model of India’s nuclear policymaking.  
 
 
3.3. An Explanatory Model of India’s Nuclear Policy Making 
 
By introducing unit-level variations in the preference system of states and recognizing 
preferences other than security maximization, the existing system polarity is no longer 
viewed as independent variable, but rather as dependent along two dimensions: the 
particular interests states pursue and the power required to satisfy those interests89.  
In the case of India’s nuclear course, two basic interests dominated its policy-making: 
security seeking and status seeking90. 
 
As outlined before, nuclear weapons power is measured in absolute terms, and its 
parameter value is dichotomous (possession/non-possession). This, again, departs from 
conventional explanatory models, according to which states try to improve security through 
                                                 
88 Menon, Raja: A Nuclear Strategy for India. New Delhi: Sage Publications 2000; pp. 27,28. 
89 see: Schweller, Randall L.: Neorealism’s Status-Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma? In: Frankel, Benjamin 
(ed.): Realism: Restatements and Renewal. London: Frank Cass 1996; p.99. 
90 The impact of welfare as national interest on India’s nuclear policy had some significance during the early 
years of India’s nuclear programme, when nuclear technology was considered a pivotal technology for India’s 
development.  India’s first nuclear test in 1974 was officially justified with potential applications for 
development projects. 
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gains in relative power vis-à-vis their competitors in the international system. This 
modification appears justified in view of the general consensus within the Indian nuclear 
discourse, i.e. that it is the very existence of nuclear capabilities that serve India’s interests, 
and less the actual number of employed devices.  
In Chart 3.2., the general model of Balancing Interests (as illustrated in Chart 2.1.) is 
adapted to the case of India’s nuclear build-up.  
 
Chart 3.2.: Nuclear Weapons and India’s National Interests 
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Within this model, the distinction is made between status seeking, defined as a national 
interest determining the respective state’s dissatisfaction with the international system, and 
the policy of prestige, which aims at overcoming dissatisfaction by improving status within 
the international system.  
 
While status seeking through the acquisition of nuclear weapons is the dependent variable, 
determined by the compulsions of the international nuclear order as the independent 
variables to the model, the policy of prestige is the independent variable, defined as a 
means in the pursuit of India’s national interests determining India’s quest for increased 
international status. In practical terms, however, these two meanings cannot be treated 
separately, as the policy of prestige implies both dissatisfaction with the current status as 
well as the quest for improved status. 
 
In India’s regional security environment, Pakistan and China were perceived as the two 
major challenges to India’s security. The perceived threats emanate first of all from 
conventional weaponry as an element of military power (mainly confined to the limited 
territory of Kashmir), and secondly from the existence of nuclear capabilities (mainly from 
China).  
 
In contrast to India’s perception of its regional security environment, its main motive in 
challenging the global nuclear order was less its perception of this order as a source of 
insecurity than as a source of injustice and subjugation. Accordingly, the security 
dimension of the nuclear order was less imminent, and the Indian nuclear discourse focused 
more on the national interest defined in terms of status. This focus accounts for the strong 
impact that the nuclear issue had on India’s self-perception as a dissatisfied power within 
the global system of states. It further explains why India’s nuclear programme was mainly 
aimed at displaying power, i.e. drawing on the reputation of power, and less on the 
substantive increase of real power through the actual employment of nuclear weapons and 
their integration into the country’s defence structures.  
 
From this model, the following working hypotheses can be derived: 
• India’s nuclear policy is determined by a compound of two fundamental, 
interrelated national interests: security seeking and status seeking. 
• While national security is considered one of these two major interests, it is not seen 
on top of a lexicographic preference system per se. 
• Next to the global nuclear order, the impact on India’s nuclear policy emanating 
from the structural compulsions of the regional subsystem, in which Pakistan and 
China figure as the main threats to India’s security, is only secondary. 
• Until 1998, the prime focus of India’s nuclear policy was on gains in terms of 
absolute power, the parameter value being dichotomous (possession / non-
possession). 
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3.4. Elite Perception and Nuclear Policy Making 
 
3.4.1. Who are the Elite? 
 
The model developed so far focuses on the composition of the compound of national 
interests that determine India’s nuclear course. Status seeking is thereby viewed as a 
national interest in its own right, with the policy of prestige as the foremost means to 
pursue this interest. ‘Status’ and ‘prestige’ are thereby socially constructed terms which 
only exist because the actors attribute a certain meaning to them. Within this study, the 
normative intuitions underlying the social construction of these terms are identified through 
the analysis of texts crafted by a group of opinion leaders and strategic experts, referred to 
as India’s strategic elite.  
 
The term ‘elite’ is defined as a group of persons who are acknowledged by the society as 
having a superior status with regard to their abilities and expertise in a specific field, and 
who have a strong influence derived from their superior position. At this stage, a clear 
distinction has to be made between the terms ‘elite’ and ‘ruling elite’, the former exercising 
informal influence and the latter including organisational position-holders. This distinction 
appears necessary due to the traditionally non-institutionalised and informal strategic policy 
making process in India. This peculiar feature enabled the strategic elite to decisively 
determine the country’s nuclear course outside the institutional framework (for the 
intermediary role of the ‘strategic elite’ between the government and the public in India’s 
democratic set-up, see Chart 3.3.).  
 
It is assumed, however, that the normative intuitions of the strategic elite differ neither from 
those of the organisational position-holders, nor from that of the interested public, rather 
representing a cross-section of it (that is to say that the identification of the norms on which 
the strategic elite base their perceptions of the country’s status allows for a generalisation 
with regard to similar norms existing in the country’s polity as a whole). This simplified 
assumption is challenged by scholars of subaltern studies, who emphasise the 
fundamentally different interests between the nationalist elite and the majority of the 
population. Paradoxically, the nationalist perspective of the elite, who are referred to by 
Partha Chatterjee as ‘Nationalist Bourgeoisie’91, emerged from their struggle against 
colonialism, but at the same time, absorbs many of the ideas of colonialism, including the 
concept of ‘nation’. This inconsistency becomes most apparent in the field of strategic 
policy making. The strategic elite are mostly educated in the West, adopt Western strategic 
concepts, and publish almost exclusively in English language. Their ideas of a modern 
nation and its interaction with other nations are based on Western ideas of a Westphalian 
international order. The question emerges whether the concept of ‘nation’, which after all is 
a genuinely Western idea, is shared by the majority of India’s underprivileged. Right from 
its beginning, the nuclear programme was inseparably linked by the elite to the myth of 
India as a proud and sovereign nation. This metaphoric meaning of nuclear weapons 
                                                 
91 Chatterjee, Partha: The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1993. 
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became the major symbolic attribute justifying their acquisition. Empirical evidence is not 
clear about the extent to which the general public accepts this meaning. While the nuclear 
tests of 1998 triggered a wave of nationalism which affected all classes within India’s 
society, the general interest in the nuclear issue and the normative values attached to it 
appears to be rather limited. Despite these flaws, the simplified assumption that the 
strategic elite represent a cross-section of the society at large with regard to the values and 
interests expressed, is nevertheless maintained in the model for methodological reasons92.  
 
Using this assumption, the question about the identity of the strategic elite loses much of its 
relevance, as it has little effect on the outcome of the analysis. In other words, this study 
first of all aims at determining the meaning of status and prestige in the perception of the 
strategic elite and, by inference, in that of India’s polity in general. Only to the extent 
necessary to achieve this aim, the history of certain decisions in the process of India’s 
nuclear policymaking is traced by identifying those individuals who actually participate in 
the decision-making process and the decision-making structures, including the relationship 
between organisational position-holders, the actual decision-makers, and the hierarchy 
within the structure. The existence of the strategic elite is determined a priori within the 
model. 
 
How do the strategic elite interact with the government on one side, and the interested 
public on the other? Studies on India’s nuclear policy usually accept the view that within 
Indian society, a broad consensus exists that the global nuclear status-quo before 1998 was 
unjust and neither served India’s interests nor reflected India’s growing economic and 
military power. According to Stephen P. Cohen,  
 
[m]ost Indians, especially those in the Delhi-centered strategic and political 
community, strongly believe that their country is once again destined to become a 
great state, one that matches the historical and civilisational accomplishments of the 
Indian people. This view is encountered at nearly all points along the Indian 
political spectrum. Over the years, there developed a complex linkage between the 
greatness of India and the nuclear question.93 
 
Even those sections in Indian society that strongly opposed the acquisition of nuclear 
weapons do not challenge this belief. They just disagree with the mode of how to tackle this 
injustice: instead of acquiring the bomb, they insist on a policy of global nuclear 
                                                 
92 Further criticism of this assumptionarises from the disproportional representation of high cast Hindus and 
religious minorities among the strategic elite. As Stephen P. Cohen writes: “...the aura of crisis and danger 
that surrounds nuclear weapons demands a powerful political center as well as a correspondingly powerful 
administrative mechanism to guard them and decide upon their use. This is very appealing to once-powerful 
regional elites, and the bomb lobby has a disproportionate number of high-caste Hindus, members of religious 
minorities, and others who have been dispossessed from regional politics by the emergence of mass politics. 
The bomb lobby is dominated by Indians with a common understanding of the importance of maintaining the 
political primacy of New Delhi” (Cohen, Stephen P.: Why did India ‘Go Nuclear’?. In: Thomas, Raju G. C. / 
Amit Gupta (eds.): India’s Nuclear Security. Boulder: LynneRienner 2000; p.26.) 
93 Cohen, Stephen P.: op.cit.. 2000; p. 17. 
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disarmament. The dynamics that shape public opinion and create this alleged national 
consensus on the nuclear issue are rarely analysed in depth. 
 
Generally, explanations focusing on domestic dynamics determining a state’s international 
action point to the crucial role of domestic pressure groups—military services, the military 
industries and the civilian scientists involved in the research and development of arms—on 
a state’s security decision-making process. Institutionalist explanations stress the 
emergence of military structures and institutions that develop an interest of their own, 
thereby making security policy shifts towards reconciliation and cooperation in the 
international arena more difficult. In contrast to this, electoral politics as a determinant of 
state behaviour tends to make decision making on security issues much more volatile and 
unpredictable. Another set of internal explanations of state behaviour, based upon 
psychological theories, focuses on misperceptions and risk-taking by decision-makers in 
which cognitive errors make leaders favour confrontation over expected-utility calculations. 
 
The crucial feature of India’s nuclear decision making is the democratic framework in 
which it functions. In no other country has the nuclear policy been so openly, intensely, and 
emotionally debated across the broader public than in India. These circumstances raise 
questions about the general relationship between democracy and strategic policy decisions. 
One approach to this question is laid down in the Democratic Peace Theory, which is based 
on the general assumption that the governmental form of liberal democracy leads to a more 
peaceful international behaviour. The essence of this assumption is clear and simple: 
democracies do not fight democracies. The causes of war, as well as the arming behaviour 
of a state, are thereby derived from internal dynamics, i.e. the state’s form of government. 
In the case of the South Asian nuclear confrontation, the focus is laid on the interaction of a 
democratic state (India) with its authoritarian counterpart (either Pakistan94 or China). The 
empirical evidence about defensive / offensive state behaviour in this interaction is much 
less clear than it is between two democracies. Some historical evidence even suggests that 
democracies are tempted to fight non-democratic states in order to impose democratic 
structures on them by force and improve their own security. This liberal interventionism by 
democratic states might be further fuelled by claims of moral superiority and the perceived 
righteousness / legitimacy of aggressive action. The assumption made by proliferation 
pessimists, that military-dominated regimes are more likely to engage in excessive nuclear 
build-up and develop offensive nuclear postures than civilian led governments, lacks 
empirical evidence in the case of South Asia.  
 
The present study refers to the problem of public opinion as outlined by Hans Morgenthau 
(see section 2.1.3.2.). For obvious reasons, policy makers in democracies tend to be much 
more sensitive to the dynamics of public opinion than their counterparts in authoritarian 
regimes. The appreciation of the effects of public opinion dynamics on India’s nuclear 
decision making oscillates between two poles: many among India’s opinion leaders claim 
that the public exerts a positive influence by keeping the government’s strategic policy 
                                                 
94 nuclear decision-making in Pakistan has been in the hands of the military even in the period of democratic 
rule. 
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making in check. As their argument goes, this tempering effect accounts for the very long 
period of abeyance between India’s first nuclear test in 1974, and its nuclear breakthrough 
and self-declaration as nuclear weapon state in 1998. Others point to the negative effect of 
India’s public sentiments on the government’s strategic decision making. In their view, the 
nuclear breakthrough in 1998 was caused by partisan and electoral considerations of the 
ruling BJP–led coalition. 
 
While the effect of public opinion – whether tempering or inciting – on India’s nuclear 
course is unclear at this stage, an unambiguous assumption can be made about its positive 
effect on India’s policy of prestige. India’s public opinion on the nuclear issue reacted to 
the inequalities of the existing nuclear order by reasoning “in the simple moralistic and 
legalistic terms of absolute good and absolute evil”95. Based on this assumption, the 
following working hypothesis can be added to the above: 
• The conditions under which the Indian government tried to obtain public support 
strongly favoured the pursuit of a policy of prestige. 
In other words, the fact that India’s approach to nuclear weapons was less driven by 
security considerations and more by considerations of prestige and international standing 
was caused, to a certain extent, by the strong impact of emotionalised public opinion on the 
Indian government’s strategic decision making process. 
 
The impact of public opinion on strategic decision making is indirect and, as Morgenthau 
pointed out, not a one-way route. Within the Indian context, the interplay between 
government decisions and public opinion dynamics are affected by a set of particular 
conditions.  
First of all, strategic decisions were often made by India’s Prime Minister in a personalised, 
ad hoc way, detached from clear institutional procedures as well as systematic input from 
experts. 
Secondly, India’s polity is generally inward looking, and foreign policy issues (with the 
exception of Indo-Pakistani antagonism) receive little attention. Due to this phenomenon, 
public opinion on issues of foreign policy, above all the on the nuclear issue, proved to be 
highly volatile and affective. 
Thirdly, the organizational position-holders among India’s policy making elite traditionally 
adopted a passive position on the nuclear issue, usually protracting decisions until external 
pressures necessitated a particular course. 
 
These three basic conditions – lack of institutions, volatility of public opinion, passivity of 
decision-makers – created a space for the country’s strategic elite to set the parameters for 
India’s strategic course. Such strategic thinkers are identified as the key group that 
managed to monopolise the debate on the nuclear issue as part of the larger security 
discourse in India. This process of monopolising security policy is thereby not an 
idiosyncratic one, but follows a general pattern of discourse dynamics: 
 
                                                 
95 Morgenthau, Hans J.: op.cit.; p. 161. 
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Security becomes a performative act, through which an influential group acquires 
the monopoly of security discourse. These approaches therefore focus on who is 
speaking on security and how they acquired the right to do so... . It is certainly 
interesting to discover who creates the security object and how it is created, but we 
cannot ignore the fact that these actors must explain these threats and that their 
reaction to the threats must be justified to their political community... . (T)hose who 
acquire the monopoly are perceived as legitimate spokespeople able to identify the 
threat. It is not their capacity to identify the threat that has enabled them to hoist 
themselves to the rank of spokepeople, but their authority. The threat is therefore 
invented and the process is pure manipulation... . (I)nternational relations also take 
place within a domestic public sphere, where explanations are necessary... . 
Therefore, it appears that though one must acknowledge the role played by elites in 
shaping the security agenda as well as the competition involved in this process, we 
must also accept that if this process is successful it is because the discourse echoes 
values that are important to certain groups in that society. Actors themselves think 
in terms of values and goods and these motivate their actions.96 
 
The strategic elite, which is able to monopolise the security discourse, hold an element of 
power which, in a Habermasian definition, comprises both the ‘communicative power’, 
arising from the successful process of deliberation within the public sphere, as well as the 
‘administrative power’, associated with the functions and institutions of the state97. 
Correspondingly, they were able to determine the government’s policy in two ways: first, 
through directly advising India’s policy makers, and secondly, by guiding public opinion 
and generating public pressures on the government.  
 
Chart 3.3.: The Role of India’s Strategic Elite 
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96 Marcel, Valerie: The Constructivist Debate: Bringing Hermeneutics (Properly) In. Paper presented at the 
2001 ISA conference, 21. February 2001; p. 11. 
97 see: Habermas, Jürgen: Between Facts and Norms: Contribution to a Discourse Theory of Law and 
Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996. 
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Throughout the history of India’s nuclear programme, the advisory role of strategic experts 
to the Prime Minister was based mainly on a personal relationship. In 1998, the BJP 
government started a process of institutionalising the government’s access to strategic 
expertise by creating the National Advisory Board, to which several eminent members of 
the strategic elite became members. 
 
Beyond this direct influence of the strategists on the government’s decision-making, their 
most effective instrument of power marks their ‘communicative power’, i.e. their 
supremacy over public opinion—mainly exercised through intensive publishing in India’s 
dailies. 
Among these opinion leaders, three main groups are distinguished: the military-strategists, 
the politico-strategists, and the scientific-strategists. 
 
 
3.4.2. The Military-strategists  
 
Since Nehruvian times, India’s military remained largely excluded from strategic decision 
making. The reason for this traditional exclusion was the civilian leadership’s suspicion of 
political ambitions within the military leadership. Many among India’s policy elite account 
the exclusion of the military for India’s success in maintaining its democratic stability, a 
feat rare among post-colonial states. The rigor in which this taboo was guarded by the 
political class also had the negative effect of excluding the expertise of active military 
servicemen from the country’s overall strategic decision making. This deficiency was 
particularly felt within India’s nuclear policy decisions, which often lacked a clear 
understanding about deterrence postures and employment doctrines. This problem was of 
particular concern for many outside analysts:  
 
Worrisome however, is a tradition of near-total exclusion of the military from 
nuclear planning. Indeed, failure to institutionalize effective service participation in 
all aspects of the nuclear doctrine could ultimately place the deterrent credibility of 
the arsenal at serious risk.98 
 
After the nuclear tests of 1998, the Indian government acknowledged this shortcoming, and 
in the course of the institutional reforms of 1999 it created the Strategic Policy Group, 
which included all three service chiefs. The main task of this body was to assist the 
National Security Council in developing strategic doctrines and deployment postures. Until 
the present day, however, India’s military leadership has restrained itself from interference 
in policy making, avoiding for the most part even writing opinion articles or analyses in 
India’s dailies. 
 
                                                 
98 Gizewski, Peter: Indian Nuclear Doctrine: A Critical Assessment of the Proposal for a Minimum Nuclear 
Deterrent. The International Security Research and Outreach Programme, Government of Canada 1999; p.9. 
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The exclusion of active service members from the political arena has created space for a 
large community of retired military personnel entering the epistemic community. Several 
think tanks staffed by retired officers have emerged, most prominently among them the 
Delhi-based Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA). General K. Sundarji (1928 
– 1999), India’s Chief of Army Staff from 1986 to 1988, was the single most influential 
individual within this section of India’s strategic elite and significantly contributed to 
India’s nuclear course throughout the crucial years of the 1990s. 
 
Other than one might expect, the retired military officers generally took a more diffident 
stance on India’s nuclear build-up than those experts with either political or scientific 
backgrounds. This relatively restrained position on the bomb had two major causes: the first 
cause was the fear that the funds allocated to the nuclear programme might cause a budget 
cut in the procurement of conventional weaponry. The second reason involved recognition 
of the limited strategic value of nuclear weapons with regard to Pakistan.  This is associated 
with the military’s lower estimation of the symbolic value of nuclear weapons in terms of 
the country’s international status and prestige.  
 
3.4.3. The Politico-strategists 
 
The politico-strategist group within India’s strategic elite is quite heterogeneous, comprised 
of journalists, political scientists, political activists, independent intellectuals, members of 
NGO’s and various associations, and active and retired politicians and diplomats. As would 
be expected of such heterogeneousness, the opinions expressed by this group cover the 
entire political spectrum, ranging from dogmatic pacifism to militarist-imperialist 
ideologies. 
 
Despite this diversity in opinion, two basic features are worth noting: first, more than the 
two other groups within the strategic elite, the politico-strategists’ opinions reflected the 
zeitgeist. Politico-strategists tend to adapt their views to the government’s official position. 
While Indira’s decision to test in 1974 found widespread approval among political opinion 
leaders, the anti-nuclear stance of Morarji Desai was equally supported by the same group 
only a few years later. Similarly, I.K. Gujral’s doctrine of regional reconciliation found as 
much support as the BJP’s pro-bomb policy shortly thereafter. This phenomenon, which 
might be viewed as opportunism, is often justified by these strategists with the alleged need 
to create a national consensus behind the government’s position for the common good of 
the country.  
 
The second basic feature of this group’s position is its shared understanding of India’s 
inappropriately low international status. Even the anti-nuclear activists largely accept this 
view, disagreeing only about the appropriate means for improving India’s status. Thus, it 
can be said that while India’s dissatisfaction with its position within the international 
system was unanimously felt by all sections of India’s political elite, the potential of 
nuclear weapons as an antidote—by increasing the country’s international status via the 
national policy of prestige—was controversially debated.  
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3.4.4. The Scientific-strategists 
 
Throughout the history of India’s nuclear programme, the leaders of its nuclear 
establishment did not, as with many of their foreign counterparts, hide behind professional 
discretion and secrecy, but actively sought a place in the limelight. Most of the heads of 
India’s Atomic Energy Commission, from Homi Bhabha to Abdul Kalam, were quite 
successful in attaining national hero status as well surrounding themselves with an aura of 
genius.  
These motives account for the predilection the nuclear scientists acquired for displaying 
nuclear power, thereby often neglecting the most efficient measures military application 
development. 
 
The outstanding position of nuclear scientists in India’s society, and the consequences of 
this exhibitionist phenomenon for the course of India’s nuclear programme, has two major 
implications for the further course of this study. 
First of all, it proves Morgenthau’s basic assumption about the policy of prestige being “as 
intrinsic an element of the relations between nations as the desire for prestige is of the 
relations between individuals”99.  
 
Here again it becomes obvious that international and domestic politics are but 
different manifestations of one and the same social fact. In both spheres, the desire 
for social recognition is a potent dynamic force determining social relations and 
creating social institutions. The individual seeks confirmation, on the part of his 
fellows, of the evaluation he puts upon himself. It is only in the tribute others pay to 
his goodness, intelligence, and power that he becomes fully aware of, and can fully 
enjoy, what he deems to be his superior qualities.100 
 
Secondly, it shows the interrelation between the quest for individual (national) reputation 
(prestige) as well as more critical interests, such as security (self-preservation): 
 
It is only through his reputation for excellence that he can gain the measure of 
security, wealth, and power he regards to be his due. Thus, in the struggle for 
existence and power – which is, as it were, the raw material of the social world – 
what others think about us is as important as what we actually are. The image in the 
mirror of our fellows’ minds (that is, our prestige), rather than the original, of which 
the image in the mirror may be but the distorted reflection, determines what we are 
as members of society.101 
 
                                                 
99  Morgenthau, Hans J.: op.cit.; p.84. 
100 ibid. 
101 ibid. 
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India’s nuclear scientists were well aware that neither the rather marginal role of nuclear 
power production for India’s development102 , nor the controversial contribution of nuclear 
weapons to the country’s security could, in themselves, justify the enormous budget 
allocations to the nuclear programme. As such, the projection of the symbolist meaning of 
nuclear technology, preferably through the display of power, was considered an intrinsic 
part of the scientists’ work. In Morgenthau’s terminology: The image of the nuclear 
programme in India’s public was more important to the scientific community in their 
struggle for existence than its actual contribution to the country’s development and 
security.  
 
Since independence, when Homi Bhabha, the founder of India’s nuclear programme, 
became one of Jawaharlal Nehru’s key advisors, the nuclear establishment meaningfully 
contributed to India’s strategic policy making. The scientists enjoyed enough public 
confidence not only to develop nuclear devices but also to contribute to the development of 
the corresponding nuclear military strategy as well as the broader nuclear policy of the 
country. This, again, is a unique feature of India’s nuclear course. 
 
Due to the nuclear scientific establishment’s efforts to direct public opinion on the nuclear 
issue, its representatives continuously published opinion articles and analyses in India’s 
dailies. This section of India’s epistemic community, referred to as the scientific-strategists, 
generally proved to be the most uncompromising and determined proponents of India’s 
nuclear build-up  (compared to the two other sections of India’s strategic elite). Unlike the 
politico-strategists, the scientific-strategist did not view the discriminatory international 
nuclear regime in reference to India’s security needs, but as an unfair attempt to curb 
India’s scientific genius.  
 
 
3.5. Psychology and Strategic Policy Making 
 
The socially constructed values allocated to the policy of prestige and status seeking play a 
dominant role in India’s nuclear policy making. Status and prestige are thereby defined not 
in absolute but in relative terms. The essence of the policy of prestige is to influence the 
impression other nations have from the power of one’s own nation. Within the Indian 
discourse, the reputation inherent to nuclear weapons power was considered the most 
effective instrument to gain international prestige. 
 
This approach raises three main questions: what made the nuclear issue so compelling for 
India’s struggle for international recognition? Why were Western nations, and particularly 
the USA, the main addressees of India’s policy of prestige? And finally, why were the 
negotiations with the international non-proliferation regimes the main platform for this 
struggle?  
 
                                                 
102 In 2001, only 3,7% of India’s total power production was generated by nuclear power plants. (source: 
IAEA Country Nuclear Power Profiles: India. 2004). 
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In order to tackle these questions, a supplemental concept to prestige and status needs to be 
introduced: the role of perceived equity in international relations. Similar to prestige and 
status, equity is a socially constructed concept. In the normative context of India’s post-
colonial, multi-ethnic society, the idea of equity is reflected in the omnipresent sense of 
being discriminated by neo-colonialist powers in an unjust world system. Along these 
perceived emotions, the nuclear non-proliferation regime epitomised the unjust world 
system, and the USA epitomised the neo-colonialist powers dominating it. The power of 
these emotions proved to be the decisive cognitive bias determining India’s nuclear policy 
making. 
 
The central academic appreciation of this cognitive bias within the framework of the 
Realist Theory of International Relations was introduced by Robert Jervis103. Jervis stated 
that  
 
it is often impossible to explain crucial decisions and policies without reference to 
the decision makers’ beliefs about the world and their images of others. That is to 
say, these cognitions are part of the proximate cause of the relevant behaviour and 
other levels of analysis cannot immediately tell us what they will be. And even if we 
found that people in the same situation... behave in the same way, it is useful to 
examine decision-making if there are constant differences between the decision-
makers’ perception and reality.104 
 
The dominating role of the equity norm in India’s perception of the international system, 
particularly on the global nuclear order, further created several attendant, strongly 
interrelated psychological effects on the way India interacted with other states. Among 
these, five major effects are outlined, following Robert Jervis’ explanatory model: 
 
Source-message interaction 
A negative attitude towards specific countries caused India to perceive their respective 
policies with similar bias. For instance, when American foreign policy, which had been 
largely disinterested in South Asian affairs during much of the first four decades of India’s 
independence, proclaimed the South Asian region as one of its foci under President 
Clinton’s administration in the early to mid-1990s, India’s perception did not alter 
immediately. Both America’s ignorance as well as its involvement were perceived as acts 
of neo-colonialism. The negative attitude towards America’s involvement (in the early and 
mid-1990s) was caused less by its substance, but by the simple fact that it was American.  
 
Cognitive-affective balance 
A further feature is the tendency to perceive ‘the West’ as one bloc lead by America, 
thereby failing to detect deviations that do not fit into this pattern.  This is true particularly 
                                                 
103 Jervis, Robert: Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press 1976. 
104 ibid.; pp. 28, 29. 
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with regard to the vast majority of Western countries, which neither own nuclear weapons 
nor attribute values of prestige and status to them. 
 
Perceptual defence 
The negative affective judgement of Western, or American, actions and intentions by 
India’s elite has proved to be remarkably persistent over time. Psychologically, this 
phenomenon is explained by the persistence of stereotyped images. Actors do not easily 
adapt their stereotyped perception to reality but, on the contrary, tend to adjust real facts to 
their perceptions. “Our stereotyped world is not necessarily the world we should like it to 
be. It is simply the kind of world we expect it to be”105. The persistency of pre-existing 
beliefs largely detached India’s nuclear policy making from short-term policy changes by 
outside powers.  
 
Irrational cognitive consistency 
Once the mainstream discourse on nuclear weapons within India’s polity shifted towards 
affirmation in the mid-1990s, the value of these weapons was attributed to several, logically 
unrelated issues. In other words, those favouring nuclear weapons for reasons of status 
seeking also acknowledged their deterrence value against China and Pakistan, not to 
mention their benefit for civilian applications. Balanced positions, in which some values are 
affirmed while others are rejected, are the exception. This phenomenon is referred to by 
Jervis as ‘irrational cognitive consistency’:  
 
[P]eople who favour a policy usually believe that it is supported by many logically 
independent reasons. When a person believes that a policy contributes to one value, 
he is likely to believe that it also contributes to several other values, even though 
there is no reason why the world should be constructed in such a neat and helpful 
manner.106 
 
Cognitive dissonance 
The nuclear weapons issue was debated in India longer and more intensely than in any 
other nuclear weapons state. Once the consensus in favour of the bomb was reached in the 
1990s, this affirmative position was defended more vigorously, and defectors were more 
categorically denied than one might expect considering the decade long period of doubt and 
uncertainty. The shrill and uncompromising call for the bomb in the 1990s was an act of 
reassuring oneself about the consistency of one’s decision. Jervis refers to this phenomenon 
as ‘cognitive dissonance’: 
 
The central contribution of the theory of cognitive dissonance is the argument that 
people seek to justify their own behaviour – to reassure themselves that they have 
made the best possible use of all the information they had or should have had, to 
believe that they have not used their resources foolishly, to see that their actions are 
commendable and consistent... In constructing defensible postures to support their 
                                                 
105 Walter Lipman cited in Jervis, Robert: op.cit.; p. 372. 
106 Jervis, Robert: op.cit.; p. 128. 
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self-images, people must often rearrange their perceptions, evaluations, and 
opinions. To see that their decisions were correct may involve increasing the value 
they place on what they have achieved and devaluing what they sacrificed. By 
spreading apart the earlier alternatives and heavily weighting sunk costs, inertia and 
incrementalism are encouraged. Each step in the process of developing a policy 
adds psychological pressures to take further steps.107 
 
The uncompromising stand for the bomb and the repudiation of any doubts was frequently 
backed by the argument that India had already invested too many financial resources and 
resisted too many international pressures to step back from the threshold and not go 
nuclear. 
 
Underweighting the probability of failure 
The perception of equity was further dominant in the psychological phenomenon of 
underweighting the probability of failure108, i.e. assessing the risks of nuclear escalation as 
minimal or non-existent. The nuclear confrontation in South Asia, as the underlying logic 
goes, is as stable as the Cold War nuclear deterrence situation. This logic allowed India’s 
nuclear apologists to reject critical nuclear risk assessments as acts of orientalism.  
 
 
3.6. Related Explanatory Concepts to India’s Rise as a Nuclear Power 
 
3.6.1. India as an Emerging Power 
 
In recent years, a number of studies in this field describe India’s new politically and 
militarily self-confident international action by referring to it as emerging power109. 
Thereby, the general understanding of the concept ‘emerging power’ is closely related to 
that of the ‘dissatisfied power’ used in this study. The distinction between these two 
approaches lies within the direction of its explanatory aim: while studies on emerging 
powers focus more on the status a respective state tries to achieve, the ‘dissatisfied power’ 
approach focuses on the hitherto suboptimal status which the respective state wishes to 
surmount. In practical terms, the approaches represent two sides of the same coin. A further 
distinguishing characteristic is the divergence in the underlying methodologies, as the 
appreciation of the ‘emerging powers’ phenomenon remains mostly descriptive. 
 
According to Stephen P. Cohen, the way in which the rank of a particular state within the 
international system is determined shows some similarities to the distinction between the 
reputation and substance of power: 
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There are at least three ways to determine India’s position in the hierarchy of states. 
One is to examine the present judgements of other states, as well as of Indians, in 
order to assess India’s reputation as a great power. A second is to look at India’s 
material strengths and weaknesses. Third, one can attempt a ‘class’ analysis, to 
determine its rank among other states.110 
 
Cohen’s definition of ‘reputational power’ as a determinant of the international hierarchy 
remains vague: “For the past several decades, India has had a weak or at least highly 
variable reputation, as judged by the ability to influence without attempting to exercise 
influence. Such influence flows naturally and silently; it is what Joseph S. Nye Jr. has 
termed ‘soft power’.”111 Similar to the model of the present study, Cohen points out the role 
nuclear devices played in India’s quest for international status and prestige as well as its 
interrelation with the country’s security: 
 
The 1998 tests increased India’s prestige and status, thus indirectly improving its net 
security. India will always be seen as a ‘nuclear weapons state’, an accomplishment 
more politically significant than technically impressive. How long the reputational 
spin-off from the nuclear tests will last is hard to tell, but if the Indian government 
can avoid any crisis that demonstrates how weak and superficial its nuclear 
capabilities really are, and if it can use its nuclear status as a way of leveraging a 
seat on various arms control fora, then the decision will prove to have been a correct 
one from the perspective of helping to elevate India to the rank of major power.112 
 
This explanation of the motives and goals behind India’s nuclear course remains 
unsatisfactory. First of all, Cohen suggests that the increase in prestige and status through 
nuclear weapons automatically causes an increase in the country’s security without offering 
any coherent explanation about the causal link between these two aspects.  
 
Furthermore, Cohen’s claim that the leveraging of seats on arms control fora was one major 
motive of India’s nuclear build-up is not convincing. The idea that India’s considerable 
efforts to build the bomb had been motivated by its desire to become a member of those 
fora that discuss the abolition of these weapons appears far-fetched even if, as Cohen 
suggests, the membership in such fora is a prerequisite for the country to elevate to the 
ranks of the major powers. 
 
In sum, Stephen Cohen’s account of India as an emerging power gives many historic 
insights into this oft discussed phenomenon. However, he fails to overcome the general 
weakness inherent to most accounts on this phenomenon: he considers the quest for 
increased status within the international order as an intrinsic part of state behaviour, thereby 
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failing to give a more analytic and profound assessment of the motives and dynamics 
behind the state’s status seeking.  
 
3.6.2. The Concept of India’s Strategic Culture 
 
Similarly to the balance-of-interests approach applied in the present study, the concept of 
strategic culture aims at linking balance-of-power theory with unit-level explanations of 
domestic politics and foreign policy formulation113. In his study on India’s strategic culture, 
Rajesh M. Basrur restricts the definition of strategic culture to “a specific congruence of 
factors: historical context, technological capability, the availability of economic resources 
and, above all, ethical norms relating to nuclear weapons”114 The weakness of Basrur’s 
model is the attempt to integrate unit-level variations of strategic culture into the structural 
realist approach, which posits that the structure of the international system—in which states 
act as security-maximisers—determines the acquisition of a state’s power and level of 
security. Basrur attempts to solve this contradiction by claiming that “in Neorealism, 
structure only induces broad outcomes, leaving room for variation in specific choices 
within a range of possibilities. Thus, while structure impels states toward maintaining 
armed forces for security, it does not dictate specific choices about the quantity and quality 
of forces”115 This explanation, however, undermines the structural nature of neorealist 
theory.  
 
Strategic culture, as an intermediate variable between the structure of the international 
system and the unit-level conditions, determines a state’s preference for certain foreign 
policy options:  
 
Viewed as a set of structured preferences, strategic culture at one level entails 
fundamental understandings about the nature of the strategic environment, the role 
of force in that environment, perceptions of threat and the framing of responses. At 
another level, it involves preferences relating to the organization of those responses 
in terms of the quality and quantity of military forces considered necessary in order 
to meet national objectives.116 
 
According to Basrur, strategic culture is composed by the level of perception, the 
operational level, and the structural frame. The first level deals mainly with a state’s 
perception of its relations towards its neighbours and the role nuclear weapons should play. 
The operational level deals with a state’s preferences about how nuclear weapons realize 
their assigned goals with regards to size, deployment and technical characteristics. The 
structural frame consists of a state’s response to deterioration in its strategic environment, 
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its tolerance of ambiguity, and its disposition toward formal and informal negotiation 
preferences.  
 
In sum, the concept ‘strategic culture,’ acting as an intermediate variable between structure 
and agency, provides the analytic frame to explain some of the particularities of India’s 
nuclear course. However, its major weakness is its all-embracing definition, which leads to 
somewhat fuzzy, arbitrary outcomes. 
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4. Methodological Aspects 
 
 
4.1. The Unit of Analysis  
 
According to the model, a limited group of opinion leaders referred to as India’s strategic 
elite, decisively determined India’s nuclear course. These strategic elite acted as 
intermediary between the political office-holders on one side and the interested public on 
the other side. The most significant means by which the strategic elite exercises its 
influence on both the public and the government is through extensive publishing in India’s 
print media, primarily in English-written daily and weekly newspapers and journals. 
 
India’s news and press media has traditionally shown a remarkable degree of autonomy 
from governmental influence throughout its more than one century-long history. The major 
English-language newspapers, in particular, maintained their independence from 
governmental influence through backing by large non-governmental business companies. In 
post-independence India, the only structural factor challenging this autonomy was the 
major newspapers’ strong dependency upon government advertising, which allowed the 
government to exercise some form of indirect control over the newspapers’ content. This 
dependency decreased sharply in the course of the liberalisation process initiated in 1991. 
India’s constitution guarantees a high measure of freedom for the press. Since 
independence, these legal norms were suspended only during the Emergency from 1975 to 
1977. 
 
The total circulation of newspapers in India amounts to 142 million copies per day.117 
Among these, a relative majority of 61 million copies are published in Hindi, followed by 
26 million English-language copies. Altogether, India’s newspapers are published in as 
many as 101 languages.118 While the indigenous language newspapers generally have a 
rather local or regional outlook, the English-written newspapers focus on national and 
international issues. Additionally, the English-language press has a widespread appeal 
among India’s upper and middle class, and its readership is mainly concentrated in the 
country’s metropolitan areas. 
 
The readership profile of the English-language press largely coincides with those sections 
among India’s public in which the discourse on India’s nuclear build-up is largely taking 
place. This fact explains why the strategic elite choose these newspapers as their preferred 
fora to express their views on the subject. In this context, the exclusion of indigenous 
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language newspapers from the present study appears justified, and the exclusive focus upon 
English-language newspapers does not invalidate the findings. 
 
The sample is limited to articles from India’s four major English language daily 
newspapers: The Times of India, The Hindustan Times, The Hindu, and The Indian Express. 
For reasons of fairness and balance, the sample is further supplemented by articles from the 
smaller newspaper, The Statesman.  
 
Among the best-selling English language newspapers worldwide, The Times of India ranks 
fourth, selling around 2.1 million copies per day: a figure topped only by three British 
tabloids.119  India’s second largest English language newspaper, ranking 6th worldwide, is 
The Hindustan Times with 1.8 million copies, followed by The Hindu with 0.8 million 
copies and The Indian Express with approximately 0.6 million copies.120 The circulation of 
The Statesman is comparably low at 180,000 copies121 per day.  
 
The five newspapers represent India’s four major metropolitan areas with The Times of 
India and The Hindustan Times based in Delhi, The Indian Express based in Mumbai, The 
Hindu originating from Chennai, and finally The Statesman as Bengal’s largest English 
written daily with its base in Kolkata.  
 
For the collection of the articles, the following guidelines apply: 
• The data collection has been limited to those articles in which the author expresses 
and evaluates a clear string of arguments concerning the acquisition or maintenance 
of nuclear weapons by India. Simple reports on events in the nuclear field are 
excluded. 
• The articles were generally taken from the following rubrics: ‘Front Page,’ 
‘International’ or ‘World,’ ‘Opinion,’ ‘Editorials,’ ‘Analysis,’ ‘Column,’ and 
‘Perspective.’ Exceptionally, interviews and book reviews are included only if the 
interviewer / reviewer expresses his own view on the topic. 
• Only those articles are included which have a primary focus on a nuclear related 
topic. This limitation is of particular relevance with regard to Indo-Pakistani 
relations. The extensive number of articles addressing the Kashmir issue in general 
without focusing on its nuclear dimension is excluded from this study.  
 
The random sample of articles includes 705 entries which allows for a rudimentary 
quantitative analysis (as it is done in Chapter 5) and the testing of hypotheses on some 
major trends within opinion within the elite on India’s nuclear course. Beyond these 
quantitative methods, the main analysis is done by applying the method of interpretive 
content analysis. 
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4.2. The Period of Analysis 
 
Strategic analysts applying conventional concepts to explain the course of India’s nuclear 
build-up usually consider the early 1960s as the decisive time when the dynamics of India’s 
quest for the bomb were initiated. Along this view, the 1962 war with China and the first 
Chinese nuclear test in 1964 were the two key events determining India’s path towards 
nuclearisation. In retrospect, this approach lacks empirical evidence, as neither the 
development of its nuclear infrastructure, which was already set up before these events, nor 
India’s determination to go nuclear appear to have been particularly pushed forward in the 
immediate aftermath of these events. Rather, the nuclear question remained (politically, less 
technologically) unanswered for at least the two decades to come. 
 
Alternatively, the present study focuses on the crucial years in which India made its 
irreversible decision to go openly nuclear. As the study will show, this decision was only 
seemingly made in May 1998 after the nuclear testing. More likely, the events of 1998 were 
the final act of a decision making process which had commenced at least a decade earlier. 
The period of analysis of this study comprising these crucial years of India’s nuclear 
programme begins with the presumed completion of India’s first crude nuclear device in 
1986, which coincided with the initiation of an intense debate among India’s strategists 
about the security implications of nuclear weapons in the wake of the Brasstacks Crisis. 
The end of the period of analysis is mid-2003, five years after the nuclear tests. Thus, the 
period of analysis lasts seventeen years from mid-1986 to mid-2003. It is split into three 
intervals of five years each and an interval of two years comprising the decisive time 
between the conclusion of the CTBT in mid-1996 to the nuclear tests in mid-1998. The 
analysis is further complemented by a detailed description of the pre-1986 developments, 
as well as an outlook on the post-2003 period. 
 
Table 4.1.: Phases of India’s Nuclear Development  
Sequence Time Interval Status 
pre-1986 
Sequence 
until mid-1986  infrastructure: since about 1964 
capability: no 
nuclear status: no 
I. Sequence mid-1986 – mid-1991 5 years infrastructure: yes 
capability: presumptively 
nuclear status: no 
II. Sequence mid-1991 – mid-1996 5 years infrastructure: yes 
capability: yes 
nuclear status: no 
III. 
Sequence 
mid-1996 – 10.5.1998 2 years infrastructure: yes 
capability: yes 
nuclear status: no 
IV. 
Sequence 
11.5.1998 – mid-2003 5 years infrastructure: yes 
capability: yes 
nuclear status: yes 
post-2003 
Sequence 
since mid-2003  infrastructure: yes 
capability: yes 
nuclear status: yes 
 
 
It appears paradoxical that the period considered crucial for India’s nuclear weapons 
programme starts only after India presumptively assembled its first nuclear device, which, 
according to common sense, appears more like its final act. This temporal delimitation is 
nevertheless justified due to the fact that the nuclear status was defined by India’s policy 
makers not in technical but in political terms.  
 
Pre-1986 Sequence 
Before 1986, India’s nuclear scientists advanced the programme to develop the atomic 
bomb incrementally without the backing of any clear or explicit political decisions. The 
policy makers adopted a laissez-faire attitude, which was euphemistically called the 
concept of ‘keeping the nuclear option open,’ thereby obscuring the fact that a true concept 
was actually non-existent. Within this study, the early period of India’s nuclear programme 
(see Chapter 6) is addressed in detail only to the extent necessary to understand the post-
1986 dynamics. 
Newspaper articles during the earliest period of India’s nuclear programme in the 1950s 
and early 1960s mainly address the civilian part of the programme. Even after the Chinese 
nuclear tests of 1964, opinion articles and editorials on the nuclear weapon question were 
rare. Press coverage of the debate on military aspects of nuclear technology intensified only 
in the late-1960s in the wake of the NPT negotiations. Still far from common in India’s 
dailies in the 1990s, the nuclear weapons issue was sporadically addressed after the 
completion of the NPT in 1968, as it was in the aftermath of India’s first nuclear tests of 
1974 and following rumours regarding Pakistani progress with their nuclear programme 
expansion in the early 1980s.  
 
I. Sequence 
The beginning of the first sequence is timed to the year 1986, when India was considered to 
have passed the nuclear rubicon by assembling its first crude nuclear device. This instance, 
however, remained largely unnoticed by India’s public. Instead, it was the emergence of the 
Brasstacks Crisis in 1986 and 1987 which for the first time ever triggered a broader debate 
among India’s elite on the strategic impact of the nuclearisation process in the region. In the 
course of the crisis, the shift in the bilateral strategic relationship caused by the introduction 
of nuclear weapons entered the debate and formed part of the rhetoric interaction between 
both states. Nuclear deterrence was no longer an abstract construct of strategic theorists but 
an imperative factor in the bilateral interaction.  Mutual threat of nuclear retaliation then 
entered strategic planning. The strategic debate was further fuelled by the deterioration of 
Indo-Pakistani relations during the Kashmir Crisis of 1990.  
 
II. Sequence 
The second sequence comprises the government of Narashima Rao (1991 – 1996). The 
widespread process of economic reforms and liberalisation initiated by the Rao government 
in 1991 coincided with the end of the Cold War. Both developments changed India’s 
international relations fundamentally. However, different from what many expected, neither 
the market orientation of India’s economy and India’s integration into the world economy, 
nor the end of the superpowers’ nuclear arms race formed an axiomatic disaffirmation of 
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the nuclear option by the Rao government. The tight scrutiny of government spending 
introduced by Rao only marginally slowed down the nuclear programme, and the arsenal 
was further developed towards operational readiness during his time in office. 
Evidence indicates that Rao did in fact authorise preparations for nuclear tests as the 
ultimate manifestation of India’s nuclear achievements and was stopped only by the 
downfall of his government in 1996. The implication of India’s nuclearisation for its 
security, which had been central to the nuclear debate during the 1986-1991 phase, 
increasingly moved to the background. Instead, the negotiations on the indefinite extension 
of the NPT, completed in 1995, and the debate on the CTBT, concluded in 1996, became 
the dominant features of India’s nuclear debate, particularly since 1993. The year 1996 
marked the high peak of the nuclear debate with almost daily newspaper commentary 
lamenting India’s discrimination by the international nuclear order.  
 
III. Sequence 
At the beginning of the third and most eventful phase in mid-1996, two events coincided 
which turned out to be of major importance for India’s nuclear course. First, the BJP took 
over India’s government in mid-1996 but failed to form a coalition and stepped down after 
only 13 days in office. While this brief period proved to be too short for the BJP to make 
major decisions on the nuclear front, the advocacy for a powerful nuclearised India in the 
course of its campaign for the 1996 Lok Sabha elections had a major impact on India’s self-
image on the international scene. 
The election campaign coincided with a heated international debate on the Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty, which was largely perceived by India’s elite as a discriminatory and 
humiliating attempt by the nuclear powers to subdue India. As it is argued in the course of 
this study, the fundamental decision to go openly nuclear was made in 1996. The reason for 
the two-year delay until India’s actual self-declaration as a nuclear weapon state in mid-
1998 involved both the governmental instability of this period and the successor United 
Front government’s decision to postpone nuclear testing. 
Inder Kumar Gujral, Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1996 to 1997, and Prime Minister 
himself from 1997 to 1998, soon elaborated new guidelines for India’s foreign policy based 
on co-operation and unilateral confidence building measures which came to be known as 
the ‘Gujral Doctrine.’ Nuclear tests were postponed as they would have undermined the 
credibility of this new course in India’s foreign policy. The general pro-bomb stance of the 
Indian government, however, remained intact, and the development of nuclear weapons 
progressed uninhibited. This period of equilibrium between the informal decision to go 
nuclear and its implementation ended with the downfall of the United Front government in 
1998. 
 
IV. Sequence 
The beginning of the fourth sequence is marked by ostensibly the most striking event in the 
history of India’s nuclear programme: the nuclear testing on May 11, 1998 and the Indian 
government’s subsequent self-declaration as a nuclear weapon state. This break in India’s 
nuclear course was preceded by the BJP’s return to power a few days before. After the 
tests, the general outlook of the debate on the nuclear issue changed fundamentally. In its 
immediate aftermath, a hype of national pride and enthusiasm swept through the country. 
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Within a remarkably short range of time, the rhetoric of India’s strategic elite shifted from a 
categorical rejection of the status quo of the international nuclear order to support. Prior to 
the tests, the dominant argument for India’s elite to reject the nuclear order was based upon 
the perceived discrimination of the nuclear club which admitted some countries while 
closing the door for others. Now that India had broken down the door of this club and 
entered by force, the main objective of India’s strategists was to fix the damaged door and 
close it behind India. Being a nuclear weapons power soon became the cornerstone of the 
country’s self-perception and its increasingly self-confident actions within the international 
arena. In the words of one analyst, ‘India had learned to live with the bomb.’122 
 
 
4.3. Explanatory Variables 
 
As the first step of the quantitative and qualitative content analysis, the 705 collected 
articles are classified according to the main issues addressed within the larger field of 
India’s nuclear path. Eleven major issues are thereby identified which comprise the eleven 
explanatory variables for the combination of motives behind India’s nuclear course. 
These variables are: 
 
1. Institutional Framework 
Out of the total number of articles collected, 41 deal with the institutional framework in 
which nuclear policy making is taking place. Several of these critically assess India’s 
decision making process, which was traditionally done in a rather personalised, non-
institutionalised fashion by India’s Prime Minister. 
 
2. Science and Engineering / Nuclear R+D / Self-Reliance 
39 of the collected articles are concerned with technical aspects of the nuclear programme, 
most of which were authored by members of the nuclear scientific community. These 
authors preferred to represent nuclear technology as the currency by which India could 
demonstrate its genius. This recurring theme played a central role in India’s nuclear 
programme during its initial phase in the 1950s and 1960s and has continued to play a 
(although decreasing) role up to the present day.  
 
3. Domestic Policy Arena 
This variable comprises 138 articles on the inter- and intra- party nuclear discourse, Lok 
Sabha debates on the nuclear issue, the government’s nuclear policy with regard to partisan 
and electoral politics, the moral attitude of the Prime Minister or other key political players 
towards the bomb, etc. 
 
4. General and Regional Security Threats 
Within 69 articles, India’s overall strategic environment (excluding articles specifically 
addressing the threat from Pakistan or from China but including those articles addressing 
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the Sino-Pakistani combined axis as a source of threat) is analysed. Generally, these 
assessments focus on a combination of strategic incentives to go nuclear, being either a 
Sino-Pakistani axis, a Sino-Pakistani-American axis, a nuclear threat by several Western 
states, or the display of any existing nuclear weapon state as potential threat to India’s 
security. 
 
5. India’s Nuclear Doctrine 
The fact that India’s nuclear doctrine was developed largely in a post-hoc fashion is a 
uniquely Indian phenomenon. Similarly, most of the 39 press analyses commenting on 
possible doctrine designs reacted to prior nuclear developments instead of anticipating 
them. This phenomenon suggests that in India, unlike other nuclear weapon states, the 
nuclear arsenal was less developed according to doctrinal requirements but, on the contrary, 
that its doctrine was formulated according to the technical faits accomplits. 
 
6. Threats from Pakistan  
Herein, all 88 articles dealing with Indo-Pakistani nuclear relations are subsumed. Excluded 
are the articles addressing the Sino-Pakistani combined nuclear threat (see variable 4), as 
well as those articles dealing primarily with the Kashmir conflict. 
 
7. Threats from China 
As few as 16 articles fall into this category, despite mainstream strategic thought that it is 
mainly the Chinese nuclear threat which accounts for India’s nuclear build-up.  
 
8. India’s Status 
59 of the collected articles are concerned with nuclear weapons as elements to improve 
India’s international status and prestige. These assessments largely ignore the security 
relevance of nuclear weapons and focus on the reputation of power, not its substance.  
 
9. US American Non-Proliferation Initiatives 
A substantive number of 76 analyses deal with India’s relations to the United States. 
America is thereby viewed less as an immediate threat to India’s security. Rather, its non-
proliferation policy is seen as one of the main obstacles to India’s rise to the ranks of a 
major power. Paradoxically, attempts by the United States to prevent India’s nuclear build-
up proved to be one of the major driving forces behind India’s quest for the bomb.  
 
10. NPT (Extension) 
The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, signed in 1968, was perceived as the West’s crucial 
legal instrument to maintain its international supremacy in the discriminatory nuclear world 
order. The negotiation process, in particular, and its indefinite extension in 1995 fuelled 
invocations in favour of a strong nuclearised India among its elite. Altogether, 74 articles 
on the NPT were collected. 
 
11. CTBT 
Immediately after the indefinite extension of the NPT, international negotiations on the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty began, which concluded in mid-1996. This quick 
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succession of the Geneva negotiation rounds caused a persistent augmentation of 
nationalistic sentiments within the nuclear discourse in India, creating a deadlock of India’s 
position on the international nuclear regimes.  Consequently, India was on an irreversible 
path towards nuclearisation. The 66 articles collected on the CTBT were largely published 
in the time period from mid-1995 to mid-1997. 
 
The set of 11 variables is divided into three main groups which are discussed in each of the 
three main parts of the present study (see table 4.2.). These comprise: a) the group of 
variables dealing with domestic factors, b) the group of variables dealing with factors 
related to India’s regional security environment, and finally c) the group of variables 
dealing with the international nuclear order and India’s status therein. Due to the 
interlinkage between the variables, a clear cut allocation into the three groups often 
becomes a difficult task.123 These ambiguities prevent a deeper quantitative analysis of the 
data, suggesting instead a qualitative analysis on the basis of interpretive methods. 
However, they do not invalidate quantitative testing of general hypotheses concerning the 
relative frequency of certain arguments over time.  
 
Table 4.2.: Regrouped Variables 
 
GROUP VARIABLES 
1. Domestic Factors 
 
Chapter 7 
 
 
1. Institutional Framework 
2. Science and Engineering / Nuclear R+D / Self-Reliance 
3. Domestic Policy Arena 
 
2. Regional Security 
 
Chapters 8, 9, 10 
 
 
4. General and Regional Security Threats 
5. India’s Nuclear Doctrine 
6. Threats from Pakistan  
7. Threats from China 
 
3. The International  
Nuclear Order 
 
Chapters 11, 12, 13 
 
 
8. India’s Status 
9. American Non-Proliferation Initiatives 
10 NPT (Extension) 
11 CTBT 
 
 
These three groups of variables correspond to the three major sets of a state’s international 
behaviour as outlined in the general model of this study (see Figure 2.3). While domestic 
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which comprises variable 8.  
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factors determining India’s nuclear course are unit-level motives per se for or against the 
acquisition of the bomb, the two other factors represent the two major structural incentives. 
 
The security related factors emerging from India’s regional security structure represent 
those factors which conventionally dominate Neorealist explanatory models. These are 
supplemented by the third group of explanatory variables, which emerge from the 
peculiarities of the international nuclear order. Although interrelated, they are not 
congruent with security aspects. As the qualitative content analysis of this array of variables 
will show, assessments dealing with the international nuclear order, particularly the existing 
international nonproliferation regimes, frequently ignore the security aspects altogether and 
deal instead with aspects of national pride and prestige. Therefore, as it is argued, the 
variables of the third group drove India’s nuclear course more towards the pursuit of 
reputation of power as a means to increase its international status while the security related 
factors were seminal for India’s increase in the substance of power.  
 
 
4.4. The Synthesis of Quantitative and Interpretive Methods  
 
The methodology applied in this study combines quantitative measures and interpretive 
methods. Both methods aim at analysing the sample of collected opinion articles. 
Conducting elite interviews was originally part of the planned research design but was 
dropped after several pre-test interviews failed to produce any utilisable results. The reason 
for the impracticality of the interview is the delicacy of the issue addressed.  This prevented 
the interviewees from directly expressing their attitudes towards the bomb, particularly with 
regard to those intangible aspects behind the value and meaning of nuclear weapons 
(sentiments of national pride, feelings of discrimination, or anti-colonialism) on which the 
study focuses. The textual distinction between ostensible statements and hidden agendas 
proved to be impracticable. 
 
Similarly, quantitative methods of content analysis based on word counting failed to bear 
any useful results. To illustrate the problem behind word counting techniques, the pre-test 
on the relevance of the China factor on India’s nuclear decision making is summarised 
here. 
 
On the basis of the sample set of articles, the relevance of China in India’s nuclear calculus 
is measured by correlating the frequency of the terms ‘China,’ ‘Chinese,’ and ‘Beijing’ 
with the frequency of key words like ‘threat,’ ‘threatening,’ etc. The result showed a 
significantly higher correlation in articles immediately before and after the nuclear tests in 
May 1998, suggesting that the Chinese threat really mattered. A closer look at the articles’ 
content, however, revealed that a large majority of opinion leaders welcomed as a major 
achievement China’s discomposure with being labelled by India as the main cause for its 
nuclear build-up. India’s strategic elite was gratified that India finally received the 
appropriate attention from China after many years of perceived (and humiliating) 
ignorance. This is hardly consistent with security considerations. Quantitative methods of 
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content analysis fail to identify such nuances. Instead, qualitative methods based on 
interpretative techniques of content analysis form the methodological backbone of this 
study. Basic quantitative methods, including frequency counts, are applied only to generate 
some basic trends in India’s nuclear discourse over time.  
 
4.4.1. Methods of Quantitative Analysis 
 
Within the quantitative analysis of the randomly collected sample of 705 nuclear-related 
articles, three different measures are introduced that are aimed at:  a) measuring the general 
attitude of the author towards the bomb (attitude scale), b) measuring the variance of the 
general outlook of the nuclear debate over time (time series analysis), and c) measuring the 
degree to which the debate within India’s elite was polarised, or, reversely expressed, the 
degree to which a consensus existed among India’s elite on the nuclear issue (polarisation 
index). 
 
The Attitude Scale 
A property, defined as a qualitative characteristic of the object, is attributed to each of the 
705 entries. The property, designated as the attitude score, has three different possible 
values. Value 1 is attributed to the property of those articles in which the author expresses 
his or her unambiguous opinion in favour of the bomb. Value 0 is attributed to the property 
of those articles in which the author takes either a neutral opinion on India’s nuclearisation 
or the expressed opinion is not applicable to the dichotomous anti-/pro-bomb scheme. 
Value -1 is attributed to the property of those articles in which the author expresses his or 
her unambiguous objection to India’s nuclear build-up. 
The attitude scale is defined as the mean of the values attributed to the property of a sample 
of articles. The samples of articles are defined as variable-wise, group-wise, or sequence-
wise, or, as a combination of all three, as figure for the total sample of articles collected. 
The attitude scale (AS) is defined as: 
AS = ∑  
=
n
i n
Xi
1
 
where 
n = number of unit in the sample 
Xi = attitude score from each sample unit 
 
The range of possible values for the attitude scale is between the minimum of -1 (a 
consensus among the authors against India acquiring / maintaining the bomb) and the 
maximum of +1 (a consensus among the authors in favour of India acquiring / maintaining 
the bomb). The value of 0 marks the equilibrium of indetermination among the authors’ 
aggregated attitude.124 
 
                                                 
124  The value of 0 does not imply a neutral attitude, as the attitude scale only measures the mean aggregate 
attitude, not the polarisation within the compound of attitudes. 
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The Time Series Analysis 
The time series analysis aims at measuring the arrangement of a series of observations (for 
example, the number of articles observed) of a variable (or group of variables) in the 
sequence of their occurrence at successive points of time (as defined in section 4.2). 
Measurements are made at irregular time intervals ti (with 1 ≤ i ≤ 4). 
The main objective of the time series analysis is to illustrate the change of the outlook of 
India’s nuclear debate over time.  
 
The Polarisation Index 
The polarisation index is defined as the standard deviation of the attitude score (-1 ≤ X ≤ 
+1) of the sample. It aims at providing an indication of the average amount by which the 
scores deviate from the mean (termed as the attitude scale) of the distribution.125 
 
The polarisation index (PI) is defined as: 
PIx = 
1
)²(
1
−
−∑
=
n
XXi
n
i  
 
where 
n = number of units in the sample 
Xi = attitude score from each sample unit 
X  = sample attitude scale  
 
The range of possible values for the polarisation index is between the minimum of 0 (a 
consensus among the authors exists) 126 and the maximum of +1 (the number of authors is 
equally divided between bomb advocates and bomb opponents, the discourse is entirely 
polarised). 
 
4.4.2. Positivist Epistemology and Interpretive Methods 
 
The study’s central object of investigation is the discourse on nuclear weapons among 
India’s strategic elite during the central years of India’s nuclear build-up. Quantitative 
methods, as introduced above, are able to provide some general indications on the nature of 
the debate as well as some general trends about the changes of the debate over time. These 
quantitative methods nevertheless fail to highlight the nuances within India’s nuclear 
debate, particularly during its peak in the mid-1990s.  At this time, security considerations 
were pushed to the background and other, less tangible motives dominated the debate, such 
                                                 
125 It is important to note that the polarisation index indicates the average deviation from the attitude scale 
within a sample, and not the average deviation from neutrality. Given the hypothetic case of a wide consensus 
among the sample in favour of the bomb, each neutral unit increases the polarisation index. 
126 It is irrelevant whether this consensus is in favour or against the bomb, or whether it exists on the authors’ 
consistently neutral position. 
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as excessive bouts of national pride, bashed national self-esteem, and banal emotions like 
conceitedness and defiance. 
 
The dynamics of the nuclear debate in the Indian context along intangible, emotional 
arguments inevitably raise the question about the distinction between the natural and the 
socially constructed reality in which some facts exist because the political actors attribute a 
certain meaning to them. Within this rather complex compound of motives, political action, 
particularly the interaction with other states, becomes meaningful and comprehensible only 
in relation to its underlying normative intuitions.  
 
In light of the difficulties to detect these normative intuitions by quantitative methods, the 
introduction of qualitative methods to this study appears necessary. While the correlations 
derived from quantitative analysis allow for a certain degree of generalisation, it is the 
qualitative approach which gives meaning to these correlations and contributes to the 
understanding of the political processes and phenomena. The term ‘understanding’ is 
thereby defined in a hermeneutic sense. It implies the interpretation of the actors’ motives 
and the meaning of their action. The correct interpretation of political action, according to 
Max Weber, requires the identification of its process and its underlying motive, as well as 
the historic context in which it is placed. The interpretation of typified action, political 
action which follows a certain typology, further implies the need to identify its suitability in 
terms of the meaning attributed (‘Sinnadäquanz’), and its causal suitability (‘kausale 
Adäquanz’).127 Interpretation alone does not suffice to identify the meaning of action but 
merely allows for the construction of hypotheses. Its scientific validity can only be 
achieved through hypothesis testing, its confirmation through empiric data.  
 
This approach moves beyond the positivist epistemology of conventional approaches and 
includes elements of hermeneutic epistemology: 
 
A hermeneutic constructivism will focus on the actor’s perception of this normative 
and material environment and will evaluate the ensuing political action within this 
context. As such, hermeneutics offers an interpretative approach similar to post-
modernism. It does not, however, conceive of an agent’s behavior as determined by 
his normative structures, nor does it conceive this behavior as determined by 
material factors, as would have positivist approaches. A hermeneutic constructivism 
is therefore a thick-but-not-too-thick constructivism. It offers a nuanced view of the 
relations between agent and structures and leads us to a contextual analysis of 
political behaviour.128 
 
                                                 
127 “Eine richtige kausale Deutung eines konkreten Handelns bedeutet: daß der äußere Ablauf und das Motiv 
zutreffend und zugleich in ihrem Zusammenhang sinnhaft verständlich erkannt sind. Eine richtige kausale 
Deutung typischen Handelns (verständlicher Handlungstypus) bedeutet: daß der als typisch behauptete 
Hergang sowohl (in irgendeinem Grade) sinnadäquat erscheint wie (in irgendeinem Grade) als kausal adäquat 
festgestellt werden kann” (Weber, Max: Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre. Edited by Johannes 
Winckelmann. Tübingen: UTB 1967; p. 512.  
128 Marcel, Valerie: op.cit. 
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The focus on ‘understanding’ rather than ‘explaining’ within hermeneutic epistemology 
appears adequate considering the centrality of cognitive aspects of the identified motives, 
beyond material aspects like security seeking, within the explanatory model of the present 
study. The meaning of such aspects for political action can only be understood within the 
normative context in which the subject is placed.  
 
This normative context determines the elite’s interpretation of events and political action on 
which their definition of national interests is based. According to Marcel,  
 
when decision-makers define the national interests they wish to promote, they offer 
an interpretation that will be judged by their society and the international 
community. This interpretation will be subject to a (formal or informal) debate from 
which new norms may emerge. And, in reaction to new international events, this 
first interpretation may be challenged by another that will attempt to recast the 
national interests in a different light. As such, we see that interpretations can be 
subject to small changes as well as upheavals.129 
 
Within this feedback process, norms are not independent variables to the model but change 
themselves. Nothing illustrates the changing nature of norms better than the normative 
approach to nuclear weapons within the Indian discourse over the past decades.  
 
The method applied in this study to describe the nuclear discourse in India draws on the 
identification of specific features of the debate within a certain time sequence. In a second 
step, a limited set of showcase press articles containing elite analyses on these features are 
identified, analysed, and interpreted.  
By applying hermeneutic – or interpretive – techniques, the author is fully aware of how the 
study implies subjectivity, the significance of the context of time and space in which the 
author himself is placed, including his own convictions and beliefs, for the outcome of the 
analysis.130  The author’s interpretation is itself part of the above feedback process between 
international events and their normative interpretation, blurring the conventional 
differentiations between actor and observer, object and subject, or objectivity and 
subjectivity. Lifting the clear-cut boundaries of these spheres causes a weakening of the 
overall explanatory power of the model. This loss of explanatory power is compensated by 
gains in the power to ‘understand’ the actors’ motives within their historic and normative 
context along the Gadamerian epistemological tradition. The introduction of elements of 
interpretivism is done as a methodological necessity that does not at all exclude positivist, 
hard empirical methods but rather supplements them, just as the Weberian Wertrationalität 
does not exclude the Zweckrationalität but is rather implicated therein.131 By applying this 
                                                 
129 Marcel, Valerie: op.cit. 
130 Hans-Georg Gadamer referred to this phenomenon as ‘merger of horizons’ (‘Horizontverschmelzung’). 
(Gadamer, Hans-Georg: Wahrheit und Methode: Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik, Tübingen, 
J.C.B. Mohr, 1960). 
131 for an overview of this debate, see: Gerring, John: “A Normative Turn in Political Science?”. online 
publication, June 14th 2004, to appear in: Lebow, Richard Ned / Mark Lichbach (eds.): “Theory and 
Evidence”; forthcoming. 
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combined epistemological approach based on textual exegesis,132 the author deliberately 
brings in his own normative beliefs and his interpretation includes his own normative 
conclusions.133 
 
                                                 
132 The textual exegesis, despite its limitation to a small number of units (the strategic elite), allows for the 
design of general hypotheses on existing norms and motives in the Indian polity (see Chapter 3.4.). Further 
empirical determination of the number, interrelation and hierarchy of the individuals involved is therefore 
beyond the scope of this study. Methods allowing for this determination, such as decisional methods, 
positional methods, or the reputational approach do not cope adequately with the underlying norms and the 
meanings of the motives behind the decisions made, and are therefore inappropriate for the main research 
objective of this study. 
133 For the distinction between self-interpretation and second-order interpretation (referred to as double 
hermeneutics), see: Guzzini, Stefano: “A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations”. In: 
European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 6 (2), 2000; p. 162. 
 75
 
 
 
5. Elite Perception and India’s Nuclear Course: Tracking 
Empirical Evidence 
 
 
5.1. India’s Elite: Between Diversity of Opinion and Bomb Lobbying 
 
As expressed within India’s daily newspapers during the period of analysis, India’s 
strategic elite was generally in favoured acquiring the bomb. Using a value scale for the 
attitudes expressed in the sample of 705 articles, the 0.45 value delineates a clearly positive 
value. Furthermore, the respective values for each of the eleven variables are also positive 
without exception. As presented in Table 5.1., the degree to which the strategic elite favour 
India’s nuclearisation significantly differs, depending on the main issue addressed in their 
respective analyses.  
 
Table 5.1.: Attitude towards the bomb (issue-wise) 
(scale: from – 1 (anti bomb) to + 1 (pro bomb)) 
 
Rank Variable Value 
   
1. Threats from China 0.81 
2. India’s Nuclear Doctrine 0.69 
3. India’s Status 0.69 
4. US American Non-Proliferation Initiatives 0.64 
 av. International Nuclear Order 0.63 
5. NPT (Extension) 0.62 
6. CTBT 0.59 
 total average 0.45 
7. General and Regional Security Threats 0.42 
 av. Regional Security 0.42 
8. Science and Engineering / Nuclear R+D / Self-Reliance 0.36 
9. Institutional Framework 0.32 
 av. Domestic Factors 0.27 
10. Threats from Pakistan 0.25 
11. Domestic Policy Arena 0.22 
 
Experts addressing the Chinese nuclear threat most unanimously favour the nuclear option 
with the attitude scale showing the value of 0.81. In other words, a general consensus exists 
among India’s strategic experts that nuclear weapons are of some value for India in 
deterring its nuclear armed northern neighbour. The articles concerning India’s nuclear 
doctrine formulation ranked second highest with an attitude scale of 0.69. This outcome is 
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not surprising, as opponents of India’s nuclearisation usually do not concern themselves 
with doctrine formulation. 
 
While the strategists clearly regard India’s own nuclear capabilities as necessary to counter 
the Chinese nuclear arsenal, they show much less enthusiasm for the nuclear bomb with 
regards to more general aspects of India’s regional strategic environment at an attitude 
scale of 0.42.  Even less support is given when relating to specific threats to India’s security 
posed by Pakistan, as displayed by the attitude scale of 0.25. This outcome is very 
consistent with the experts’ understanding of the strategic value of nuclear weapons for 
India vis-à-vis China and its limited strategic value vis-à-vis Pakistan. Despite the strong 
pro-bomb attitude in the China related articles, the overall attitude scale value for the group 
of security related variables134 at 0.42 is still below the average attitude scale for the total 
sample of articles.  
 
As compared to the group of security-related variables, those variables dealing with the 
international nuclear order show a much stronger pro-bomb tendency with an attitude scale 
of 0.63. The respective value for each of the four variables comprising this group135 is well 
above the overall average of the total sample. Among the four variables comprising the 
group, articles focusing on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (‘CTBT’ variable) show a 
comparably modest inclination towards India’s nuclearisation. The value of 0.59 clouds the 
strong effect that the CTBT debate during the years 1995 to 1997 had on India’s final 
decision to go nuclear. The reason for this modest value is the fundamental shift in India’s 
stance on the CTBT in late 1993. The positive position of the Indian government on the 
tentative CTBT prior to this shift generated several articles on the issue making the case 
against India’s nuclearisation.  However, the dismissive position of the Indian government 
on the CTBT after 1993 caused the strategic elite to equally oppose the treaty and 
consequentially favour India’s nuclearisation instead.  
 
The failure to capture the several shifts in India’s nuclear policy clearly shows the limited 
explanatory power of the attitude scale, as well as the need to further introduce methods of 
time series analysis (as it is done in section 5.2.). 
 
Finally, the group of domestic factors reflects an overall modest pro-bomb attitude. The 
respective attitude scale value for each of the three variables comprising this group136 is 
below the total average.  Thus, the analyses dealing with domestic policy issues show the 
lowest approval rate for India’s nuclear build-up among all eleven variables.  
 
Throughout the period of analysis, a majority of analyses on the nuclear issue published in 
India’s daily newspapers reflected a rather pro-bomb attitude, reflecting a positive value in 
the attitude scale. Changes of the attitude scale do nevertheless reveal significant variances 
                                                 
134 Comprising the four variables: ‘General and Regional Security Threats,’ ‘India’s Nuclear Doctrine,’ 
‘Threats from Pakistan,’ and ‘Threats from China.’ 
135 ‘India’s Status,’ ‘US American Non-Proliferation Initiatives,’ ‘NPT (Extension),’ and ‘CTBT.’ 
136 ‘Institutional Framework,’ Science and Technology / R+D / Self-Reliance,’ Domestic Policy Arena.’ 
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over time. As presented in Chart 5.1., the pro-bomb attitude among India’s opinion leaders 
was particularly high over the two-year period from the conclusion of the CTBT in mid-
1996 to the nuclear tests in May 1998. After the tests, this large scale consensus in favour 
of the bomb decreases significantly. 
 
Chart 5.1.: Attitude Scale Time Series Comparison 
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mid-1986 - mid-1991
mid-1991 - mid-1996
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In the following section, the time series analysis is further refined by looking at the 
variance in the frequency of the specific issues addressed throughout the four sequences of 
the relevant time period. 
 
 
5.2. The Crucial Years: Changing Attitudes on the Bomb 
 
5.2.1. Debating Nuclear Issues: Some General Trends 
 
The analyses concerned with the Chinese nuclear threat are the most resolute in supporting 
India’s nuclear build-up. Considering the widely accepted understanding among strategic 
scholars that India’s nuclear capabilities are aimed at deterring the Chinese nuclear arsenal, 
this result appears to offer confirmation. A look on the variable-wise breakdown of the total 
sample of articles (see Chart 5.2.), however, reveals a much more puzzling picture.  
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Chart 5.2.: Issue-wise Nuclear Reporting (N=705) 
CTBT
NPT (Extension)
US Non-proliferation
Status Seeking
Chinese Threat
Pakistani Threat
Doctrine Formulation
General Security
Domestic Politics
R+D/Self-Reliance
Institutional Frame
 
The articles dealing with China comprise only 2.27% of all nuclear related articles 
collected. While the analyses on China reflect a largely pro-bomb attitude, the China factor 
plays only a marginal role in the general debate on the nuclear issue within the Indian 
context. This dilemma raises the following question: if, as most strategists claim, India’s 
nuclear build-up is mainly motivated by the Chinese nuclear threat, why is this issue largely 
ignored in the Indian nuclear debate? 
 
A relative majority of around one-fifth of all articles analysed in this study (19.57%) deals 
with the domestic policy arena, in particular the role of nuclear weapons in India’s political 
party competition. Additionally, six variables comprise about one-tenth of the total number 
of articles each: threats from Pakistan (12.48%), American non-proliferation incentives 
(10.78%), the NPT debate (10.50%), general and regional security threats (9.79%), the 
CTBT debate (9.36%), and India’s international status (8.37%). Three rather technical 
issues comprise around 5% each: institutional framework (5.82%), science/R+D/self-
reliance (5.53%), and India’s nuclear doctrine (5.53%). 
 
Overall, the group of variables dealing with the international nuclear order comprise 
39.0%,137 while the security related variables and the variables related to domestic factors 
comprise 30.1% and 30.6% respectively. 
In the following sections, an issue-wise distribution of nuclear reporting is made for each of 
the four time segments within the period of analysis. 
                                                 
137 Among those articles in which a clear pro-bomb attitude is expressed, the overall share of this group is 
even higher (45.1%), as compared to the group of domestic factors (25.7%), and the security related group 
(29.1%). 
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5.2.2. Phase I: The Strategic Debate 
 
In the course of the Brasstacks crisis of 1986 and 1987, newspaper analyses on India’s 
nuclear developments generally shifted from the normative, abstract debate of the early 
years towards addressing more tangible aspects of nuclear weapons. Deterrence and nuclear 
strategy were no longer issues only addressed by a small group of specialists, but were 
thrust into the larger public debate. The single most frequently addressed issue in the time 
segment from mid-1986 to mid-1991 was India’s security, thus addressing implications of 
the introduction of nuclear weapons for India’s strategic environment in general (18.75%) 
and for the antagonistic relationship to Pakistan in particular (12.50%). Further, domestic 
factors such as the adjustment of India’s strategic decision making structure (16.67%) and 
the attitude shift on the bomb among India’s policy making elite (14.58%) were frequently 
analysed by India’s opinion leaders. 
 
Remarkably, not a single recorded article addressed the Chinese nuclear threat exclusively. 
In India’s nuclear debate between the years 1986 and 1991, China was displayed only as a 
nuclear supplier to Pakistan, not as an independent international actor in its own right.  
 
Chart 5.3.: Issue-wise Nuclear Reporting (mid-1986 – mid-1991) (n=48) 
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As compared to the other three time segments, the nuclear debate during the five years from 
the emergence of the Brasstacks Crisis to the re-emergence of the Congress rule in mid-
1991 was the most balanced, least heated, and most diverse in terms of the range of issues 
addressed. 
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5.2.3. Phase II: The Non-proliferation Debate 
 
In the early 1990s, the nuclear debate in India changed fundamentally. While security 
related issues as well as domestic issues dominated the debate in the previous time 
segment, these two sets of issues lost much of their relevance as soon as the Kashmir crisis 
of 1990 was over. In the time segment from 1991 to 1996, these two sets comprise only 
18.05% and 12.03% of all articles, respectively. Instead, issues related to international 
attempts to prevent nuclear proliferation began to dominate the debate (69.92%).  
 
Most prominently among these was the excessive debate on the extension of the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty, which was finalised in 1995, as well as the pressures applied by 
the US government upon India to sign the treaty and to abstain from developing a full-
fledged nuclear arsenal. Both issues triggered a large amount of commentary in India’s 
daily newspapers, accounting for 26.32% and 21.05% of all nuclear analyses during this 
period. These articles were often written in a highly emotionalised and polemic fashion, 
deploring Western attempts to keep nuclear weapons away from India and to impose a 
discriminatory regime to maintain its supremacy. In this period, the nonproliferation debate 
gained a momentum which proved to be unprecedented in other countries, and in which 
tangible security aspects of the treaty were largely replaced by emotional arguments related 
to aspects of dignity, national pride, anti-colonialism, and collective defiance. Within the 
logic of this debate, opposition to the international nonproliferation regime was largely 
accepted as the legitimate raison d’être for India’s nuclear programme as a whole. 
 
Chart 5.4.: Issue-wise Nuclear Reporting (mid-1991 – mid-1996) (n=133) 
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Subsequent to the indefinite extension of the NPT in mid-1995, the over-heated debate 
turned its attention to the negotiation process of the CTBT that followed immediately after 
the NPT negotiations and was finalised in mid-1996. Articles on the CTBT comprise 
15.79% of all nuclear related articles during the second time period. 
 
5.2.4. Phase III: The Determined Debate 
 
The downfall of the Narashima Rao government and the takeover by Atal Behari 
Vajpayee’s BJP-led government as the successor to the Congress government in mid-1996 
coincided with the final negotiations on the CTBT in Geneva. Thus, it is one of many ironic 
occurrences that just as India’s only major party to unconditionally propagate India’s 
nuclear build-up came to power for the first time, the intensity of the debate on the nuclear 
issue reached its peak. It is therefore not surprising that the two most frequently discussed 
issues in the period from mid-1996 to mid-1998 were India’s stance on the recently 
concluded Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the fundamental attitude shift among 
India’s policy makers with regard to nuclear weapons. What is surprising, though, is the 
extent to which the former issue dominated over the latter within the discourse. An 
overwhelming 64.71% of all nuclear related articles dealt with India’s stance on the CTBT, 
while 14.71% were concerned with the domestic policy debate on India’s new nuclear 
course. In other words, the heated debate on the CTBT overshadowed all other aspects of 
India’s nuclear course. 
 
Even the assumed paradigm shift in India’s nuclear policy after the BJP’s came to power, 
first in a brief thirteen-day period in mid-1996 and finally in early 1998, received 
comparably little attention, clearly being sidelined by the dynamics of the CTBT debate. 
This empirical evidence weakens the popular perception that it was mainly the paradigm 
shift on the nuclear issue after the BJP’s emergence in the government and its subsequent 
self-declaration as a nuclear weapon state that accounts for India’s nuclear testing in 1998. 
More plausible than the BJP argument are those explanations which view the developments 
in Geneva in 1995 (NPT extension) and 1996 (CTBT) as crucial for India’s nuclear 
decisions in May 1998. According to this view, the governmental instability during the 
period between 1996 and 1998 accounts for the two year delay of the tests which would 
have otherwise been conducted in the immediate aftermath of the CTBT finalisation in 
summer 1996.  
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Chart 5.5.: Issue-wise Nuclear Reporting (mid-1996 – mid-1998) (n=34) 
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The evidence presented here suggests that the overall decision to go nuclear was made 
before the BJP’s rise and was therefore not a decision specific to this party.  Instead, it was 
rooted in a wider consensus among India’s elite, its major parties, and most sections of 
Indian society at large. As shown in Chart 5.1., the attitude scale during the period from 
mid-1996 to mid-1998 had the highest value (0.71) of all four time sequences, supporting 
the above assumption about the early point of time in which the decision to go nuclear was 
made. 
 
5.2.5. Phase IV: The Liberated Debate 
 
After the nuclear tests, articles concerned with India’s nuclear course again shifted to its 
pre-1991 outlook in terms of their relatively modest attitude as well as the diversity of 
issues addressed.  
The share of the articles commenting on India’s stance towards the CTBT dropped from 
64.71% prior to the tests to only 7.62% after the tests. 
 
The two most frequently addressed issues were – similarly to the pre-1991 period – aspects 
related to domestic politics (18.54%) as well as those articles addressing the Pakistani 
nuclear threat (15.89%). While in the previous two time segments articles addressing issues 
related to the international nuclear order comprised more than two thirds of the total 
articles, the share of this group shrinks to only 34.77% in the period from mid-1998 to mid-
2003.  
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Chart 5.6.: Issue-wise Nuclear Reporting (mid-1998 – mid-2003) (n=302) 
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More remarkable than this drop in numbers was the change in the rhetoric applied within 
these articles. While prior to the tests the leitmotif was the blatantly unjust and 
discriminatory nuclear order, this theme more or less disappeared from the strategic elite’s 
attention. Instead, India’s opinion leaders shifted their influence from fierce rejection of the 
international order towards a cautious approval of it. In other words, by acquiring the 
bomb, India transitioned from a strongly dissatisfied power within the international nuclear 
order into a modest status quo power within a remarkably short range of time. The writing 
style changed in the same manner from emotionally overblown to a more prosaic style in 
the post-May 1998 period. This general trend in nuclear reporting was suspended only 
when Pakistan’s president Pervez Musharraf played the nuclear card during the Indo-
Pakistani tensions in Kashmir in 2001 and 2002, explicitly including the first-use option as 
a threatening device in the course of both countries’ sabre-rattling rhetoric. This incident 
accounts for the relatively high number of articles addressing Pakistan’s nuclear threat 
during this time segment.  
 
 
5.3. Towards a “National Consensus” 
 
India’s opinion leaders frequently called for a national consensus on the nuclear issue, 
which was considered a prerequisite for India to pursue an effective and credible 
negotiating strategy on the international scene. Within this study, the polarisation index is 
introduced in an attempt to measure the degree to which this consensus existed. As defined 
in section 4.4.2., the polarisation index is the standard deviation of the attitude scores of a 
sample by the respective authors of the articles representing the units of the sample.  They 
have been coded as follows:  +1 for a clearly expressed opinion in favour of the bomb, 0 for 
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a neutral or inapplicable position, and -1 for a clearly expressed rejection of the nuclear 
option. The polarisation index is measured between 0 for a maximum consensus on the 
issue and +1 for a maximum heterogeneity among the opinions expressed. 
 
The overall polarisation index (PI138) for the total sample of 705 articles shows a value of 
0,82. This high value leads to the conclusion that a consensus among India’s opinion 
leaders on the nuclear issue has never existed. However, no statement on the degree of 
polarisation within certain specific issues of the nuclear field can be made on the basis of 
the overall figure.139 
 
The comparison of the respective polarisation indices of the three groups of variables 
shows the expected outcome. The degree of polarisation is highest among the group of 
domestic variables (PI = 0,88), followed by the compound of security-related variables (PI 
= 0,84). Among the three groups, those articles dealing with the international nuclear order 
show the lowest PI (0,72). Thus, the consensus among the strategic elite was highest on 
issues related to the international nuclear order. This outcome is in line with the elite’s 
ambition to maintain a controversial debate on domestic aspects of the nuclear issue, while 
at the same time trying to speak with one voice with regards to India’s interaction with the 
international community, particularly those states leading the international nonproliferation 
discourse.  
 
This picture is further corroborated in the comparison of the respective polarisation indices 
for each of the eleven variables (see Chart 5.7.). The PI for articles on India’s domestic 
policy arena shows a remarkably high score of 0,93, indicating a polarised fragmenting of 
the authors into supporters of the government’s nuclear policy and its opponents. The fact 
that the set of articles dealing with the nuclear threat by Pakistan ranks second with a 
polarisation index of 0,89 reflects the doubts on the strategic value of nuclear weapons for 
India with regard to the Pakistani threat. The group of opinion leaders considering nuclear 
weapons as inadequate to counter the Pakistani threat is thereby quite heterogeneous, 
ranging from peace activists who generally reject any form of armament, to military-
strategic hardliners who favour a strong armament in conventional weaponry instead of 
nuclear weaponry.  
 
                                                 
138 on the Polarisation Index (PI) see Chapter 4.4.1. and Appendix A. 
139 The polarisation scale is not an aggregate scale, and a high degree of polarisation of the total sample does 
not necessarily result from equally polarised sub-samples. A general consensus among each of the eleven 
variables might still produce a high degree of polarisation when collapsed into a total sample. 
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Chart 5.7.: Polarisation Index of 11 Variables 
Institutional Frame
R+D/Self-Reliance
Domestic Politics
General Security
Doctrine Formulation
Pakistani Threat
Chinese Threat
Status Seeking
US Non-proliferation
NPT (Extension)
CTBT
0,00
0,10
0,20
0,30
0,40
0,50
0,60
0,70
0,80
0,90
1,00
 
As expected, the sample of articles dealing with the Chinese nuclear threat shows the 
lowest polarisation index of 0,40. Therefore, throughout the period of analysis, a large scale 
consensus existed on the necessity of acquiring the bomb to counter the Chinese nuclear 
capabilities. 
 
 
5.4. Findings of the Quantitative Analysis 
 
The above quantitative analysis of the sample of 705 collected articles on the nuclear issue 
revealed some general trends within India’s nuclear discourse. The major findings are 
summarised in the following set of statements: 
• The group of articles dealing with the role nuclear weapons played in India’s 
domestic policy arena forms the single largest among the eleven variables, 
indicating the inward-looking nature of India’s nuclear debate. Additionally, articles 
on domestic aspects of the nuclear issue showed the highest degree of divergence of 
opinion among their authors, and, in their aggregation, the lowest degree of support 
for the acquisition of nuclear weapons. 
• Analyses on the Chinese nuclear threat were generally the most affirmative for 
India’s nuclear build-up. Furthermore, China-related articles showed the highest 
degree of consensus among their authors.  Throughout the period of analysis, 
however, as few as sixteen out of 705 articles were primarily concerned with China, 
indicating the widespread disinterest of India’s strategic elite in the so called ‘China 
factor’ and the marginal role it played in India’s nuclear debate. 
• The analysis of Pakistan-related articles gives a rather inconsistent picture. Within 
the extensive reports and comments on India’s conflicting relations with Pakistan, a 
large majority of authors considered nuclear weapons to play only a secondary role 
therein (these articles are excluded from the study). Those articles focusing 
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primarily on the nuclear dimension of the Indo-Pakistani conflict are deeply divided 
in their assessment of the strategic benefits of nuclear weapons for India. The 
Pakistani threat figured prominently in India’s nuclear debate during the Brasstacks 
Crisis of 1986 and 1987, during the Kashmir crisis of 1990, and during the tensions 
in Kashmir in 2001 and 2002, when President Musharraf asserted Pakistan’s nuclear 
first use option. In the decisive years from 1991 to the tests in 1998, as well as in 
the aftermath of the tests during the years 1998 and 1999, threats from Pakistan 
played a rather minor role within the nuclear discourse. 
• Extensive commentary on the international nuclear order, particularly on the NPT 
and the CTBT as the two pillars of this order, clearly dominated the nuclear debate 
during the crucial years of India’s nuclear course in the mid-1990s. In the time 
segment from 1991 to 1996, these articles addressed three distinct but interrelated 
topics: the negotiations on the NPT extension, the CTBT negotiations, and 
American non-proliferation efforts. In the subsequent period from 1996 to 1998, the 
conclusion of CTBT negotiations, which were finalised in mid-1996, dominated as 
the single most addressed issue.  These articles comprised two thirds of all articles 
while the NPT-debate as well as American non-proliferation policy lost most of 
their relevance.  
• The United States was the second most addressed country behind Pakistan in 
connection with the nuclear issue, which was well ahead of China. America was 
thereby not viewed as an immediate threat to India’s security but rather as the 
ringleader of those Western countries attempting to maintain their supremacy 
though the discriminatory international nuclear order. 
 
In sum, the quantitative analysis has provided some indications about the general outlook 
of the discourse on nuclear weapons among India’s strategic elite. Most importantly, it has 
given a clear picture of the main issues addressed within the broader nuclear field. Issues 
relating to the international nuclear order dominated the debate during the crucial years. 
These issues, which were particularly prevalent during the time of the Geneva negotiations 
on the NPT in summer 1995 and on the CTBT in summer 1996, were hardly debated in 
terms of their immediate implications for India’s security.   More accurately, they were 
concerned with the implications of nuclear weapons for India’s international standing. The 
dominance of such issues in the nuclear debate during the crucial years suggests that 
nuclear weapons were generally perceived by India’s opinion leaders as tools to increase 
India’s reputation of power rather than the substance of power. This assumption is further 
supported by the fact that the China factor, which was seen by India’s elite as the major 
security-related motive for India’s nuclear build-up, played only a marginal role within the 
nuclear debate overall. 
For a more detailed analysis of the dynamics behind India’s nuclear course, however, 
quantitative methods appear insufficient.  They fail to detect the often subliminal discourse 
on the rather intangible motives of national pride, prestige, and status seeking behind the 
ostensible issues addressed by the authors of the collected articles. For the purpose of 
assessing these motives, methods of interpretive content analysis are applied in the further 
course of the study. 
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6. The Origins of India’s Nuclear Weapons Programme 
 
 
6.1. Preconditions for India’s Nuclear Development 
 
6.1.1. Nuclear Weapons and the Nation-building Process 
 
At the time of India’s independence in 1947, the commercial use of nuclear energy was still 
no more than a dream of the future. Nuclear power for civilian purposes made its debut on 
the world stage (in the Soviet Union) only in 1954. Until then, the leading countries 
pursued the technology almost entirely with an eye towards its military applications. Within 
the relatively stable context of India’s early post-colonial period it is puzzling that the 
Indian government showed such a great eagerness to devote huge amounts of its scarce 
financial resources to the development of nuclear technology. While its rapidly increasing 
demand for electric power provides a good explanation (bearing in mind that nuclear 
technology for electrical production was at this time still relatively unproven), we find the 
cart leading the horse in that as a general principal the development of nuclear technology 
for military purposes preceded (and in fact, drove) the development / adaptation of the 
technology for civilian purposes. 
 
In the midst of the process of nation-building – in this case, the emergence from the 
paternal relationships of the colonial period into peer nation status – the great and ongoing 
enthusiasm of India’s elite for nuclear technology makes sense. Part of the significance of 
having “mastered the atom” is as a national monument on the road from traditionalism to 
modernity, showing forth to all the world India’s mastery of high science and its powers of 
self-determination. 
As M. V. Ramana states: 
 
In the case of India, where the bulk of financial support for science came directly or 
indirectly from the state, it has been argued that science, through its association with 
‘freedom and enlightenment, power and progress’ contributed in a major way to the 
Indian state’s efforts at legitimizing itself.140 
 
According to Stephen P. Cohen, 
 
the nuclear program is one in a series of important symbolic projects that the centre 
has undertaken to develop a sense of Indian nationhood and identity. The content of 
that nationhood is, when projected through the prism of the bomb, a scientifically 
adept, multicultural people capable of achieving great things with minimum 
                                                 
140 Ramana, M. V.: La Trahsion des Clercs: Scientists and India’s Nuclear Bomb. In: Ramana, M.V. / C. 
Rammanohar Reddy (eds.): Prisoners of the Nuclear Dream. New Delhi: Orient Longman 2003; p. 212. 
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resources. Originally, the symbolic meanings were attached to the civilian nuclear 
program, and its leadership often boasted of the way in which Indian talent and 
innovativeness thrived under the adverse conditions brought about by Western 
economic sanctions and technology restraint regimes. Tamils, Telugus, Parsis, 
Punjabis, Bengalis, high-caste and low-caste, Muslim, Sikh, and Hindu all 
contributed to the effort. The underlying philosophy is that no single Indian state is 
capable of such a project and that only by working together can the diverse peoples 
of India accomplish such great deeds.141  
 
In short, nuclear energy stood for the Nehruvian vision of India as a modern, developed and 
proud nation state. This close linkage between the vision of India and the symbolic 
meaning of high science is tellingly described in Itty Abraham’s work ‘The Making of the 
Indian Atomic Bomb: Science, Secrecy and the Postcolonial State’142. Therein, Abraham 
describes nuclear technology as a modern fetish of the Nehruvian state: 
 
For the Indian citizen to become truly modern, s/he would need to internalise the 
norms of science, the so-called ‘scientific temper’ much beloved by Nehru, but this 
was obviously less amenable to state dictates. What the state could do was install 
massive, modern, awesome technological artefacts – dams, steel mills, new cities, 
nuclear reactors – objects embodying a different rationality, which would transform 
traditional landscapes through their sheer power; the hope was that the technological 
artefact would stand in relation to the people as a modern fetish143. 
 
And elsewhere, 
 
The postcolonial vision of India, summarised by Chatterjee144 as the ‘discourse of 
development’, was crucially dependent for its articulation on the idea of science. 
The idea of science, epitome of and metaphor for the modern, was a recurrent theme 
in anti-colonial nationalist thought as well, especially as it grappled with the 
seemingly opposed categories of ‘tradition’ (the authentic present) and ‘modernity’ 
(the desired future) while seeking to remain ‘Indian’.145  
 
Typical for the teleological worldview among elites in post-colonial societies, Nehru’s 
vision of a modern state implicitly accepted Western societies as being ‘modern’. India’s 
practice of secretly acquiring nuclear expertise from the West while publicly emphasising 
the indigenous development of high technology reflects the course of its modernisation: a 
process vacillating between emulation of and competition with the West. 
 
                                                 
141 Cohen, Stephen P.: op.cit.. 2002; p. 16. 
142 Abraham, Itty: The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb: Science, Secrecy and the Postcolonial State. 
London: Zed Books 1999. 
143 ibid.; p. 20. 
144 Chatterjee, Partha: op.cit.. 1993. 
145 Abraham, Itty: op.cit.; p.26. 
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While clandestine scientific cooperation was indispensable, the official understanding of 
the nuclear issue as a national endeavour made it suitable as an ideal global playing field 
for inter-state competition. As such, nuclear technology symbolised the form of modernity 
to which India aspired.  Nuclear development proved to be a compelling device for nation-
building; India cast itself as a solitary state actor engaged in an international competition, 
 
The dynamics of this inter-state competition set two basic parameters for the Indian nuclear 
programme: excessive secrecy and immanent urgency.  Furthermore, the nature of the 
competition, in which India sparred with other (particularly Western) states for supremacy 
in the rather abstract field of high science, necessitated symbolic, emblematic forms to 
demonstrate technological achievements. India’s first major opportunity to demonstrate its 
avant-garde position in the nuclear field was at the first UN Conference on Atomic Energy, 
which took place in Geneva in 1955. In a move to avoid a deadlock caused by Cold War 
rivalry, a majority of the delegations to the conference chose Homi Bhabha, the head of 
India’s Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), as the potentially most neutral and least 
objectionable president. This nomination was enthusiastically welcomed by India’s media. 
However, it was not celebrated for what it really was: a great success for Nehru’s policy of 
non-alignment. Instead, it was widely perceived as world recognition of India’s scientific 
advancement and growing importance as a modern, powerful member of the international 
community. This form of demonstration, which would eventually be ritualised through 
regular events praising and reassuring India’s prowess, already showed some of its specific 
features in 1955: the scientific community’s self-portrayal as the spearhead of India’s 
transition to modernity, the uncritical and enthusiastic coverage of these events by India’s 
media, and the bandwagoning of India’s political elite in order to profit from the scientists’ 
popularity. In the course of this competition, mastering the atom became an end in itself 
and nuclear technology developed along lines far removed from those originally intended; 
namely, as a tool to either improve India’s development through the production of cheap 
power or to enhance the country’s security through the manufacture of nuclear weapons. 
In view of these dynamics, a clear-cut distinction between the civilian and the military 
nuclear programme was only relevant for outside governments, strategic analysts and IR 
specialists. For Indian decision-makers this distinction was of minor relevance, as both 
applications subserved indistinguishable goals. 
 
6.1.2 Nehruvian Moralism 
 
Nehru’s moralist approach to foreign policy is summarised by Sreeram S. Chaulia as 
follows: 
 
All of Nehru’s salient foreign policy tenets – non-alignment, Panchsheel, anti-
colonialism, disarmament and One World – were premised upon two central 
Gandhian paradigms of tolerance and means justifying ends. Nehru reiterated in 
foreign policy pronouncements that India was ‘essentially a gentle and peace-loving 
country’ and hence incapable of aggressive power-political actions. Bloc rivalries 
and Cold Wars were inedible to the Indian psyche since they cultivated hatred and 
demonised one half of the world as sub-human and evil. India would crusade 
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against arms races and nuclear proliferation as they were manifestations of a ‘crisis 
of spirit’ negating the dignity of human life and a ‘strange way to ensure security by 
adding to every conceivable danger’. Instead of inaugurating a ‘new civilisation’ 
based on tolerance and international co-operation after two devastating wars, the 
Superpowers had betrayed the peoples of the world by continuing to deal in 
realpolitik terms.146 
 
As further analysis will show, a certain gap existed between Nehru’s sublime rhetoric and 
his actual policy decisions – above all those concerning the nuclear course of the country. 
Whatever practical meaning Nehruvian moral postulates might have had for the course of 
India’s nuclear build up, they greatly influenced the discourse on the nuclear issue as well 
as the attitudes of the elite involved therein. The concept ‘keeping the nuclear option open,’ 
which dominated the nuclear discourse for more than three decades, was nothing more than 
a rhetorical attempt to overcome the contradiction between India’s development of nuclear 
weapons capabilities and Nehruvian moralism. Another dominant feature of India’s nuclear 
discourse, the perception of its ‘victimisation’ in international affairs, emanates from 
Nehruvian moralism as well. Up until the present day, a wide consensus exists among 
India’s elite on the historiographic view: India was forced to build up nuclear weapons 
because of outside pressures — either from the cynical nuclear policies of the imperial 
West or from security threats by malicious and aggressive neighbours. Any proactive 
nuclear proliferation efforts by India itself are still largely denied within the Indian 
discourse — even after its self-declaration as a nuclear state in 1998 – as acknowledging an 
active Indian role in the nuclear competition would break the Nehruvian moral taboo. 
 
The decisive impact of Nehru’s moral postulates on India’s foreign policy debate benefited 
from the fact that India’s foreign and security policy has been predominantly determined by 
the Prime Minister. His or her moral beliefs and personal identity shaped the Indian nuclear 
policy more than informed strategic analysis.  
Since the nuclear question emerged in the early 1950s, India’s Prime Ministers were 
agonising over two contradicting ideas about India’s role within the community of states:  
 
Two vital norms coexist uneasily within this identity: one, India should achieve 
major power status in the international system and, two, India should demonstrate 
moral superiority over the world’s dominant states, which have been perceived as 
exploitative, overly militarised, and insensitive to the needs and aspirations of the 
world’s majority of poor people. These two norms have clashed in the nuclear 
policy arena.147 
 
The difficulty in accommodating both norms became apparent in Nehru’s speeches in the 
early 1960s, in which he explicitly announced India’s intention to capable of manufacturing 
nuclear weapons while simultaneously declaring that India would never build them. This 
                                                 
146 Chaulia, Sreeram S.: BJP, India’s Foreign Policy and the ‘Realist Alternative’ to the Nehruvian Tradition. 
In: International Politics, Vol. 39, June 2002; p 218. 
147 Perkovich, George: op.cit.. 1999; p.448. 
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stance has often been misunderstood by Western listeners as hypocritical rhetoric. It was 
nevertheless Nehru’s attempt to uphold his moral stance and, at the same time, find India’s 
place in an international system that encouraged possession of (practically unusable) 
weapons for determining standing and power.  
 
Although rhetorically Nehru maintained that India’s nuclear infrastructure served purely 
civilian purposes, he maintained India’s right to develop the nuclear weapons option, i.e. to 
construct the nuclear installations necessary to build a bomb. Until 1962, the anti-bomb 
rhetoric was most outspokenly applied by Nehru’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Krishna 
Menon.  Stephen P. Cohen summarised Nehru’s and Menon’s attitudes on the issue as 
follows: 
 
Nehru was strongly opposed to an Indian nuclear weapons program, although he did 
not foreclose the possibility of the ‘option’ strategy. His closest confidant and 
adviser, V. K. Krishna Menon, was even more anti-bomb... . Nehru and Menon 
could keep Bhabha and the scientists in check by diverting their energy to the 
civilian (i.e. ‘peaceful’) program with a bit of fudging on the side.148 
 
In the first fifteen years after Independence, Nehru’s idealistic foreign policy put India into 
a well established and often admired position within the international community. Its 
commitment to non-alignment and morality (instead of power) set a rather narrow range for 
the course of India’s nuclear programme. The civilian nuclear industry was the prototype of 
large-scale, state-run industrial sectors, which formed the backbone of Nehru’s socialist 
economic strategy that aimed at transforming India into a modern and industrialised nation. 
The heavy investment in the nuclear sector by the Indian government and the carte blanche 
it gave to Homi Bhabha, the leader of the nuclear establishment, inevitably got Nehru into a 
tight spot concerning potential military applications of the new technology. Until 1962, the 
gravity of the established moral standards overshadowed all pro-bomb dynamics in India’s 
national interest composition and kept its foreign policy on a strictly negative attitude 
towards the nuclear option. Any shift in this rigorous declaratory stance would have been 
perceived as a personal loss of face by Nehru. 
 
6.1.3. Development and Security 
 
Throughout the history of India’s nuclear programme, the idea of equality among states as a 
characteristic of a just and fair world order proved to be one of its central driving forces. 
This idealistic motive was inherent in the social justice and equal opportunity embodied by 
India’s civilian nuclear power production as well as in India’s struggle against the 
discriminatory nuclear world order laid down in the NPT. The emergence of the principle 
of equality and its significance for the states’ interaction with each other is described by 
Hans J. Morgenthau:  
 
                                                 
148 Cohen, Stephen P.: op.cit.. 2002; p. 16. 
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Throughout history, mankind has been divided by drastic differences in standards of 
living. What sets the present situation apart is the awareness of these differences by 
the advantaged and disadvantaged members of mankind owing to the modern 
technologies of communications. That awareness coincides with the ascendancy of 
the principle of equality, both of opportunity and condition, throughout the world. 
Hence the aspirations of the disadvantaged to a narrowing of the gap between rich 
and poor – and the moral embarrassment of the rich in the face of these aspirations. 
It goes without saying that these aspirations and the attendant moral embarrassment 
– both incapable of satisfaction or relief on a worldwide scale – are extensively used 
as ideological justifications and rationalizations for specific political aims in the 
service of concrete national interests.149 
 
When the USA and the Soviet Union launched their respective nuclear programmes in the 
context of the ongoing Second World War, their prime objective was to develop an ultimate 
and decisive weapon. This centrality of military applications continued to play a crucial 
role throughout the emergence of the Cold War. The events at Hiroshima and Nagasaki had 
proven the effectiveness of these weapons, creating a myth of ultimate omnipotence. The 
technology’s complexity and the fact that it was mastered only by a limited circle of 
advanced states further fuelled the aspirations of other powers to go for the bomb. Britain 
and France soon followed suit.  
 
Starting with China, several Third World countries initiated their nuclear programmes not 
only for military purposes, but above all as a potential source of energy which would satisfy 
their growing power demands in the course of industrialisation. After Dwight D. 
Eisenhower launched the ‘Atoms for Peace’ initiative in 1953, promoting the civilian use of 
nuclear energy, several so-called second generation nuclear powers initiated their own 
civilian programmes.  These either rejected any military potential or considered such it only 
as a by-product. 
 
In the case of India, the nuclear programme is often referred to as a prime example of a 
second generation power’s programme, in that producing large quantities of cheap energy 
for India’s economic development remained paramount, and the nuclear weapons option 
was developed only later, on top of the existing civilian nuclear infrastructure. The latest 
publications considerably weaken this interpretation150.  In this view, the potential for 
military applications has been an inherent part of the nuclear planning of India’s scientific 
community right from the outset. India’s nuclear installations were designed to suit both 
civilian and military purposes, and construction of facilities for manufacturing nuclear 
devices had already been started in the 1950s – well before the two incidents commonly 
referred to as the incentives for India’s nuclear weapons programme: the Sino-Indian war 
of 1962 and the first Chinese nuclear test in 1964.  Despite public denegation, the Indian 
leadership under Jawaharlal Nehru appeared to have approved, or at least tacitly tolerated 
this course.  
                                                 
149 Morgenthau, Hans J.: op.cit.; p. 107. 
150 see: Abraham, Itty: op.cit.. 1998; and Perkovich, George: op.cit.. 1999. 
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For India’s elite, and particularly for Jawaharlal Nehru himself, the nuclear issue was rarely 
assessed for its true potential to solve India’s energy problem alone, nor was its potential to 
improve India’s security given any careful thought. Rather, it was more regarded as a 
symbolic instrument to show India’s progress towards modernity to domestic as well as 
foreign audiences.  This attitude explains Nehru’s relative disinterest in the technical details 
of the programme. He restricted his authority in the nuclear field to an easy-going 
supervision of its broader course, and largely abstained from interference. Only 
sporadically was India’s leadership forced to drop its comfortable aloofness and make clear 
decisions about either pursuing the optimal development of atomic energy capacities or 
those with the option for military applicability – less optimal for civilian energy production. 
Jawaharlal Nehru always chose the second option. Thus, despite widespread belief, the 
initiation of India’s nuclear weapons build-up was not a secondary effect of its civilian 
nuclear programme, but the expression of the elite, and therefore Jawaharlal Nehru’s, 
political will. For instance, the AEC’s decision to base its nuclear programme on both 
plutonium reprocessing and breeder technology at a time when the development of this 
technology was only in its beginnings – its success in producing nuclear energy was more 
than uncertain – could not be explained purely in terms of economic rationality. The only 
existing applications for plutonium in the 1950s were military in nature.  
 
The Indian case illustrates the inadequacy of the common distinction between civilian and 
military applications when it comes to tracing the motives behind a state’s decision to 
launch a nuclear programme. For Nehru, the nuclear question has never been a 
dichotomous choice between economic development and security. Nor is the academic 
debate about whether security is a necessary precondition for economic development or 
vice versa of much practical relevance for India’s nuclear course. Instead, nuclear 
technology and its accompanying myths presented an attractive device to symbolise the 
vision Nehru had for a proud and strong nation: modernity, scientific advancement, self-
reliance, prowess, international prestige and respect. National welfare though economic 
growth and national power through military might were thereby two interrelated objectives 
of the same Nehruvian vision.  
The nuclear energy sector fitted perfectly into Nehru’s economic model, which aimed at 
self-sufficiency, central planning and state monopoly of key economic sectors. This 
concept of a strong state reflected the zeitgeist of the early post-war era. Further, central 
planning was considered crucial for the nation-building process India was struggling with 
after decolonisation and partition in 1947. 
 
The linkage between military prowess, symbolised by nuclear technology, and India’s 
efforts to develop into a modern, self-sufficient, and proud nation state was not as openly 
discussed among India’s elite as the omnipresent issues of nuclear energy, economic 
development, and modernisation. Similarly to the modernisation-through-economic-growth 
theme, the simple logic of increased security through increased power capabilities reflected 
the zeitgeist of the early Cold War era. The Realist idea of a monocausal relationship 
between the build-up of national power capabilities and the increase of national security 
emerged in the 1950s, just at the time when the nuclear issue began entering the Indian 
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domestic discourse. The historical context in which this idea is rooted is described by Itty 
Abraham: 
 
National security, which officially takes as its purpose the strengthening of the 
military might of the state, the protection of the territories claimed in its name, and 
the conservation of the way of life identified as the cultural norm, is as much a time-
dependent and place-specific ideology as national development. Again a post-War 
phenomenon, national security has a number of genealogies, but is probably most 
influenced by the histories of the United States, aptly symbolised by the translation of 
the Department of War into the Department of Defence in 1947. National security in 
this mode can be summarised as a totalising condition of civilian militarization 
beyond simply border defence or even inter-state war, the indistinguishability of war 
and peace in relation to the practices of state security institutions and the panoply of 
legal instruments that support their activities, the militarisation of information and the 
enormous growth in intelligence agencies, related to which can be observed ever 
increasing degrees of state surveillance, deeply dependent on technology, which 
identify social threats to established order both within and without the formal 
territories of the state, and the increasing scientisation of the practices of war to such 
an extent that the battlefield has become increasingly a virtual space. In short, 
‘national security’ expresses the paranoias of the modern state; it remains a major 
contradiction within democratic states; indeed the extent of the technological 
penetration of society by the national security apparatus is usually in direct proportion 
to the wealth of the state. 
While national security can be said to be a truly global phenomenon at this point, the 
modular form was imported into the third world along with national development in 
the early post-War period, which gives this combination a distinct history from that 
moment on151. 
 
The emergence of Realist paradigms as the widely acknowledged rules of the game in the 
international arena posed an enormous challenge to Nehru’s vision of an order based on 
norms of peaceful co-existence, not on military capabilities. While he opposed any large 
scale military build-up, he nevertheless fostered the development of nuclear capabilities. 
This contradiction, which puzzled the community of staunch Realists, can only be 
understood by looking at the symbolic value that mastering nuclear technology had for 
Nehru’s vision of India. The inter-state competition for scientific excellence in the nuclear 
field was India’s ‘virtual battlefield’, and Nehru’s permanent argument with his Western 
counterparts along normative, abstract ideas was his preferred form of shadow boxing 
therein. As inherent to most contests, the nuclear competition soon gained a dynamic of its 
own, in that India continued to develop nuclear energy capacities even after it became clear 
that they could not be produced in an economically efficient way or satisfy India’s 
increasing energy demand. Similarly, the development of nuclear weapons capabilities 
continued largely detached from changing international conditions. The nuclear 
competition thus grew out of the concept of ‘national security’ in its narrow sense. 
                                                 
151 Itty Abraham. 1998; pp. 12, 13. 
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6.1.4. Pre-Independence Developments 
 
The initiation of the Indian nuclear energy program, which can be traced back to the pre-
independence period of the early 1940s, is closely linked to the name Homi Bhabha, the 
leading figure in the nuclear scientific community until his death in 1966. 
Returning from Britain in 1939, where he had studied nuclear physics at Cambridge 
University, he started efforts to set up an indigenous Indian institution to promote 
fundamental research in the natural sciences. While his efforts were often displayed in 
retrospect as an act of idealism for the cause of India, his true motivations are better looked 
at in terms of the global and domestic political compulsions of the times. Britain 
encountered hard times while facing an existential threat from Nazi Germany and a 
powerful independence movement in India, its major colony. In these desperate times, 
British patriotism caused a strong nationalisation in all key areas of economic and social 
life. In British academia, and particularly in the disciplines that were considered as being of 
strategic importance for national security, no space was left for a young, aspiring scholar of 
Indian origin. Thus, Bhabha’s promising career within Britain ended before it had started. 
His commitment to the creation of an indigenous research infrastructure after his return to 
India was less an act of patriotism, but rather acknowledgement of India’s lack of adequate 
research institutions that could enable him to continue high-level research in his field. 
 
As the leaders of the forthcoming independent Indian government were overwhelmed with 
difficulties, the only way for Bhabha to generate the substantial funds and to achieve the 
necessary institutional backing for his cause was to give it a more attractive meaning than 
the banal goal of promoting physics research. Attaching a symbolic meaning to the nuclear 
programme – displaying it as the spearhead of India’s quest for modernity and self-reliance 
– was its inherent and existential part right from the beginning. 
 
In 1944, Bhabha founded the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research, which became the 
main research centre for fundamental physics and the nucleus of India’s nuclear 
programme. In the same period, the pre-independent government set up the Board of 
Atomic Energy Research, with Bhabha as its chair, which would eventually become India’s 
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) in 1948. 
 
At the time of independence in 1947, Bhabha was acting as India’s unofficial representative 
in various negotiations on scientific cooperation. His strategy was to offer barter deals in 
which India traded its rich stocks of minerals (crucial for a nuclear chain reaction) in 
exchange for nuclear knowledge transfers.  
 
6.1.5. The National Endeavour 
 
According to India’s official historiography, its civilian nuclear programme developed 
military applications only after India’s leadership recognized the Western tendency to rely 
on nuclear weapons for national prestige and international advantage. Many scholars 
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challenge this view by claiming that the military component was inherent to the nuclear 
programme right from its beginning. 
 
The early years are interesting for a researcher because they lay the ground for any 
subsequent theory on whether India stumbled towards a bomb, or made deliberate 
progress towards it. Most government sources adopt a distinctly ambivalent attitude 
to this question. They aver that they were pushed into making the bomb by the 
cynicism and indifference of the international order, which ignored India’s cry for 
an ethical and moral approach to nuclear weapons and disarmament. At the same 
time the very same sources point with pride and satisfaction to the sagacity and 
statesmanship of Nehru, Bhabha, Shastri, etc., in safeguarding India’s security by 
encouraging the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) to work surreptitiously on 
the bomb. There is also a splinter group in India which believes that the scientific 
community was and is a virtual sub-government. This is not entirely without basis, 
since the scientific community could hardly be directed by a group of grassroot 
politicians.152 
 
Right from its outset, Bhabha was aware of the dual-use nature of the nuclear programme. 
In the early 1950s, he not only accepted the potential military use of the programme, but 
also sought to create the means and know-how to acquire nuclear capabilities for military 
purposes. India’s strong opposition to the growing efforts of the international community to 
establish restrictions and safeguards on fissile material reflected Bhabha’s stance. 
 
Bhabha’s plans for acquiring nuclear capabilities were carried out in a rather clandestine 
fashion, and it is unclear to what extent Nehru knew about it in detail. His doctrine of 
achieving status for India strictly through peaceful means and his view of nuclear weapons 
as highly immoral devices did not allow him to pursue their development – at least in his 
official statements. He nevertheless recognised the fact that other states actively used 
nuclear weapons as tools to gain international status and advantage. Nehru discerned the 
contradiction between his quest for international status – necessitating keeping the nuclear 
option open – and his moral concept of a peaceful world order. As George Perkovich wrote:  
 
Closer scrutiny, however, reveals that Nehru also accepted, albeit reticently and 
ambivalently, the potential military deterrent and international power embodied in 
nuclear weapon capability. ... . The moralist visionary Nehru abhorred the wanton 
destructiveness of nuclear weapons and saw them as anathema to the unique spirit 
of India. ... At the same time, however, there was another Nehru, the ambitious, 
realist prime minister who recognized that nuclear weapon capability could enhance 
India’s status and power in the West-dominated world... .153 
 
Nehru’s undisputed position as India’s leader and his great moral authority within the 
Indian polity combined with his and Bhabha’s informality and secrecy in determined the 
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course of the nuclear programme and in preventing the emergence of a broader, more 
informed public debate on the issue. Within parliament, the nuclear issue was debated only 
twice during the first fifteen years of independence. The first time was in 1948, when the 
Constituent Assembly passed the Atomic Energy Bill. The second time was fourteen years 
later when the Lok Sabha debated and passed the amended Atomic Energy Act of 1962. 
Due to the absence of any informed and committed debate among parliamentarians, in the 
media, or in the public as a whole, the democratic mechanisms of checks and balances did 
not function effectively. Decisions on the nuclear issue were, trusting in their moral 
integrity and technical expertise, left to Nehru and Bhabha. Both men made decisions 
grounded in moral convictions, status orientation and awareness of the technically possible. 
 
Table 6.1.: Chronology of India’s Nuclear Course, 1947 – 1960 
 
Year 
 
International Events Domestic Events Technological Achievements 
1947  Independence Cooperation on Nuclear Technology 
with UK, Canada 
1948  Atomic Energy Act, 1948, 
Creation of Indian Atomic 
Energy Commission (AEC) 
 
1949 First nuclear test by Soviet Union
 
Victory of Communist Party in 
Chinese civil war 
  
1950 First test of a Hydrogen bomb by 
the USA 
  
1951   UK agrees to deliver construction 
plans for 1MW Apsara research 
reactor 
1952 
 
First British nuclear test   
1953 ‘Atoms for Peace’ Program by 
President Eisenhower 
 
First test of a hydrogen bomb by 
Soviet Union 
  
1954 Commissioning of first nuclear 
power plant by Soviet Union 
Creation of the Department of 
Atomic Energy (DAE) 
 
Creation of the Atomic Energy 
Establishment at Trombay 
 
1955 UN Conference on Atomic 
Energy, Geneva 
 Purchase of 40MW CIRUS research 
reactor from Canada 
1956   1MW Apsara research reactor goes 
critical, no IAEA safeguards 
1957    
1958   Construction of plutonium 
reprocessing plant at Trombay 
1959 Chinese Occupation of Tibet and 
Aksai Chin 
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Table 6.1. (continued) 
1960   CIRUS 40MW research reactor goes 
critical, no IAEA safeguards 
 
Purchase of 2 light-water LEU 
200MW reactors from USA at 
Tarapur  
 
Purchase of 2 natural uranium 
200MW RAPS reactors from 
Canada at Kota  
 
Nuclear weapons were not seriously considered as strategic devices until 1959. In this year, 
information about the secret Chinese occupation of Aksai Chin coincided with rumours of 
progress in the Chinese nuclear weapons programme, leading to a halting debate among 
India’s strategic elite about whether it should pursue a nuclear weapons option to counter 
the perceived Chinese threat, or adhere to the principle of peaceful coexistence. The calls 
for open acquisition of nuclear weapons were yet rare, as the moral stance of Nehru was 
still strong enough to uphold the nuclear taboo. At this time, a characteristic feature of the 
future nuclear debate was already visible, that is, its cautious rhetorical distinction between 
acquiring a nuclear option and acquiring nuclear weapons. In 1953, the initiation of the 
‘Atoms for Peace’ programme by Dwight D. Eisenhower gave a boost to India’s quest for 
nuclear technology. The technologically advanced countries put their efforts at limiting the 
spread of nuclear expertise on the backburner and started to promote its peaceful uses in 
Third World countries, including peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) for mining or canal 
digging. This policy shift had several motives: extensive lobbying efforts by the nuclear 
industry; a naive belief in the benefits of modern technology; a gross misjudgement of the 
usefulness of PNEs; and misleading claims about the technical distinctiveness of PNEs and 
nuclear warheads. 
 
Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, the development of nuclear capabilities by the 
Homi Bhabha-led scientific establishment was progressing incrementally and 
independently from political directives, as well as strategic considerations. Political 
legitimisation of this progress was given in a rather post hoc manner.  
 
6.1.6. Institutional Developments 
 
The basic institutional structure of India’s nuclear programme was laid down in the Atomic 
Energy Act passed by the Constituent Assembly in 1948. Although the Act did not 
explicitly mention the development of a nuclear weapons structure as one of the 
programme’s objectives, its careful wording avoided any provisions that would exclude it 
in the future: 
 
... the Bhabha paper (Atomic Energy Act) put up to the government in 1948 was not 
entirely innocent. The background to it and reading between the lines leaves 
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posterity with no doubt that Bhabha realised that a national nuclear programme 
would eventually acquire certain military objective.154 
 
The 3-person Indian Atomic Energy Commission was created as a supreme supervisory 
body, with Homi Bhabha, K.S. Krishnan and S.S. Bhatnagar, the former serving as 
chairman. Next to their membership in the AEC, all three held several other leading 
positions in the nuclear establishment. The AEC reported only to the Prime Minister, while 
Parliament had no control over its decisions. The AEC was the key institution of the 
emerging, highly opaque nuclear decision-making structure. The smooth transfer of 
institutional authority from the main nuclear decision-making body, the Board of Research 
on Atomic Energy (within the CSIR, or Council of Scientific and Industrial Research) to 
the AEC in 1948 was assured by the twin capacity of S.S. Bhatnagar as member of the 
AEC and director-general of CSIR. 
 
As illustrated in the previous section, India’s elite perceived the nuclear build-up as a 
national endeavour within a global competition, one in which success depended on time-
efficiency and, above all, secrecy. India’s nuclear decision-making institutions were 
designed along these two central requirements. It was put in the hands of only a few 
decision makers who led in an autocratic, informal, and opaque fashion. These nuclear 
policy elite carefully kept their decisions out of parliamentary or public debate, as this 
would, in their view, contravene their objectives, secrecy and urgency. 
 
As chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Bhabha held the key position of the 
nuclear establishment. However, his enormous influence derived not from his office, but 
from his close friendship with Jawaharlal Nehru. Both men shared the same vision of India: 
a modern, strong, and respected member of the international community. In accordance 
with the zeitgeist of their times, this status was to be achieved above all through economic 
modernisation and technological advancement in general, and the ‘mastering of the atom’ 
in particular. From the start of the nuclear programme in the 1940s until Nehru’s death in 
1964, virtually all major decisions in the nuclear field were made by Bhabha and 
sanctioned by Nehru. In a move to align the institutional framework to the supreme position 
of Bhabha, the government changed the constitution of the AEC in 1958: Its chairman was 
given a veto right, enabling him to overrule any decision made by the board of the AEC. 
Secrecy was further reinforced by introducing severe punishments for the circulation of 
classified, nuclear-related data. 
 
Accordingly, the Prime Minister managed the allocation of funds in a somewhat autocratic 
and highly opaque manner. Immediately after the Atomic Energy Bill had passed the 
Constituent Assembly in 1948, the CSIR recommended to Nehru the allocation of Rs. 80 
lakhs to the nuclear sector for the construction of a reactor and supplementary facilities. 
Bhabha then contacted Nehru with a request for Rs. 100 lakhs over four years, to be made 
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available to the AEC155. Nehru fully accepted Bhabha’s demands. This informal financing 
practice continued thereafter.  
 
In sum, until 1961, the institutional foundations laid down in the formative phase of the 
Indian nuclear programme reflected the preferences of the nuclear scientists around Homi 
Bhabha and India’s leadership under Jawaharlal Nehru. The institutional arrangements 
guaranteed a maximum of secrecy, an essential prerequisite for maintaining the myth of 
nuclear technology as the symbol of India’s path to modernity. 
 
The ineffective checks and balances by either the parliament or the public, and the 
exclusion of other scientists outside Bhabha’s clique, however, proved to be the major 
structural flaw of India’s nuclear development in the time to follow. As George Perkovich 
wrote:  
 
There was no system of checking and balancing Bhabha, no open means by which 
scientists could inform political decision makers of costs and benefits of particular 
policies. This lack of mechanisms for independently evaluating the AEC’s claims 
and proposals would handicap India for decades.156 
 
6.1.7. Self-Reliance and International Cooperation 
 
The high-flying rhetoric and the immoderate attribution of various symbolic meanings to 
the nuclear issue sent public expectations to unrealistic heights, increasing the urgency for 
the group around Bhabha to demonstrate its progress in the nuclear field. Quick progress, 
however, was only possible for the scientists if they could fall back on existing expertise 
from Western programmes. On the other hand, making this dependency on knowledge 
transfers of Western knowledge public would severely damage the nuclear issue’s image as 
an indigenous, national endeavour within the global competition, as such destroying much 
of its symbolic value. Therefore, the primary strategy of the scientists was to use the 
secretiveness in which the nuclear programme was embedded to acquire the necessary 
knowledge from the West, while simultaneously displaying any progress in the nuclear 
field as an indigenous achievement. The success of this policy was facilitated by the 
euphoria among the media and public at large, in which any doubt about the indigenousness 
of the programme would have been perceived as unpatriotic.  
 
Homi Bhabha started his tour through various Western capitals as early as the mid-1940s, 
prior to India’s independence. He conducted the negotiations in the name of the Indian 
government despite his lack of any official status. His barter strategy – to offer India’s rich 
mineral resources in exchange for the transfer of Western expertise – proved to be quite 
attractive for his Western counterparts, and soon he was able to meet agreements with the 
British, Canadians, and French. The prime objective of the Indian nuclear programme in its 
initial phase was to set up a nuclear reactor. As a matter of urgency, the reactor was to be 
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established as soon as possible and at all costs. Only after the installations necessary for its 
indigenous operation were complete would further infrastructure follow (e.g. facilities to 
extract fissile material, to manufacture fuel rods, or to produce heavy water). 
 
The time pressure under which the scientists worked had significant influence on their 
decision to choose natural uranium as the basis of their reactor design; it was the best 
known and most accessible technology of its time. While the natural uranium reactor 
technology was used by India’s main cooperating partners (UK, Canada, and France), the 
alternative technology, based on enriched uranium, was mainly developed by the USA and 
Soviet Union. Cooperation with these two states was rather delicate for India. Until 
Eisenhower’s fundamental policy shift in 1953, the US administration aimed at preventing, 
or at least tightly controlling the spread of nuclear technology. Addressing the USA on the 
nuclear issue not only appeared to have little benefit, but would surely be debated within 
the US Congress and American public, thereby causing the kind of publicity the Indian 
government was eager to avoid. The US decision to drop its restrictive policy and open its 
technology to the world, Eisenhower’s 1953 ‘Atoms for Peace’ programme, came too late, 
as India had already opted for natural uranium technology as the basis of its nuclear 
programme. Approaching the Soviet Union, on the other hand, appeared similarly delicate, 
as it would alienate India’s Western partners.  
 
In 1954, Homi Bhabha managed to strike a deal with his former colleagues in the British 
nuclear establishment, eventually enabling him to fulfil his aim of setting up India’s first 
atomic reactor. Bhabha purchased the blueprints of a small and rudimentary 1 MW research 
reactor, based on medium-enriched uranium, from the British Atomic Industry. The 
‘Apsara’ reactor was built at India’s nuclear centre at Trombay in Maharashtra, north of 
Bombay. Its commissioning in August 1956 was well staged as a forceful demonstration of 
India’s indigenous brilliance. The enthusiastic media coverage of the event reflected the 
widely accepted role of nuclear technology as source of national pride within the context of 
the global competition for high science and modernity. 
 
In 1955, one year before the commissioning of the Apsara reactor, Homi Bhabha reached 
an agreement with Canada over the acquisition of blueprints for a 40 MW research reactor. 
The design of the so called ‘CIRUS’ reactor differed from the Apsara reactor in two 
fundamental aspects. First, it was fuelled with natural uranium instead of medium enriched 
uranium. As stocks of natural uranium were abundant, India was no longer dependent on 
the import of enriched uranium fuel rods. Secondly, the CIRUS reactor was moderated with 
heavy water instead of light water, forcing India’s nuclear scientists to hastily set-up 
installations for heavy water production. Construction on the first production site of heavy 
water was started at Nangal in 1958 and commenced operation in 1962, two years after the 
commissioning of the CIRUS reactor at Trombay. Despite the operation of the Nangal 
plant, indigenous heavy water production did not cover India’ demands, making it 
dependent on supplies from Western -- particularly US American -- sources157. 
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After having set up two research reactors at Trombay, India’s scientists still did not start 
work on reactors to actually produce nuclear energy, which had been the original and 
nominal raison d’être of their programme. In 1960, negotiations started with various 
potential suppliers of commercial reactors. The USA agreed to build two 210 MW reactors 
fuelled with low–enriched uranium as well as mixed natural uranium and plutonium oxide 
(MOX) at the Tarapur site, in northern Maharashtra. While Bhabha was hoping to satisfy 
public expectations of the nuclear programme by quickly setting up facilities that could 
economically produce nuclear energy, the acquisition of these reactors nevertheless came 
with two main structural weaknesses. First, full IAEA safeguard provisions applied on 
imported reactors, putting the Tarapur reactors under tight international control. Secondly, 
India had no uranium enrichment capabilities and would not be able to construct the 
necessary ultracentrifuge plants in the near future. This meant that India continued to 
depend on US supplies of enriched uranium fuel rods for decades to come. Despite these 
problems, the US-American reactors were commissioned in 1969. 
 
In 1964, India further signed an agreement with Canada to built two 220MW CANDU158-
type reactors at Kota, Rajasthan. The reactors, fuelled with natural uranium and moderated 
with heavy water, would eventually become the forerunners of indigenously built reactors. 
While these two reactors were commissioned under full IAEA safeguard provisions in 1972 
and 1980, respectively, their indigenously built successors were not subject to such 
provisions. 
 
 
6.2. Establishing the Nuclear Weapons Option 
 
6.2.1. Nuclear Energy for India’s Development: The End of a Myth 
 
When did India opt for nuclear weapons? Scholars of International Relations generally 
allude to China’s first nuclear test in 1964 as the key event that drove India to go nuclear. 
They agree on the assumption that in a regional or global strategic set-up in which one 
power acquires nuclear weapons, a strategic compulsion emerges for the rival power to 
follow suit and build a nuclear arsenal of its own. This strategic compulsion was thought to 
be even more imperative for India in 1964, especially considering the hostility in the 
bilateral relations with China after India’s defeat in the Sino-Indian war two years earlier. 
In this context, the fact that India abstained from a clear course towards nuclearisation is a 
major puzzle for IR scholars. 
 
Instead, one major pattern of India’s nuclear development gradually emerged during the 
1960s from within the domestic realm. India’s elite and interested public started to realise 
that nuclear energy would not meet the expectations put on it (i.e. the magic potion for 
India’s transformation into a modern state). Consequently, India’s policy-makers were 
confronted with increasing pressures to legitimise the generous funds allocated to the 
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programme. Even after the acquisition of four commercial reactors in the early 1960s, the 
programme was decades away from providing the substantial amount of energy needed to 
satisfy India’s growing demands.  
 
In view of the severe structural problems of the nuclear programme’s civilian aspect, the 
nuclear scientific community, which had been overwhelmed with praise at the 1956 
commissioning of the Apsara reactor, was only a few years later facing increasing pressures 
to vindicate its avant-garde position in India’s modernisation. The prospect of losing their 
status as national heroes, instead becoming the managers of badly functioning, inefficient, 
and uneconomic power plants, appeared unimaginable. This difficult situation is described 
by Itty Abraham as follows:  
 
The AEC’s hard-won ability to produce effective scientific results was irrelevant 
when its principal objective was producing cheap electrical energy for national 
development. ... . The reactor’s performance ratios had to be extremely high in order 
to service consumers adequately; mistakes or breakdowns in the supply of 
electricity would be immediately evident. If here were repeated failures, the public 
would soon realise that atomic energy was not he great panacea it had been given to 
understand. The criterion governing the activities of the atomic engineers was now 
something called ‘efficiency’, and evaluations of performance were made on the 
relative cost per atomic energy unit produced versus other sources of energy such as 
coal, oil, or hydro-power. It is this last development that most vividly illustrates the 
enormity of the changes being introduced”159. 
 
Both political and scientific leaders had strong incentives to perpetuate the nuclear 
programme’s symbolic value over and above the mere production of energy. 
 
During the first fifteen years of independence, the multiple and interrelated meanings of 
nuclear technology were equally attractive for various sections among India’s elite:  
 
Until this moment, a great source of strength for the Indian atomic scientists had 
been the multiple valences of atomic energy. It had meant a source of cheap 
electrical energy to developmentalist, a means of overcoming neo-colonial 
domination to nationalists, a sign of masculinity and intellectual prowess to 
scientists, a resource for state power to socialists, and an instrument of foreign 
policy to realists and militarists. The overdetermined meaning of the sign ‘atomic 
energy’ was precisely the source of its immense influence in postcolonial India.160 
 
But as soon as the nuclear programme mythical status as a cornerstone of India’s 
development was fading during the 1960s, both nuclear scientists and nuclear policy 
makers increasingly focused on its value as an instrument of foreign policy, i.e. its potential 
to increase the nation’s military power. In this context, the emerging nuclear threat from 
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China was less an immediate security imperative – turning India’s nuclear programme 
towards military applications – but rather a catalyst for its reorientation from the civilian to 
the military realm. 
 
The small likelihood of carrying out the development project combined with 
potential loss of what was distinctively Indian about the atomic energy programme 
could only be resolved by recombining the interests of the atomic complex and the 
state around the foundations of state identity: it meant an alliance with national 
security. This functional reason – redefining atomic energy in order to save the 
postcolonial state – is framed slightly differently when seen from the point of view 
of the AEC. For the scientists, redefining the atomic energy project meant retaining 
their identity as scientists, rather than technologists, giving them a new lease of life 
while they grappled with a new scientific problem. But how would they do this? 
Their response ... was to situate atomic energy within another realm of state activity, 
equally central to the state’s ideological mission, equally justified in terms of raison 
d’état: they decided to build bombs.161 
 
Concurrent to this gradual paradigm shift, the target figures for nuclear energy production 
issued by the scientists became increasingly quixotic. In the late 1950s, the AEC issued a 
plan to install 1000 MW of nuclear energy in the period between 1960/61 and 1965/66. 
When one assumes a minimum construction time of 5 years for a large commercial reactor, 
which would then produce 200 MW at best, this figure was far out of reach. India’s 
Planning Commission – the authoritative body for the allocation of funds to the AEC – 
finally approved a capacity of 675 MW162. This figure was no less absurd. It reveals the 
extent to which the AEC was able to control information on the state of the nuclear 
programme. During the five-year plan from 1964 to 1969, the funds allocated to the nuclear 
programme increased by 100% to 2 billion US$, or 5 % of India’s national income163. 
 
6.2.2. Institutional and Political Adjustments 
 
During the first half of the 1960s, Nehru gradually changed the direction of his rhetoric. He 
developed the formula that was to determine India’s nuclear ambiguity for the next three 
and a half decades by claiming that India had the know-how to develop nuclear weapons 
indigenously, but would not do so under any circumstances. This position differed from his 
earlier statements, as it implicitly acknowledged that India was in fact seeking to develop 
the infrastructure necessary to build the bomb, though he still maintained his posture that 
India would not go all the way and actually produce it. This position was only partly in 
accordance with the facts. To be sure, the build-up of the nuclear infrastructure had made 
some progress since 1956, but the necessary installations and expertise for plutonium 
production, as well as the ability to assemble plutonium into weapon cores, was not 
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achieved in Nehru’s lifetime, but only in 1965 or 1966. Furthermore, Nehru’s claim that 
India was able to manufacture nuclear weapons indigenously was overstated considering 
the programme’s strong dependency on the transfer of Western know-how and hardware. 
 
The general paradigm shift in India’s nuclear course, away from its developmental mission 
towards one of national power, was framed by a reform of the nuclear decision-making 
institutions. In 1962, a new Atomic Energy Act replaced the legal framework established in 
1948 by the Constituent Assembly. The power of the AEC, as well as the secrecy 
surrounding nuclear decision making, was further tightened. This legislative action appears 
inconsistent with the justification for the authoritarian and secretive institutional framework 
established in 1948, which Nehru rationalized as necessary for India’s unstable 
constitutional situation in the immediate post-colonial period. In 1962, however, India’s 
democratic and constitutional structure was largely stabilised, thereby dispelling such fears. 
Despite the dubious intentions behind the reform of the Atomic Energy Act of 1962, India’s 
parliament approved the bill without objection.  
 
Moreover, the preamble of the Atomic Energy Act of 1962 avoided the explicit exclusion 
of military applications as stated in the Act of 1948. Instead, the preamble remains vague: 
“An Act to provide for the development, control and use of atomic energy for the welfare 
of the people of India and for other peaceful purposes and for matters connected 
therewith”164. No further explanation is given to clarify what those matters connected with 
other peaceful purposes could be. In effect, the Act of 1962 created the legal and 
institutional basis of India’s ambiguous policy of ‘keeping the nuclear option open’.  
 
By openly asserting that India had the infrastructure to build the bomb, Nehru had at least 
partly lifted the nuclear taboo. As a consequence, the premises on which the nuclear issue 
was debated among India’s strategic elite shifted correspondingly. The question was no 
longer whether India should go the costly and time consuming route of building up the 
infrastructure necessary for the nuclear option. Rather, the nuclear option had now become 
a fact, as the necessary infrastructure had already been established (or was about to be 
established). This shift significantly reduced the nuclear threshold. 
 
Table 6.2.: Chronology of India’s Nuclear Course, 1962 - 1974 
 
Year International Events Domestic Events Technological Achievements 
1962 Sino-Indian War Atomic Energy Act 1962  
1963    
1964 First Chinese nuclear test Nehru dies, Lal Bahadur Shastri 
new Prime Minister 
Completion of the plutonium 
reprocessing plant at Trombay 
1965 Indo-Pakistan War   
1966 Tashkent Agreement Shastri dies, Indira Gandhi new 
Prime Minister 
Bhabha dies, Vikram Sarabhai 
new chair of AEC 
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1967 First test of a hydrogen bomb by 
China 
  
1968 Conclusion of the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) 
  
1969   2 light-water LEU 200MW 
reactors at Tarapur go critical 
1970    
1971 Indo-Pakistan War, 
Creation of Bangladesh 
Vikram Sarabhai dies  
1972 Simla Agreement Homi Sethna new chair of AEC 1 natural uranium RAPS reactor at 
Kota goes critical 
1973    
1974   Peaceful Nuclear Explosion 
(PNE) 
 
In 1964, two major events had a fundamental impact on India’s strategic course: The first 
event was the death of Jawaharlal Nehru on May 27th, leaving behind a huge leadership 
vacuum in the country’s foreign and security policy. The second event was China’s first 
nuclear weapons test only five months later on October 16th, thereby significantly changing 
the strategic constellation in Asia.  
 
Nehru’s successor as India’s Prime Minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri (1964-1966), though 
inexperienced in international affairs, was immediately confronted with the urgent and 
difficult task of finding an appropriate answer to the Chinese test. To the surprise of many, 
the low expectations stemming from his inexperienced leadership as well as the lack of 
institutionalised decision-making structures spurred Shastri’s international ambitions. His 
manoeuvring room was unimpeded by the tight (and often impracticable) ideological 
principles and the complex network of insider relationships that had grown out of Nehru’s 
opaque decision-making structure. 
 
In the nuclear field, Shastri was confronted with the intransigent, though small group of 
nuclear scientists around Homi Bhabha. Having Nehru’s fierce public condemnation of 
nuclear weapons in mind, Shastri was not aware of the ambiguity of the nuclear programme 
and Nehru’s tacit acceptance its military dimension. At that time, Shastri’s normative 
aversion to the bomb was beyond doubt. His naiveté as well as his disinterest in the matter 
nevertheless allowed a framework in which nuclear scientists could continue the military 
programme without much interference. Despite his personal beliefs, Shastri allowed the 
scientists to start preparations for a ‘peaceful nuclear explosion’ in 1965. Even considering 
his profound lack interest, it is difficult to imagine that he believed in the solely peaceful 
character of the test. Rather, his approval of the preparations for a PNE appeared to be a 
move to accommodate those voices demanding a tougher stance in the nuclear field after 
the Sino –Indian war of 1962, and the Chinese nuclear tests of 1964.  
 
Shastri developed a plan to solve India’s security problems by approaching the USA for 
security guarantees in the case of a Chinese nuclear attack. This strategy posed a challenge 
to both Nehru’s principles of non-alignment/self-reliance and to the individual interests of 
the nuclear oligarchy. Shastri’s offer to stop the Indian nuclear programme in return for a 
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US guarantee made the scientists’ opposition a matter of vital importance. Homi Bhabha, 
the most exposed critic of Shastri’s policy, brought his objection to the point by stating that 
“India needed to make some dramatic peaceful achievement to offset the prestige gained by 
Communist China among African and Asian countries [after exploding their bomb]”165. 
This statement demonstrates Indian scientists’ perception of the nuclear programme. In 
their view, India was in direct competition with China for prestige and leadership of the 
Third World community. The discipline through which this prestige should be achieved lay 
in the mastery of atoms. The statement further reveals what, in the perception of its 
scientists, India’s nuclear programme was not about: it was not seen as a device to enhance 
the country’s security. His demand for an open demonstration of India’s achievements in 
the field was an implicit call for nuclear testing. This call shows his understanding that the 
symbolic nature of the nuclear game would require corresponding symbolic 
demonstrations.  Nuclear tests were the ultimate currency in which countries could display 
their achievements. A large section of India’s strategic and policy elite followed the 
scientists’ argumentation and called on Shastri to change his policy. Shastri reluctantly 
gave in and authorised the AEC to start with preparations for a ‘peaceful nuclear 
explosion’.  
 
The 1965 war with Pakistan revealed the superiority of the conventional Indian armed 
forces. As such, one could expect a calming effect on India’s nuclear proliferation efforts. 
In strategic terms, nuclear deterrence towards Pakistan became somewhat irrelevant, as 
conventional power capabilities proved effective to do the job. Paradoxically, pressures 
demanding a more determined course of nuclear proliferation increased after the war. The 
reason was the Tashkent Peace Declaration in 1966. Shastri’s morally driven, ineffectual 
conduct of the negotiations was held responsible for the modest tone of the declaration, 
which was seen by India’s foreign policy elite as much less beneficial than India had hoped. 
Particularly, the fact that Pakistan was not explicitly mentioned as an aggressor caused 
widespread disenchantment. 
 
6.2.3. Creating A Nuclear Weapons Infrastructure 
 
The change in India’s strategic environment, caused by the Sino-Indian war of 1962, 
China’s first nuclear test in 1964, and the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965, as well as the change 
in India’s leadership by the death of Jawaharlal Nehru in 1964, had a strong  impact on the 
way the nuclear issue was discussed among India’s strategic elite. However, the nuclear 
weapons programme as such, i.e. the actual infrastructure development that allowed India 
to build nuclear weapons, occurred largely apart from the historic events as well as the 
surrounding debate. 
 
While the applicability of the nuclear programme for military purposes played a crucial role 
in the design of the civilian nuclear programme right from its beginning, the build-up of a 
self-contained nuclear weapons infrastructure became visible for the first time in 1958, 
when construction began on a plutonium reprocessing plant at Trombay. This early timing 
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appears puzzling considering India’s international and strategic position at the time, for 
Nehru’s policy of peaceful co-existence was still domestically unchallenged. India’s 
relationship with China, which was referred to as Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai (Indo Chinese 
friendship), still appeared to be untroubled, as the future Chinese occupation of Tibet, the 
Sino-Indian war, and the first Chinese nuclear tests were unforeseeable.  Domestically, 
Nehru’s position in the late 1950s was undisputed, and government stability was at its 
highest point in the history of independent India166. 
 
Central to India’s nuclear weapons programme was the production of plutonium, an end-
product of the fuel spent in atomic reactors. In combination with thorium167, plutonium was 
usable in a breeder reactor to produce nuclear energy. This technology, however, was 
embryonic in the late 1950s, and its feasibility was too uncertain to justify the arduous 
efforts scientists had in producing plutonium168.  Rather, plutonium was regarded more for 
its decisive significance for the military programme than as a component for nuclear energy 
production.  Thus, it came into the focus of global non-proliferation and safeguard efforts.  
 
The plutonium yield appeared to have been the determining factor169 for India’s nuclear 
scientists to opt for the development of natural uranium fuelled, heavy-water moderated 
reactors170. The first reactor to produce unsafeguarded plutonium was the Canadian CIRUS 
research reactor at Trombay, commissioned in 1960. It provided enough plutonium for the 
production of two rudimentary nuclear devices annually. The Phoenix plutonium 
reprocessing plant, which had been built based on US-American blueprints, was 
commissioned in 1964 and started production of weapon-grade plutonium the same year. 
India was – at least in theory – able to build its first rudimentary plutonium core nuclear 
device between mid-1965 and early 1966171. This timing suggests that India’s policy 
makers would have been able to give a commensurate response to the Chinese test of 1964 
within a few months. Correspondingly, after news of the Chinese test spread, Homi Bhabha 
claimed that India would be able to give the appropriate answer within 18 months. Bhabha 
persuaded Shastri to initiate preparations for a ‘peaceful nuclear explosion’. 
 
6.2.4. Indira Gandhi’s Rise 
 
As a tragic coincidence, the two key protagonists of India’s nuclear course of the mid 
1960s, Lal Bahadur Shastri and Homi Bhabha, both died within few days of each other in 
January 1966. Still at the Soviet city of Tashkent, where he had signed the Tashkent 
                                                 
166 Government instability is thought to have been one of the main factors determining nuclear decision 
making in the mid-1990s, including the decision for nuclear testing in 1998. 
167 Large deposits of this rare mineral were discovered in India in the early 1950s. 
168 India’s first (and only) Fast Breeder Test Reactor was commissioned only in 1985. (see: Jones, Rodney 
et.al.: op.cit.. 1998; p. 128). 
169 A second factor being self-reliance, as the technology of enriching uranium was non-existent in India. 
170 In contrast to the enriched uranium light-water moderated reactor design, this reactor type produced 
sufficient plutonium for a tentative weapons programme. 
171 This year was given by the scientists themselves, and confirmed by the CIA. Other sources raised doubts 
that India’s scientists had acquired the necessary design knowledge of the atomic bomb at this early time. 
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declaration ending the war between India and Pakistan only hours before, Shastri 
unexpectedly died of a heart attack on January 11th, 1966. Less than two weeks later, on 
January 24th, 1966, Homi Bhabha died on his trip to Geneva when his airplane crashed in 
the Savoy Alps on approach to Geneva airport.  
 
When Indira Gandhi took office as India’s third Prime Minister in 1966, the domestic 
discourse on the nuclear issue was well underway. The debate was dominated by the 
question of whether India should join or decline the upcoming Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Treaty (NPT). Opinion was divided among Indira Gandhi’s advisors. 
 
On the balance, it would appear that there were more officials in favour of the NPT 
than against it. Eventually the cabinet rejected signing it on the grounds of possible 
public criticism that the opposition could garner from accepting ‘foreign’ demands. 
The situation in the country in 1968 that led to the rejection of the NPT is very 
different from the situation in 1996 when the entire nation actually debated the 
CTBT openly in the press.172 
 
While public debate on the issue was still underdeveloped, the motives for the Indira 
Gandhi government in opposing the NPT illustrate that those dynamics of public opinion 
making that dominated India’s nuclear course in the 1990s were already in place in 1968. 
 
Indira stood in the Nehruvian tradition by opposing nuclear weapons on moral grounds. 
She nevertheless avoided a clear anti-bomb policy due to several emerging pressures. First, 
the growing social and ethnic unrest in several parts of India forced her to pay attention to 
the change of atmosphere within public opinion. Calls for a strengthening of military 
capabilities (as the supposed prerequisite for a strong and proud nation) were quite popular. 
Her pragmatic sense of power politics was favourable to the pursuit of a more vigorous 
nuclear policy. Under these circumstances, one could easily assume that Indira’s popularity 
would have benefited and her power would have consolidated had she announced India’s 
goal to acquire nuclear weapons. Remarkably, she did not. She still felt committed to reject 
the nuclear option and use nuclear technology for civilian purposes only. Obviously, the 
moral norms set by her father were strong enough to prevent her from taking the 
opportunity. Considering the Machiavellian ruling style with which she was tackling the 
numerous domestic conflicts, her restrained nuclear course appears even more notable. 
Morarji Desai, who was the leading figure and main opponent of Indira within Congress, 
took an even more rigorous anti-bomb position. As with Indira, he withstood the temptation 
to explore the nuclear issue in order to gain popularity, astonishing when one considers his 
failed attempts to topple the Indira government and succeed her as Prime Minister. 
 
The position of the two competitors, Desai and Indira Gandhi, indicated the unusual 
character of Indian political culture and of the nuclear issue within it. Desai 
maintained a strict moral stance shared by only a minority of the political elite at a 
time when he could have been expected to press every advantage to unseat the 
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prime minister. ... . The forbearance displayed by both competitors in not exploiting 
the ‘bomb’ for political gain was remarkable and reflected the determination to 
maintain India’s moral posture173.  
 
The Indo-Pakistani war of 1971 and the subsequent creation of Bangladesh greatly 
enhanced India’s strategic superiority vis-à-vis Pakistan. India emerged as the single 
dominating regional power in South Asia. Similarly to the 1965 war, strategic rationale 
would have suggested that the pressures to proliferate nuclear weapons would thus 
decrease, as the conventional superiority of the Indian forces in South Asian was beyond 
doubt after 1971. But as in 1965, these predictions failed to materialise. 
 
During the height of the Bangladesh war, the USA deployed its aircraft carrier Enterprise 
into the Bay of Bengal. This was a rather symbolic act, as the warship had no plans to 
interfere in the ongoing conflict.  It was meant by US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger as 
a gesture to reassure China, and at the same time, deter the Soviet Union from interfering. 
Unfortunately, neither US President Nixon nor his Secretary of State was able to 
comprehend the consequences of their decision. India’s decision makers felt deeply 
humiliated by the nonchalant way in which the USA was trying to bully their nation. In the 
Cold War grand strategy, Kissinger was building on the new Sino-American axis to counter 
Soviet influence in Asia. India as a non-aligned, militarily weak Third World country had 
only a minor role to play in this gambit. This evident attitude triggered strong anti-
colonialist sentiments within the Indian discourse. The second of the two fundamental 
norms of Indian foreign policy now came to the fore. The sensitivity towards any alleged 
neo-imperialist attitudes of the major powers, particularly the USA, improved the position 
of those promoting a foreign policy based on power politics instead of moral superiority 
among India’s elite. As a response to this great powers’ game, Indira Gandhi authorised 
increased efforts to prepare for the test explosion of a nuclear device. 
 
6.2.5. Vikram Sarabhai: Realism not Symbolism 
 
In search of a successor for Homi Bhabha, Indira Gandhi, who had been appointed India’s 
new Prime Minister only few days earlier, chose Vikram Sarabhai as new chairman of the 
Indian Atomic Energy Commission. Although Sarabhai had been a member of the AEC, he 
was not directly involved in the nuclear explosives programme. Prior to his appointment as 
head of the AEC, Sarabhai had been a physicist in the field of missile and space research 
and the leader of the Indian National Committee for Space Research. His election caused 
severe discontent and jealousy among the leaders of the nuclear establishment.  
 
Vikram Sarabhai’s ideas about India’s nuclear course proved to be a remarkable exception 
to the way it was understood by the majority of nuclear scientists and strategic elite. His 
position is often mistakenly described as pacifist in contrast to the hawkish mainstream 
position of the nuclear establishment. This was not at all the case. Sarabhai was a fervent 
advocate of extending the nuclear programme for both civilian and military purposes. What 
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made his position unique was his rejection of the symbolist meaning which was generally 
allotted to the nuclear issue. In his perception, the sole purpose of the civilian nuclear 
programme was to produce cheap energy. Similarly, the sole purpose of any military 
application was to manufacture functioning nuclear deterrent devices. This understanding 
might be regarded as a simple matter of course in different national set-ups, but in the 
Indian context, it meant a radical departure from the nuclear programme’s previous 
direction. The symbolist value of the nuclear issue with regard to India’s quest for 
modernity and national power was largely brushed off by Sarabhai. Consequently, he was 
highly contemptuous of the programme’s many characteristics, such as its secrecy, its 
mystification, its pseudo indigenous status and its orientation towards symbolic 
demonstrations, as he saw these features as impediments to efficient progress.  
 
Sarabhai’s realist position severely clashed with the symbolist understanding of the leading 
nuclear scientists over the question of nuclear testing.  
 
Sarabhai’s reputation among the pro-bomb lobby might not be high, but it would 
appear that he, more than anyone else, understood the complexity and magnitude of 
creating a nuclear deterrent and how far Indian infrastructure had to go to build a 
world class deterrence capability... . If India needed a nuclear capability, and if 
Sarabhai had remained Chairman of the AEC as well as head of the space division, 
it seems likely that he would have put together a composite technical capability that 
went beyond calling an underground explosion a nuclear capability; but until he 
could visualise such a creation he was not going to be hurried.174 
 
Since the mid-1950s, scientists had actively pursued the construction of the necessary 
infrastructure to manufacture explosive devices. The 1964 commissioning of the plutonium 
reprocessing plant as the final step towards this goal coincided with the first Chinese 
nuclear tests in the same year, which may have provided motivation for the scientists. At 
this stage, they felt the need to prove their achievements through a forceful demonstration, 
consequently starting preparatory work for a nuclear explosion. For Sarabhai, on the other 
side, a nuclear explosion just for the sake of demonstrating India’s greatness was 
meaningless. He approached the issue in a technocratic way: The reason for testing, as he 
saw it, was to gain information in order to optimise the nuclear chain reaction, which would 
help the weaponeers to construct effective nuclear warheads. For this purpose, he 
developed appropriate delivery vehicles, installed the necessary C³I infrastructure175, and 
last but not least, drafted stringent employment strategies to be adopted before the testing. 
This could not be achieved in the short term, however, as by the late 1960s only few 
thoughts were spent on how to actually use nuclear explosive devices once they would have 
been built. 
 
To a certain degree, Sarabhai was able to create a critical awareness among India’s political 
elite about the complexity and ambiguity of the nuclear issue. However, he was not able to 
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keep in check the clique of scientists working on nuclear explosives at the Trombay nuclear 
complex. This failure had its cause in the deficient institutional set-up of the nuclear 
programme. At the time of his death, Bhabha maintained complete personal control over 
the programme, holding all key positions tightly in his own hands. This concentration of 
power was dissolved by Indira Gandhi, who split up Bhabha’s accumulated power. While 
Vikram Sarabhai was appointed new chairman of the AEC, the directorship of the research 
site in Trombay, which was renamed the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC), was 
given to Homi Sethna, a representative of the nuclear establishment. Due to the erstwhile 
merger of the two positions in Bhabha’s hands, a clear chain of command did not exist, 
giving Sethna a substantial amount of autonomy and allowing him to resume work on the 
nuclear explosives project in 1968 over Sarabhai’s objections.  
 
Furthermore, Sarabhai’s policy faced yet another major obstacle: In the late 1960s, the 
failure of the civilian nuclear programme to back up India’s economic development by 
providing cheap energy had already become apparent. To ensure continued government 
funding to the programme, he had no choice but to side with the nuclear establishment’s 
efforts in justifying its work through the programme’s military component. This basic 
paradigm shift – from development to security – was officially announced by Sarabhai in 
early 1970 in the so called ‘Sarabhai Profile’. This document outlined the increasingly 
military outlook of India’s nuclear programme. Moreover, it focused not only on the 
development of nuclear explosives as such, but emphasised the necessary components to 
make such devices usable, above all delivery vehicles. One result of Sarabhai’s strategy 
paper was the reinforcement of India’s space programme. Despite the nuclear programme’s 
turn towards military applications, Sarabhai could not resist the temptation to emulate his 
predecessors funding methodology by grossly overstating the nuclear programme’s civilian 
potential. In his outline, he projected an unrealistic capacity of 43.000 MW of installed 
nuclear power by the year 2000 – over a hundredfold increase of 1970 capacity176. Clearly, 
this was a political figure without any realistic base177. 
 
Just when Sarabhai started to implement his plans by redirecting the programme’s focus 
away from flashy demonstrations towards the build up of efficient power capacities in the 
civilian realm, and usable nuclear weapons systems in the military realm, he unexpectedly 
died of a heart attack on December 30th 1971 at the age of only 53 years. Similarly to Homi 
Bhabha’s death six years earlier, the loss of Vikram Sarabhai in 1971 decapitated India’s 
nuclear programme at a time of significant regional and international changes. After the 
Indo-Pakistani war and the creation of Bangladesh earlier in the year, India emerged as the 
undisputed regional power with overwhelming conventional superiority. This regional 
supremacy reduced the country’s strategic need for a nuclear deterrence device, causing a 
shift in international attitudes towards India’s nuclear programme: While an Indian nuclear 
test in the mid-1960s would have been understood by the international community as a 
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legitimate act of self-defence against the emerging Chinese nuclear threat, the international 
repercussions for India’s continued efforts in the nuclear field in the early and mid-1970s 
was largely negative. The inward-looking Indian strategic elite, however, missed this shift 
in the international community’s attitude.  
 
Vikram Sarabhai was succeeded by Homi Sethna as chairman of the AEC, and Raja 
Ramanna was appointed new director of BARC. Thus, the two key positions returned to the 
hands of the nuclear establishment and the nuclear programme was set back to its pre-1966 
track. 
In sum, the period from the early 1960s to the early 1970s set most of the basic conditions 
under which India’s nuclear programme developed until 1998. In 1964, the nuclear 
scientists are thought to have reached their final goal by completing the infrastructure 
necessary to build the bomb. Strategic justification of the test was provided by China’s first 
nuclear test later the same year. However, just as it seemed that no obstacles for India’s 
nuclear weapons programme remained, the leadership of the nuclear programme shifted 
into the hands of Vikram Sarabhai, an outspoken opponent of testing. Then, six years later, 
India’s geo-strategic environment changed, diminishing the international assessment of 
India’s nuclear course. Ironically, it was just at this time when the leadership of the Indian 
nuclear programme shifted back into the hands of the pro-bomb nuclear establishment. 
 
These changes in leadership partly explain why India did not immediately react to the 
Chinese test of 1964 by conducting a nuclear test itself, as strategists expected. 
Furthermore, they clear up why India embarked on a clear course towards testing after 
1972, a time when the international conditions were much less favourable. Obviously, 
individual leadership mattered more for India’s nuclear course than strategic analysis. 
Alternatively, domestic, unit-level factors dominated over international, systemic factors. 
 
6.2.6. The Ritual of Demonstrations 
 
The use of nuclear technology as a symbolic device to generate national pride and self-
confidence, as well as to bring international prestige, made it imperative to display India’s 
achievements in a flashy and spectacular manner. This show of force became 
conspicuously apparent for the first time at the commissioning ceremony of the Apsara 
research reactor in 1956178. Contrary to what the reactor really was about – it had been built 
using British blueprints and technology components while being equipped with British 
enriched uranium fuel rods – it was celebrated as the first indigenously built atomic reactor 
in Asia (excluding those of the Soviet Union). According to widely accepted public belief 
at that time, it was to the merit of the nuclear scientists that India had caught up with its 
colonial masters less than a decade after independence. Overwhelmed with public praise, 
the scientists were able to consolidate their power position within the nuclear and strategic 
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decision-making process. This success ensured continued large-scale government spending 
on the nuclear programme for the years to come. As public enthusiasm gradually abated, 
pressures on the scientists increased to stage another demonstration of their abilities. These 
dynamics would eventually create what this study refers to as the ritual of demonstrations. 
The more the civilian nuclear programme failed to perform, the more the need for such 
demonstrations climbed. 
 
Similarly, when doubts about the strategic benefits of a nuclear deterrent device increased 
in the early 1970s, the pressures on the nuclear scientists to conduct a test did not decrease, 
as one might expect; on the contrary, they appeared more vital for the continuation of the 
programme than ever before. 
Preparations for the test intensified immediately after Homi Sethna took over as chairman 
of the AEC in early 1972.  
 
In 1974, these preparations were concluded, and the nuclear device was installed at the 
Pokhran test site in the Rajasthan desert. The scientists now awaited the final decision of 
the political leadership to detonate the device. This modus operandi reflected the 
institutional and political conditions under which the Indian nuclear programme developed: 
The laissez faire attitude of the political leadership gave the scientists the manoeuvring 
room they needed to shape the programme according to their interests and beliefs. The 
scientists pushed the programme forward to such an extent that the political decision-
makers’ had little choice but to hold course. When Indira Gandhi was faced with the 
decision whether to go for the nuclear explosion or cancel the testing plans, there was 
nothing left to do but to push the button. At this stage, stepping back from the threshold 
would have been much more costly in political terms than to go ahead and conduct the test. 
Several foreign policy advisors strongly attempted to dissuade Indira from crossing the 
threshold. The expected international repercussions, as they saw it, were not compensated 
for by any benefits the test could bring to the civilian or military nuclear programme. 
Obviously, they did not appreciate the symbolic meaning of the nuclear issue. The political 
leadership finally approved the testing for exactly this purpose. “Mrs Gandhi decreed that 
the experiment should be carried out on schedule for the simple reason that India required 
such a demonstration”179. 
Indira Gandhi emphasised the ‘peaceful’ nature of the testing, and any deployment strategy 
or doctrine that would be the necessary precondition for the military use of the data gained 
through nuclear explosions was missing.  
 
On May 18th 1974, India conducted an underground nuclear explosion at the Pokhran test 
site in the Rajasthan desert. After the test, Indira claimed that the test had served purely 
civilian purposes, such as canal digging and mining. Her critics, particularly among the 
international press, saw this as an obvious pretence. As no clear technical distinction 
between peaceful and military nuclear tests could be made, they considered the explosions 
as part of India’s clandestine nuclear weapons programme. In all honesty, the future for 
civilian applications of nuclear explosions was more than doubtful. In stressing only the 
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military context, however, critics erred to a similar degree. Considerations about possible 
applications, whether civilian or military, were largely irrelevant for the decision to go 
ahead with the test: It was an end in itself, a demonstration of India’s prowess. The nuclear 
field was ideal for this purpose, for in the view of India’s elite, nuclear technology 
symbolised what it wanted to achieve – modernity, international prestige, and strategic 
leverage: 
 
Unlike a transistor radio, a ship, or a hospital, a nuclear explosive represented the 
harnessing of the greatest physical power known to humankind, a physical power 
that the greatest nation on earth had imbued with transcendent political power as 
well. The Indian nation – at least in urban centres – believed that its aspiration for 
global greatness had been achieved.180 
 
These considerations were above all shaped by the dynamics of the domestic debate. As 
expected, the event was glorified as milestone on India’s path to modernity, and the 
involved scientists were elevated to the ranks of national heroes. For a short time, Indira 
Gandhi could distract public attention away from a host of domestic difficulties 
(widespread ethnic unrest, the erosion of central power, etc.). The boost of self-confidence 
from the domestic discourse contrasted to the largely negative international reactions. Even 
the responses from those Third World countries which had welcomed the Chinese nuclear 
tests in 1964 were lavish, despite India’s rhetorical representation of the test as an act of 
emancipation for all Third World countries. 
 
This episode revealed a general dilemma in India’s foreign policy formulation. The debate 
on international issues within the Indian polity followed largely domestic dynamics which 
were widely detached from the international discourse. The actors shaping India’s foreign 
policy were generally inward looking in that their aspired to national prestige within the 
community of states was a mere projection of their personal prestige in the domestic arena. 
Thus, the domestic debate on international issues regularly lead to certain perceptions and 
expectations which then clashed with the actual conditions in the international system. 
India’s elite reacted to these adversities defiantly. When international pressures to comply 
with the Nonproliferation Treaty increased after the test, India was more determined to 
oppose it than ever before. The Chinese reaction to India’s demonstration of prowess was – 
in the elite’s perception – much worse than the expected outcry: They more or less 
disregarded it. 
 
While the cold reaction from Third World countries caused some consternation among 
India’s elite, the fierce reaction by Western countries was expected and answers to them 
were well-prepared. Western criticism was regarded as the implicit recognition of India as a 
new and serious competitor among the world’s leading countries. Almost routinely, India’s 
elite rebuffed Western criticism as hypocritical and discriminatory. After the test, the 
international community expected India to declare itself the world’s sixth nuclear weapon 
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state and develop nuclear weapon capabilities. However, similarly to 1964, India 
contravened these expectations by, at least temporarily, halting its nuclear programme.  
 
 
6.3. The Period of India’s Nuclear Slow-Down, 1974 - 1979 
 
6.3.1. Which Course after Pokhran I? 
 
After the PNE in 1974, the nuclear programme in India came to a temporary halt. The time 
immediately after the test might best be described as the hangover after an excessive party. 
During the celebrations of the successful test, the involved scientists, their political 
mentors, large sections of India’s elite and the public gave free rein to personal and national 
pride. Once the high-flying rhetoric surrounding the event slowly abated, more and more 
questions were raised about the actual benefits of the test beyond the merely symbolic.  
This state of fatigue was particularly apparent among the political leadership. In the 
medium term, the nuclear issue failed to pay its hoped-for dividends in terms of domestic 
popularity. Disappointed by the few positive effects to her own popularity, Indira Gandhi 
soon returned to dealing with the deteriorating internal security situation in the country. 
Throughout the 1970s, she categorically rejected the scientists’ requests for further testing. 
 
In June 1975, Indira Gandhi imposed the state of Emergency, suspending the democratic 
process in India for 18 months. During this period of domestic turbulence, foreign affairs 
did not place highly on her agenda. Her main objective was not to further fuel international 
criticism of her authoritarian rule (i.e. by advancing the disputed nuclear issue), but to 
avoid monitoring of India’s proliferation efforts. 
 
In technical terms, the test was of very little value for both military and civilian 
applications, as it did not provide enough data for the scientists to improve the effectiveness 
of the atomic chain reaction significantly. As one direct outcome of the test had been the 
increased reluctance of the Western supplier countries, above all Canada, to transfer nuclear 
technology to India, the overall effect to India’s nuclear programme was more negative 
than positive. For the scientists, the Pokhran test nevertheless brought positive results, as 
the leadership of the nuclear programme was able to portray itself as the spearhead of 
India’s modernisation, thus significantly consolidating its position within India’s policy 
making process.  
 
Although India’s foreign policy elite had expected negative reactions from the Western 
countries, they were not fully able to apprehend the paradigm shift underlying this 
criticism. The naive enthusiasm of the Eisenhower era, which had driven the international 
nuclear competition, had given way to a far more critical approach. The Cuban missile 
crisis, large scale student unrest, the rise of leftist and environmental movements, and the 
Vietnam War were some of the events that fundamentally changed the way in which 
Western societies, and particularly its intellectual elites, looked at nuclear technology. 
While the Western public may have been appreciative of an Indian test in 1964, the 
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unrestrained and celebratory rhetoric that characterised the 1974 test caused severe 
consternation. Despite the public outcry, Cold War considerations prevented most Western 
governments from taking tough measures against India. In particular, the realist orientation 
of the US administration under Henry Kissinger, bound by its Cold War grand strategy, 
prevented any measures to isolate India internationally. India’s continued flirtation with an 
Indo-Soviet alliance and the Soviet willingness to cooperate with India in the nuclear 
field181 intensified Western courtship. 
 
While the overall backlash from Western governments was modest, India’s scientists found 
access to nuclear technology much more difficult. Even before the tests, India’s refusal to 
join the NPT and its rejection of IAEA safeguards for its enrichment facilities resulted in a 
decrease of sensitive technology transfers. The nuclear test significantly increased Western 
reluctance to supply India’s nuclear programme. It led to the creation of the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group (NSG), a cartel of the leading supplier states, to coordinate and upgrade 
nuclear export control policies. 
 
On top of this, several unfavourable geo-strategic developments in the 1970s drove India’s 
nuclear programme into further isolation. In 1971, the signing of the Indo-Soviet 
Friendship Treaty and, at the same time, the breakthrough in Sino-American relations, 
caused a significant shift in the Cold War constellation. In the simplified perception of 
American policy-makers, India’s position shifted that of a neutral state to an adversary. 
Correspondingly, the ‘Enterprise’ incident triggered anti-American feelings among India’s 
elite. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian Revolution – both in 1979 – 
Pakistan emerged as an indispensable American ally. The strategic partnerships of both 
countries, as well as the large-scale American military assistance to Pakistan, further 
deepened Indo-American animosities. 
 
In 1979, the U.S. Congress passed additional legislation to prevent the spread of nuclear 
weapons known as the Pressler Amendment. It forced the U.S. President to verify that 
certain countries did not possess nuclear weapons; otherwise, economic and military 
sanctions would automatically be imposed. This certification would play a crucial role in 
American relations to South Asian states throughout the 1980s.  
 
6.3.2. Domestic Turmoil 
 
Next to severe technical set-backs182, the most pressing problem for India’s nuclear 
programme was the indifference and lack of support of the political leadership from 1975 to 
1979. In 1975, Indira Gandhi imposed the Emergency, suspending basic civil rights and 
crushing opposition groups by arresting several thousand activists. In certain ways, the 
nuclear competition has always been perceived as a playing field in which national standing 
and prestige mattered more than security considerations or existential fears. Now, in times 
of severe hardship and national distress, busying oneself with the nuclear issue would have 
                                                 
181 in 1976 the Soviet Union provided India with 200 tonnes of badly needed heavy water. 
182 India’s only plutonium-reprocessing plant at the Maharashtran site in Trombay was shut down in 1975. 
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been dismissed as decadent and insensitive to the true concerns of the people. Indira 
Gandhi was more aware of public sentiment than any other member of her government. 
 
In the following two years, pressures on Indira increased to the extent that she had to lift the 
Emergency and announce general elections, which promptly lost to the Janata party and its 
leader, Morarji Desai. Desai represented the old guard of political leaders who started their 
careers in the independence movement; accordingly, he felt committed to the ideas of 
India’s founding fathers as regarded foreign policy. He condemned nuclear weapons as 
symbols of an international system which was determined by military power, thereby 
appearing somewhat more Nehruvian than Nehru’s had ever been. The particularities of the 
Indian nuclear policy process enabled him to assert his position against his pro-bomb 
political environment. With his government becoming increasingly unstable, Desai 
softened his rhetoric while still adhering to the exclusion of further nuclear testing. After he 
resigned in 1979, his successor, Charan Singh, was more preoccupied with domestic issues. 
His indifference towards international issues gave the nuclear scientists and the strategic 
elites the room to manoeuvre in shaping India’s nuclear policy. Rumours about the progress 
of the Pakistani nuclear programme renewed India’s determination in the nuclear field.  
 
 
6.4. Developing Nuclear Weapons Capabilities 
 
6.4.1. Changing International Patterns 
 
During the enthusiastic celebration of the 1974 Pokhran test, and even during the 
programme’s slow down in the mid-1970s, the crux of the test was largely ignored by the 
political leadership as well as the public: its strong impact on the Pakistani nuclear 
programme. While the nuclear programme of Pakistan had been launched in the 1950s, 
until 1974 its military application was rather ineffectual. This pattern changed after India’s 
‘peaceful nuclear explosion’. After Pakistan’s defeat in the 1971 war, the Indian nuclear 
test of 1974 further contributed to the strategic imbalance between India and Pakistani. The 
determination with which Pakistan sought to catch up with India’s nuclear programme 
began to seep into the broader public debate in the late 1970s and greatly contributed to the 
renewed engagement of the Indian political leadership since 1980. In retrospect, India’s 
first nuclear test might be assessed as the major – if not the first – impulse in the action-
reaction dynamic driving India and Pakistan towards nuclear (and missile) capabilities. This 
emerging competition was one of several factors contributing to a fundamental change in 
India’s security environment. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian revolution 
in 1979 altered the geo-strategic power balance in the region and caused a revision of the 
superpowers’ involvement. For US American strategists, the abrupt loss of Iran, its main 
outpost in the region, and the simultaneous expansion of Soviet power into Afghanistan 
created the exigency of a renewed military alliance with Pakistan, despite recent attempts 
by the Carter administration to follow a tougher line against Pakistan in the course of its 
strict nonproliferation policy. In the eyes of the Indian elite, the US government’s 
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pragmatic approach to power politics discredited its nonproliferation efforts on moral 
grounds.  
 
India found itself in the comfortable position of being able to fend off Western criticism of 
its nuclear programme by pointing to US military assistance to Pakistan. Parallel to the US- 
Pakistani rapprochement, news of large scale Chinese assistance to the Pakistani nuclear 
programme influenced the Indian nuclear debate. These developments ended the cautious 
reconciliation process between the two countries that had emerged in the mid-1970s. The 
public debate on national security became increasingly discomposed, in some instances 
even paranoid, descrying a threatening Sino-Pakistani-American axis surrounding India. 
After having been ignored until the late 1970s, the state of the Pakistani nuclear weapons 
programme was now exaggerated. Pakistan was thought to be able to test a nuclear device 
in 1982183. Indira Gandhi, who had returned to power in 1980, responded to this perceived 
strategic dilemma in two ways: First, she sought a revitalisation of Indo-Soviet ties, and 
second, she reinstated the priority of India’s nuclear weapons programme on her agenda.  
 
6.4.2. The Return of Indira  
 
India’s nuclear programme was not revived until Indira Gandhi’s return to power in 1980, 
after rumours spread about Pakistan’s increasing progress in the nuclear field. This was 
somewhat ironic, as Pakistan’s nuclear programme had been greatly intensified after India’s 
nuclear explosion in 1974 and had grown rapidly since the mid-1970s -- just as India’s 
programme lost steam. Then, in 1980, India resumed its programme under the impression 
of an increased nuclear threat from Pakistan. This episode shows the fatal action-reaction 
dynamics that were set in motion once the Pandora’s Box of nuclear proliferation had been 
opened.  
 
When Indira Gandhi returned to power in 1980, she was confronted with widespread social 
unrest. Secessionist movements in Punjab and in the Northeast threatened India’s integrity. 
The resumption of the nuclear programme was welcomed by Indira in order to gather 
public support for the troubled central government using the perceived threat from 
Pakistan. However, similarly to 1974 and 1998, this strategy failed to have much effect: 
Domestic issues continued to remain paramount. 
 
During the early 1980s, Indira’s normative aversion to nuclear weapons was steadily 
replaced by her pragmatic sense of power politics. For the domestic audience, she 
rhetorically assumed the position of a determined leader of a proud and powerful nation. 
The nuclear build up was again instrumentalised as the key symbolic issue within this 
depiction. To the outside world, Indira preferred more cautious language and downplayed 
the nuclear issue. She was obviously trying to avoid similar repercussions to the aftermath 
of the 1974 test. 
 
                                                 
183 Perkovich, George: op.cit.. 1999; p. 218. 
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With the Realist argument on their side, the nuclear scientists regained their self-confidence 
and relaunched the nuclear weapons programme in 1981. Clearly, India did not want to 
miss the opportunity again, as it did in the mid-1960s, to advance its programme at a time 
when the international attitude towards India’s nuclear efforts was particularly favourable.  
In 1983, Indira Gandhi formulated the basic paradigms of India’s foreign policy in what 
came to be known as the ‘Indira Doctrine’. The cornerstone of this doctrine was the self-
definition of India as the regionally dominant power of South Asia. The main objective was 
to limit the influence of the super powers and China in the region and establish a network 
of bilateral relationships with the other South Asian states.  
 
Table 6.3.: Chronology of India’s Nuclear Course, 1980 - 1986 
 
Year International Events Domestic Events Technological Achievements 
1980  Indira Gandhi returns to power Commissioning of safeguarded 
Rajasthan-II nuclear power reactor 
1981    
1982    
1983  Homi Sethna to Raja Ramanna Launching of India’s Integrated 
Guided Missile Development 
Programme (IGMDP) 
Commissioning of unsafeguarded 
Madras I nuclear power reactor 
1984  Indira Gandhi is assassinated. 
Rajiv Gandhi new Prime 
Minister 
 
1985   Commissioning of unsafeguarded 
Madras II nuclear power reactor 
Commissioning of unsafeguarded 
plutonium reprocessing plant at 
Kalpakkam 
Commissioning of unsafeguarded 
ultracentrifuge uranium enrichment 
plant at BARC 
Commissioning of unsafeguarded 
Dhruva research reactor at BARC 
Commissioning of unsafeguarded 
Fast Breeder Test Reactor at 
Kalpakkam 
1986  
MTCR announced in 1987 
  
 
At the same time as Indira’s new guidelines for India’s foreign policy were implemented, 
the idealistic interlude of the Carter administration ended and tough power politics was 
reintroduced by his successor, Ronald Reagan. By rhetorically maintaining India’s non-
aligned and neutral status, Indira skilfully played off both superpowers. In 1982, the nuclear 
scientists were prepared for further nuclear testing in Pokhran, and though Indira approved 
 121
the tests in late 1982 or early 1983, she revoked her decision less than 24 hours before they 
were planned to take place184. 
 
While the nuclear programme gathered momentum, domestic political turmoil again 
superseded the nuclear issue on the agenda of India’s political leaders. As before, the lower 
political priority did not cause a slow-down of the nuclear build up, but instead gave the 
scientists more room to shape the programme without interference from decision makers185. 
 
6.4.3. Towards Technological Breakthrough 
 
After the assassination of Indira Gandhi by her Sikh bodyguards in 1984, her son Rajiv 
Gandhi took office as Prime Minister. Rajiv largely inherited his mother’s general position 
on the nuclear issue. Like Indira, Rajiv Gandhi avoided openly proclaiming India’s 
intentions in building the bomb. Instead he maintained the ‘nuclear option’ rhetoric – that 
India did not have a nuclear weapons programme as such, but simply engaged in 
developing the option to acquire capabilities if needed. He insisted on India’s commitment 
to nuclear disarmament on moral grounds, and at the same time, projected India’s self-
styled image as a strong regional power. The semantic distinctions made in the ‘nuclear 
option’ rhetoric, albeit without any practical meaning, allowed him to maintain at least 
nominally the high moral standards of his grandfather, Jawaharlal Nehru.  
 
The most significant change occurred in the technical status of India’s nuclear build-up. To 
understand this change, one has to look at the differences in personality between Indira and 
Rajiv Gandhi. Indira was, at least in the second phase of her reign, a skilled leader in the 
Machiavellian vein who knew exactly what the nuclear issue was about – in both strategic 
and politico-symbolic terms. Rajiv was, on the contrary, rather unaware of the shrouded 
nature of the nuclear issue. His interest in the technical over the political side of the nuclear 
issue corresponded to his personality. Until the death of his younger brother Sanjay in 
1980, he was rather disinterested in political affairs and committed to his job as a pilot. The 
death of his brother, designated by Indira Gandhi as the heir of the Nehru-Gandhi dynasty, 
in a plane crash abruptly ended Rajiv’s aviation career and pushed him into the political 
arena. After his mother’s assassination in 1984, he found himself (almost involuntarily) 
Prime Minister of India.  
 
Under Rajiv Gandhi, the programme moved from mere symbolism towards actual 
applicability; that is, towards its weaponisation. His passionate interest in technological 
innovation, while contributing to the increasing modernisation of India’s armed forces, 
collided with several of his political interests. Being a novice in international affairs and 
facing an overwhelming quantity of domestic problems, he tried to avoid any international 
discord. 
                                                 
184 For this episode in India’s nuclear decision-making see: Perkovich, George: op.cit.. 1999; pp. 446. 
185 In fact, the period after India’s first nuclear test in 1974 was the only time when political disengagement 
did slow-down the programme. This was because the political decision to lower the priority of the nuclear 
issue was connected with an explicit directive to the scientists to stop the programme for the time being. 
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The cornerstone of the new direction for the nuclear programme was the development of 
delivery vehicles for nuclear warheads. India’s Integrated Guided Missile Development 
Programme (IGMDP), which had already been initiated by Indira Gandhi in 1983, 
witnessed substantial progress in the mid-1980s. In February 1988, the first test of the 
indigenously developed ‘Prithvi’ missile, a liquid-fuelled short-range ballistic missile with 
a range of 150-250 km, was successfully conducted. One year later, India tested the first 
version of the 1500 – 2500 km medium-range ‘Agni’ ballistic missile186. The technological 
breakthroughs for the development of both missile systems had been achieved in 1985 and 
1986, respectively, just before the supplier countries of missile technology agreed on the 
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in 1987, aimed at restricting global 
proliferation of missile technology187. The regime was motivated by the signatory states’ 
understanding that the main difficulties of the proliferating states involved not so much the 
construction of the nuclear warhead itself, but rather the development of appropriate 
delivery vehicles. Effective non-proliferation measures would therefore require the control 
of missile technology. However, the conclusion of the MTCR came too late to slow down 
India’s missile programme significantly, as the development of its Prithvi and Agni 
missiles was already well underway. At the same time that India’s missile programme 
produced its first results, the development of nuclear capable aircraft intensified, creating 
an airborne nuclear delivery system by the late 1980s188.  
 
The progress in India’s nuclear weapons programme benefited from Rajiv’s ideologically 
unprejudiced approach to international politics. He was one of the few state leaders in the 
polarised world of the 1980s able to maintain good relations with both the USA and the 
Soviet Union. Due to his adeptness on the international scene and low-key, non-provocative 
handling of the nuclear issue, India was able to procure nuclear technology from both blocs. 
Technological cooperation with the US further benefited from the change in government 
that saw the Reagan administration come to power in 1982, resulting in a paradigm shift in 
U.S. American nuclear policy. Rather than pursuing a strict nonproliferation course, the 
new administration focused on export promotion of the nuclear industry and Cold War geo-
strategy. Throughout the 1980s, the U.S. government certified Pakistan’s non-possession of 
nuclear weapons in compliance with the Pressler Amendment, despite increasing doubts 
among American legislators. In addition to large scale conventional arms exports to 
Pakistan since the early 1980s, the Indo-American arms trade also bloomed after Rajiv 
Gandhi’s visit to Washington in 1985, particularly in the field of scientific and 
technological cooperation. 
 
In sum, India’s nuclear programme witnessed a clear turn towards the development of 
actual applications in the mid-1980s. These developments paved the way for a more 
                                                 
186 Jones, Rodney W.: op.cit.. 1998; p. 111. 
187 The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) set export restrictions on technology of missile with a 
range of more than 300 km and a payload of more than 500 kg.  
188 based on British-French Jaguar, French Mirage 2000 and Soviet MiG-27 and MiG-29. (source: Jones, 
Rodney W.: op.cit.. 1998; p. 115). 
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security-oriented debate, which was about to emerge in the course of the upcoming 
Brasstacks Crisis in 1986. 
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7. Structure and Process of India’s Nuclear Policy Making 
 
In the following chapter, the complex system of domestic factors and decision-making 
processes within the Indian polity as are addressed as intervening variables to India’s 
international behaviour. The chapter is structured into three sections: nuclear authorities189, 
nuclear science190, and nuclear politics191.  
 
Chart 7.1.: Frequency of Articles on Domestic Issues (in % of total sample) 
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As Chart 7.1. shows, domestic issues played only a marginal role during the decisive years 
of India’s nuclear course between 1991 and 1998.  
 
While issues dealing with the domestic policy arena enjoyed a high degree of attention 
before mid-1986, its overall significance gradually decreased thereafter. Aspects of the 
scientific and technological realm within the nuclear field are frequently addressed before 
1986 and after 2003, but hardly play any role during the narrowly defined period of 
analysis from 1986 to 2003.  
 
Those articles concerned with nuclear authorities, or for that matter, with the institutional 
framework in which formal nuclear decision making takes place, include either reform 
                                                 
189 corresponds to variable 1 ‘Institutional Framework’ (see table 4.2.) 
190 corresponds to variable 2 ‘Science and Engineering / Nuclear R + D / Self-Reliance’ (see table 4.2.) 
191 corresponds to variable 3 ‘Domestic Policy Arena’  (see table 4.2.) 
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proposals (usually heralding processes of institutional reforms) or include a wrap–up of 
completed institutional reforms. As Chart 7.1. indicates, three major institutional reforms 
took place during the period of analysis: the first in the aftermath of the Brasstacks Crisis of 
1986, the second in the aftermath of the Pokhran tests of 1998, and the latest in 2003. 
 
 
7.1. Nuclear Authorities 
 
7.1.1. Formal Nuclear Decision-Making 
 
According to the Indian Constitution of 1951, Part V, §53 (2), “... the supreme command of 
the Defence Forces of the Union shall be vested in the President and the exercise thereof 
shall be regulated by law”192. However, no law exists which defines the extent to which the 
President executes his power as formal Supreme Commander of the Indian forces, leaving 
it unclear whether his position has a merely representative function bound by decisions of 
the Cabinet / Prime Minister, or whether it carries some authority and power itself. In 
practical terms, the authoritative position of the Prime Minister in nuclear and strategic 
policy making has never been challenged by the President. 
 
The most important advisory body to the Prime Minister is the Cabinet Committee on 
Political Affairs, consisting of four key cabinet ministers. After the nuclear tests of 1998, 
the National Security Council was established in an effort to institutionalise the decision-
making process in the strategic realm further.  
The legislative branch of the government has little formal power in the state’s strategic 
policy-making. Since the mid-1960s, few Lok Sabha plenary sessions on this issue have 
taken place. Overall, and parliament has proven rather ineffective in checking and 
balancing government decisions.  
The institutional framework of the nuclear programme was laid down in the Atomic Energy 
Act of 1948, amended in 1962 and 1987. The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was 
established as the main body responsible for the development of the nuclear energy sector.  
 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs never had much influence on nuclear decision making, but 
it played a crucial role in presenting India’s nuclear policy to the international public, as 
well as representing India in international non-proliferation and arms control bodies. The 
Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), mainly in charge of the missile 
programme, is allocated to the Defence Ministry. In both the DRDO and the Defence 
Ministry, all key positions are strictly in civilian hands. 
 
The most remarkable feature of Indian nuclear decision-making is the almost complete 
exclusion of the military. Similar to most democratic countries, the Indian constitutional 
framework puts the military under tight civilian control. Many scholars regard these rigid 
constitutional provisions as one of the reasons why India has been able to maintain its 
democratic order since independence, in contrast to most other post-colonial states. 
                                                 
192 The Constitution of India, Part V, §53 (2). 
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However, the exclusion of the military from Indian strategic affairs goes far beyond the 
normal democratic constraints. Until 1998, no (effective) institutionalised military advisory 
body existed. Strategic thinking was mainly done by bureaucrats of the Indian 
Administrative Service (IAS) and the community of scientists and engineers involved in 
arms development. This institutional structure partly explains why India’s nuclear 
programme was designed to simply ‘build the bomb’, with few thoughts on how to actually 
use it. 
The BJP government created the Strategic Policy Group in 1999, which included all three 
service chiefs. Its main task was to assist the newly created National Security Council in 
developing strategic doctrines and deployment postures. 
 
7.1.2. Institutional Flaws and Imprudent Nuclear Decisions 
 
Until 1998, policy-making in the nuclear realm had been traditionally dealt with in an ad 
hoc, personal manner by India’s Prime Minister. His or her decisions were based on the 
advice of key cabinet ministers, the leaders of the defence scientists’ community, and 
strategic policy advisers. In addition, a limited group of civilian bureaucrats within the 
Indian government had been vested with substantive institutionalised power. This group 
comprised what Ashley Tellis describes as “India’s civilian security managers – i.e. India’s 
elected political leadership and the senior bureaucrats who occupy critical institutions such 
as the Prime Minister’s Office, the Cabinet Secretariat, and key ministerial departments 
(e.g. Finance, Defence, and Home ).”193. 
 
Formally, supreme strategic decision making was done by the Cabinet Committee for 
Political Affairs (CCPA), supported by the Cabinet Secretariat and the ad hoc Secretaries 
Committee. Within the nuclear realm, short and medium term decisions were 
predominantly made within the Atomic Energy Commission. In M. V. Ramana’s view,  
 
[u]nlike most policy matters where the cabinet has the ultimate authority, the agency 
in charge of nuclear affairs is the Atomic Energy Commission, which was 
constituted under a special act of parliament, and is composed primarily of scientists 
and dominated by the top leaders of the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE). The 
DAE was set up in 1954 under the direct charge of the Prime Minister. In addition 
to the head of the DAE, it has ‘been a tradition for several years to have the 
Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister, the Cabinet Secretary, Chairman & 
(managing director of the) Nuclear Power Corporation and Director, Bhabha 
Atomic Research Centre (BARC) as members of the AEC’. Further, the structure of 
the DAE is hierarchical and not conducive to open dissent. Thus, even if junior 
scientists had qualms about working on some project, they would have few 
alternatives.194  
 
                                                 
193 Tellis, Ashley J.: “India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture: Between Recessed Deterrent and Ready Arsenal“ 
RAND Publication 2001; p.6. 
194 Ramana, M. V.: op.cit.. 2003; pp. 213, 214. 
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Beyond these institutional structures, the chain of informal decision making was basically 
non-institutionalised and remained prone to personal motives and perceptions. The 
weaknesses of this kind of policy making became obvious during the preparations and 
aftermath of nuclear and missile testing, when India’s corps diplomatique -- members of 
parliament and even members of the cabinet -- were often found to be uninformed and 
unprepared. Their unintentionally fallacious statements caused substantial displeasure in 
other capitals. In particular, the incoherent public appearance of the Indian government 
after the nuclear tests in 1998 made the need of reform in those institutions concerned with 
the nuclear issue apparent. Further, the almost complete exclusion of the military from 
nuclear decision making put India into an exceptional position within the community of 
nuclear weapons states. Pressures emerging from the public debate and partisan 
considerations of political actors had had a growing effect on the policy making process 
since the nuclear issue entered the broader Indian polity in the late 1960s. 
 
Due to the excessive secrecy in which the nuclear programme was embedded, the public 
debate on the issue proved to be rather uninformed and, as a consequence, highly volatile. 
Therefore, most criticism of the institutional framework for nuclear decision making 
(before the Brasstacks Crisis of 1986) focused on the problem of secrecy, as shown by an 
Indian Express article in April 1986:   
 
[o]ne of the most significant points to emerge from the Defence debate in the Lok 
Sabha this year was the Prime Minister’s statement that it is proposed to review and 
rationalise the system of classification so as to avoid excessive secrecy on security 
issues. This is overdue, as an informed public is a great asset which can enhance 
security by making it possible to ask the right questions, critically evaluate policy, 
and ensure true accountability.195 
 
This commentary, made in early 1986 before the outbreak of the Brasstacks Crisis, shows 
that policy makers did have insight into the disadvantageous effects of secrecy on the 
efficiency and accountability of the country’s nuclear decision-making institutions. In 1986, 
however, the willingness to reform these institutions did not go beyond the empty 
formulation of good intentions. Next to the problem of secrecy, the ineffectiveness of 
defence planning and weapons procurement was a further point of criticism.  
 
The lack of military and strategic expertise in India’s defence policy-making, which would 
eventually become the focus of criticism in the mid-1990s, barely attracted attention in pre-
Brasstacks times. Sporadic and contentious commentary disputed creation of a single 
Commander-in-Chief for the three services. The 1947 abolition of the post was motivated 
by fears that a powerful Commander-in-Chief could develop political ambitions, thereby 
endangering India’s young and still fragile democratic structure. The longer India’s 
independence remained intact, the more experts demanded the reintroduction of a top 
position in order to improve the efficiency of military strategic planning. A. L. 
Venkanteswaran summarised caveats of the opposition as follows: 
                                                 
195 N.N: “Stronger Sinews”. In: Indian Express, April 11th 1986. 
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Service requirements cannot be decided purely from the military angle. There are 
administrative and financial considerations too, besides foreign policy implications, 
all of which cannot be left to professional Service officers alone... . Defence 
Ministry officials cannot certainly have the military knowledge possessed by their 
counterparts in the Services. It is not necessary – it may even be fatal – for them to 
have it. For a similar reason, nobody has suggested that the Ministry of Civil 
Aviation should be officered by pilots and air traffic controllers; the Home Ministry 
by police officers, intelligence experts and crime detectives; and the Health Ministry 
by doctors and nurses. The officers in these ministries – which are also vital for the 
sustenance of the Armed Forces in peace or war – have not been doubted as 
unwanted thick layers.196 
 
Venkanteswaran’s case for the continuation of strict civilian control over military affairs 
reflects the attitude of the majority of strategic thinkers and policy makers in the 1980s. 
When it comes to the role of nuclear weapons in India’s strategic policy making, however, 
his recommendations do not offer any expedient solutions. As a consequence (and cause) of 
the weapon system’s uniquely external status to the armed services, the effective 
development and implementation of integrated deployment strategies was prevented. Even 
worse, it severely complicated the effective technical development of these weapons for 
military strategic requirements. 
 
7.1.3. The Post-Brasstacks Debate on Institutional Reforms 
 
In the late 1980s, several major events and changes in India’s strategic environment took 
place, including: the Brasstacks Crisis (including its nuclear dimension) in 1986-87, the 
IPKF debacle in Sri Lanka in 1987, and the looming cessation of the Cold War, a wider 
debate on necessary reforms to adjust India’s strategic policy making was thus triggered, 
allowing adaptation to the international system. The need to institutionalise strategic 
decision making became particularly apparent during the Brasstacks Crisis, where these 
deficiencies almost unintentionally caused the outbreak of a war with Pakistan. In 
Perkovich’ view,  
 
[t]he Brasstacks crisis also revealed the danger in India of excessively centralized 
and personalized prime-ministerial decision making. Rajiv Gandhi had intensified 
the centralization of power begun by his mother. As the authors of Brasstacks and 
Beyond concluded, during the crisis he made ‘major decisions in a personal 
capacity, without the concerned bureaucracy properly examining the issues 
involved’. Once matters got dicey, Rajiv took over and largely excluded military, 
Ministry of Defence, and Ministry of External Affairs officials from his 
deliberations. This led to moves that exacerbated the danger. The liabilities of this 
type of decision making are greater in nuclear policy, where prime ministers and top 
scientists tend to exclude others from deliberations. This has generally led to 
                                                 
196 Venkateswaran, A.L.: “Why a defence ministry?” In: Indian Express, May 25th 1984. 
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cautious policies, but at the exceptional moments when major decisions were made, 
as in 1974 (and 1998), the lack of analysis and strategy led arguably to negative 
outcomes. Some defence scientists and experienced civil servants in the prime 
minister’s office began to professionalize nuclear decision making after 1982, but 
India still lacked a durable system.197  
 
The impetus of the emerging debate came from General K. Sundarji, the former Army 
Chief responsible for the Brasstacks manoeuvres and the handling of the subsequent Crisis. 
In 1989, Sundarji suggested the creation of a National Security Council (NSC) as the 
central strategic policy making body.  
 
Sundarji’s suggestions were seized on by several strategic commentators, most prominently 
B.S. Raghavan, K. Subrahmanyam, and Manoj Joshi.  
Raghavan suggested the creation of a National Security Council, thereby stressing India’s 
enhanced international status; 
 
The need for integrated security policy planning arises, particularly in the case of 
India, from some of the concomitants of the role of the region’s policeman rubbing 
off on it (the Defence Minister, Mr. K.C. Pant’s disclaimer notwithstanding) and the 
outside world’s perception of it as an emerging great power with only the 
superpowers and China as real challenges to it.198 
 
Raghavan’s estimation of the international perception of India’s status appears to be (at for 
the time of its publication) wishful thinking, as the dominant image of India remained that 
of a poor, underdeveloped Third World Country that was economically, technologically 
and militarily backwards. The effort to redefine India as an emerging power was still 
confined to certain sections of India’s strategic and foreign policy elite.  
In a follow-up article, Raghavan draws a blueprint of a modified structure of India’s 
security policy making institutions. The cornerstone of his reform proposal is the creation 
of a National Security Council. 
 
                                                 
197 Perkovich, George: op.cit.. 1998; pp. 281,282. 
198 Raghavan, B.S.: “Security Policy Planning – filling in the gaps”. In: The Hindu, August 11th 1989. 
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Chart: 7.2.: Reform Proposal of India’s Security Making Institutions by B.S. 
Raghavan (1989) 
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Raghavan’s blueprint already showed several structural features of the NSC which would 
be created a decade later. Two aspects of his proposal are noteworthy: First, he does not 
mention the creation of a Joint Commander-in-Chief of all three services, thus ignoring the 
main feature of the pre-Brasstacks-Crisis’ discourse. Second, he suggests introducing a law 
under which the President would decide whether India should acquire nuclear weapons on 
the advice of the Cabinet, following the recommendations of the NSC.  
 
In reference to K. Sundarji’s and B.S. Raghavan’s call for the creation of a NSC, K. 
Subrahmanyam explains why the government has so far failed to implement the necessary 
reforms:  
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 It is not for want of submission of proposals to the authorities concerned. The 
reasons are to be traced to the country’s political culture and the structure of its 
Cabinet Government, the civilian bureaucracy and the armed forces and their 
methods of functioning.199  
 
Subrahmanyam continues to illustrate how India’s ‘political culture’ has caused suboptimal 
strategic policy decisions by referring to historic events: 
 
There was no discussion on the international implications of carrying out the 
peaceful nuclear explosion [PNE] of 1974. The result was the Prime Minister 
developed cold feet after the only test and yielded to the arguments of her aid-addict 
advisers who hardly understood the game of international tradeoffs between 
economic and strategic considerations... . This political culture of secret, 
personalised functioning without members of the Cabinet sharing responsibility or 
exerting their weight on Cabinet decisions which is the crux of collective Cabinet 
government reached its nadir on June 25, 1975 when Emergency was declared 
without any justification being offered and without the members of the Cabinet with 
one exception asking a question. A political culture in which Cabinet Ministers act 
as dummies cannot have a viable National Security Council to take long-term 
security and foreign policy decisions.200 
 
K. Subrahmanyam’s frequent writings on strategic affairs in India’s main dailies proved 
invaluable for their straightforwardness as well as their impact on the ongoing elite 
discourse. He criticises India’s strategic policy making culture by presenting anecdotal 
evidence from Morarji Desai’s tenure as Prime Minister: 
 
The Private Secretary [of Morarji Desai] conducted his own foreign policy and 
nuclear policy such as dealing with Israel and initiating a proposal for a joint Indo-
U.S. study on fullscope safeguards. These were gross violations of the principle of 
joint Cabinet responsibility. 
Just on the eve of his departure to attend a U.N. special session on disarmament Mr. 
Morarji Desai in the course of a Cabinet meeting, without the item being on the 
agenda, just read out a few lines from his forthcoming U.N. speech, renouncing all 
future nuclear tests. As usual no one else said anything. However before he reached 
New York the President, Mr. Sanjiva Reddi, sent him a message telling him that it 
would not be appropriate to make such an announcement in the U.N. special 
session. Mr. Desai ignored it and delivered his lines renouncing any future Indian 
tests. Subsequently under pressure from Parliament he tried to make some 
distinction between nuclear t.”201 
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200 ibid. 
201 ibid. 
 132
Subrahmanyam’s anecdote vividly illustrates the political dynamics behind the often 
intriguing semantics in India’s nuclear debate, from Desai’s distinction between ‘nuclear 
tests’ and ‘nuclear blasts’, over Indira’s distinction between ‘nuclear tests and ‘peaceful 
nuclear explosions’202, to the distinction between ‘developing nuclear weapons’ and 
‘developing a nuclear weapons option’, by all Indian Prime Ministers from Jawaharlal 
Nehru to I.K. Gujral.  
 
The core problem for long-term strategic decision making in India is, according to 
Subrahmanyam, that policy makers are unwilling to concern themselves with the issue: 
 
[I]n spite of efforts by individual Ministers, service chiefs and senior bureaucrats it 
has not so for [sic.] been possible to have an integrated decision making structure 
for long term national security policy making. The underlying reason is that no 
Prime Minister, from Jawaharlal Nehru down to Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, had felt the need 
for such a structure... . That ad hoc decision making is costlier than coherent long 
term policy making does not seem to have worried Prime Ministers and most of the 
Defence Ministers. It is also quite possible that Prime Ministers who have seen their 
Cabinet colleagues approve decisions without bothering to study their implications 
or even knowing what it is they are agreeing to ... may have developed a cynical 
attitude towards structured decision making.203 
 
In contrast to the widespread consensus among India’s strategic elite about the benefits of a 
democratic structure for strategic decision making, Subrahmanyam takes a remarkably 
critical position, breaking a taboo from the security afforded him by his status: 
 
It is not being argued that nothing can be done to improve our decision making 
procedures and structures in national security. While it is possible and necessary to 
undertake various steps in that direction it has to be recognised that there are very 
serious constraints arising out of the limitations of our democratic system at its 
present stage of evolution and the kind of leadership it produces.204 
 
Unlike K. Subrahmanyam, Manoj Joshi expresses his strong confidence in India’s cabinet 
government. He explicitly warns about placing the NSC outside of parliamentarian control, 
as it would bear the risk of ‘extra-constitutional functioning’. The blueprint Joshi develops 
for a tentative NSC resembles Raghavan’s earlier draft. More than other commentators, 
Joshi focuses on the newly emerging pressures for nuclearisation in the South Asian 
strategic environment: 
 
[s]ince 1985, various official pronouncements have declared that Pakistan has the 
nuclear bomb. Whether or not it does, the fact is that it has a programme that has 
                                                 
202 actually K. Subrahmanyam himself confidently adheres to the euphemistic expression ‘peaceful nuclear 
explosion’.  
203 Subrahmanyam, K.: op.cit; The Hindu, August 22nd 1989. 
204 ibid. 
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been worked upon for quite some time now and India cannot but work with the 
assumption that Pakistan is a nuclear armed country. The proliferation of missiles in 
South-West Asia and the Pakistani tests last year only strengthen the argument that 
the Indian security environment is rapidly undergoing a change. What this means 
for the country or the world cannot be determined by an individual or a group. It 
requires deliberation within the institutional framework of the Government. 
Unfortunately such a framework does not exist. This is one of the many 
qualitatively complicated tasks that the new National Security Council has to 
address itself to.205 
 
Because of the strategists’ debate on the issue, the government finally picked up on the idea 
of a NSC. However, the design for such a body, as envisaged by Prime Minister V.P. 
Singh, did not improve the existing structures significantly. As Manoj Joshi commented,  
 
[t]he NSC (as planned by V.P. Singh) is new wine in old bottle. The NSC itself is 
nothing but the CCPA (Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs), the Strategic 
Policy Group nothing but the Secretaries Committee with a new hat and the NSC 
Secretariat nothing but the good old JIC (Joint Intelligence Committee). The Prime 
Minister, Mr. V.P. Singh, has strongly defended his proposal and has said that it will 
not violate the principles of Cabinet Government and supremacy of Parliament. 
However, he may have missed the central point. The decisions of the NSC will be as 
good or as bad as the policy options that are placed before it.206 
 
The downfall of the V.P. Singh government stopped the reform initiative in its tracks. After 
the 1991 Lok Sabha elections and the return of the Congress Party to power, his successor 
Narashima Rao put any reforms of India’s strategic policy making institutions on ice, 
instead continuing the traditional ad hoc, informal approach. When Rao caved in to the 
scientists’ request to prepare for nuclear testing, he did so without any formal declaration 
and apparently without consultation of any strategic advisory body.  
 
The failure of the institutional reform debate in the post-Brasstacks period to produce any 
results illustrates the general dilemma of India’s strategic decision making: the laissez-faire 
attitude of the political leadership in their refusal to make clear decisions as long as they 
were not pressured to do so. Consequently, a situation arose in which the political decision-
makers did not determine the dynamics of India’s nuclear course, but only reacted to them. 
 
7.1.4. The Post-Pokhran Institutional Reforms 
 
During the reform debate of the late 1980s / early 1990s, the strategic analysts had 
recommended setting up institutional bodies that would develop white papers for India’s 
strategic planning. Based on their recommendations,  the Indian government would then 
decide whether to go nuclear. However, the Indian government did exactly the opposite: It 
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made (purely on political grounds) the final decision to conduct the test and only afterwards 
created a body that would review India’s strategic policy making. The task force was 
created exactly one month before the actual testing on April 10th 1998, yet after the go-
ahead had already been given. While many scholars interpret this chronology as an 
indication of the government’s indifference towards strategic aspects, this study goes one 
step further and suggests that the government intentionally waited until the political 
decision to test was irreversible before setting up the task force. The fear was clearly that a 
profound strategic review would suggest something different. In other words, it was less an 
act of careless indifference, but an act of systematic preclusion. 
 
The three-person task force assigned to review India’s strategic policy was chaired by K. C. 
Pant, a former Defence Minister in the Congress government who had rejected all reform 
initiatives and had left the Congress Party in early 1998. The time between the creation of 
the task force and the nuclear tests was mainly used by Pant to smooth the way for the 
events to come. When India’s Defence Minister George Fernandes made his anti-Chinese 
remarks a few days before the tests, (grossly distorting the threat scenario of Chinese 
missile, naval and air wing preparations around India207), K. C. Pant added:  
 
We are surrounded by missiles and there is no reason why the work that our 
scientists have done to develop missiles should not be carried forward... . There is a 
need for this country having a minimum credible nuclear deterrence. And this 
option is growing at the time.208 
 
These remarks reveal two important features of the nuclear discourse immediately before 
Pokhran II. There was a strong tendency among a significant portion of India’s strategic 
elite to see India as being ‘surrounded’ by a threatening regional environment. The Indo-
Chinese rapprochement of the previous years did not decrease these fears, but on the 
contrary, it increased the threat perception: the process was viewed as part of a malicious 
Chinese strategy to subdue India. Additionally, Pant’s perception of the scientists’ work 
illustrates the general way in which strategic planning was done in India: Nuclear weapons 
were not developed to satisfy India’s strategic needs, but the other way around: In 1998 
India’s strategic planners demanded a strategic assignment of their nuclear weapons after 
development. In the semantics of India’s strategic discourse, now that India’s ‘nuclear 
option’ existed, K. C. Pant urged the government to ‘exercise this option’.  
 
Next to K. C. Pant, the task force included the Deputy Chairman of the Planning 
Commission (future foreign and defence minister Jaswant Singh) as well as Jasjit Singh, 
the director of India’s leading government-sponsored strategic think-tank, the Institute for 
                                                 
207 It remains unclear whether K. C. Pant and George Fernandes knew about the pending nuclear tests. While 
it is somehow hard to believe that the defence minister did not know about the nuclear tests one month before 
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decision in only 24 hours before the tests. (see: Perkovich, George: op.cit.. 1998; p. 415.). 
208 Interview with a private TV network, cited from N.N: “China bigger threat to India than Pakistan: defence 
minister”. In: Agence France Press, May 3rd 1998. 
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Defence Studies and Analyses. The prime task of this group was to design a blueprint for 
the National Security Council (NSC), which would then work out a strategic defence 
review. 
 
On the recommendations of the task force, a National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) 
was established next to the creation of the National Security Council in late 1998. The 
advisory board, consisting of several members of India’s strategic elite, soon submitted a 
Draft Report on the Indian Nuclear Doctrine209, which became the basis of India’s strategic 
policy planning. The creation of these bodies contributed to an increased transparency in 
India’s strategic discourse. Furthermore, it increased the strategic expertise informing 
policy decisions. 
 
Chart 7.3.: Strategic Decision Making in India after the Institutional Reforms of 
1998/99 
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The Indian system is not a satisfactory one. The chiefs are not able to do justice to 
both their roles as operational commanders of forces and chief planners of future 
requirements of the services and its long-term preparedness. There is a good case to 
separate the two functions, devolve the operational responsibilities to theatre 
commanders and merge the service headquarters with the ministry of defence. In 
that set-up, the civilian defence secretary will deal with budget and accounts, 
coordination with other ministries and states and foreign procurement. The service 
chiefs will look after housekeeping of the services, professional advice to the 
defence minister and long-term defence planning.210 
 
Interestingly, Subrahmanyam reverses the main argument of those opposing the merger of 
civilian defence making institutions with the military command. According to them, such 
an action would carry the risk of the military interfering in political affairs and endangering  
India’s democracy. Subrahmanyam counters these fears by claiming that the control (in 
Subrahmanyam’s words: ‘subjugation’) of the armed forces by the civilian bureaucracy and 
its political leadership leads to a politicisation of the forces, which would likewise pose 
serious risks to India’s democracy: 
 
Any resourceful defence minister should interact intensively not only with his 
civilian bureaucracy but also his service chiefs and senior officers of the armed 
forces on a day-to-day basis. Only then would he be able to function effectively 
without being influenced unduly by one or the other. Our democracy has been safe 
because of the apolitical nature of our! armed forces. If armed forces were to be 
politicised because of civilian ineptitude there are serious risks to our democracy.211 
 
While the basis of these fears appears questionable, Subrahmanyam’s claims nevertheless 
prove to be quite effective for invalidating his opponents’ main argument. 
 
In the weeks and months following the tests, the government was preoccupied with 
repairing the diplomatic damage caused by the inapt handling of the test and its aftermath, 
particularly continuous abusive commentary by its lugubrious defence minister. During this 
time, the foremost task of the National Security Council was to adjust the parameters of 
India’s strategic policy making to the enhanced international status India was thought to 
have achieved through its self-declaration as a nuclear weapons state. According to V. 
Sudarshan,  
 
[t]he review will undoubtedly take into consideration that India’s role in the region 
will have to be redefined in a manner that is consistent with New Delhi’s claim to 
its altered nuclear status. This status no doubt should affect its perception of its 
altered strategic frontiers. It would be illogical to suggest that the strategic frontiers 
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of the country have not changed in any material and political manner after the 
nuclear tests.212 
 
Next to the need for an official nuclear doctrine, the possession of nuclear capabilities 
implied the need for an institutionalised chain of command and control. For this purpose, 
the Planning Directorate of the Armed Forces developed a white paper that was 
subsequently approved by all three services. 
 
The guiding principle of the white paper was the absolute control of nuclear weapons by 
the political leadership. Furthermore, the paper suggested the creation of a National 
Command Authority (NCA), chaired by the Prime Minister that would bear sole authority 
over the use of nuclear weapons.  
 
Chart 7.4.: Suggested Nuclear Command and Control Structure (1998) 
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Integrated Defence Staff as well as a Defence Intelligence Agency. In its attempt to create a 
Chief of Defence Staff, it faced some resistance from the services, who feared a loss of 
authority.  
 
In January 2003, the government finally decided to establish a Nuclear Command 
Authority (NCA) with the highest competency for nuclear weapons. The NCA is structured 
into the Political Council, chaired by the Prime Minister, and the Executive Council, 
chaired by the National Security Adviser to the Prime Minister. Next to the Nuclear 
Command Authority, the post of a Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Forces Command 
was established as the responsible decision maker for nuclear deployment and warfare. 
 
Chart 7.5.: Nuclear Command Structure established in January 2003 
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[t]he creation of the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) brings into effect a 
longstanding requirement. The Government has done well to announce its coming 
into being. It formalises what was essentially a set of unstructured arrangements 
among senior member of the politico-military-scientific establishment. An 
increasing number of doubts were being expressed about the commitment of India’s 
leadership to effective nuclear weapons management. The announcement sets at rest 
some doubts over nuclear issues, reiterates the promises made by the Government 
internationally and incorporates doctrinal issues listed in the draft nuclear 
doctrine.213 
 
Parallel to the introduction of the NCA, the government gave official status to the Nuclear 
Doctrine drafted by the National Security Advisory Board in 1999. With a single exception, 
the official doctrine remained unchanged from its draft version: The comprehensive no-
first-use posture of the draft was softened by introducing the option of a nuclear first strike 
in the case of an attack with biological or chemical weapons. This mitigation of the no-first-
use option, one of the cornerstones of the defenders of India’s moral exceptionalism, went 
unnoticed by most strategic analysts, and even deliberately ignored, such as by K. 
Subrahmanyam: “New Delhi is not going to plan a nuclear attack and under its ‘no first 
use’ doctrine will only respond to an attack”214. Considering the accuracy with which 
Subrahmanyam addresses every detail of the doctrine in his article, it is difficult to fathom 
why he avoids explaining the most important aspect of the doctrine, that is, what kind of 
attack would trigger India’s nuclear response. 
 
Jasjit Singh goes one step further by indirectly questioning the validity of the no-first-use 
option: 
 
We also must objectively assess what would be the scenarios where India would 
need to use nuclear weapons first, warranting a first-use strategy and its attendant 
costs? A significant military setback, if not a decisive military defeat, or surprise 
breakthrough by the enemy with conventional forces, are two possible theoretical 
contingencies. But these could happen only if we allow our conventional military 
capability to go down to unacceptably dangerous levels.215 
 
In other words: The no-first-use option is valid only as long as India has superior  and 
victorious conventional forces. This logic reduces the concept of no-first-use to absurdity. 
Despite its flaws, the idea of a ‘valid-until-revoked’ no-first-use option gained some 
popularity among the hawkish sections of India’s strategic elite: 
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[T]he ‘no first use’ policy is indicative of strength for the same reason that reserving 
the option to strike first is a sign of weakness. Again, a ‘no first use’ policy does not 
reduce our inherent capacity or capability to strike first if so warranted. The option 
to hit first always remains if the circumstances have so altered as to force a major 
change in our nuclear policy.216 
 
The only critical assessment of the redefinition of the no-first-use option came from W.P.S. 
Sidhu: 
 
The most troublesome aspects of the SFC and the accompanying doctrinal 
pronouncements, however, are the ones related to the use of nuclear weapons to 
counter even a biological or chemical attack.... . [I]t is not clear which of India’s 
potential adversaries are likely to use chemical or biological weapons in preference 
to nuclear weapons. Almost all of India’s neighbours and potential adversaries have 
signed and ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological 
Weapons Convention (BWC) which not only prohibit the possession but also ban 
the use of these weapons.217  
 
 
7.2. Nuclear Science 
 
7.2.1. Between Science and Politics: The Scientific Establishment 
 
As the previous section has shown, the structure of nuclear decision making in India 
underwent fundamental changes, going from a basically informal, non-institutionalised 
mode under Nehru to a sophisticated, full-fledged nuclear command and control structure 
under the Vajpayee government of 2003. Correspondingly, the role of the nuclear scientists 
changed significantly. Generally, the less institutional bonds existed, the more the scientific 
establishment was able to shape India’s nuclear course and determine the country’s 
strategic and international policy. The scientists were thus able to shape the direction of 
India’s nuclear development for most of the post-independence era. This caused, according 
to M. V. Ramana, caused a certain degree of continuity in nuclear policy making: 
 
At the level of setting up the necessary infrastructure and the activities of the 
scientific and technological establishment one can discern continuity and a steady 
progression over the decades. This continuity is possible because nuclear scientists 
have been able to pursue programmes that diverge in subtle ways from proclaimed 
policy; this ability, in turn, is related to the structure of nuclear policy making and 
implementation in India.218  
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Table 7.1.: India’s Scientific Leadership 
 
years AEC* DRDO** BARC*** 
1947-1966 Homi Bhabha Suri Bhagavantam Homi Bhabha 
1966-1971 Vikram Sarabhai B.D. Nag Chaudhuri  Homi Sethna 
1971-1983 Homi Sethna B.D. Nag Chaudhuri Raja Ramanna 
1983-1987 Raja Ramanna V.S. Arunachalam P.K. Iyengar 
1987-1990 M. Srinivasan V.S. Arunachalam P.K. Iyengar 
1990-1993 P.K. Iyengar V.S. Arunachalam Rajagopala Chidambaram 
1993-2000 Rajagopala Chidambaram A.P.J. Kalam  Anil Kakodkar 
2000- Anil Kakodkar Vasudev K Aatre 
(until 2004) 
M. Natarajan  
(since 2004) 
B. Bhattacharjee  
(until 2004) 
S. Banerjee  
(since 2004) 
* Atomic Energy Commission 
** Defence Research and Development Organisation 
*** Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, prior to1967: Atomic Energy Establishment Trombay 
(AEET) 
 
The unique position of defence scientists in India’s strategic policy-making has its origins 
in the congenial relationship between Jawaharlal Nehru and Homi Bhabha. Bhabha 
successfully created the myth of nuclear science as the symbol of India’s path to modernity:  
 
[w]ithout much sense of irony, Indians worship science, particularly nuclear 
science. The adulation of scientists is widespread among the Indian strategic elite. 
The Nehruvians see science as salvation, and the more rustic backwaters of the 
political and security elite agree and argue, as did Nehru, that India was a supremely 
advanced scientific state when the West and the Islamic world were mired in 
ignorance. For both groups, the nuclear program only reclaims India’s birthright.219 
 
The scientists’ unique role further benefited from several favourable features of India’s 
institutional set-up. The ad hoc decisions characteristic of India’s Prime Ministers relied 
heavily on advice from experts. As an effective institutionalised advisory body for 
decision-making institutions (strategic advice from military personal was largely absent) 
did not exist until 1998, this gap was filled by the nuclear scientists and engineers, despite 
limited expertise in strategic and international affairs. The scientists profited from the 
enormous respect and authority they enjoyed among the political elite and the public. Their 
image perfectly fit the anti-colonialist and status-oriented principles of India’s foreign 
policy.  
 
India’s nuclear scientists did not define their work in the context of security as part of the 
country’s economic development. Showing an immense degree of hubris, they portrayed 
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their nuclear achievements as one of the most substantial contributions to the greatness 
Indian civilisation. This attitude is reflected in a comment by Raja Ramanna, the chairman 
of India’s Atomic Energy Commission from 1983 to 1987: 
 
There was never a discussion among us over whether we shouldn’t make the bomb. 
How to do it was more important. For us it was a matter of prestige that would 
justify our ancient past. The question of deterrence came much later. Also, as Indian 
scientists we were keen to show our Western counterparts, who thought little of us 
those days, that we too could do it.220 
 
Ramanna’s statement contains all major features that contributed to India’s nuclear build-
up: the crucial role of prestige thinking, the ‘historic’ mission of by the nuclear scientists, 
the strong sense of inferiority and perceived discrimination vis-à-vis the West, and the 
extent to which nuclear achievements were seen as emancipation from the West. 
Throughout most of the history of India’s nuclear programme, the scientists were able to set 
its agenda with little outside interference.  
 
The scientists’ role as single source of advice to the political decision makers was further 
strengthened by the complexity of the issue and the general indifference of India’s political 
elite towards details of nuclear technology221. Homi Bhabha epitomised nuclear scientists 
as the avant-garde of India’s scientific elite, leading the country on its path to modernity. 
This heroic depiction left little room for critical self-reflection on their work. Accordingly, 
self-doubts were nearly non-existent. Even until the present day, India’s nuclear scientists 
are largely absent from those international fora in which science is critically debated, such 
as the Pugwash Conference. Dhirendra Sharma critically remarks that  
 
[it] is unbelievable that no Indian scientist signed the Pugwash declaration. 
Originally, Betrand Russel, the convenor of the conference, was invited by 
Jawaharlal Nehru to hold the first meeting in India. But Dr. Homi J. Bhabha, the 
chief science adviser to Nehru and the first chairman of the Atomic Energy 
Commission (AEC), was not keen to be associated with the movement, which was 
believed to be inspired by ‘fellow-travellers’. Consequently, India lost the honour of 
being the host of the conference. Later it was held at Pugwash, a village in Nova 
Scotia in Canada. Indian scientists still suffer from the Bhabha legacy and are 
allergic to all critical science movements.222 
 
What is described by Sharma as a ‘disease’ afflicting Indian scientists is nothing than the 
scientists’ own self-image, the basis of their self-defined raison d’être.  
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The ad libitum shaping of India’s nuclear policy by its scientists remained largely 
unfettered by strategic or diplomatic qualifications. In 1966, when both Lal Bahadur Shastri 
and Homi Bhabha passed away within days of each other much of the basic knowledge of 
India’s nuclear planning simply vanished. “It is impossible to know what the new prime 
minister believed the actual nuclear policy was. Shastri as prime minister and Bhabha as 
AEC chairman had shaped it, but there is no evidence regarding who else knew the whole 
agenda”223. 
 
When Indira Gandhi took over as India’s Prime Minister in 1966, she did not have much 
idea of how to handle the nuclear issue. Her first decision was to choose Vikram Sarabhai, 
then head of the Indian National Committee for Space Research, as the new Chairman of 
the AEC. Sarabhai’s exceptional approach to the nuclear issue, combined with Indira 
Gandhi’s lack of knowledge, disrupted the previous course. An unusual period of nuclear 
restraint lasted until 1971, when Homi Sethna, a representative of the traditionalists among 
the nuclear scientific establishment, succeeded Sarabhai as chairman of the AEC. Further, 
the 1971 Bangladesh war -- considered a personal success for Indira Gandhi -- had 
significantly increased the Prime Minister’s international profile and self-confidence. These 
new conditions returned India’s nuclear programme to its pre-1966 track. Homi Sethna and 
Raja Ramanna, his successor as head of BARC, intensified preparations for a nuclear test 
explosion. 
 
Sethna and Ramanna designed the nuclear test of 1974 as a mere show of force to 
demonstrate the genius of the individual scientists involved as well as the greatness of the 
nation as a whole. A wide consensus existed among international observers that India’s 
claim of a ‘peaceful nuclear explosion’ was hypocritical, a cover for the nuclear weapons 
programme. This understanding clearly misses the point. While the main purpose of nuclear 
weapons testing is the optimisation of warhead designs for missiles, the Indian test of 1974 
did not include such designs, nor were the scientists’ plans for developing missiles in the 
near future. It was not conceived for the development of new ways to dig canals or mines. 
Its single motive was the demonstration of power.  
 
A further expression of the scientists’ self-depiction was their exclusion of political 
decision makers from the test preparations. Obviously, a formal approval by the political 
leadership was considered unnecessary; for the scientists, it was more a matter of informing 
the government rather than them for permission. 
The Prime Minister’s green light was solicited only few days before the actual test. P.K. 
Iyengar, one of the scientists involved in the test preparations and later the leading figure in 
BARC and the AEC, confirms the scientists’ autonomy from political interference: “A 
couple of days before the event, the decision-maker in Delhi, Indira Gandhi, gave the green 
signal. Very few dignitaries were invited to witness the event. The team-spirit was high and 
the scientists were sure of their success”224. Interestingly, Iyengar speaks of the decision-
maker as a single individual, ignoring the legislative branch altogether. After the test, Indira 
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Gandhi’s decision to bring the scientists under political control caused quite a bit of 
disconcertment within the nuclear scientific establishment.  
 
In the early to mid-1980s, two institutional developments further limited the AEC’s ability 
to shape India’s nuclear course. First, the development of further components for military 
applications, above all the missile programme in begun in 1982, was taken over by the 
Defence and Development Organisation (DRDO), which subsequently emerged as the 
second institutional pillar of the programme. The DRDO was institutionally placed within 
the Ministry of Defence, thus under much tighter governmental control than the AEC. 
Second, Indira Gandhi had learned from the 1974 experience and included consultation 
with a much broader group of experts and policy makers before making final decisions on 
the nuclear issue. 
 
The ten years between 1983 and 1993 witnessed the coming and going of three AEC 
chairmen: Raja Ramanna, M. Srinivasan and P.K. Iyengar. After completing their 
respective tenures, they became very active in shaping public opinion through extensive 
publishing and commentary in India’s media. They successfully maintained the ‘nuclear 
scientists as national heroes’ myth throughout the crucial 1990s in the face of continued 
setbacks in the civilian nuclear programme.  
 
In 1989, Rajiv Gandhi was unseated by a corruption scandal on the acquisition of 
conventional military weaponry, ending the rule of Nehru-Gandhi dynasty for the time 
being, and paving the way for the emergence of a multi-party system in India. This system 
change had several ramifications for the country’s nuclear programme as it amplified two 
of its major structural weaknesses: Firstly, governmental instability and shorter election 
periods made long-term strategic planning even more difficult than it had been in India’s 
past. Secondly, the increasing frequency of elections further strengthened the politicians’ 
tendency to instrumentalise the nuclear issue for electoral purposes, causing a further 
emotionalisation of the nuclear debate and increasing the myth’s hold on the public 
imagination.  
 
In 1991, government spending on the nuclear programme came under scrutiny over the 
course of the new government’s economic reforms and its efforts to consolidate India’s 
overburdened national budget. These changing conditions increased the pressure on the 
nuclear scientific establishment to justify its work. In effect, Rao’s economy-first policy 
slowed down but did not stop the nuclear programme. With the collapse of the fragile 
coalition government looming and the opposition BJP openly playing the nuclear card for 
electoral purposes, Rao finally dropped his reticent stance and gave the scientists free hand 
to develop the nuclear programme. The scientists proceeded with the development of 
missile delivery vehicles and concluded preparations to conduct further nuclear tests. These 
were considered necessary for optimising the atomic chain reaction and making nuclear 
warheads suitable for missile delivery. Rao appears to have authorised these preparations 
personally, but stopped short of actually authorising the detonations225. While accepting 
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India’s need for a nuclear deterrent, Rao nevertheless refrained from testing out of fear that 
negative international reactions -- including the imposition of sanctions -- would cause a 
major blow to the slowly recovering Indian economy and thereby endanger his programme 
of economic transformation. He followed the dual strategy of accommodating popular 
domestic sentiments by fiercely opposing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty while 
simultaneously calming the international audience by not stepping forward in the nuclear 
field. In 1993, R. Chidambaram succeeded P.K. Iyengar as chairman of the AEC. 
Chidambaram clearly moved preparations for nuclear testing, including the test of a 
hydrogen bomb, to the top of his agenda for the nuclear programme. 
 
After the downfall of the Rao government in 1996, his successor Atal Behari Vajpayee 
authorised nuclear tests immediately, but withdrew his authorisation as soon as it became 
apparent that his government would not survive the upcoming vote of confidence. The 
following governments, led by Deve Gowda (1996-1997), and Inder Kumar Gujral (1997-
1998), marked an exception in India’s foreign policy. During Gowda’s term, foreign policy 
for the first time ever was made not in the Prime Minister’s office, but within the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs. Then Foreign Minister Inder Kumar Gujral, who would himself become 
Prime Minister in 1997, developed a new doctrine for India’s foreign policy based on 
regional co-operation and unilateral confidence building efforts. His careful diplomacy 
increased India’s stature in and around the South Asian region. Towards Pakistan, his 
policy had the potential of breaking the vicious circle of mutual provocation, allegation, 
and misperception. Furthermore, he enjoyed increasing respect the new foreign policy 
among the domestic audience, disproving the conventional belief of the Indian political 
class that only an aggressive stance towards Pakistan could win domestic approval. 
 
By 1997, this cautious policy had become increasingly ambivalent, particularly in the 
nuclear field. As late as 1996, Gujral reaffirmed that India had no intentions to weaponise 
its nuclear capability. As the head of an increasingly unstable coalition government and 
with fierce opposition from the scientists around Chidambaram, however, he was soon 
forced to revise his policy. While still rejecting nuclear tests publicly, he was not able or 
willing to stop or significantly slow down the scientists’ work on the nuclear programme. 
When Gujral left office in 1998, preparations for the nuclear tests had already been 
completed. There was nothing left for his to do successor but push the button. 
 
In the election campaigns of 1996 and 1998, the BJP’s manifesto appealed heavily to 
national pride and prestige. India’s self-respect, international status and military prowess 
were linked to the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Once in place, this instrumentalisation of 
the atomic bomb barred manoeuvring room on the nuclear issue. As he did in 1996, Prime 
Minister Vajpayee authorised nuclear tests immediately after his assumption of office in 
1998. 
 
In the immediate aftermath of the 1998 tests, public admiration of the nuclear scientific 
establishment reached its peak. The DRDO and AEC leaders in charge of the tests received 
the country’s highest honours. Few voices raised critical questions about their work. 
Among these was Ramachandra Guha, who considered the hype surrounding the nuclear 
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scientists as a betrayal of the traditional values to which India’s scientists were once 
committed. He starts his lament by comparing two quotes, one by Mahatma Gandhi in the 
aftermath of the Hiroshima tragedy, and the other by Atal Behari Vajpayee in the aftermath 
of the 1998 tests: 
 
“ ‘He who invented the atom bomb has committed the greatest sin in the world of 
science’ – Mahatma Gandhi, after Hiroshima. 
‘I extend my felicitations to all scientists and technologists who have made this 
possible, and say to them, ‘India is proud of you’ ‘ – The President of India, after 
the recent tests at Pokhran.”226. 
 
Guha continues his line of questioning: “[S]hould we shout ‘Jai Vigyan’ only when science 
makes a terrific noise, when it announces to the world that India yields to no one in the 
manufacture of weapons of mass execution?”227. Guha’s reintroduction of Gandhian moral 
values remained unheard in the wave of public jubilance. 
 
Once the dust had settled in the Rajasthan desert, the public celebration of the nuclear 
scientists gradually abated. During this phase of India’s nuclear consolidation, a more 
realistic assessment of the strategic and international impact of India’s nuclearisation began 
to cool the ardour for scientific achievements. Only in mid-2002, with the nomination of 
AEC Chairman Abdul Kalam for President, was unrestrained public enthusiasm revived. 
Public and political support for Kalam’s candidature was overwhelming. “Dr. A.P.J. Abdul 
Kalam is not only a brilliant scientist, but also a national asset as far as building India’s 
nuclear capability is concerned. If Pakistan is at all scared of India, it’s because of Kalam 
and his team”228. This comment, made by a commentator not belonging to the strategic elite 
as defined in this study, reflects the Pakistan-centric vox populi with regard to the role of 
nuclear weapons. Moreover, it gives a good impression of the extent to which the vox 
populi attributes the elevation of India into a respected and feared position to the heroic 
work of the nuclear scientists (despite their actual hesitation to develop militarily effective 
nuclear devices).  
The pitfalls of this popular myth became apparent only a few days later. Kalam, himself a 
believer of the myth, claimed that during the recent crisis in Kashmir, only the deterrent 
effect of nuclear weapons had prevented war, thereby (unintentionally) corroborating 
Pakistani President Musharraf’s similar belief. Kalam’s remarks irritated many among the 
moderate strategic commentators: 
 
In endorsing General Musharraf’s claim, our presidential candidate has done grave 
damage to the national cause when he stated that nuclear weapons – in Pakistan and 
India – have deterred war. If he has been misquoted, he must clarify it for public 
benefit. But if this is his scientific, objective assessment, then we all have a lot to 
worry about... . As the prospective constitutional head of this country, Kalam seems 
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to have undermined the very rationale of the policy of this government and the 
governments before this. He is, of course, entitled to his personal views. Bu, 
keeping in mind the position he is to assume, he needs to be careful when his public 
statement rationalises Islamabad’s mythodology that nuclear weapons neutralise the 
conventional superiority of India and hence deters war... . We are a nuclear weapon 
state, and we need to ensure that people assuming new responsibilities in high 
positions are adequately briefed. Kalam, the humble man that he undoubtedly is, 
will need to remind himself that you do not ascend Vikramaditya’s throne after 
filing nomination papers for the post of the head of state of the largest democracy in 
the world. Hence it would be important for him to get himself fully briefed on 
national security issues and the strategy to deal with the most complex challenge 
that the country is facing since independence.229 
 
This remark shows the extent to which the nuclear discourse in 2002 had changed since 
1998. Far from the submissiveness of earlier times, the commentator clearly points to the 
limited expertise of nuclear scientists in strategic affairs. His analysis reflects the strategic 
elite’s increasing efforts to overcome the emotional, mainly prestige-oriented approach to 
the nuclear issue and engage in a more sober analysis of the impact of nuclear weapons on 
India’s security. Following this newly emerging trend, the strategic elite appeared to be 
much less willing to accept the mythic position of the nuclear scientific establishment 
uncritically. 
 
7.2.2. Self-Reliance and Indigenous Development 
 
As previous sections of this study have shown, the nuclear scientists’ raison d’être was 
strongly bound up with the symbolic meaning of nuclear technology, specifically India’s 
aspirations to compete with Western countries in the fields of high technology and military 
power. This psychological phenomenon, which might be referred to as ‘occidentalism’ 
(orientalism is still seen by many of the elite as a major determinant of Western behaviour) 
was instrumentalised by the nuclear scientists in order to further their own aspirations. 
Crucial for the success of this instrumentalisation were the myths of self-reliance and 
indigenous development. Only if progress in the nuclear field could be achieved without 
help of the West would it prove India’s technological equality. The more apparent it 
became that civilian nuclear power production would never become the advertised magic-
potion for India’s economic development, the more the scientists focused on military power 
as the tool with which India could join the ranks of the world’s major powers.  
 
The interrelation between the scientists’ failure to contribute to economic development, 
their personal and national ambitions, and their creation of this myth, is expressed best by 
M.V. Ramana: 
 
Added to this is the fact that the DAE, like the larger scientific community in India, 
has had relatively few notable accomplishments. There have been, for example, no 
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Nobel Prices awarded to any scientist for work conducted in post-independence 
India. An important study of the scientific community in India found that most 
scientists were troubled by the marginal position of scientific activity in India in 
general, and of their own scientific research in particular. The lack of relevance, 
perceived or real, of scientific research to the actual problems of India further 
accentuates the peripherality of scientists and results in widespread demoralisation. 
The shrill rhetoric, especially on the part of the nuclear and missile establishments, 
about self- sufficiency and indigenous development is indicative of the desire for 
wider recognition. Building nuclear weapons and thereby being seen as serving a 
national priority by the elite has, therefore, been an answer to the larger failure on 
the part of the DAE to either produce world class science or provide cheap and 
reliable electricity.230  
 
In the 1990s, the single most active member of the nuclear scientific community to 
propagate the myth through extensive publishing was M. R. Srinivasan, who chaired the 
AEC from 1987 to 1990 and served as secretary to the Department of Atomic Energy. In 
the following, Srinivasan’s assessments and comments during this period are analysed in 
order to clarify the postulates and characteristics of the scientists’ myth creation. 
 
In an historic account of the early phase of India’s nuclear programme, Srinivasan describes 
the high esteem India’s nuclear scientists (including himself) enjoyed among their 
colleagues in Western countries: 
 
Looking back to the Fifties and Sixties, it is truly amazing how important India’s 
presence was on the international nuclear diplomatic front. It was certainly due to 
the commanding personality of Homi Bhabha whether at the meetings of the 
Scientific Advisory Committee to the U.N. Secretary General and later to the IAEA 
Director General or at the bilateral level with countries then most advanced in 
nuclear technology namely the U.S., U.K., France and Canada... . The principal 
reason why the scientists and technologists from these nuclear advanced countries 
had high regard for India arose from the rapid and dramatic progress in nuclear 
science and technology that was being made in India.231 
 
Next to a high measure of self-confidence, these remarks betray the scientists’ skewed take 
on the nuclear issue; that the interaction with other countries was not the business of India’s 
political leadership, its diplomatic corps, or its military, but solely within the responsibility 
of the nuclear scientists. 
 
More revealing of Srinivasan’s understanding of the scientists’ supreme position unclear 
diplomacy is an anecdote about an event that occurred in the wake of the NPT negotiations 
in the late 1960s: 
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L.K. Jha who was then Secretary to the Prime Minister accompanied Vikram 
Sarabhai to a number of important capitals for high level discussions. Jha had nearly 
succeeded in convincing Vikram Sarabhai that India should sign the NPT. Vikram 
Sarabhai had had a strong Gandhian influence in his early upbringing. However the 
early associates of Homi Bhabha, who were in influential positions in the nuclear 
establishment, prevailed upon Sarabhai not to support India joining the NPT.232 
 
As an international treaty affecting India’s security, one might expect the NPT to be signed 
by the executive (on the advice by experts in security and diplomatic affairs) and ratified by 
the legislative. In the India of the late 1960s, these procedures were reversed: The political 
leadership vainly tried to persuade the scientific leaders to sign the NPT, who nonetheless 
rejected it, taking very little time to weigh its strategic advantages. This illustrates the 
actual state of affairs at the time. 
 
Srinivasan’s account ends with a rather ambiguous statement on the general outlook of the 
nuclear programme:  
 
India’s nuclear energy programmes have from the beginning been geared towards 
peaceful uses. These include electric power generation, use of radio isotopes and 
radiation in industry, medicine and agriculture. Much of the programme has been 
open at all times to visits from Indian and overseas scientists. Nearly all of his work 
is open for public scrutiny by way of publications of conferences and seminars, 
apart from reports placed before Parliament and those released to the public. The 
nuclear community has never hidden the fact that acquisition of peaceful nuclear 
technology also confers a certain degree of nuclear capability for national 
defence.233 
 
Srinivasan’s deliberations did not particularly correspond to reality, especially considering 
the excessive secrecy in which the nuclear programme was embedded, and the consistent 
efforts to deny a national defence aspect. At this stage, one might speculate on why 
Srinivasan, after initially repeating the myth of civilian intentions, softens this (almost 
categorical) claim by hinting at possible military applications. Two motives might have 
been at work. First, Srinivasan might have been aware of the rather poor performance in 
electric power generation and that the application of radiation in industry, medicine and 
agriculture might not be seen as sufficient to legitimise the enormous government spending 
on the nuclear programme. One of primary reasons for the setbacks in nuclear energy 
production had been the scientists’ and engineers’ overriding emphasis on indigenous 
development, a more cost intensive approach that constantly resulted in delays and 
shutdowns. Self-reliance was also induced by the increasing reluctance of Western 
suppliers to transfer their knowledge (due to India’s refusal to co-operate in international 
safeguards and control regimes). In 1981 India’s actual nuclear power capacity was less 
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than one tenth of the originally envisaged target of the ten-year plan of 1971; by the mid-
1990s, the output of India’s nuclear power plants was only a quarter of 1981 targets234. 
Additionally, Srinivasan’s comments, made in 1993, might have been aimed at paving the 
way for events to come, particularly the nuclear tests of 1998235. 
 
In subsequent accounts, Srinivasan gradually shifted his focus away from peaceful nuclear 
development towards weapons research. In 1995, he reinterpreted India’s nuclear course to 
be a national endeavour of paramount importance aimed at providing security236. Within 
this reinterpreted account, self-reliance becomes the most crucial theme. Referring to the 
construction of India’s first research reactor in the 1950s, which, due to the lack of 
indigenous expertise, had to rely on the importation of blueprints for British reactor designs 
and British fuel rods, Srinivasan writes: 
 
When India built its first research reactor, Apsara, in 1955-56, Bhabha decided it 
would be designed and built in India. All the equipment, including the control 
system, was fabricated in India. It is true that the fuel elements were obtained on 
lease from the U.K., but it was an Indian reactor.237 
 
This reinterpretation of the origins of India’s nuclear programme marks a gross distortion 
of reality. The motives behind this deception can only be understood in the context of the 
nuclear discourse of 1995, in which India’s strategic elite reacted with humiliation and 
defiance to the conclusion of the (allegedly discriminatory and colonialist) NPT. Srinivasan 
concludes his account with a clear avowal of nuclear weapons for India: 
 
Can anyone really believe that India would have sought U.S. help in so important a 
matter as nuclear weapon capability?... . When the strategic analysts in Washington 
were busy studying U.S. responses to a nuclear China, the scientists and 
technologists in India were busy in the laboratories, workshops, manufacturing 
facilities and project sites to build up comprehensive nuclear capabilities. India 
would never have contemplated, nor will it in the future, to acquire status and power 
by riding piggyback on anyone. The task of the present generation of political 
leaders is to ensure that the capabilities created in the past are consolidated and 
further extended to other areas of high technology, especially where they are 
concerned with national security.238 
 
By categorically denying that India would ever ‘acquire status and power by riding 
piggyback on anyone’, Srinivasan brings the leitmotif of the nuclear myth to a point. The 
whole purpose of nuclear technology, according to the nuclear scientists’, was to bring 
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status and prestige to the country. This purpose could only be achieved if India based its 
achievements exclusively on its indigenous genius. This logic explains Srinivasan’s strong 
efforts in disavowing technology transfers even if such a claim appears doubtful, as in the 
case of the Apsara reactor.  
 
Srinivasan’s remarks also illustrate the gradual but fundamental change in the scientists’ 
rhetoric during the crucial 1990s. While the scientists initially denied intentions to create 
military applications, in 1993 they cautiously admitted that military applications might 
have been created as a kind of by-product of the civilian nuclear programme. Finally, in 
1995, Srinivasan et al. began to reinterpret the nuclear programme, now claiming that they 
had been wise enough to create a nuclear weapons option from the beginning in 
anticipation of the international events, which would eventually have forced India to take 
the step anyway. It is important to note that the nuclear scientific establishment was only 
able to make this rhetoric U-turn without a loss of face because of the nature of the Indian 
debate.  In the mid-1990s, playing the nuclear weapons card was almost a necessity. In 
1995, the rhetorical realignment was completed and the nuclear scientific community 
concentrated on preparing for tests, including that of a hydrogen bomb, and increased 
pressures on the government to finally declare India a nuclear weapon state.  
 
Once the nuclear hype of the 1998 tests had abated, the appeal of the nuclear scientists’ 
rhetoric started to fade. Two major developments hurried its decline. Next to the 
aforementioned evolution of the nuclear discourse towards a more level-headed 
appreciation of the issue, the reforms of 1991 not only gave new dynamic to India’s 
economy, but also caused a fundamental change in India’s society as a whole. Among 
India’s elite, catch phrases like ‘self-reliance’ and ‘indigenous development’ which had 
been so successfully applied by the nuclear scientists until 1998, gradually lost much of 
their appeal, being too closely associated with the outmoded ‘swadeshi’ era. 
Srinivasan wistfully laments the beginning of a new epoch:  
 
Until about a decade ago, all of us were proud that India produced its own power 
plants, petrochemical plants, refineries etc. All of a sudden, India has lost its 
commitment to self-reliant development. Now our newspapers and commentators 
are euphoric about how India is an attractive market for industries from the 
developed countries. Gone is the objective that we would be exporting capital goods 
and engineered products to other parts of the world. Let us by all means increase our 
software exports but let us not lose the gains made by the mastery of producing high 
technology products in the classical industries.239 
 
Paradoxically, once the myth had lost much of its appeal, the debate on the future of 
civilian nuclear power gained new momentum. Unleashed from the ideological constraints 
that had refused international safeguards out of national pride, and considered technology 
imports  humiliating, the cost calculations of nuclear energy production suddenly appeared 
much more beneficial. This renewed Indian interest in imports of nuclear technology 
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coincided with a relaxation of export controls by the member countries of the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group (NSG), as the nuclear industry faced a severe recession due to the gradual 
renunciation of nuclear energy by several Western governments. As Manpreet Sethi states,  
 
(n)o new nuclear plants have been built in the US over the last decade, despite a 
rekindling of interest. Consequently, a recession-ridden nuclear industry is trying to 
influence the government to tone down its proliferation concerns for the sake of 
better nuclear commerce. Market forces could compel Western governments to 
accept a certain laxity in export controls. This is even more likely since in several 
reactor-exporting countries. The present confluence of domestic needs and 
international factors, therefore, demand a fresh and serious look at nuclear power as 
a viable alternative source of energy.240 
 
Manpreet Sethi’s account shows the extent to which India’s strategists had moved their 
focus away from the symbolist approach towards a market-orientation guided by cost-
benefit analyses and problem-oriented thinking. 
 
Yet another shift in elite perception involves the almost subliminal change in attitude 
towards Western non-proliferation policies. Once seen as the epitome of discrimination, 
colonialism , and unfairness, joint non-proliferation efforts -- such as the export control 
measures by the Nuclear Suppliers Group -- were now looked at much more favourably. 
Clearly, post-1998 India had increasingly identified itself with the ‘nuclear haves’, a change 
in perspective from outsider to insider. This change in attitude is best observed in Jasjit 
Singh’s view on the matter: 
 
The irony is that our concerns regarding non-proliferation, environmental 
degradation, nuclear safety, and so on, are no different from those of the NSG. What 
comes in the way is the issue of our nuclear weapons acquired for our security 
without violating any international law or our own commitments to it. But if human 
development of a billion people (and the market it represents for developed 
economies) has to progress with any sense of priority, then a fresh look at the 
question of access to clean affordable nuclear energy becomes an imperative. This 
would require some changes in the working guidelines of NSG to deal with issues 
on a case-by-case basis. India obviously would have no objection to placing such 
reactors under international inspection and safeguards at best.241 
 
Interestingly, the newly emerging debate on the benefits of nuclear energy was largely 
dominated by the strategic thinkers in and around the IDSA. That the nuclear scientific 
establishment was largely marginalised illustrates their overall loss of influence and weight 
in the nuclear debate during the nuclear consolidation in the new millennium 
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7.3. Nuclear Politics 
 
7.3.1. Nuclear Weapons and Partisan Politics 
 
The pros and cons of nuclear weapons have been subject to public debate in India to a 
greater extent than in any other nuclear weapon state. This unique feature explains not only 
the strong emotionalisation of the debate, but also its lack of strategic depth. It further 
explains the ‘keeping the nuclear option open’ policy designed to accommodate various 
divergent views among the various parties and sections of India’s polity. 
When a broader public debate on the nuclear issue emerged in the mid-1960s, Nehru’s 
vision of a morally superior foreign policy was supported by a vast majority of the public. 
The discrepancy between Nehru’s restrained nuclear rhetoric and the progress of nuclear 
achievements created the space for several parties and political leaders to break the nuclear 
taboo and demand an open nuclear arsenal for India. Still smarting from the debacle of the 
Indo-Chinese war, the opposition BJS party launched an initiative in favour of the bomb. 
Because they controlled only 14 of 394 seats in the Lok Sabha (compared to 361 Congress 
seats) it was quite clear that the initiative would not enjoy a majority. It nevertheless had a 
significant impact on the general discourse on the matter, also signalling the end of Nehru’s 
unchallenged position in foreign policy making. Within Congress, several members 
favoured the creation of a nuclear arsenal, but refrained from joining the opposition.  
 
After Nehru’s death in 1964, Lal Bahadur Shastri faced even stronger opposition to his 
continuation of Nehru’s policies. The main reason that additional political parties did not 
play the nuclear card was the worsening economic situation in the country, particularly the 
severe food crisis of 1964 and its aftermath. Considering the desperate situation endemic of 
large portions of the Indian population, calls for generous spending on the development of 
nuclear weapons would have been highly immoral. The counter argument by the 
proponents of a nuclear weapons build up, that it is a state’s top responsibility to provide 
security as a precondition for economic progress, was considered cynical by the majority of 
the public. 
 
For parties within the mainstream political spectrum, the nuclear question was a two edged 
sword. Anxious to avoid criticism that they were ignoring the security needs of the country, 
they did not rule out the acquisition of nuclear weapons. On the other side, taking a clear 
pro-bomb attitude appeared equally unalluring, as it would have generating criticism that 
they were neglecting the economic hardship of the people. This ambiguity, as well as the 
fact that foreign and security matters traditionally played a marginal role in the voting 
decisions of India’s electorate, caused most mainstream parties not to take any clear 
position on nuclear weapons at all.  
Shastri finally, similarly to his predecessor and successors, maintained the state of nuclear 
ambiguity / indecision known collectively as ‘keeping the nuclear option open’. This 
concept was fuzzy enough to appease the anti-bomb moralists as well as the pro-bomb 
nationalists alike, and allowed the nuclear scientists to ignore the political debate. It also 
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proved to be ambiguous enough to accommodate the rather pro-bomb course by Indira 
from 1971-1974 as well as Morarji Desai’s anti-bomb course during the 1977-1979 period.  
 
The parties’ broad disinterest in the nuclear topic ended in the mid-1980s with the rise of 
the Atal Behari Vajpayee and L.K. Advani-led BJP. The party’s success in increasing its of 
seats in the Lok Sabha, from 2 in the 1984 elections to 86 in the 1989 elections, was 
facilitated by a Hindu nationalist agenda that propagated a strong and powerful India. 
Nuclear weapons were the crucial element in manifesting India’s increased ambitions 
internationally. According to M. V. Ramana,  
 
[t]he rise of Hindu nationalism or Hindutva in recent years is due to a new ‘elite 
insecurity’ arising from the increasing social and political assertion of marginalised 
groups and the uncertainties associated with economic liberalization. Hindutva’s 
answer to this is a quest for ‘international status’, through the deployment of 
symbolic gestures of ‘great power status’ such as the ability to acquire and test 
nuclear weapons. The May 1998 tests, or for that matter the destruction of the Babri 
Masjid, a 16th century mosque, in 1992, are acts that demonstrate how it envisions 
masking India ‘strong’.242 
 
In the mid-1980s, the objectives of the nuclear scientists and those of the Hindu nationalists 
converged. The nuclear weapons myth appeared to an appealing device for both achieving  
international recognition in high science and international status in military potency. 
In July 1985, the BJP National Executive passed an unambiguous resolution at its meeting 
in Bhopal that demanded the immediate acquisition of a nuclear deterrent for India. While 
the Congress Party maintained its explicit course of nuclear ambiguity, the Janata Party, the 
Congress’ main rival party at the time, acknowledged the BJP’s success and sharpened its 
rhetoric on the issue. The Janata Party’s response, however, did not clarify the ambiguity 
behind the nuclear weapons stance of the traditional parties. In its attempt to distance itself 
from Congress’ obvious inaction, the party passed a resolution: 
 
While the Congress (I) is trying to divert the attention of the people away from their 
life of misery, poverty, unemployment and inflation by alluring them with post-
dated cheques on the next century prosperity, it continues to mislead them by 
referring time and again to the possibility of invasion from across our frontier. It 
might be that the Congress (I) in order to hide its failure on the economic and social 
front, feels the need to cry wolf. But one might cry wolf too often.  
The Janata Party never indulged in this game and maintained the friendliest 
relations with Pakistan as well as China but it did not slacken its guard even for a 
moment. In all the sectors of defence, the Janata Party Government’s constant 
endeavour was to keep our defence forces fully equipped. The party, however, feels 
that being a sovereign nation, India has the right to exercise its nuclear policy in full 
freedom.243 
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That the Janata resolution aims at clarifying the party’s position on nuclear weapons, 
illustrates the dilemma in which most mainstream political parties were trapped. The Janata 
party first tries to satisfy the moralists’ concerns by criticising the Congress government’s 
failure to improve the situation of the poor. It then tries to accommodate the pacifists by 
demanding that India maintain ‘the friendliest relations with Pakistan and China’. Finally, it 
tries to adopt the pro-bomb notion. The tricky question of why India needed nuclear 
weapons when it could neither afford them, nor justify them through its security 
environment, remained unanswered. 
 
Generally, the transformation of India’s political landscape into a competitive, multi-party 
system and the formation of large coalition governments affected the nuclear discourse. 
More and more parties instrumentalised the nuclear issue for partisan purposes, thereby 
increasing pressure to acquire the bomb openly. According to Stephen P. Cohen,  
 
[t]he medium-range political calculations seemed to have made it easier to reach a 
decision to go nuclear. It was not just that the BJP had come to power (both a 
Congress and a Janata government were apparently on the edge of ordering tests and 
certainly authorized the preparations for subsequent tests), but that all political 
parties from 1990 onward were more vulnerable to pressure on a variety of different 
issues from within their ranks and from coalition partners. This development, 
coupled with a larger shift away from opposition to nuclear weapons per se and the 
growth of militant ‘nuclearism’ (the belief that nuclearisation could solve a wide 
range of national, cultural, and strategic problems) created an environment in which 
the decision to go nuclear was domestically politically acceptable and, perhaps, 
politically essential for those on the Indian right.244 
 
Until 1998, the only major political party that could credibly claim to have an 
unambiguous, clear-cut nuclear policy was the BJP. The Congress as well as the subsequent 
governments continued the policy of ambiguity. Nuclear decisions making was either non-
existent, leaving the nuclear course in a state of political indecision, or it was made in a 
post-hoc manner to catch up with the fait accompli created by the scientists. 
 
7.3.2. Pokhran II: Electoral Politics BJP Style? 
 
Due to the aforementioned paralysis among the political class with regard to nuclear policy 
making, the discourse on nuclear weapons largely occurred outside the parliament as well 
as the party competition until 1998. India’s opposition to the NPT and CTBT, as well as the 
general realization that the country should at last declare itself a nuclear weapon state, was 
not guided by a political directive, but grew out of the strategic elite’s debate on the issue. 
 
As in previous elections, the BJP was again the only major party to campaign with a clear 
and unambiguous position in favour of the bomb. The BJP position was openly supported 
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by an increasing majority among India’s strategic thinkers, particularly in the military, 
which considered the government’s indecision as one of the major causes for India’s poor 
performance on the international scene. 
In an account of the BJP’s position on India’s security, published between the election in 
March/April 1998 and the nuclear tests in May 1998, Ashok K. Mehta states that 
 
while other parties were ambivalent about exercising their nuclear option, Brajesh 
Mishra, the BJP’s spokesman for foreign affairs, was unequivocal: ‘My party will 
make the bomb’. He derived the authority to go nuclear from the BJP’s election 
manifesto – re-evaluate the country’s nuclear policy and exercise the option to 
induct nuclear weapons... . There could yet be many hiccups in exercising the 
nuclear option given that the Congress and United Front want to retain the softer 
option of ambiguity – to have the cake and eat it too.245 
 
Taking difference to the 1996 manifesto, which had attached India’s nuclear breakthrough 
to international developments, the BJP’s 1998 election manifesto carried the clear and 
explicit message that, once in power, India would ‘exercise the nuclear option’.  
 
In the immediate aftermath of the tests, India’s commentators identified dual motives 
behind the BJP’s nuclear policy: one being its attempt to raise the country’s status and 
prestige in the international arena, and the other in the domestic policy arena. These 
motives are summarised by Harish Khare: 
 
Now that the Pokhran bangs have been heard, it is obvious that the Prime Minister’s 
own prestige stands enhanced. The troublesome allies will now be expected to show 
the Prime Minister the defence that is due to him... . The BJP leadership has reason 
to believe that the none of the political parties, particularly the Congress (I), would 
be able to frontally oppose the tests. Today’s tests are of a piece of a thinking that 
aggressively believes in pursuing the BJP agenda, forcing the country and the 
political parties to oppose or support the BJP line. The tentativeness in the Congress 
(I) reaction is indicative of the dilemma faced by most political parties; the BJP will 
hope to capitalise on the new mood, first by consolidating the unity of the alliance 
and then by trying to take over the centrist political space.246 
 
Harish Khare’s comment exposes the dilemma in which the Congress party had 
manoeuvred itself. The Congress could rightfully claim credit for having advanced India’s 
nuclear programme to a ready-to-use stage. However, this would unmask its decade long 
policy of nuclear ambiguity as a farce. On the other hand, due to the overwhelming public 
euphoria, it appeared politically prohibitive to criticise the BJP for having conducted the 
tests, thereby leaving public praise exclusively to the BJP. 
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In effect, the tests ended the ambiguists’ muddling though and forced them to take a 
position either for or against the bomb. As Achin Vanaik commented,  
 
[i]n one fell swoop, the bomb tests have dramatically altered the terrain of discourse 
on the nuclear issue. The biggest victims of what has happened are not the anti-
nuclearists. Though small. they remain an inescapable part of the debate and will 
not disappear as long as the nuclear weapons themselves do not. It is the ambiguists 
whose ranks have been decimated. Their perspective have been rendered 
meaningless, their future is non-existent, and its practitioners have simply been 
swallowed up. A few who are appalled may move towards the anti-nuclearist side, 
most will join the more ardent nuclearists. Yet amazingly, for decades and right up 
to May 11, the ambiguists represented both the large majority and the sober middle 
ground of decision-makers and decision-shapers on the issue. All it took was, in 
effect, a violent political coup by a party ruthlessly determined to transform the total 
character of Indian society to destroy their position.247 
 
Achin Vanaik, one of the few critics of the nuclear tests, hoped that some of the 
‘ambiguists’ might chose to join the nuclear opponents, though this was guided more by 
wishful thinking than a realistic account of their motives. The Congress party, as well as 
most of the United Front coalition, finally felt impelled to follow the BJP line and to 
welcome the tests as a national achievement. Most of India’s commentators, still under the 
sway of national enthusiasm, did not view the Congress’ turnabout as an act of political 
opportunism, but as an unselfish act of solidarity for in a time when India was facing large 
scale international repercussions. This view is reflected in K.K. Katyal’s account: 
 
The government was well within its right to take credit for a decision which others 
could not or did not take. But it did not resist the temptation of taking political, 
partisan mileage out of the tests. This confirmed the fears of other parties. They 
could not be blamed that count but did they conduct themselves responsibly? Even 
before the offensive overtones in the BJP’s post-test posture became known, they 
sought to question the ‘timing’ of the tests. They, it was clear, hesitated to align 
themselves with the pride that could, justifiably, be experienced by all Indians. 
Fortunately, the Congress (I) was prompt in correcting its stance. As the party 
president, Mrs. Sonia Gandhi, told the Working Committee, the nuclear issue was a 
national, not partisan matter. The Congress (I), according to her, was not interested 
in the political fallout of the tests and the entire country, unitedly and solidly, 
supported the initiative. ‘We recall with equal pride that successive Congress 
Governments have ensured that India’s  nuclear capability remains up-to-date so 
that our security is not compromised’. With the Congress (I) choosing not to strike 
any jarring note and a section of the United Front aligning itself with the national 
mood, almost the entire political establishment, it is hoped, will be in tune with the 
popular sentiment.248 
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The satisfaction of the majority of India’s strategic elite with the Congress’ admittance into 
the pro-bomb ranks stems from the widely expressed demand for a national consensus. This 
was thought imperative for effectively fending off international, post-test pressures on 
India, once again betraying the widely accepted of the nuclear breakthrough as a national 
act of emancipation and resistance against Western discrimination. “There are times when 
the main political parties have the duty to arrive at a national consensus through informal 
consultations and avoid public bickering”249. 
 
Other commentators, such as Subramanian Swamy, rejected the all-for-one rationale and 
offered instead a one-dimensional explanation for the events: “In the case of Pokhran-II, 
Mr. Vajpayee’s purpose is his desire for political advantage”250. Representing the anti-
bomb faction of India’s strategic thinkers, Achin Vanaik indicates a conspiracy of India’s 
nationalist right: 
 
The Sangh Parivar has shown by this act not only that it means what it says when it 
comes to the pursuit of its vision of Indian nationalism but that it has no democratic 
scruples whatsoever. The decision to test was (apart from Mr. Fernandes) not 
discussed or even shared beforehand with its coalition partners. An act of such 
momentous import was undertaken by the BJP alone, although on its own it has no 
public mandate even to rule... . Yet a powerful political force (which pretends to be 
only cultural) and which is not in government and is not democratically accountable 
to the Indian voter was privy to this decision and information – the RSS... . The 
implication of this secretive contempt for all fundamental democratic norms and the 
revealed closeness with which the RSS-BJP work together is nothing short of 
frightening. We have been forewarned. A battle for the very soul of Indian 
nationalism is being fought. They are out to usurp the nationalist discourse and 
dominate it with their communal, belligerent and Hindutva-related constructs of 
national security, national interests and national greatness.251 
 
Vanaik’s conspiracy theory illustrates the confusion in which the anti-nuclearists found 
themselves after the tests. Having taken an anti-Western (better: anti-American) position 
himself, Vanaik is unable to tackle the BJP’s main argument for India’s nuclearisation: its 
importance for the country’s emancipation from Western dominance. Instead, he portrays 
India’s nuclearisation as an act masterminded by the Hindu right, thereby neglecting not 
only the decade-long involvement of the Congress and most of India’s mainstream political 
establishment, but also the leading role of the nuclear scientists and India’s strategic 
community -- each of which group had followed its own agenda.  
 
The Hindu-bomb theme was central to several other accounts on the issue. Kuldip Nayar 
saw a parallel between the destruction of the Babri Masjid and the nuclear tests: “The BJP 
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has never been straight. Its old habit is to bludgeon the nation into accepting a fait 
accompli. With the Babri demolition, it harmed India’s image of a pluralistic society. This 
time they have detonated the bomb and pushed the country into an arms race”252. 
While criticism of the BJP’s policy was rather lukewarm among most of India’s strategic 
elite, their reticence ended after Pakistan conducted its own nuclear tests. Home Minister L. 
K. Advani’s attempt to brand those strategists who considered Pakistan’s policy as 
inevitable consequence of India’s prior testing as ‘the enemy from within’, was largely 
disapproved even by those who had initially taken a favourable position to the BJP’s 
nuclear policy. 
 
In the perception of many, the BJP’s attempt to exploit the post-test jingoism for its own 
partisan purposes had gone too far. V. Krishna Ananth even draws a comparison with the 
methods applied by Nazi propagandists: 
 
The war-mongering that the senior Ministers in the Vajpayee Cabinet resorted to 
and the manner in which the treasury benches heckled all those who spoke of the 
ominous signals from Pokhran vis-à-vis the normalisation of ties with Pakistan have 
for long been the language of the Sangh Parivar and are now becoming the language 
of the Government. These resemble so much the manner in which the Nazi brigade 
behaved in the Reichstag (German Parliament) in the early years of Adolf Hitler’s 
rise to power... . The hysteria that is being built up, with the Prime Minister making 
it part of his everyday routine to address crowds in front of his residence and the 
public display of ‘patriotism’ by the Sangh Parivar’s ranks through such exercises 
as signing in blood in support of the bomb resemble scenes witnessed in the streets 
of Berlin in the initial years after Hitler captured power.253 
 
During the following weeks and months, the BJP toned down its jingoistic rhetoric as it 
became aware of its counterproductive effects. Instead, Prime Minister Vajpayee adopted a 
more statesmanlike attitude on the nuclear issue. Consequently, the Hindu-bomb argument 
-- was so emphatically advocated by the anti-bomb section of India’s strategic elite in mid-
1998 -- lost much of its sheen during India’s nuclear consolidation. 
 
In retrospect, the Hindu-bomb explanation appears too simplistic to explain the 1998 tests. 
In the aftermath of the tests, the BJP certainly tried to play the jingoistic card in order to 
gain popular support for its fragile coalition government. But considering of the large scale 
consensus in favour of the bomb, which emerged in India’s nuclear debate throughout the 
1990s, it becomes apparent that the support base for India’s nuclear breakthrough was 
much broader than the Hindu right. As the further course of this study will show, domestic 
political developments might even have protracted, rather than accelerated India’s decision 
to claim nuclear status.  
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8. Systemic Proliferation Incentives within the South Asian 
Region 
 
 
8.1. The Structure of India’s Regional Strategic Environment 
 
Analyses exploring security-related incentives for India’s nuclear build-up comprise either 
non-specified security threats in general or threats emanating from a specific neighbouring 
power as possible motives. 
As shown subsequently, the group of security related articles is categorised into four 
variables: a) articles addressing non-specific threats; b) articles addressing India’s nuclear 
doctrine formulation; c) articles addressing the nuclear threat from Pakistan; and finally d) 
articles related to the Chinese nuclear threat. 
 
Chart 8.1.: Frequency of Articles on Security Related Issues (in % of total sample) 
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Chart 8.1. shows the relative frequency of articles on security-related issues. In the 
aftermath of the Brasstacks Crisis of 1986 and 1987, one out of three articles dealing with 
the nuclear issue was mainly concerned with the security dimension, as compared to the 
ratio of one-fourth during the pre-1986 period. Then, in the crucial stages of India’s nuclear 
course during the 1990s, security aspects of India’s nuclear programme largely disappeared 
from the nuclear discourse. From 1991 to 1996, only one out of six nuclear articles focused 
on security-related issues, and in the 1996-1998 sequence, this ratio further shrunk to one 
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out of ten. Once India had conducted its nuclear tests and declared it a nuclear weapon 
state, security considerations re-emerged into the focus of wider public attention.  These 
concerns then comprise one-third of the nuclear-related articles in the 1998-2003 period 
and half of the articles in the post-2003 period.  
 
Chart 8.1. further reveals that threats to India’s security were perceived by the strategic elite 
in a more general and abstract way in the early phase, while after the nuclear breakthrough 
of 1998, these threats were mainly attributed to the two specific powers, Pakistan and 
China. 
The strategic requirements for India’s nuclear doctrine received little attention prior to the 
tests and were largely debated only thereafter, again giving some empirical evidence to the 
inherent post-hocism which appears to be an idiosyncratic phenomenon of India’s strategic 
debate. 
 
Much of India’s impetus to proliferate nuclear weapons can be traced to prior proliferation 
dynamics in either Pakistan or China. The first broader debate on the nuclear issue within 
India’s polity emerged in the mid-1960s, shortly after China had conducted its first nuclear 
test in 1964 and only a few years after India’s defeat by China in the border war of 1962. 
After a period of nuclear slow-down, the Indian nuclear programme again accelerated in the 
early 1980s after rumours spread that Pakistan was putting forth strong efforts in fostering 
its nuclear capabilities.  As they followed Pakistan’s test firing of the medium-range Ghauri 
ballistic missile which are capable of targeting main cities in India, the Indian nuclear tests 
in 1998 were again interpreted by many as reaction to prior proliferation dynamics within 
Pakistan 
 
8.1.1. Pakistan’s Nuclear Threat 
 
In the perception of India’s public as well as most of its political leadership, the prime 
objective for the country’s nuclear weapons was to improve its security vis-à-vis Pakistan. 
In strategic terms, this position produces several puzzles. India began its nuclear 
programme (or, in official language, created the nuclear weapons option) well before the 
emergence of the Pakistani threat. At this early stage, it must have been clear to India’s 
strategic planners that the initiation of an Indian nuclear programme would make it 
strategically imperative for Pakistan, the conventionally inferior power, to follow suit and 
equally develop the bomb. The launch of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme was thus 
inevitable and unambiguously emanated from security considerations. Pakistan set its 
nuclear programme on a clear course towards weapons development in the mid-1970s 
following two events which significantly altered its security calculus: first, Pakistan’s 
defeat in the war of 1971 and its subsequent disintegration, and second, India’s first nuclear 
test of 1974. The progression of these events show a remarkable similarity to the 
emergence of the security threat to India by China one decade earlier, which was similarly 
triggered by a lost war in 1962 and subsequent nuclear testing of the adversary in 1964. 
 
This causality did not, however, fit into the weltanschauung of the apologists of India’s 
nuclear course, in which the contrast between India’s fundamentally defensive strategic 
 164
policy and Pakistan’s genuinely aggressive international action is a fixed dogma. In their 
accounts, it was singularly Pakistan’s defeat in the Bangladesh war of 1971 rather than 
India’s development of nuclear capabilities that triggered Pakistan’s nuclear 
proliferation.254 With this view, it was India that had no choice but to react to Pakistan’s 
proliferation and equally build up a nuclear arsenal to protect its security interests.255 Even 
if some accept this historically distorted interpretation of the causalities behind the South 
Asian nuclear rivalry, the strategic imperatives for India’s nuclear build-up are not at all 
manifest. The overwhelming superiority of India’s conventional armed forces would have 
been enough to deter Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, thereby superseding the strategic 
deterrence value of its nuclear weapons. 
While Pakistan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons might be considered appropriate to 
equalise India’s superior conventional force, it is hard to imagine that economically 
dependent Pakistan would have been able to resist international pressures against building 
the bomb if India would have joined the NPT and abstained from acquiring the bomb.  
 
In other words, India would have been able to avoid Pakistan’s nuclear breakthrough prior 
to 1998 if it would have taken appropriate steps on the international scene. After 1998, the 
open introduction of nuclear weapons in both countries’ bilateral relationship was 
strategically disadvantageous for India. Ashely Tellis states the following:  
 
Pakistan’s nuclear potential, as exemplified both by its weaponry and by the 
plethora of delivery systems it is developing or has already acquired, is certainly 
problematic in that for the first time in India’s post-independence history, its 
immediate – and weaker – rival has acquired the ability to hold at risk significant 
national assets such as major population and industrial centres, critical military 
facilities, and strategic infrastructure assets located great distances from the frontier. 
This new vulnerability to standoff attack by weapons of mass destruction represents 
a dramatic change in the strategic balance vis-à-vis Pakistan. Whatever the minutiae 
relating to this balance traditionally may have been, the one single and 
incontrovertible manifestation of New Delhi’s superiority was India’s ability – 
however notional – to threaten assets throughout the depth of Pakistan’s territory 
while remaining immune to any comparable attack directed against India. To the 
degree that Pakistan could mount any credible threats at all, these were restricted to 
challenges levelled at the frontiers, with the vast depth of India’s heartland 
remaining a protected sanctuary lying beyond Pakistan’s reach. The addition of 
long-range missile-delivered nuclear weapons to Pakistan’s arsenal, however, has 
overturned this traditional Indian advantage... . In effect, then, Pakistan – the 
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traditionally weaker adversary – has now neutralized India’s conventional and geo-
strategic advantages, while India remains weaker than its other major adversary, 
China, by most indices of strategic capability – including geopolitical importance, 
economic growth, and nuclear capacity.256 
 
Furthering the effect of making India’s heartland vulnerable to a Pakistani attack, the 
introduction of nuclear weapons might cause what is referred to as the ‘stability-instability 
paradox.’ With this reasoning, Pakistan might be encouraged by the stability of the overall 
nuclear deterrence situation to engage in a low profile war across the disputed Kashmir line 
of control without fearing a major Indian counter attack.257 
 
The disarray caused by the disputable strategic value of nuclear weapons against Pakistan 
among India’s political elite became apparent in the course of the 2002 bilateral crisis in 
Kashmir. This episode was summarised in the SIPRI Yearbook 2003 as follows: 
 
First, Prime Minister Vajpayee claimed that the recent crisis showed that India had, 
in effect, successfully called Pakistan’s nuclear bluff. Next, President Abdul Kalam 
claimed that nuclear weapons had averted any kind of war. (Embarrassingly, this 
was in essence the same claim as that made by President Musharraf and contrary to 
what Prime Minister Vajpayee was saying). Finally, General V. P. Malik, former 
Chief of Army Staff, stated that nuclear weapons were largely irrelevant for 
conventional warfare and played no deterrent role during the Kargil War or in the 
2002 crisis. 
Indian views on the role of Pakistani nuclear weapons are even more puzzling. A 
section of the Indian nuclear policy-making community has had a tendency to 
belittle Pakistan’s nuclear capability. In the past, for example, leading scientists 
have declared that Pakistan could not have enriched uranium to the levels required 
to make a bomb. The nuclear tests by Pakistan ended such speculation. However, 
the idea reappeared in a different guise during the 2002 crisis. K. Subrahmanyam, 
an influential Indian strategist, suggested that, if Pakistan were to deploy any 
nuclear missile the USA would destroy them. Pakistan would not therefore be able 
to use its nuclear weapons – a comforting, if fallacious, idea.258 
 
The above paragraph of the SIPRI Yearbook 2003 summarises the four major 
interpretations of Indo-Pakistani nuclear relations commonly followed by India’s political 
and strategic elite. All four approaches are guided by their respective advocates’ attempts to 
vindicate India’s nuclear policy rather than by the impartial will to assess the effect of 
nuclear weaponisation in the bilateral relationship. By calling Pakistan’s deterrence posture 
a ‘nuclear bluff,’ Prime Minister Vajpayee suggests that nuclear weapons are of little 
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relevance in the bilateral relationship. The downplaying of the Pakistan factor in India’s 
nuclear calculus aims at supporting the official position, according to which India’s nuclear 
arsenal is directed principally against the Chinese nuclear threat. The statement by India’s 
President A.P.J. Abdul Kalam reflects the general ambiguity inherent to the position mainly 
advocated by India’s nuclear scientists. By stating that the introduction of nuclear weapons 
prevented war, Kalam attempts to highlight the scientists’ contribution for regional peace 
and stability. This logic, however, implies the acceptance of the equalising effects of 
nuclear weapons, which diminishes India’s strategic benefits with regard to its superiority 
in conventional weaponry. Kalam thereby involuntarily supports Musharraf’s claims that 
the nuclearisation of the South Asian region actually benefited Pakistan rather than India. 
Yet another inconsistency in the position commonly expressed by the nuclear scientists is 
the emphasis on  
 
The scientists’ commonly expressed position further includes the inconsistency of 
emphasising Pakistan’s exigent nuclear threat, which had to be balanced by India, and the 
scientists’ frequent questioning of the technological maturity of the Pakistani arsenal, which 
aimed at pointing out its inferiority with regard to India’s nuclear achievements. This 
contradiction stems from the conflicting nature of the two underlying motives, the exigency 
for nuclear weapons for India’s security vis-à-vis Pakistan as justification for the nuclear 
programme and the role nuclear weapons play for the country’s (and the involved 
scientists’) international prestige. 
In contrast to Vajpayee’s categorical denial of any existing deterrence effects, General V. P. 
Malik carefully distinguishes between the overall deterrence relationship between the two 
countries, which he implicitly accepts as a matter of fact, along with the failure of 
deterrence in the limited conventional confrontation in Kashmir. Within the domain of 
strategic thinking, Malik accordingly takes a middle position between those claiming that 
the overall Indo-Pakistani deterrence relationship reduces the risks of conflict escalation in 
Kashmir and those suggesting the contrary by pointing to the stability-instability paradox.  
 
Ultimately, K. Subrahmanyam’s view reflects the mainstream position of the politico-
strategic community.  It combines Vajpayee’s approach of downplaying the Pakistan factor 
in India’s nuclear calculus and the nuclear scientists’ view of Pakistan as an aggressive, 
vicious, but nevertheless inferior neighbour. 
 
8.1.2. The Chinese Nuclear Threat 
 
Due to the strategic inadequacy of nuclear weapons for India in its relation to Pakistan, 
many strategic thinkers turned to the role of the so called ‘China factor’ as the major 
strategic incentive for India’s nuclear build-up, despite public preoccupation with arch rival 
Pakistan. In their academic back-up of India’s nuclear course, these pundits focus on the 
threat posed by the Chinese nuclear arsenal and on the rival nature of the national interests 
of these two major Asian powers. In their view, it is a strategic imperative for India to 
acquire an equally strong (nuclear) power capability to balance China just as the Balance-
of-Power theory suggests, thereby creating an equitable Asian and global balance of power 
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system.  The official government statements issued after the tests of 1998 explicitly 
followed this line.  
 
The two groups of bomb advocates and bomb sceptics assess the strategic relevance of the 
Chinese nuclear arsenal to India’s security in a fundamentally different manner.259 
Of major concern for India’s pro-bomb strategists are Chinese missile sites in Tibet, which 
allegedly target major northern Indian population centres with nuclear capable 
intermediate-range ballistic missiles. In Ashley Tellis’ view: 
 
It is China’s land-based ballistic missile force, together with the kinds of warheads 
this component can assuredly carry to target, that remains India’s principal concern 
in the near term. The exact nature of this threat, however, seems to have been 
misconstrued by Indian policymakers and analysts who claim that it derives, among 
other things, from Chinese IRBMs deployed in Tibet.260 
 
While the deployment of nuclear capable missiles at the aforementioned Tibetan sites 
remains unconfirmed at present, few experts disagree with the fact that China is actually in 
a position to target India with nuclear capable missiles from other sites in Sichuan, Qinghai 
or Yunnan Province. While in technical terms, the Chinese nuclear threat to India can easily 
be viewed as a matter of fact, its validity in political terms is much more ambiguous.  
Internationally, the will to accept India’s acquisition of nuclear weapons as a counter to the 
Chinese threat decreased significantly after the end of the Cold War. During the late 1960s, 
most strategic analysts throughout the world expected India to acquire nuclear weapons as a 
reaction to its defeat against China in the war of 1962 and the first Chinese nuclear test two 
years later. Assessing India’s strategic situation in the mid-1960s, Itty Abraham writes:  
 
Under the implicit codes of the contemporary international system, an Indian 
nuclear test would have been read as a straightforward and appropriate response to 
Chinese nuclear tests from 1964 onward. Additionally, given the state of American 
and Soviet relations with China, an Indian nuclear test at that moment would have 
hardly had the international response it was to have a decade later; indeed, an Indian 
test in 1966 would have been conducted with tacit superpower approval. Yet no 
Indian bomb followed.261 
 
Different than expected, India’s policy makers at that time did not see a strategic necessity 
to deter China through nuclear weapons. Even when India detonated its nuclear device in 
1974, its political leadership insisted on the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear 
programme and consequently negated any deterrence purpose. Paradoxically, most of the 
reasons that would have legitimised India’s nuclear breakthrough in the 1960s appeared to 
have been overcome when India finally decided to reveal its nuclear weapons programme 
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in 1998. At this time, most international strategic thinkers considered India’s nuclear 
revelation to be rather counterproductive in security terms vis-à-vis China. First of all, a 
credible nuclear deterrent towards China would have necessitated secure second strike 
capabilities as well as appropriate ballistic missile delivery vehicles to reach key strategic 
targets located in far distance at China’s east coast. Both were far from combat-ready in 
1998 and also not on top of India’s priority list, according to official statements in this 
period. Secondly, the 1998 tests came after a period of significant rapprochement between 
India and China, which was initiated by Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to Beijing in 1988. These 
dealings culminated in two border agreements signed in 1993 and 1996. Prior to the tests, 
the Chinese government sent out signals that its strategic interests were limited to the 
Taiwan issue and the South China Sea and that it had a strong interest in preserving the 
status quo at its south western border with India. The Chinese move to overcome old 
rivalries and fundamentally improve its relationship with India appeared to be less 
motivated by perceived pressures emerging from India’s growing military capabilities but 
instead by the growing economic attractiveness of the Indian market for Chinese goods and 
services.262  
 
In fact, the only persistent conflict of bilateral interests is the still unresolved demarcation 
of the common Himalayan border. However, the two border agreements and the mutual 
understanding to solve this problem peacefully made the repetition of a border war similar 
to 1962 highly unlikely.  A scenario in which such potential open conflict would escalate 
into a nuclear war thus appeared unthinkable in the short and medium term future. Strong 
improvements within India’s conventional military capabilities at its border with China 
would have prevented a recurrence of the events of 1962 in any case, since the potential 
costs of such open conflict for China would outweigh its potential benefits, as there were 
rather minor Chinese interests at stake. Next, those who consider a nuclear deterrent to be 
an appropriate tool to match the Chinese threat still fail to explain the timing of the nuclear 
tests.  Moreover, the necessity to reveal India’s nuclear programme at all remains 
unanswered, as the concept of opaque nuclear deterrence which dominated India’s strategy 
prior to the tests would have been sufficient. Continued opacity would have further avoided 
the risks of pre-emptive strikes and an unleashed nuclear arms race. 
 
During the crucial years of India’s nuclear programme in the 1990s, India’s strategic and 
foreign policy elite’s opinion on the China factor could be roughly divided into three main 
lines of thought. First was the large section of pragmatists who did not view the Chinese 
threat as acute, instead suggesting engagement with China in a process of bilateral 
rapprochement to work out a modus vivendi. This would foreclose the risk of a future 
emergence of a critical Chinese threat. This approach was followed by Rajiv Gandhi’s 
policy of reconciliation initiated in 1988 and was further promoted by the successor 
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governments of Narashima Rao and Deve Gowda. The second section comprised those 
strategic thinkers who found it imperative for India to counter China’s nuclear arsenal with 
an arsenal of its own.  This was simply because China was technically able to target India, 
irrespective of how realistic this nuclear threat scenario actually was. The position was 
widely accepted among India’s military, analysts who focused upon the military-strategic 
aspects of nuclear weapons, and those who were less concerned with its political 
dimension. The third section comprised a group of policy-makers who traditionally adopted 
an anti-Chinese attitude. This group, under the informal leadership of then-Defence 
Minister George Fernandes, had acquired a particularly influential position in the National 
Front government in 1998 and was largely responsible for the government’s anti-Chinese 
declaratory policy in the aftermath of the tests. This anti-China faction instrumentalised the 
military-strategists’ pro-bomb arguments for its own political agenda and excessively 
overplayed the alleged nuclear threat emerging from the Tibetan missile sites.  
 
8.1.3. Pakistan-China Threatening Axis 
 
Finally, Chinese assistance to Pakistan’s nuclear programme attracted widespread attention 
by India’s bomb advocates, drawing an alarming scenario of an axis of two nuclear capable 
adversaries threatening India from the north. In fact, Chinese technical assistance to 
Pakistan’s missile programme appeared to be substantial. Further, some credible although 
unproven allegations were raised about Chinese transfer of sensitive nuclear know-how. 
Claims by some sceptics that Chinese assistance had largely commercial motives appear to 
be somehow naive. While China’s strategic interests behind its nuclear assistance to 
Pakistan are quite evident, its impact on India’s nuclear discourse was nevertheless mainly 
psychological. While the Sino-Pakistani cooperation undoubtedly accelerated Pakistan’s 
nuclear programme significantly, it was not the decisive factor in rendering Pakistan’s 
nuclear breakthrough possible. In other words, the strategic imperatives for Pakistan to 
develop the bomb by all means and with any available assistance was simply too 
compelling.  
 
In sum, regional security threats from Pakistan, China, or a combination of both, proved to 
be permissive but not imperative for India to develop nuclear weapons. However, the 
apologists’ logic of nuclear weapons being necessary for India to be prepared for any 
imaginable threat scenario, no matter how unlikely, is consistent with the paradigms of the 
prevalent (neorealist) strategic thought.  They therefore proved to be adequately 
convincing. Despite its seeming consistency, this rationale nevertheless implies two major 
flaws.  
First, the question needs to be raised “whether India’s nuclear and missile activities have 
had a self-fulfilling logic and stimulated external reactions that were painted as threats to 
India and used to justify its nuclear weapons programme.”263 Such dynamics became 
obvious during the initiation and continuation of Pakistan’s nuclear programme. They were 
further apparent in India’s strategic policy towards China, particularly in the period 
between 1988 and 1998.  
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A second major flaw is the application of double standards with regard to the security needs 
of the three state actors involved. In fact, the security arguments given by Pakistan to 
justify the acquisition of nuclear weapons bear some analogies to the Indian case. Both 
states’ strategic planners assert the threat posed by a superior and genuinely hostile nuclear 
armed neighbour as its main incentive to go nuclear. This argument appears to be somehow 
more tangible and existential in the case of Pakistan vis-à-vis India than in the case of India 
vis-à-vis China.  This reasoning is why many Indian strategists generally accept Pakistan’s 
security rationale behind its nuclear decision. When it comes to certain aspects of both 
countries’ nuclear course, however, India’s strategists tend to adopt a more differentiated 
position. For instance, China’s no-first-use declaration as well as its unambiguous 
declaration not to threaten non-nuclear weapon states was largely dismissed by India’s 
strategists as a mere paper tiger, which could be revised by China immediately in case of 
crisis. A wide consensus existed that India as the inferior power could not trust China’s 
assurances on this matter. On the other hand, Pakistan’s dismissal of India’s assurances on 
similar grounds when India made its no-first-use declarations after the nuclear test of 1998 
was largely interpreted by India’s strategists as an indicator of Pakistan’s genuinely 
aggressive intentions. Similar double standards were applied regarding intentions behind 
missile testing or both countries’ occasionally launched arms control initiatives.  
 
 
8.1.4. Extra-Regional Nuclear Threats 
 
Next to China and Pakistan, no other existing or potential nuclear power is perceived as a 
strategic threat to India’s security. While the Soviet Union or present day Russia is a 
perceived as strategic ally and supplier of essential technology throughout India’s post-
independence history, the two minor nuclear weapon states of France and Great Britain 
were considered largely irrelevant for India’s security. 
 
In the case of the United States, it is a more complex task to determine the relevance of its 
nuclear force for India’s security, as perceived by most of India’s strategic analysts. In 
several analyses, India’s nuclear test of 1974 is described as a consequence of the 
deployment of the allegedly nuclear-armed US aircraft carrier USS Enterprise into the Bay 
of Bengal during the Bangladesh War of 1971. This incident created much fear among 
India’s elite of being blackmailed through American gunboat diplomacy. Many Indian 
opinion leaders considered nuclear weapons as an appropriate deterrent device to fend off 
American interference into South Asian affairs, particularly into the ongoing conflict over 
Kashmir. However, a look into the media comments and analyses on this episode reveals 
that the Enterprise incident did not generate fears in terms of a perceived threat to national 
security, but rather triggered vehement feelings of humiliation and indignity. Again, the 
debate centred on national pride and less on national security. American military 
intervention is hardly considered a realistic threat scenario among India’s strategic 
planners. This distinct motive is described by Ashley Tellis:  
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Clearly, India’s strategic managers – in contradiction to some of New Delhi’s 
vociferous elites – do not view the United States as posing a nuclear threat to India 
today... . It is also unlikely that India will view the United States as a nuclear 
opponent in the future, even though India will at some point acquire the capability 
to target U.S. facilities and forces at various sites along the Asian periphery. 
Whether India actually acts in accordance with its capabilities here will therefore be 
determined by New Delhi’s perception of U.S. attitudes toward India and, more 
particularly, by its assessment of America’s willingness and desire to intervene 
militarily in South Asian affairs to India’s detriment.264 
 
An American presence in the Indian Ocean would most likely have the effect of avoiding 
outside intervention by deterring China from large scale meddling into the region, just as it 
had aimed at deterring Soviet involvement during the 1970s and 1980s. In a future scenario 
in which China emerges as the major strategic rival to the U.S., the following has been 
theorized: 
 
U.S. efforts to deter China will inevitably provide a measure of safety to the various 
smaller states in Asia, including India – none of which may actually contribute to 
the sustenance of that larger goal. Since the United States would most likely seek to 
preserve the security of these states in the face of Chinese blandishments or 
aggression in efforts to prevent the balance of power in Asia from deteriorating to 
its disadvantage, it is possible that states like India would not find it necessary to 
develop the panoply of deterrent capabilities they might otherwise have had to 
cultivate.265 
 
There is some evidence in support of the hypothesis that the American presence to a certain 
extent deterred involvement of other powers. Tellis’ prediction that this deterrent effect 
might be appreciated by India’s decision makers, leading to a more cautious build-up of 
indigenous deterrent capabilities, is, however, unlikely to materialise considering the above 
mentioned negative emotional patterns towards American involvement in South Asia.  
 
 
8.2. India’s Strategic Thinkers 
 
 
8.2.1. The Military: Politics of Self-Restraint 
 
Being aware of the dangers a politicised military would have for its young democracy, the 
first generation of India’s post-independence political leadership carefully kept servicemen 
out of the policy-making process. The gap in strategic policy making was filled by nuclear 
scientists despite their limited insight into military-strategic as well as foreign policy 
affairs. In the mid-1960s, two crucial events slowly initiated a process of rethinking of this 
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adamantly defended principle. First, the fiasco in the Sino-Indian war of 1962 made the 
deficits of India’s strategic policy apparent. Second, the death of Homi Bhabha in 1966 
significantly weakened the leadership of the nuclear scientific establishment, which 
subsequently lost much of its dominant position within India’s strategic policy making. 
 
An immediate outcome of the lost war of 1962 was the creation of the Institute for Defence 
Studies and Analyses (IDSA) three years later in a move to create a strategic think tank 
culture that would enable the government to draw on strategic expertise in its medium and 
long-term strategic planning. By integrating retired military officers into the IDSA, the 
government further hoped to reduce pressures from the strategic community demanding the 
involvement of the military in the country’s strategic policy making. In its effort to keep the 
military out, the government benefited from the changed course of the nuclear 
establishment under its new leader Vikram Sarabhai, who, unlike his predecessor Homi 
Bhabha, did not regard nuclear weapons as mere symbols of international prestige but as 
practical devices with an immediate strategic value. This new policy and the victorious war 
of 1971 suspended the debate for the time being. The continued exclusion of the military 
from the nuclear debate was further caused by the military’s initial indifference towards 
such symbolic, non-usable weapons of prestige. The military’s disinterest in the matter was 
only overcome in the mid-1980s due to three major developments: first, India began to 
develop the necessary components, such as missiles and C³I structures, to make these 
weapons militarily applicable; second, the emerging Brasstacks Crisis of 1986 and 1987 
made the development of a stringent nuclear strategy and doctrine a matter of urgency; and 
third, the rise of General K. Sundarji, who became India’s Chief of Army Staff in 1986 and 
encouraged the military leadership to adopt a more active role in the country’s policy 
making process. 
 
For the first time, India had a leading military officer who actively and intensively 
participated in the country’s strategic policy discourse, thereby breaking the military’s self-
imposed exclusion from the policy-making process. Until his resignation in 1988, Sundarji 
pressurised the government to abandon its ambiguous nuclear policy and to finally decide 
on the nuclear question. After his resignation, Sundarji became one of India’s most active 
and influential writers on a wide range of strategic and defence matters. From 1988 until his 
death in 1999, Sundarji acquired the position of being the unofficial voice of the Indian 
armed forces on defence policy matters.  
 
Sundarji disagreed with the nuclear scientists and most of the political leaders who defined 
nuclear weapons as mostly political devices in what were posited as indigenously Indian 
approach to strategy. Instead, he referred to explicit Western concepts of strategic thought, 
above all the Realist concept of ‘balance-of-power.’ Based on the Realist paradigms, 
Sundarji developed a strategic policy of minimum nuclear deterrence, which in his view 
would lead to a stable nuclear deterrence situation in South Asia.  
 
In late 1990 and early 1991, Sundarji engaged in an acrimonious debate with Pran Chopra, 
a proliferation pessimist and defender of India’s traditional course of nuclear ambiguity. 
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This debate led to the publication of several articles and counter articles in The Hindu. 
Therein Sundarji’s vision of India’s future nuclear course became fully visible.  
Sundarji was clearly aware that the acquisition of nuclear weapons would inevitably cause 
Pakistan to follow suit; this was a move that he thought was legitimate and rational for 
Pakistan to do. But he dismissed the fears of many that this mutual nuclear build up would 
trigger a perpetuating nuclear arms race on the subcontinent. In reply to Pran Chopra’s 
respective objection, Sundarji states: 
 
The first wrong assumption is that once countries like India and Pakistan go overtly 
nuclear, they are in for an unending nuclear arms race restrained only by the 
economic difficulties faced by both countries. [Pran Chopra] does not make the 
distinction between ‘war fighting’ and ‘war deterring’ capabilities.266 
 
By dismissing Chopra’s assumption of a perpetuating arms race, Sundarji ignores the 
crucial question: do India’s nuclear policy makers comprehend the distinction between ‘war 
fighting’ and ‘war deterring’ capabilities? In other words, Sundarji develops a minimum 
nuclear deterrence posture which satisfies its strategic task, but he ignores any possible 
motive other than strategic behind India’s nuclear build up. Similarly, Sundarji rejects the 
nuclear critics’ objection that it was impossible for India to ever catch up with the advanced 
Chinese nuclear programme. In his view, the critics’ objection was irrelevant as a minimum 
nuclear deterrence posture would enable India to deter China without matching its nuclear 
arsenal in numbers. Sundarji claims: 
 
[T]o deter the Chinese nuclear capability, we need not have superiority or 
equivalence, but only a retaliatory capability in the second strike mode; that this 
should be capable of inflicting unacceptable damage, with unacceptable damage 
defined sensibly. I had also suggested that for minimum deterrence, the ability to hit 
a few cities would constitute unacceptable damage.267 
 
Sundarji’s published assessments on the nuclear question were undoubtedly the most 
sophisticated of all newspaper commentary in India in terms of expert knowledge. 
However, he failed to comprehend the dynamics of India’s nuclear debate, which centred 
on motives other than mere strategy.  This misinterpretation led to policy outcomes not 
envisaged by Sundarji. This deviation was most obvious in 1998 when India tested a 
hydrogen bomb that Sundarji explicitly considered unnecessary for minimum nuclear 
deterrence. India subsequently declared itself a nuclear weapon state without having 
developed second strike capabilities, despite Sundarji’s explicit claim that a nuclear arsenal 
without such capabilities was strategically useless as deterrence device against China. 
Despite his strong objections to hesitant politico-strategists like Pran Chopra, Sundarji 
nevertheless avoids taking an uncompromising stance in the polarised debate between the 
bomb advocates and their critics. In a remarkably aloof analysis of the nuclear discourse 
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among India’s journalists and commentators, he criticises the polarised nature of India’s 
debate. In his words, “[t]his ‘us against them’ syndrome – the pro-bomb and the anti-bomb, 
the uniformed and the un-uniformed, this kind of approach scares me.”268 According to 
Sundarji, the emotionally overloaded and largely uninformed debate is mainly caused by 
the secrecy in which the nuclear programme is embedded: 
 
These issues are too serious to be dealt with emotionally or by rhetoric. In every 
other non-communist country, this kind of exercise has been going on in academic 
circles and professional circles. Perhaps this is where the true analysts are. Then, the 
commentators or pundits and the rank and file journalists get into the act, and take 
the facts and figures, and their arguments to the people through the media and 
informed debate ensues. 
In India the academic analysts are largely absent or busy re-inventing the Western 
‘wheel.’ The professionals, even those who are serious about their profession and do 
some work are generally hamstrung by the Official Secrets Act. The journalist/ 
commentator/ pundit is forced to take on all roles. There is paucity of indigenous 
literature on the subject and a proliferation of Western and specially U.S. literature, 
which is naturally oriented towards superpower equations. Some are even slanted 
towards anti-proliferation goals. The Soviet and Chinese literature in this field are 
few and language is a barrier. These unfortunately lend themselves to a benign 
acceptance and to a local propagation of the U.S. views; thoroughly understandable 
under the circumstances. This may lead to uncharitable attribution of motives. The 
only answer is therefore a thorough liberalisation of information to activate the 
professional and academic communities to get an informed debate going. 
Meanwhile, we must say, ‘Thank you’ to the pundits who have kept the debate 
alive, however imperfectly!269 
 
Sundarji’s comment is a rare reflection on the shortcomings of the nuclear debate by one of 
its most active participants. However, suggesting that the quality of the emotionalised 
debate could be improved by simply cutting back the secrecy provisions of the nuclear 
programme appears too short-sighted. It again reveals Sundarji’s failure to comprehend the 
full complexity of the dynamics behind the debate.  
 
In sum, Sundarji’s assessments contributed to a general improvement of the nuclear debate 
in terms of expert knowledge in military and strategic affairs. His approach to nuclear 
weapons reflected the views of a majority among the upper ranks of India’s military. 
However, his failure to accept the multiple political motives behind the elite’s debate on the 
issue as well as the nuclear policy making of the political class and his naive assumption 
that nuclear decisions were made on the basis of strategic considerations alone weakened 
his influence.  Additionally, this misinterpretation impeded the effective implementation of 
many of his elaborate recommendations.  
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8.2.2. The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) 
 
The absence of the military in Indian strategic policy-making created space for a group of 
strategic specialists, who exercised strong influence on the elite’s understanding of strategic 
affairs. The most influential group of strategic specialists convene in the government-
funded Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) in Delhi, whose published expert 
reports often reflect a semi-official assessment of the current state of strategic affairs in 
India. 
 
The crucial event after which the government realised the need for a professional strategic 
policy advisory body was the humiliating defeat in the 1962 war with China. Prior to this 
event, the military-strategic perspective of India’s policy makers was confined to the South 
Asian neighbourhood, which was a familiar and predictable ground for most among the 
first generation of India’s post independence politicians. The fiasco of 1962 abruptly 
widened the scope of India’s strategic thought. According to D.K. Palit: 
 
The Chinese confrontation caught not only our armed forces off balance, both in the 
field and at headquarters, but also the policy-making machinery in government. There 
was a realisation in some quarters that national security as long-range problem 
required a wider approach to strategic concepts than could be followed by agencies 
which were intimately involved with day-to-day conduct of national defence. This 
realisation was intensified after China exploded her atom bomb and started on her 
course towards operational nuclear capability. Perhaps as a result of this, it was 
decided that the time had come to establish an independent cell in government 
machinery which, unencumbered by the immediacy of contemporary policy, would be 
in a position to initiate discussion on, and conduct research into, problems of national 
security on a wider and more long-range basis. Under the sponsorship of Mr. Chavan, 
then Defence Minister, the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) was 
established in November 1965.270 
 
The structure and functions of the IDSA were modelled after the American RAND 
Corporation. During its initial phase under its first Director, Major General Som Dutt, the 
institute defined itself first and foremost as an advisory body to the government, consulting 
the Defence Minister and occasionally drafting reports the Standing Committee on Defence 
of the Parliament. Dutt eventually became the IDSA’s only director opposing India’s 
nuclearisation. In his careful assessments of India’s strategic environment, he challenged 
the widely held belief among India’s strategic elite in the late 1960s that China’s 
conventional superiority would still enable it to intrude into India’s northern territory as it 
did in 1962. Further, he considered the possibility of Chinese nuclear blackmail against 
India as an unlikely scenario, as its consequences in terms of superpower pressures would 
outweigh any benefits China would have from such a policy. Dutt argued that the financial 
costs to build up nuclear deterrence capabilities on a counterforce basis would be 
                                                 
270 Palit, D.K.: “Institute For Defence Studies: A Decade Of Progress.” In: The Hindustan Times, November 
24th 1975. 
 176
prohibitively high. With regard to Pakistan, he foresaw the self-fulfilling logic India’s 
nuclear build up would have on the initiation of Pakistan’s nuclear programme, therefore 
suggesting India’s nuclear self-restraint.  
 
The course of the IDSA radically changed when the sceptical Som Dutt was replaced as 
director by the fervent bomb advocate K. Subrahmanyam in 1970. In retrospect, this change 
in the leadership of India’s strategic elite might be considered as significant for India’s 
long-term nuclear course as the change in leadership of the nuclear scientific community 
from Vikram Sarabhai to Homi Sethna in 1971.  
 
Stephen P. Cohen describes Subrahmanyam’s position as follows:  
 
Subrahmanyam is a secularist but spent much of his career trying to prove that 
Nehru really would have favoured nuclear weapons. Like many of his generation he 
respected Nehru’s commitments to a democratic, secular state but felt that Nehru 
had been too weak and pliable, and bore some of the responsibility for India’s defeat 
in the Sino-Indian war of 1962 and India’s failure to deal decisively with Pakistan 
(and Kashmir) at an early stage. More recently, Subrahmanyam has tried to make 
the case that Mahatma Gandhi, also, would have favored nuclear weapons. The 
formula he and others developed thirty years ago has now become fairly widely 
accepted: India would acquire nuclear weapons in order to pressure the nuclear 
‘haves’ to disarm (a theory reminiscent of the notion that the village in Vietnam had 
to be destroyed to be saved). Indians could have their nuclear cake and eat it: an 
Indian nuclear program came to be seen as an instrument of resistance to the 
blackmail tactics of the nuclear weapons states and thus entirely justified. Further, if 
nuclear weapons were evil, then the so-called disarmament plans by the nuclear 
weapons states (whose hands were dirtied by their use or threat of use of nuclear 
weapons) were also evil, and such arrangements as the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Treaty (NPT) and even the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) could be 
opposed on moral grounds.271 
 
After taking office as director of the IDSA, Subrahmanyam dismissed Dutt’s fears of a self-
fulfilling logic with regard to Pakistan’s programme and contributed his alternative logic of 
South Asian nuclear dynamics. Therein, India’s nuclear programme was peaceful because 
India’s government said it was peaceful. Pakistan’s claim that peaceful and military 
applications could not be distinguished was, in his view, false and misguided.272 Further, 
the fact that Pakistan’s government denied that civilian and military purposes could be 
distinguished showed that Pakistan’s own claim about the peaceful intentions of its 
programme was false, and that its nuclear programme had purely military motivations. 
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Subrahmanyam concluded that India had no choice but to counter Pakistan’s nuclear threat 
with a nuclear weapons programme of its own: 
 
What concerns Indian security planners is the simple fact that Pakistan is going in for 
nuclear capability which cannot be related to a peaceful programme. There can be 
differences of opinion on how we should respond to this contingency, but what are 
difficult to understand are the attempts to explain away the entire Pakistani nuclear 
programme, ignoring its relevance to India’s security. Debating points may be scored 
by raising the question of whether our Pokharan test did not have a similar impact on 
Pakistan’s security, but it does not help us to evolve a meaningful response to the 
possibility of a nuclear Pakistan. Negotiations with Pakistan may be the preferred 
strategy for some people, but that does not absolve security planners of the 
responsibility to provide for the failure to find a mutually acceptable negotiated 
solution.273 
 
Subrahmanyam further elaborated a conservative approach to strategy, according to which 
India should be prepared for any imaginable contingency. This approach included threat 
scenarios posed by Pakistan above all, but also the U.S. and Soviet naval presence in the 
Indian Ocean, a potential presence of nuclear armed Chinese submarines in the Indian 
Ocean, US military assistance to various littoral states, and so forth.274 The hidden agenda 
behind a militarily strong India, that is, the increase in international status as a recognised 
major power, is only vaguely insinuated by Subrahmanyam: 
 
While regional arrangements have developed in various parts of the world, in all cases 
without exception there is a big power guarantor and enforcer of security behind them. 
In India’s case, as a big nation it is unrealistic for this country to look for such 
guarantees from an external source without its having an adverse impact on our unity 
and development. Hence there is a certain loneliness among big nations – such as the 
US, USSR, China and India – for whom easy security options are not open.275 
 
Subrahmanyam’s almost romantic ‘lonely on the top’ view of India’s position among the 
four world leading countries proved to be a highly seductive idea for large parts of India’s 
elite.  His views greatly influenced India’s self-image as a leading power in the world, 
explaining for instance the absence of any self-doubt among India’s strategic elite when 
India became completely isolated during the NPT and CTBT negotiations in Geneva in the 
mid-1990s.  
 
After K. Subrahmanyam was succeeded by P.R. Chari as the head of IDSA in 1975, he 
nevertheless continued to dominate India’s strategic discourse in the decades to come. His 
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influence on India’s strategic thinking mainly stemmed from extensive publishing, 
particularly in The Times of India.  
 
By 1986, K. Subrahmanyam had prepared the ground for the emergence of a broader 
strategic debate in India, which was subsequently dominated by the bomb advocates under 
the opinion leadership of the IDSA and ultimately led to India’s nuclear revelation in 1998. 
In one of his authoritative publications of that time, he summarised India’s need for nuclear 
weapons as follows:  
 
If India does not exercise the nuclear option and thereby acquire the nuclear 
deterrence at marginal additional cost, there may be two penalties. First, we may face 
a nuclear Pakistan or a nuclear China or the coercive diplomacy of a nuclear super-
power without having the countering capability. Secondly the full cost-effectiveness 
of the nuclear capable system will not be exploited.276  
 
Next to Subrahmanyam, two further directors of the IDSA were able to significantly 
contribute to the nuclear discourse in India, namely P.R. Chari and Jasjit Singh. 
Unlike Subrahmanyam, Jasjit Singh, who directed the IDSA during the crucial years of 
India’s nuclear course in the 1990s, focused less upon the political dimensions of nuclear 
weapons and instead emphasised its military-strategic value as deterrence devices. Initially 
lacking Subrahmanyam’s omnipresence in India’s media, Jasjit Singh was mainly 
concerned with doctrinal and deployment aspects of nuclear weapons, particularly its 
integration into the armed services. 
 
Interestingly enough K. Santhanam, who directed the IDSA in the years from 2001 to 2004, 
did not have the military-strategic background that all of his predecessors had, but was 
himself a former nuclear scientist who developed much of his career at BARC and in the 
DRDO. His impact on India’s nuclear discourse, however, remained limited during the time 
of his directorship. In August 2004, he was succeeded by officiating director Uday 
Bhashkar. 
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9. The “Diabolic Enemy” Stereotype: Indo-Pakistan Relations 
 
 
9.1. The Roots of Indo-Pakistani Antagonism 
 
9.1.1. Regional Balance of Power 
 
The root causes of the hostility between India and Pakistan can be ascribed to four major 
structural factors:277 first, the lack of institutional structures resulting from the British ‘Cut 
and Run’ policy in 1947; second, the conflicting ideology of both states, with Pakistan 
defining itself through its Muslim identity and India defining itself as secular state; third, 
the clash between strong irredentist pressures in Pakistan and anti-irredentism in India 
towards the territory of Kashmir; and, fourth, the geo-strategic importance of the disputed 
territory in Kashmir. While the first factor was dominant in the first years after 
independence, the second and third factors played a crucial role during the period from the 
mid-1950s to 1971. After the Bangladesh War of 1971 and the subsequent disintegration of 
Pakistan, structural factors lost much of their relevance, and ethnicity as determining factor 
came to the fore278. 
 
During their almost six decades' long antagonistic relationship, India and Pakistan fought 
three major wars as well as several minor border wars and clashes.279 The first Kashmir war 
of 1947 and 1948 was mainly caused by the overhasty departure of the British Raj. 
However, a second factor, which was to determine the course of antagonism between both 
states for the following decades became apparent: the concurring nature of both countries’ 
ideologies. Prior to independence, the Muslim majority in the north western and north 
eastern regions of British India fought their struggle for a separate state along religious 
lines. Thus, Muslim identity featured as the central motive in Pakistan’s nation-building 
process after 1947. In this context, giving up the claims over the Kashmir valley with its 
vast Muslim majority would endanger the raison d’être of Pakistan as a sovereign state. In 
Nehruvian India, on the other hand, Kashmir was viewed as the test case for its secularist 
ideology. India’s leadership feared that a failure of the secularist state order to 
accommodate the Muslims of Kashmir would become a precedent for several other ethnic 
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and religious minorities in the periphery of the Indian heartland.  This would, in turn, 
endanger the existence of the Indian multiethnic state as a whole. 
 
This ideological competition was the main structural cause for the second Indo-Pakistani 
war in 1965. The institutional integration of Kashmir into the Indian Union up to 1965 
increased the irredentist pressures in Pakistan, which finally caused it to take action in the 
Kashmir question. 
 
Six years after the 1965 war, the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971 was triggered by the 
secessionist uprising in East Pakistan and therefore did not originate from the structural 
causes of Indo-Pakistani antagonism. The outcome of the war nevertheless changed the 
nature of Indo-Pakistani relations more than any other previous event. Firstly, the loss of its 
eastern territory cemented Pakistan’s geo-strategic inferiority. Next, the Pakistani 
ideological pillar of being the homeland of all Muslims on the South Asian subcontinent 
became obsolete. The Simla Agreement signed between India and Pakistan after the 
Bangladesh war further weakened the Pakistani position and blocked its efforts to counter 
Indian military superiority through alliance building. 
 
After the Bangladesh war, India emerged as the undisputed regional power within South 
Asia. However, Indian power politics during the era of Indira Gandhi estranged its smaller 
neighbour states and thus obstructed the establishment of a ‘Pax Indica’ despite the 
country’s vast regional superiority in terms of power capabilities and power resources. 
After 1971, no major war was fought between India and Pakistan. Several proxy wars 
including the Brasstacks Crisis in 1987 and the Kashmir Crisis in 1990, as well as low 
intensity wars such as the Kargil insurgency in 1999, marked the continued hostility 
between both states along the unstable Line of Control in Kashmir. 
 
9.1.2. Introducing the Nuclear Dimension 
 
Pakistan had established an Atomic Energy Commission in 1956, which was preoccupied 
with civilian application during its first decade. The development of nuclear weapons 
capabilities is closely associated with Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who emphatically demanded 
Pakistan’s nuclearisation during his tenure as Pakistan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs in the 
late 1960s and then initiated its nuclear weapons programme in 1972 after he had become 
Pakistan’s Prime Minister. The nuclear issue turned increasingly relevant in both countries’ 
bilateral relations only after India’s first nuclear test in 1974. This event established 
Pakistan’s governmental and military understanding that India had unambiguously 
embarked on a path towards full-fledged nuclearisation.  It also strengthened the resolve of 
Pakistan’s leadership to counter the emerging nuclear threat by equally developing atomic 
bombs. Immediately after the test of 1974, Pakistan reinforced its nuclear weapons 
programme, which made a great leap forward in 1975 as Pakistan’s AEC was able to 
illicitly secure Dutch blueprints of an ultracentrifuge for uranium enrichment through A.Q. 
Khan.  Eventually, Khan would become chairman of the AEC and the ‘father of the 
Pakistani bomb.’ 
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The first rumours about the fast advancing Pakistani programme entered the strategic 
debate in India in the late 1970s. An article in The Statesman in late 1979 summarised the 
official position on nuclear weapons by quoting India’s Defence Minister C. Subramaniam: 
“India would have to reconsider its policy if Pakistan were to go nuclear.”280 Next to the 
Pakistani threat, the author discusses five further obstacles to India’s nuclear course: the 
two superpowers’ continued arms race; the other three nuclear powers’ continuation of their 
respective programmes; Israel's continued proliferation efforts; continued clandestine 
proliferation in countries such as South Africa and Taiwan; and access to nuclear 
capabilities by so called crypto nuclear nations. The time frame in which India should 
develop its nuclear arsenal would depend on “[w]hether the interventionist tendencies of 
nuclear weapon powers get strengthened further.”281 This list of incentives reflects the 
mainstream perception of India’s strategic elite on the threat environment in which the 
country’s nuclear build-up was taking place. It shows that the emerging nuclear threat from 
Pakistan remained paramount within India’s nuclear calculus, while the Chinese threat, like 
the one from the UK and France, was perceived to be rather academic. The vague 
mentioning of ‘interventionist tendencies of nuclear powers’ reflects the psychological 
impact caused by the ‘Enterprise’ incident of 1971 among India’s strategic elite. 
 
What becomes apparent in the Statesman article is the very low threshold set by these 
conditions, which make the acquisition of nuclear weapons by India appear like an almost 
inevitable next step. The author leaves no doubt that India’s nuclear build-up is the only 
passable option to meet Pakistan’s nuclear threat. The idea of creating a nuclear weapon-
free zone in South Asia is dismissed, as such a zone would, in the cited words of the 
defence minister, urge “the recreation of joint paramountcy of U.S.-USSR and China over 
the old British India and persuade the nations in this part of the world to accept less than 
full sovereignty vis-à-vis the nuclear paramount powers.”282 Second, the introduction of full 
scope safeguards by the IAEA would “impose ‘technological hegemony’ over developing 
nations and this was totally unacceptable to India.”283 
The Statesman account illustrates the shift of the mainstream nuclear discourse in the late 
1970s and early 1980s period in which the Nehruvian nuclear taboos were gradually lifted.  
 
It shows several key elements.  First, in the perception of India’s elite, the imminent threat 
to India’s security within the regional strategic set-up came from Pakistan, not China. 
Second, efforts by outside powers or international organisations to stop the emerging 
nuclear arms race were dismissed on anti-colonialist grounds. Third, the use of key words 
such as ‘nuclear paramount powers’ and ‘technological hegemony’ appeal to emotions of 
national pride and dignity.  This is similar to the language used in the debate on the 
discriminatory international regime, as well as in the debate on self-reliance and indigenous 
development.  
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The discourse on India’s response to Pakistan’s nuclearisation continued along these lines 
throughout the 1980s with little variations.284 
In this period, two events further heightened fears of a Pakistani nuclear threat: Pakistan’s 
return to military rule in 1977 and the outbreak of a massive ethnic and religious uprising 
by the Sikh minority in the Indian state of Punjab. The psychological impact of both 
incidents exceeded their actual importance for India’s security by far. 
 
Pakistan’s civilian leaders, above all Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, had adopted a much more 
bellicose and threatening rhetoric on nuclear matters than their counterparts in the military. 
This change in rhetoric weakened the widely held belief among India’s elite that a military 
controlled Pakistan would establish a much more unpredictable, potentially aggressive 
nuclear policy. Further, the alleged assistance of Sikh insurgents by Pakistan, which had a 
common border with the Indian state of Punjab, appears to have been grossly overrated by 
India’s political elite. In its attempt to avoid any unnecessary provocation, Pakistan’s 
military ruler Zia ul-Haq resisted actively interfering in the conflict but instead only 
passively supported the insurgents by turning a blind eye on cross border arms smuggling.  
 
In April 1981, G.K. Reddy suggests that India’s nuclearisation was a reaction to American 
assistance to rearm Pakistan conventionally.285 In strategic terms, Reddy’s argument is 
doubtful, as conventional proliferation efforts by an inferior power do not cause nuclear 
proliferation incentives for the superior power per se. 
One of the most outspoken proponents of an immediate nuclearisation was Krishan Kant, a 
former member of parliament who lost re-elections in 1979. During his lobbying efforts, he 
put forth an image of a hostile Pakistan with grim intentions.  Once Pakistan acquired 
nuclear capabilities, he proposed, they would not dare to use them. In a May 1981 article, 
Kant expressed his view that the only way to prevent the looming disaster was to “speedily 
develop the infrastructure for the bomb without further ado so as to acquire a superior 
deterrent capacity.”286 
 
In an August 1985 article, G.C. Katoch raises the question about the costs of India’s 
response to Pakistani nuclearisation. While stating that if India does not acquire nuclear 
weapons, it would have to respond to Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities with an intensive 
conventional rearmament, Katoch comes to the conclusion that extensive spending, either 
nuclear or conventional, is imperative for India. Katoch’s reasoning is simple: “When a 
nation’s security is at stake, there is, of course, no such thing as spending too much on 
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defence.”287 This assessment reflects the general shift in mainstream opinion in the course 
of the 1980s, which gradually turned away from the highly moralistic Nehruvian rhetoric 
towards a much more demure evaluation of the economic costs of nuclearisation.  
 
 
9.2. Indo-Pakistani Nuclear Shadowboxing 
 
9.2.1. Getting Down to Brasstacks 
 
Between May 1986 and March 1987, the Indian army under its Commander-in-Chief 
General K. Sundarji conducted a large scale combined manoeuvre in the Rajasthan desert 
along its border to Pakistan, which was named operation ‘Brasstacks.’ The military 
leadership failed to inform Pakistan about details and did not make any reassuring 
statements about the non-aggressiveness of this exercise. The Pakistani army, which 
conducted its annual military manoeuvres at the same time in neighbouring Sindh province, 
reacted to this perceived acute threat with military mobilisation and troop deployments to 
the common border, triggering an action-reaction dynamic that increased tensions close to 
war. 
 
The causes behind the escalating Brasstacks Crisis were complex and manifold. The crisis 
revealed a lack of confidence-building measures, a failure of crisis management, and a 
disturbing lack of sense of responsibility among military and political leaders.288 In terms 
of both countries’ nuclear relationship, the crisis marked a crucial turning point. To begin 
with, nuclear deterrence played a role in Indo-Pakistani antagonism, though the true impact 
of nuclear deterrence on the outcome of the crisis is controversially debated among scholars 
up to the present day. While the direct impact of deterrence is arguable,289 its indirect effect 
on both countries’ strategic planning was incisive. After the experiences of 1986 and 1987, 
a nuclear exchange was no longer a vague future scenario, but was perceived as a real 
threat which had to be dealt with in a promptly manner. Soon after the tensions reduced in 
1987, several official bodies as well as think tanks began conceptualising improvements of 
nuclear safety as well as possible bilateral nuclear risk reduction measures, such as an 
agreement not to attack each other’s nuclear facilities.  
 
A second major aspect of the nuclear dynamics during the Brasstacks crisis was India’s 
apprehension of a Chinese involvement in the escalating hostilities. During the winters of 
1986 and 1987, India as well as China deployed troops along their common border. Then, 
in early 1987, false rumours spread in India’s media that China was deploying nuclear 
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capable missiles at several sites in Tibet. The Chinese government dismissed these 
allegations. 
 
The accounts of India’s strategic elite with regard to the emerging nuclear threat from 
Pakistan became more virulent in the course of the Brasstacks crisis in 1987. The changing 
rhetoric becomes apparent in the alarmist threat assessment by wing-commander Amar 
Zutshi in May 1987, in which he accuses Libya’s Colonel Gaddafi of having financed 
Pakistan’s nuclear programme.290 Zutshi draws a scenario whereby a nuclear armed 
Pakistan would promote disloyalty and confrontation among Muslim subversives in India, 
as well as intensify infiltration across the border.  
 
These developments would finally lead to a military adventure in Kashmir. According to 
Zutshi’s account, a Pakistan-China-US axis was likely to undermine India’s position in 
South Asia by establishing hegemony in South-East Asia, therefore subjugating Nepal and 
Bhutan, and eventually thrusting into India with the help of small bullies such as 
Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. India’s commanders would not be able to sustain the morale of 
the troops vis-à-vis nuclear armed Pakistan.  Pakistan would then occupy Kashmir and 
Rajasthan, and “install a vassal ‘Khalistan’ in Punjab”.291 Pakistan’s action would be 
sanctioned by a conspiracy in the Security Council, in which Russia joins the US and 
China, stopping India before it could strike back. As the only option India has to avoid such 
disastrous scenario, Zutshi suggests the creation of a balancing axis with Iran and Japan 
(which would part from its alliance with the US and instead join its “spiritual home” of 
India).292 If the need emerges, India’s option would include fighting a nuclear war with 
Pakistan, as “[o]ne small bomb each on Rawalpindi and Lahore would be enough to 
eliminate the Republic of Pakistan for good. But India will survive even with ten nuclear 
bombs.”293 Surely, Zutshi’s bizarre account reflected the stance of only a minority within 
India’s strategic community. But the simple fact that he was at that time an active officer 
who published this article (and continued to publish articles thereafter) in one of India’s 
most respected dailies reflects a certain degree of confusion among the strategic thinkers as 
to how to deal with the emergence of the Pakistani nuclear threat. 
 
Many among Indian opinion makers referred to Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities as the 
‘Islamic Bomb,’ thereby insinuating assistance from other Islamic countries. Pakistan, as 
their argument went, would have never been able to develop the bomb without the financial 
and technological help of outside powers, namely the Arab countries. In an October 1989 
account, Sanat Biswas emphasised Pakistan’s alleged dependency from a range of foreign 
countries in military, technological and financial terms:294 “During the first three decades of 
its existence, Pakistan collaborated with the imperialist powers.”295 According to Biswas, 
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Pakistan acted as agent of these ‘imperialist’ powers by introducing the idea of a “regional 
weapon free zone,” which served only the interests of the USA and China. Biswas 
continues by stating that “it is necessary to mention a common theme, often put out by the 
U.S. Administration and the Western media, that the Pakistan nuclear venture is a direct 
outcome of the Indian nuclear explosion of 1974. This is only part of the propaganda to 
induce India to sign a full-scope safeguard agreement.”296 He then offers an alternative 
explanation to the origins of Pakistan’s programme by introducing the concept of the 
‘Islamic Bomb:’ 
 
… [T]here was no way that Pakistan could have got together on its own a multiple-
routed nuclear weapon programme based only on a security requirement vis-à-vis 
India. It simply does not have the financial resources. It is only with lavish Arab 
funds that such a programme could have been undertaken, and since the prime 
concern of the Arab states is Israel, it is not the Indian nuclear blast that should be 
cited as the inspiration for Pakistan. … . It was to Pakistan’s advantage to obtain 
‘approval’ – and the funds – for an ‘Islamic Bomb’ by projecting the Arab-Israel 
conflict and the advantages to be gained by injecting an Arab nuclear argument into 
the confrontation. It is also clear that once Pakistan has acquired a minimum nuclear 
armoury, it will switch the focus of its strategic thrust from Israel to India, whatever 
the Arabs might say.297 
 
The massive financial and technological foreign aid to Pakistan’s nuclear programme has 
always been a core conjecture by India’s strategic thinkers. While most analysts name 
China as the first highest provider and the U.S. as second, Biswas is much more cautious 
about the incentives for Chinese involvement in the region. Along his version, the Arab 
countries rearmed Pakistan. The ‘Islamic Bomb’ motive, although lacking much empirical 
evidence, was a very popular theme among India’s strategic community during the late 
1980s as it offered convenient answers to the two major puzzles: how could Pakistan build 
up nuclear weapons in much shorter time with significantly less financial resources than 
India and has India’s initiation of the nuclear arms race on the subcontinent caused a self-
inflicted strategic dilemma. By claiming that Arab states provided the necessary financial 
resources, and that Israel, not India, was the foremost incentive for Pakistan to go nuclear, 
these two questions could be answered in a much less self-critical way. 
 
In the years from 1988 to 1990, India’s push towards a full-fledged nuclear arsenal 
accelerated. According to unofficial sources it had increased the number of crude nuclear 
devices to around twenty. It had further modified Jaguar S and Mirage 2000 aircraft as 
appropriate delivery vehicles. Its missile programme achieved a major breakthrough in 
February 1988 with the first test flight of its SSM Prithvi, followed by a test flight of the 
IRBM Agni one year later. While still being far from maturity, the Prithvi missile launch 
was nevertheless lauded as a major demonstration of India’s progress. 
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Due to these developments, India’s strategic elite regained its self-confidence and sense of 
superiority vis-à-vis Pakistan. India’s nuclear discourse overcame its irritation about 
Pakistan’s capabilities and accepted them as a given fact, with which India had to deal. As 
Manoj Joshi asserted, “[w]ho or what is to be blamed is not the issue. The fact of the matter 
is that today India has the ‘unique’ distinction of having two nuclear armed neighbours with 
whom, it has or has had strained relations and has fought a total of four full-scale wars.”298  
While hawkish strategists like Biswas dismissed the idea that India’s nuclear test of 1974 
had caused an intensification of Pakistan’s nuclear efforts as Western propaganda, 
moderate strategists like Joshi instead took the fatalistic position that once the nuclear 
dynamics in South Asia were set in motion, the questions of what or who had caused it had 
simply lost their relevance. This stance proved to be quite appealing to most Indian elite 
because it prevented them from asking uncomfortable questions about India’s self-defeating 
policy with regard to the initiation of the nuclear competition on the subcontinent. 
 
According to Joshi’s prosaic analysis, India now has three basic options: do nothing and 
rely on the little deterrent value of the 1974 Pokhran tests; sign a verifiable non-
proliferation agreement; or, assemble nuclear weapons and send unambiguous signals to 
Pakistan.299 A growing number of opinion leaders during the early 1990s adopted the 
position, that as things stood, India had no choice but to acquire a credible nuclear 
deterrent. While in the late 1980s most strategic commentators considered the introduction 
of nuclear weapons into the South Asian region as unavoidable, few developed strategies to 
stop these developments. One interesting suggestion for averting a regional nuclear arms 
race is provided by Pran Chopra, who invokes the recent cessation of the nuclear 
confrontation between Argentina and Brazil as a loophole for India and Pakistan out of the 
nuclear dilemma.300 Most other commentators emphasise approaches to stabilize rather than 
reverse the Indo-Pakistani nuclear relationship. These include the intensification of 
(bilateral) dialogue, the establishment of confidence-building measures, etc.301 
 
In 1989, an insurgency in the Kashmir valley began, which would eventually determine the 
hostile relationship between India and Pakistan for the years to come, bringing both 
countries to the brink of war on several occasions. In spring 1990, tensions increased after 
India accused Pakistan of supporting rebels advancing across the Kashmiri high altitude 
border after snowmelt. As in 1987, tensions mounted to a full-blown crisis in which both 
countries’ imperfect nuclear arsenals posed an omnipresent threat. Perceived threats were 
fuelled by alarming news about large scale Chinese assistance to Pakistan in the nuclear 
field. The Kashmir Crisis of 1990 differed from the 1986 and 1987 Brasstacks Crisis in its 
attendant rhetoric. The nuclear discourse after 1987 had increased the awareness among 
both countries’ political and strategic elite concerning the dangers and strategic 
implications of nuclear capabilities. Accordingly, the nuclear rhetoric of 1990 was less 
provocative than in 1987. Several academic accounts of the 1990 episode suggest that 
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nuclear capabilities in fact deterred both countries from going to war.302 In 1991, India and 
Pakistan finally ratified and implemented the agreement which had been signed three years 
earlier, whereby attacking one another’s nuclear facilities was prohibited. 
 
 
9.2.2. The Hidden Nuclear Competition 
 
From the early to mid 1990s, several more detailed analyses on the strategic rationale 
behind India-Pakistan nuclear relationship were published.303 One of these analyses 
deserves special attention here. In a review article published in 1993 on a recent publication 
by former Chief of Army Staff, General K. Sundarji, M.R. Srinivasan, himself former 
Chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission, gives a comprehensive and balanced 
overview of the current state of strategic affairs in the Indo-Pakistani nuclear rivalry.304 He 
begins by lamenting the institutional shortcomings that prevent India from pursuing a more 
effective nuclear policy towards Pakistan: 
 
Some of us involved in dealing with matters of high strategic policy certainly recall 
discussions with the highest political leadership, almost always on a one to one 
basis. Though this practice may have been justified on grounds of secrecy, many of 
us have felt the grave inadequacy of the absence of appropriate institutional 
structures to discuss and decide on these vital issues. Ad-hocism is endemic with the 
government of India.305 
 
This statement appears remarkable considering the fact that the nuclear establishment, led 
for several years by Srinivasan, was able to secure its influence on strategic affairs mainly 
due to this lack of institutionalised strategic decision-making structures.  
 
Similarly noteworthy is Srinivasan’s more than demure stance on the aspect of self-
reliance, which had been the backbone of the nuclear scientists’ displayed self-image: 
 
Some of my colleagues in the nuclear community place an important distinction on 
the fact that India has developed its nuclear capability with its own efforts while 
Pakistan has greatly benefited through clandestine acquisition of sensitive 
technologies and materials. It is a matter of great pride and satisfaction that we in 
India have depended on our own efforts and this experience will stand us in good 
stead for the future also. We can, however, place no value judgement on Pakistan 
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breaching the embargoes placed by the supplier countries. We must take note of its 
present capabilities and tailor our policies accordingly.306 
 
Srinivasan rejected the idea that China played any prominent role in pushing India towards 
nuclear build up, as both countries have more conjunctive than diverging interests. Rather, 
India’s nuclear course was, according to Srinivasan, monocausally determined by 
Pakistan’s moves: “It was only in the late 1980s that the new element, namely acquisition 
of a limited nuclear weapon capability by Pakistan, created a new situation.”307 
 
He dismissed the view of some strategic theorists who noted that a conventionally superior 
power can live with a nuclear armed but conventionally inferior neighbour without seeking 
nuclear equation: 
 
Gen. Sundarji is right in suggesting that no self-respecting Chief of the Indian Army 
would want to lead his men into a war with Pakistan when he knows that the enemy 
possesses nuclear weapons and he himself does not. This is notwithstanding any 
level of superiority in conventional weaponry and forces India may enjoy. To use 
Gen. Sundarji’s words ‘only nuclear weapons can deter nuclear weapons’ (quoted 
from K. Subrahmanyam).308 
 
While the careful assessment of M.R. Srinivasan contrasts the usually flamboyant, highly 
emotionalised calls for nuclear prowess issued by the nuclear scientific community, its 
implied policy recommendations were nevertheless unequivocal. Srinivasan suggested a 
determined effort to develop a full-fledged nuclear arsenal, including nuclear-propelled 
submarines. Further, he suggested goal-oriented reforms of defence planning and 
institutional strategic decision-making.  
 
The overall number of nuclear related articles on the Indo-Pakistani relationship declined 
significantly in the early to mid-1990s, as the international nuclear non-proliferation issue 
began to dominate India’s domestic debate. In the final two years prior to the tests in 1998, 
Pakistan almost disappeared from the scope of nuclear related publications. The few 
exceptions unanimously called for an immediate acquisition of a nuclear deterrent as the 
only viable option to counter the Pakistani nuclear threat.309  
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9.3. After Pokhran II: Learning to Live with Pakistan’s Bomb 
 
9.3.1. Redefining Indo-Pakistani Nuclear Relations  
 
Immediately after the nuclear tests in May 1998, several government statements 
emphasised the Chinese nuclear threat as the primary cause. Next to the China factor, there 
was no doubt that the test flight of the MRBM Ghauri by Pakistan in April 1998 induced 
the element of urgency into India’s test preparations. After India’s nuclear tests, many of its 
strategists perceived the tests as a symbol of dominance over Pakistan. Their triumph ended 
on May 28, when Pakistan itself conducted five nuclear tests. While Pakistan’s catch up 
was expected by most, it surprised many among India’s political and strategic community. 
Many commentators reacted sullenly. Their attempt to downplay Pakistan’s achievements 
was misinterpreted by some international observers as a negation of Pakistan’s deterrence 
capabilities by India’s elite.310 
 
The authoritative assessment of the Pakistani tests reflecting the mainstream strategic 
thought among India’s elite was published by its central figure K. Subrahmanyam in The 
Times of India on May 30, 1998.311 Subrahmanyam begins his account of the strategic 
implication of Pakistan’s tests by claiming that “[t]he Pakistani nuclear test has brought 
into the open that country’s nuclear weapon which has been in existence for 11 years.”312 In 
his view, the only significant change in both countries strategic relationship was the 
introduction of a more stable mutual deterrence, which would calm down the Kashmir 
conflict and make any high-intensity conventional war, as well as a nuclear war, much less 
likely. His appraisal, which in retrospect appears to have been too optimistic considering 
the emergence of the Kargil crisis a few months later,313 Subrahmanyam states: 
 
If one were to compare the eight years of Indo-Pakistan nuclear coexistence with the 
first eight years of US-USSR, US-China and Sino-USSR nuclear relationship, the 
former has been much more stable. There was no arms race between Pakistan and 
India though the leadership of each knew that the other had nuclear weapons. … . 
Both countries exercised restraint in a tacit framework of low-intensity conflict in a 
situation of mutual deterrence. Developments on the ground have totally disproved 
western predictions about this region being the world’s nuclear flashpoint, which it 
has not been and is not going to be. Most prognostications about an India-Pakistan 
nuclear arms race are purely speculative and merely a mechanical extension of the 
behaviour pattern of the three nuclear weapon powers; and this pattern ignores the 
history of the last eight years.314 
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By suggesting that Indo-Pakistani nuclear coexistence has a history of eight years, 
Subrahmanyam implicitly dates the initiation of the bilateral deterrence situation to the 
Kashmir Crisis in 1990. This suggestion, as well as Subrahmanyam’s claim that Pakistan 
had assembled its first nuclear device in 1987, is mentioned nine times throughout the 
article. His very strong emphasis on this chronology reflects his strong effort to avoid by all 
means the impression that India was the driving force behind South Asia’s nuclearisation.  
This again reflects India’s strategic elite’s difficulties in accepting India’s negative role 
within the nuclear dynamics in South Asia in the 1970s. Despite the widely accepted fact 
that India assembled its first device in either 1985 or 1986 around three years before 
Pakistan, Subrahmanyam dates this achievement to 1988, which is one year after Pakistan’s 
alleged breakthrough.  
 
The subsequent comparison of India’s strategic situation with those of the three major 
nuclear weapons states, USA, USSR, and China, indicates the ranks that nuclear India has 
joined following the nuclear tests, according to Subrahmanyam. 
His assertion that India’s eight year record as a nuclear weapons state has been much more 
successful in terms of stability and self-restraint as compared to the three major nuclear 
powers lacks empirical evidence. This argument, which is repeated three times throughout 
the text, is underpinned by the same highly emotionalised theme that guided the 
symbolically overloaded debate on the NPT, CTBT, and international non-proliferation 
issue at large: the categorical rejection of any attempts by ‘the West’ to withhold from India 
the right to have nuclear weapons on the high grounds of national pride and dignity.  
 
Who is the ‘West?’ Subrahmanyam uses this key term in a similar fashion to most other 
members of India’ strategic elite in a rather abstract, almost metaphoric way. It is used to 
project the ugly face of some powers in terms of their neo-imperialist, self-serving 
attitudes. The main intention of the authors is thus to contrast India’s high moral standing 
to these attitudes. This rationale guided the highly emotionalised rally of India’s strategic 
elite against the international non-proliferation regime, as well as any perceived ‘Western’ 
attempts to curtail India’s nuclear sovereignty at large. The term ‘West’ as used in this 
context does not encompass the geographic entity to which is usually referred. Rather, non-
nuclear Western states as well as France are largely excluded from the attention of India’s 
elite. When referencing these alleged attitudes, the authors usually refer to statements from 
either the political or the strategic elite in Washington, or, to a lesser extent, their 
counterparts in London. When denoting ‘Western’ concerns about the region of South Asia 
being the “world’s nuclear flashpoint,”315 the authors usually reference either CIA director 
James Woolsey’s testimony before the US Senate Governmental Affairs Committee on 
February 24, 1993, according to which the South Asian region “poses perhaps the most 
probable prospect for future use of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear 
weapons,” or one of President Clinton’s sporadic replications of this statement in the 
following years. Beyond this very limited array of references that fit into the projected 
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stereotypes, a deeper assessment of the diversity of ‘Western’ attitudes is hardly ever 
carried out by India’s strategic elite. 
 
Another noteworthy feature of Subrahmanyam’s general assessment is his categorical 
negation of any existing nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan. This main theme 
appears inconsistent with his effort to display India’s nuclear build-up as a reaction to prior 
progress in Pakistan’s nuclear proliferation. This inconsistency becomes even more 
apparent when Subrahmanyam assesses the quality and prospects of Pakistan’s nuclear 
programme: 
 
There are limits to the Pakistani capability to acquire nuclear weapons and missiles. 
It is totally unrealistic to talk of Pakistan starting a nuclear arms race against India 
since it is not an independent self-sufficient producer of arms. Therefore, there is no 
cause for worry about an arms race being triggered by the Pakistani nuclear test.316 
 
Subrahmanyam’s ambivalent explanation reflects two contradicting aspects of India’s self-
perception: first, its morale ethos as a peaceful, principally anti-nuclear power, which had 
to acquire the bomb only because of imminent nuclear threats from its neighbours; second, 
its aspirations as an emerging major power and fully accepted member of the nuclear club. 
India’s obsession with Pakistan is part of the first aspect but is seen as major obstacle to the 
second objective. These dual motives explain why Subrahmanyam first claims that India’s 
nuclear build-up had been a reaction to the Pakistani nuclear threat, then claims that India 
(not Pakistan) had now joined the three other major nuclear powers, and finally ends by 
stating that Pakistan is no match to India, and as its nuclear capabilities pose no incentive 
for India to engage in an arms race.317 
 
The reason for this pessimistic assessment of Pakistan’s capabilities is, according to 
Subrahmanyam, its lack of self-sufficiency. In the aftermath of the Pakistani tests, many of 
India’s commentators pointed to the prestigious value of India’s nuclear weapons as 
indigenously crafted devices, in contrast to the ‘imported’ - and as such much less worthy - 
Pakistani capabilities. According to mainstream understanding, Pakistan’s nuclear 
breakthrough had been facilitated by a joint effort with technology provided by China and 
political backing from ‘the West.’ According to Subrahmanyam: 
 
[T]he US deliberately looked away even as Islamabad assembled the weapons in 
1987. India, which had observed unparalleled restraint from 1974 to 1988, and was 
the only country which did not build an arsenal following its nuclear test, was 
compelled to develop its nuclear deterrent in the light of Sino-Pak collaboration and 
US indulgence of proliferation.318 
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In sum, K. Subrahmanyam’s in depth account of Indo-Pakistani nuclear relations after the 
tests provided a meaningful insight into the various dynamics and conditions in which 
India’s strategic though was embedded. At first sight, Subrahmanyam’s article induces 
more questions than offers stringent explanations. Subrahmanyam nonchalantly negates the 
existence of an Indo-Pakistani arms race just two days after both countries had conducted 
their nuclear testing in an action-reaction mode. Further, he explains in a triumphant 
undertone that India has finally proven the ‘Westerners’ wrong who had expressed fears 
about the Indo-Pakistani nuclear confrontation. This, too, appears negligent to the 
international mood at the time of his publication; the bellicose rhetoric of mutual 
accusations and allegations between India and Pakistan reached a peak in the immediate 
aftermath of the tests, thereby increasing international concerns about the dangers of 
nuclear escalation in the region. Finally, he explicitly ridicules Pakistan’s nuclear 
capabilities just two days after Pakistan surprised most Indians by conducting nuclear tests 
only two weeks after India, and thereby demonstrating that it had acquired the nuclear 
technology effectively through massive technology transfer. This scant regard for 
Pakistan’s nuclear achievements appears even more remarkable considering 
Subrahmanyam’s 26-year long unremitting call for India’s nuclearisation as the only way to 
counter Pakistan’s looming nuclear threat. 
 
What becomes obvious in Subrahmanyam’s article is the instrumentalisation of the 
Pakistani threat by the nuclear bomb lobby, first by generating domestic support for the 
bomb among the anti-Pakistani sections of India’s public, and then by justifying India’s 
nuclear advancement internationally while allowing India to maintain its high moral 
posture.  
Once India had passed the nuclear threshold, the Pakistan argument lost its attractiveness. 
On the contrary, the obsession with Pakistan was now regarded as a major obstacle for 
India to achieve major power status. Subrahmanyam’s seemingly contradicting argument 
illustrates this shift. 
Subrahmanyam’s account shows a strong inclination of the author with the object of his 
analysis. This inclination is inherent in most nuclear articles in the immediate aftermath of 
the tests. 
 
Among the very few exceptions in which the author successfully kept a distance to the 
object of analysis in the heated post-Pokhran atmosphere is Amrita Abraham’s account of 
the Indo-Pakistani nuclear relations one month after Pokhran II.319 Abraham systematically 
dispels several myths that had become dogmatic truths among mainstream opinion leaders 
including Subrahmanyam. First of all, Abraham questions the popular view that Western 
imperialistic states’ sole purpose through the international non-proliferation regime was to 
deter India from achieving its merited status and prestige. According to Abraham: 
 
The containment of regional conflict and rivalry has always been the central 
argument for international non-proliferation regimes. Non-weapon states, who are 
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no less conscious of the biases in the NPT and CTBT, have accepted them as the 
price of peace in the neighbourhood while they concentrate on improving standards 
of living.320 
 
Abraham continues by questioning a cornerstone of India’s foreign policy up until 1998, 
which is the bilateralist approach to the Kashmir issue and its rejection of any third party 
involvement: “[t]he facts are Pakistan’s vulnerability in economic and military terms and 
the unpredictability of India’s intentions. The assumption is that international engagement 
in South Asia will reduce any military threat and produce political openings in Kashmir.”321 
 
Finally, Abraham notes the hypocrisy behind India’s offer of a no-first-use agreement to 
Pakistan by mentioning India’s rejection of similar offers by China: 
 
(T)he offer of a no-first-use agreement is inappropriate for the new situation in 
South Asia. China made a no-first-use declaration after its first nuclear test in 1964 
and has repeated it several times since. Having proved, by citing China as 
justification for Pokhran-II, how little confidence such declarations create, New 
Delhi cannot expect Islamabad to be enthused.322 
 
Unfortunately, Abraham asks uncomfortable questions but does not offer any substantive 
solutions. 
 
In the immediate aftermath of both countries’ nuclear testing, the anti-nuke movement 
almost disappeared from the public scene. The difficulties of the nuclear critics to create an 
awareness of the nuclear dangers among the euphorised public in the aftermath of the tests, 
is illustrated by V.R. Krishna Iyer’s 323. Iyer started by providing an imbalanced account of 
the origins of the nuclear curse:  
 
The Manhattan project was the beginning of a nuclear empire established by the 
U.S. The first bomb was an experiment on the coloured part of the globe – 
Hiroshima, (not a city in Germany which is white but in Japan which is yellow). 
Frankly, after the war de facto ended, the American military demons did not want to 
miss the satanic opportunity to know the quantum of destruction an atom bomb, in 
their hands, was capable of [sic.].324 
 
He continues by summarising India’s record of responsive, anti-nuclear international 
policy, which, in his view, had been disrupted by the tests: 
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By conducting nuclear tests Indian scientists may have become great but the nuclear 
bomb raises issues of the humanitarian obligation of science in the shape of nuclear 
disarmament as against global cannibalism. The radioactivity in Pokhran and other 
consequences, when sequential steps are taken, violate the compassionate 
quintessence of cultural Bharat.  
All nuclear powers have, together in a large conspiracy, brought the world to the 
brink of a catastrophe while paying lip service.325 
 
His solution to India’s self-inflicted dilemma was as overloaded with moralism as it was 
trivial.  According to Iyer, “[w]e must have the courage and vision to uphold humanity in 
its solidarity. Make Indians united, contented, socialistic, and bound together in one 
fraternity by using all its resources, not to kill, but to promote life and abolish 
inequalities.”326 
 
Segments of India’s political class, scientific community, and strategic opinion leaders 
found the high degree of indigenous technology in India’s nuclear weapons systems to be a 
major source of national pride. This is compared especially to Pakistan’s ‘imported bomb.’ 
The value of India’s indigenous course was therefore mainly symbolic. The strategic 
balance between the two rivals began to change, however, as Pakistan’s nuclear equalizer 
compensated for much of its conventional inferiority. The fact that Pakistan was now able 
to threaten India’s heartland, and above all its power centres Delhi and Mumbai, posed a 
major dilemma for India’s strategic elite and required a fundamental rethinking of its 
strategic postures. 
 
While the causes of India’s nuclear build up may have been related mainly to the Chinese 
threat, its consequences were felt most severely in India’s relationship to Pakistan. The 
relative analytic importance of Pakistan and the strategically less significant role of China 
are explained by the two-dimensionality determinants of the strategic relationship between 
two states, consisting not only of the relative power capabilities but also of the respective 
state’s intentions. China surely has the capabilities to pose a nuclear threat to India, but it 
lacks substantial conflicting interests which would substantiate threatening intentions. 
Pakistan’s intentions, however, are clearly defined against India, giving its communicated 
deterrent threat a high degree of credibility despite doubts among some sections of India’s 
enclave about the effectiveness of its nuclear arsenal. These strategic circumstances were 
brought to the attention of India’s strategic elite during the Kargil conflict in spring 1999, 
less than one year after the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan.  
 
9.3.2. From Pokhran to Kargil 
 
The incident in Kargil in 1999 marked a turning point in the strategic appreciation of 
nuclear weapons among India’s elite, abruptly changing the general disposition of nuclear 
reporting within India’s media. Subsequently, several more balanced assessments of the 
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strategic and economic costs and benefits of India’s nuclear arsenal were published.327 The 
effect of nuclear weapons on the Kashmir conflict was evaluated more critically than it had 
been prior to Kargil: 
 
Contrary to India’s expectations that the testing of nuclear weapons by the two 
countries would result in stability, the ground situation shows otherwise. 
After testing its nuclear weapons, Pakistan … inferred that its nuclear arsenal would 
now be enough to deter India from taking military action against it using its 
conventional forces. Consequently, it concluded that acquisition of nuclear weapons 
had given it more room to expand the scope of covert war in Jammu and 
Kashmir.328 
 
Even those authors who were generally supportive of India’s nuclear policy no longer 
limited their analysis to complaisant commentary but instead engaged in an open debate on 
the pros and cons. In his assessment of Indo-Pakistani nuclear relations after Kargil, Arun 
Kumar Banerji counters some of the mainstream views on the benefits of nuclear weapons 
for India by stating that “[c]ontrary to conventional wisdom, the possession of nuclear 
power by India and Pakistan will not lead to the prevention of proxy war; rather such wars 
may increase, with the advantage of the nuclear ‘umbrella.’”329 He generally criticises the 
lukewarm justification for the testing given by the Indian government by saying that “[i]t 
was argued by the government, after the Pokhran tests, that these were necessary for India’s 
‘national security,’ though no convincing explanation was given about any sudden change 
in India’s security environment that made the nuclear tests necessary.”330 He then 
cautiously indicated what Subrahmanyam and others were so eagerly denying in the 
immediate aftermath of the tests: by testing first, India was the main driving force behind 
the regional nuclear arms race. In his words, “India’s decision to go for nuclear tests 
triggered Pakistan’s decision to go for similar tests, thereby initiating the possibility of a 
nuclear arms race in the region which, if not checked, will be ruinous for the economics of 
both the states. India’s post-Pokhran diplomacy contributed to the increase in tensions in 
the region.”331 Since the tests, as Banerji argues, the nuclear policy of the Indian 
government had gradually become much more responsive and mature. Despite the 
developments in Kargil, he retained a positive appraisal of Vajpayee’s bus diplomacy and 
the Lahore declaration of February 1999. He further appreciated the positive turn in Indo-
U.S. relations in the course of the eight rounds of the Talbot-Singh dialogue, and the 
general rapprochement in Indo-Chinese relations, which had reached bottom when 
Vajpayee’s letter to Clinton was leaked to the press in mid-1998.  This letter claimed that 
the Chinese threat was the main reason for India’s testing. 
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Banerji’s assessment clearly illustrates the strategic elite’s efforts since mid-1999 to 
emancipate themselves from the government’s nuclear policy. While most members of 
India’s strategic community gave unqualified support to the government’s nuclear policy 
when the wave of patriotism swept through the country in the immediate aftermath of the 
tests in 1998, this unconditional loyalty, which was euphemistically referred to as ‘national 
consensus’ by the elite themselves, ended with the Kargil conflict in June 1999.  
 
9.3.3. The Period of Consolidation 
 
After Kargil, a whole string of analyses from Pakistani or international authors were 
published,332 which caused a broadening of the domestic debate among the traditionally 
inward looking strategic community.  
The traditionalists among the bomb lobby nevertheless adhered to their views that were 
largely isolated from any input from the internationalised debate. One of their leading 
figures, M.R. Srinivasan,333 former chairman of the AEC and member of the National 
Security Advisory Board, expressed his views in August 2001 and maintained the 
fundamental dogma of India’s idiosyncratic discourse. He explains why the nuclear rivalry 
between India and Pakistan was an invention of the ‘Western’ media: 
 
For about 50 years, the Western media has managed to convey the impression of an 
equivalence between India and Pakistan in spite of the big difference in size, 
population and economic strength... . Now the Western media is up to its old tricks 
referring to India and Pakistan as the South Asian nuclear rivals. Simply because 
Pakistan conducted six tests at Chagai in May 1998, there is certainly no parity in 
nuclear capabilities between Pakistan and India.334 
 
In Srinivasan’s view, India’s superiority in the nuclear realm existed not only because of its 
larger number of weapons and its superior infrastructure, but also because of its ability to 
survive a nuclear strike due to its larger size, which is why it would surely “come out the 
winner (sic.).”335 According to Srinivasan, the blame for the military dictatorship in 
Pakistan as well as for the persistency of the Kashmir conflict rested on America.  He 
explains this with the following:  
 
The American leaders during the last five decades have actually encouraged military 
dictatorships all over the world. They find it easier to deal with dictators than the 
raucous politicians who have to satisfy the expectations of diverse constituencies 
and win elections in democratic states. … . The 50 years of U.S. handling of global 
disputes has virtually frozen nearly all of them and carries them over to the present. 
                                                 
332 Among these: Krepon, Michael: “Nuclear Risk Reduction.” In: The Hindu, June 30th 2001; Main, Zia / 
A.H.Nayyar, Sandeep Pandey / M.V. Ramana: “What they can agree on.” In: The Hindu, July 10th 2001; and a 
review article on Mian, Zia, Smitu Kothari: “Out of the Nuclear Shadow.” In: The Hindu, 19th August 2001. 
333 Srinivasan, M.R.: “Indo-Pak nuclear asymmetry.” In: The Hindu, August 1st 2001. 
334 ibid. 
335 ibid. 
 197
It is arguable that some of the disputes such as the one between the two Koreas, that 
between Taiwan and China and that between India and Pakistan would have reached 
some resolution if external interventions had not taken place.336 
 
Besides the inconsistency of these two arguments (in the Korean dispute and the Taiwan 
issue, the US supported the democracies against their autocratic rivals), these remarks 
reflect the previously discussed metaphoric concept of ‘the West,’ or, for that matter: 
‘America.’ Srinivasan finally illustrates the great superiority of India’s nuclear 
achievements vis-à-vis Pakistan and China by looking at the civilian nuclear power sector. 
According to Srinivasan, China had built so far only one power reactor indigenously and 
imported two others from France. Pakistan had acquired one reactor from Canada and one 
from China, while India was operating fourteen reactors, four imported and ten 
indigenously built: “The Indian Government and even the Department of Atomic Energy 
have unfortunately not been very enthusiastic is (sic.) stressing the great progress made by 
India in nuclear power technology on a self-reliant basis.”337  This assessment appears 
problematic in three ways.  To begin with, it is factually unsustainable.338 Secondly, it is 
inconsistent as it first attempts to describe China’s nuclear installations as imported, then 
states that Pakistan’s installations were equally imported from China. Thirdly, there is no 
contextual link between the main theme of the article, which is Indo-Pakistani nuclear 
relations and the civilian nuclear power programme. 
 
While the description of the Indo-Pakistani nuclear relationship shows all elements of the 
idiosyncratic world view – including generalisations such as ‘Western’ maliciousness, 
Indian moral and cultural exceptionalism, Pakistan’s technological inferiority – the main 
theme of the second part of his assessment reflects a view that is traditionally adopted by 
India’s community of nuclear scientists. A crucial element of this view is the myth of 
India’s (civilian) nuclear achievements as symbols of national pride and the genius of its 
people. This theme, which is labelled by Itty Abraham as the ‘myth of modernity,’339 
dominated India’s nuclear discourse in the initial phase of its nuclear programme during 
much of the 1950s and 1960s. In 2001, however, it ha largely disappeared from the debate. 
It was weakened by the devastating cost-performance ratio of the civilian nuclear 
programme which swallowed enormous funds while contributing only 3.7% of India’s 
power consumption.340 Given these facts, Srinivasan’s adherence to this antiquated myth 
appeared anachronistic. In fact, the nuclear myth narrative gradually disappeared during 
India’s nuclear consolidation in the first years of the new millennium. 
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9.3.4. The Stability-Instability Paradox 
 
In 2002, two additional incidents significantly altered the Indo-Pakistani nuclear 
relationship. First, in the course of mounting tensions along the Kashmir LoC in spring 
2002, General Musharraf threatened publicly to conduct a nuclear first strike in case Indian 
troops would cross it. The second occurrence was the publication of an alarming US study 
on the consequences of a nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan, which would 
presumably cost twelve million lives in both countries.341 So far, the scenario of a nuclear 
holocaust was hardly ever seriously discussed in India’s media; a phenomenon which is 
referred to by Robert Jervis as the ‘underweighting of the probability of failure’ typically 
arises in morally driven debates on a state’s arming decisions.342 
 
The lack of consciousness about the consequences of a nuclear exchange among India’s 
public was addressed by Shekhar Gupta in an Indian Express article in June 2002: 
 
[H]ow come there is so little fear over a nuclear war in the subcontinent? Are the 
people of India and Pakistan trapped in self-denial? The answer, for now, was 
simple. It isn’t just denial that makes our people so nonchalant. It is a more 
dangerous cocktail of denial, anger and ignorance laced with a selective 
understanding of a bitter history.343 
 
The U.S. report triggered a broad debate on the nuclear risks among India’s elite, in which 
four major different views emerged. First, several commentators decried the leaders’ 
ignorance towards the dangers of nuclear war and the consequences such a war would have 
for the civilian population. In the second approach, some opinion leaders downplayed the 
dreadful consequences of a nuclear exchange while maintaining the notion that a nuclear 
war could be won by India.  The third group comprises those strategists who acknowledge 
the dreadful consequences but maintain the position that the risks of nuclear war were 
minimal due to the existing deterrence stability. Finally, a relative majority among India’s 
strategic elite acknowledged the risks as well as the consequences of a nuclear war but put 
the blame on Pakistan. 
 
On the ignorance of the political leadership in India and Pakistan towards the risks of a 
nuclear war, P.R. Chari states: 
 
[I]rresponsible persons occupying high office in India and Pakistan have been 
strident that a conventional war can be fought and won in South Asia; that it could 
escalate to a nuclear conflict has been dismissed as showing the pusillanimity of the 
faint-hearted and the flawed logic of the weak-headed. Faith, instead, has been 
placed in the maturity of the two leaderships and their doctrinal belief that nuclear 
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weapons are designed not for use but for deterring nuclear attack; hence limited 
non-nuclear wars can be contemplated.344 
 
The second category comprised mainly members of India’s political leadership, among 
them most prominently India’s will-be President A.P.J. Abdul Kalam. In response to 
Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf’s statement on a possible first use of nuclear weapons, 
Kalam affirmed India’s posture of no-first-use, as well as his confidence in the stability of 
deterrence given the superiority of India’s nuclear capabilities: 
 
Pointing out that India’s nuclear policy continued to be ‘no first use’, the father of 
the country’s guided missile technology [A.P.J. Abdul Kalam] said such a policy 
stemmed from ‘confidence’. India could adhere to such a policy because of its 
confidence it could reply four-times stronger if nuclear weapons were ever used 
against it by Pakistan.345 
 
Inherent to Kalam’s view is the belief in the usability of nuclear weapons and the feasibility 
of winning a nuclear war.  
 
The third approach of downplaying the risks of a nuclear escalation is best illustrated by the 
Indian Express article from Sumit Ganguly. He repudiated the term ‘ignorance’ when 
referring to the leaders’ position and instead favoured to call it ‘equanimity’ given the 
extremely low risk of nuclear confrontation. His view of the ‘doomsday reporting’ as a 
mischievous invention of ‘the West’, or for that matter, America, was widely shared among 
the mainstream strategic elite in India in 2002. According to Ganguly: 
 
Political leaders on both sides have exacerbated tensions with saber-rattling public 
statements. The doomsday reporting that has predominated in the US news media 
and the overblown rhetoric of US policymakers, however, would have us believe 
that decision makers in New Delhi, India, and Islamabad, Pakistan, do not 
understand the strategic significance or the terrifying properties of nuclear weapons 
or the ruinous consequences of even a limited nuclear war. Rest reassured: They do 
understand... . 
If Indian and Pakistani leaders meant to use their nuclear weapons, they would have 
built shelter for their critical decision makers and formulated elaborate plans for 
post-attack recovery. 
There is no evidence that either side has so prepared. The lack of panic on the 
streets and in the government buildings of Islamabad and New Delhi, cited with 
such disdain by Western reporters, is a sign not of naivety but of equanimity. … . 
Nonetheless, the possibility of nuclear war in the region remains exceedingly small. 
The energy and rhetoric that the news media and policy makers are devoting to 
conjuring doomsday scenarios would be better spent addressing the root causes of 
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the current crisis: Pakistani support for terrorism in Kashmir and, underlying it all, 
the legitimate grievances of the Kashmiri people.346 
 
The logic of Ganguly’s main argument is not convincing, as he deduced the modest risks of 
nuclear escalation from the fact that the leaders did not prepare for it. This logic does not at 
all weaken those ‘doomsday reports’ which described the leaders’ ignorance as one of the 
most disturbing sources of the heightened nuclear dangers.  
 
The fourth category of assessments – acknowledging the dangers of nuclear war and 
blaming Pakistan for the critical situation – included the alarming reactions to President 
Musharraf’s threat to use nuclear weapons if regular Indian troops cross the LoC in 
Kashmir. 
 
Despite the fact that there was nothing new in Musharraf’s statement, as Pakistan’s 
strategists always considered the first-use option as crucial to its nuclear doctrine, 
Musharraf’s emphatic rhetoric had the effect of a wake-up call for the whole spectrum of 
India’s elite. 
Balakrishnan Rajagopal attempted to place the rhetoric escalation between India and 
Pakistan into a broader, global framework: 
 
Ours has become the age of threats. India threatens Pakistan with a ‘limited war’ 
and a complete nuclear annihilation if it uses nuclear weapons first. Pakistan openly 
threatens India with a ‘first strike’ nuclear option if it as much as moves its forces 
one inch across the Line of Control... . The United States President, George Bush, 
the originator of all threats, threatens the entire world – ‘if you are not with us, you 
are against us’ – and specific countries and groups through his ‘axis of evil’ 
framework. And terrorists threaten innocents and their governments around the 
world. Threats have then become a routine way of conducting international 
affairs.347 
 
Rajagopal’s subsequent deliberations about the illegality of nuclear threatening according 
to international law are obviously a helpless objection which was lacking much practical 
relevance in 2002.  
 
Several opinion articles challenged two of the central beliefs of the Indian nuclear policy 
makers about the effects of nuclear weapons in Indo-Pakistani strategic relations.  First, 
there is a belief that India’s superior nuclear capabilities would surely deter a Pakistani first 
strike, and second, there is also the perception that the introduction of nuclear weapons 
would keep the conflict in Kashmir in check, preventing its escalation into a major war.  
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Many analysts urge the Indian government not to take the deterrence effects of India’s 
nuclear capabilities for granted, and instead take Pakistan’s first use threat seriously. Their 
view holds the following:  
 
[E]ven if a second strike is certain, it does not follow that Pakistan would 
necessarily refrain from a first strike. It would be naïve to expect nuclear decisions 
in a war situation to be based on a rational assessment of the consequences. Further, 
suicide is not incompatible with rationality.348 
 
With the Indian no-first use doctrine in place, “Pakistan … could be the only introducer of 
nuclear arms into an Indo-Pak conflict.”349 Manpreet Sethi distinguishes two possible 
scenarios through which the conflict could become nuclear. In her view: 
 
[T]here could possibly be two scenarios in which the Pakistani leadership – 
political, military or whoever else has control over the nuclear trigger – could resort 
to nuclear use: 
a) In desperation, if the conventional military might of India appears to totally 
overwhelm Pakistan as to put its survival as a national entity in danger. 
b) In despair, if the Pakistani leadership finds itself in such a hopeless situation, 
domestically and internationally, that it finds greater sense in self-annihilation than 
life after war.350 
 
Sethi’s further deliberations foreshadow a change in the strategists’ general understanding 
of how to best deal with the Pakistani threat. While the policy of containment and 
predominance have dominated India’s strategic thinking since independence, more 
strategists have begun to contemplate the dangers that a destabilised and harried Pakistan 
would pose for India’s security. In 2002, however, this process of rethinking was still in its 
fledgling stages, and yet only very few voices went as far as to suggest a policy change 
towards an active assistance to stabilise Pakistan’s state structures. 
 
In the first years of the new millennium, those who saw Pakistan as the evil empire still 
dominate India’s mainstream strategic thinking. Among them, two different interpretations 
of Musharraf’s threat could be distinguished: the first applied the expression ‘blackmail’ to 
express the ruthlessness of Pakistan’s action, while the other termed it a ‘bluff’ to express 
its triviality with regard to India’s superior capabilities. 
Shekar Gupta’s view reflects the ‘blackmail’ line of thinking. In his view, “(t)he past six 
months have seen a decisive unravelling of Pakistan’s strategy of nuclear blackmail. I will 
bleed you through a thousand cuts and, if you hit back, I shall nuke you. Then you may 
nuke me back in return, but I’m so mad I don’t care.”351 These remarks describe, although 
in quite demagogic and tendentious words, what is referred to in IR theory as the stability-
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instability paradox.352 Noteworthy in Gupta’s further deliberations is the complaisance 
towards American involvement, which, in his interpretation, helped to bring the irrational 
Pakistani leadership to terms. This view reflects yet another paradigm shift in India’s 
mainstream strategic thought towards a more balanced assessment of outside involvement 
beyond the stereotyped approach expressed in the mainstream idea of imperialist objectives 
by ‘the West.’ 
 
In a rather hawkish approach to counter Pakistani nuclear ‘blackmail,’ Premvir Das 
suggested in November 2002 increasing India’s military superiority, and as a second 
option, go to war. In his view: 
 
[T]o argue that war is not an option makes even less sense. To make or threaten war 
is one of the instruments of power of a nation state and to rule it out as an option is 
both unwise and irrational. The business of statecraft is to make this instrument 
usable, if necessary. If war was an option in 1971, and let us not confuse ourselves 
by believing that it came about in response to Pakistan’s pre-emptive air strikes, 
then it must be available as an option now.353 
 
Das’ claim that wars and the threat of wars were a legitimate instrument of power of a 
nation state is concordant with conservative IR theories. Deterrence theory even suggests 
that the credible threat of using nuclear weapons is integral part of a stable nuclear 
deterrence relationship. His argument is problematic, however, as he obviously asserts the 
right of fighting wars or threatening with war only to India but not to Pakistan. In his view, 
Musharraf’s first use threat was not a legitimate ‘instrument of power of a nation state’ but 
a condemnable act of blackmail by an irresponsible leader. This attitude reflects the 
inherent double-standard thinking by the hawkish section of India’s strategic elite, which 
creates a fundamental distinction between the ranks of Pakistan and India within the 
international system. This distinction could be observed in the hawks’ position on several 
further issues, most obviously within the debates on the general reliability of no first-use 
options, as well as the NPT and CTBT debates. 
 
In his account on Pakistan’s alleged attempt of blackmail, C. Raja Mohan suggested the 
build-up of missile defences as a simple solution to India’s dilemma. According to Mohan:  
 
Gen. Musharraf’s refusal to end cross-border terrorism and his threat to use nuclear 
weapons in the very first stages of a military conflict should make the early 
deployment of missile defences an urgent national priority for India. 
The central lesson from Gen. Musharraf’s nuclear blackmail is simple. Without 
neutralising Pakistan’s nuclear calculus based on the first use of nuclear weapons, 
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New Delhi will not be able to bring effective military pressure on Islamabad to give 
up cross-border terrorism.354 
 
The logic behind Mohan’s suggestion to build up a missile defence as the potentially best 
solution to India’s security concerns follows the same logic as the call for nuclear weapons 
by India’s strategic community throughout the 1980s and 1990s. The appealing nature of 
the missile defence stems from two myths: the myth of invulnerability and the myth of 
modernity. Precedent to this idea is the launching of the American NMD programme, 
which was the expression of the American neo-conservatives’ pursuit of their dream of 
invulnerability.  This programme had replaced nuclear weapons as the symbolic epitome of 
the world’s ultimate and most modern weapon. In Mohan’s view, “every argument that has 
been used by Washington to justify its missile defence project applies with greater urgency 
to New Delhi.”355 Despite its appealing character, Mohan’s vision lacked much 
practicability. First of all, he does not make any distinction between the missile defence 
system envisaged for India on the basis of the Israeli Arrow system and the technically 
more sophisticated and financially more costly American NMD system. Second, he ignores 
the technical limitations that the introduction of such a system would face due to the 
geographic proximity, the short warning times, etc. Third, he overlooks strategic 
difficulties, such as pre-emptive strike imperatives and nuclear arms race incentives.  
 
At first sight, Mohan’s rejection of American regional involvement appears to be in line 
with the long held mainstream position of India’s strategic thinkers. A closer look, 
however, reveals a crucial alteration to the traditionally anti-American narrative: Mohan 
does not reject American involvement as a matter of principle on the grounds of anti-
imperialism and national dignity. Rather, he accepts the general legitimacy of the American 
global war on terrorism as well as its quest for a national missile defence system but asserts 
its failure in the case of Pakistan. According to Mohan, India was confronted with similar 
terrorist threats as the US and could therefore expect American sympathy and assistance. In 
his view, “[t]he U.S. department, which has been unable to get Gen. Musharraf to deliver 
on his promises to end cross-border terrorism, has little credibility in opposing the transfer 
of missile defence technologies to India.”356 
Das’ position on America's regional involvement is similar but worded in a much more 
radical manner: 
 
First, America must disengage from our neighbourhood and turn its attention 
elsewhere in its fight against terrorism. This alone can give us the political space for 
exercising a military option. Second, we must create a decisively stronger military 
capability versus the adversary.357 
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While the hawks among India’s strategists were still in the process of adjusting their world 
view to the new reality of nuclear threats, or, at times, adjusting their interpretation of the 
new reality to their world view, a majority of India’s strategists engaged in an intensive 
debate on how to stabilise Indo-Pakistani strategic interaction under the new conditions.  
 
The strategists’ search for solutions is illustrated by an article in The Hindu in July 2002. 
The article was written by V.R. Raghavan, then director of the Delhi Policy Group and a 
retired Lt General and India's director general of military operations.358 
Raghavan emphasises the significance of nuclear weapons in the Indo-Pakistani conflict: 
 
Nuclear weapons remained the central determining factor in the standoff between 
India and Pakistan. The deterrence effect of nuclear weapons has played a major 
part in both the creation and management of the crisis being played out between the 
two states. Public focus has remained on the steps taken by the two countries and 
the role played by the United States. The reality is that nuclear weapons with India 
and Pakistan determined the parameters of both the crisis and its containment. 
Nuclear deterrence was manipulated by all three countries to serve their individual 
needs.359 
 
He increasingly draws up the particular interests the key players, India, Pakistan and the 
United States, had in the standoff. While maintaining that deterrence played a crucial role 
in the conflict, he nevertheless refrains from clearly stating who deterred whom and who 
benefited more from the deterrence relationship. Instead, he reflects upon the different 
opinions on this question among India’s strategic decision makers and analysts.  
 
There are divergent voices in India about who deterred whom. The Prime Minister 
said war was imminent at a point of time, and that his Government was prepared for 
a nuclear war, if it were to come about. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam has stated that without 
nuclear weapons on the scene, war would have been a certainty. The former Army 
chief, V.P. Malik, disagreed and asserted that nuclear weapons neither eliminated 
nor reduced the risk of outbreak of hostilities. Some of India’s strategic analysts are 
divided between two divergent positions. One group advocates getting out of the 
defensive trench mentality and calling the Pakistani nuclear bluff by going on the 
military offensive. Others point out that nuclear war cannot be a bilateral affair and 
would impact on other countries, who in turn will insist on a role in the standoff.360 
 
In contrast to most other analysts, Raghavan did not a priori commit himself to one of the 
three interpretations of Pakistan’s policy – bluff, blackmail, or legitimate deterrence – but 
instead contemplates all three.  He finally considers the ‘bluff-version as the most plausible: 
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Whether India and Pakistan bluffed or blackmailed or deterred each other, and did 
the same to major powers, would be speculated upon for a long while. This question 
is reinforced by India and Pakistan recently stepping back from their earlier 
positions. There are claims being put forward that war was never part of the plan in 
New Delhi. In Pakistan it is claimed that its military capability alone was adequate 
to deter India from going to war. After manipulating nuclear deterrence to raise 
fears of a nuclear exchange to gain a relative advantage, both sides have portrayed 
themselves as rational nuclear states.361 
 
Finally, Raghavan raises concerns about the damaging effects of the unabashed 
‘manipulation’ of the nuclear issue in Indo-Pakistani interaction to India’s international 
reputation and credibility. According to his view: 
 
Attempts by India and Pakistan to repeatedly work up crises with nuclear 
underpinnings will lead to a range of adverse spin-offs. India can ill afford to be 
seen as unpredictable or irrational in nuclear matters. Its claims to being a 
stabilising influence in and outside the South Asian region will come under doubt. 
Its ability to manage its strategic interests in cooperation with other major powers 
will be questioned.362 
 
In sum, Raghavan’s analysis illustrates a general trend towards more careful and balanced 
reporting and commenting on the nuclear issue. He deliberately avoids the ‘us-against-
them’ approach, depicting India’s relationship to Pakistan and the United States, but instead 
emphasises the distance between him as the observer and India’s political actors involved. 
His account of the motives, interests, and gains of the three states was a priori 
uncommitted. Merely his concluding remarks on India’s relations with ‘other major 
powers’ illustrates the traditional distinction by India’s strategists between India as member 
of the major powers’ club and Pakistan as pariah state. 
 
Nonetheless, the application of double standards remained inherent to most assessments of 
the 2002 crisis between India and Pakistan, particularly within the debate on the first-use 
option and the alleged intentions of the Pakistani leadership. According to Amit Baruah: 
 
Indian perception of Pakistan’s nuclear intention must err on the side of ‘use’ – not 
that of ‘non-use.’ The steadfast refusal of the Pakistanis to give a commitment of 
‘no first-use’ says enough about Islamabad’s ‘intentions’. … . Pakistan was 
recognised the world over as the aggressor, but it took some time for this to happen. 
Islamabad will not have that much ‘time’ to respond to any Indian provocation. 
Given the manufactured paranoia about India in Pakistan, any little action from New 
Delhi will be construed as a big threat by the ‘faujis’ sitting in Rawalpindi. Those 
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responsible for building up India as the bugbear in Pakistan are the very persons 
responsible for upholding Pakistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.363 
 
Before the nuclear tests of 1998, there had been unanimity among India’s mainstream 
strategists that China’s no-first use declaration could not be trusted and India should 
therefore build up its own full-fledged arsenal. Once India had declared itself a nuclear 
weapon state, it proposed itself a no-first-use agreement to Pakistan. Pakistan’s rejection of 
joining India’s no-first-use declaration was condemned by the same strategists as the 
outcome of a ‘manufactured paranoia’ towards India, which ‘says enough about 
Islamabad’s intentions.’  
 
After the tests, most of India’s elite believed that the fundamentally different status of India 
and Pakistan within the international system, which was widely seen as an axiomatic fact, 
had been internationally acknowledged. American criticism of General Musharraf’s threat 
of nuclear first use was commented on in India’s media with great ease. This appears ironic 
considering the fact that the United States as the world’s leading power insists on 
maintaining the nuclear first-use option. Most analysts expressed their satisfaction about the 
assumed increasing awareness of the international audience about Pakistan’s malicious 
intentions and India’s legitimate security concerns. This satisfaction was illustrated in an 
article in The Hindu in June 2002, in which the author claims the following: 
 
The scenario of a nuclear war between Pakistan and India has come to impinge on 
the conscience of the global community in the context of a stark contrast between 
the nuclear security doctrines of these two estranged neighbours. While India has 
consistently stated that it will not be the first to use nuclear weapons against any 
country, Pakistan does not subscribe to a similar principle. It is this notion of 
ambiguity about Pakistan’s intentions which serves as grist to the doomsday mills 
on the international stage. Now, although Pakistan is not alone among the states 
possessing nuclear weapons in refusing to propound a ‘no-first-use’ policy, what 
seems to have set Islamabad apart is its tendency to justify such an attitude by citing 
its strategic vulnerability to a big neighbour like India.364 
 
The continued application of double standards stemmed from the dual significance of 
nuclear weapons as strategic devices as well as symbols of international prestige and 
standing. While the considerable impact of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons for both countries’ 
strategic relationship is widely accepted by India’s strategic thinkers, a nuclear Pakistan 
was still considered a major obstacle for India’s efforts to elevate its international status to 
the rank of a major power. 
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9.3.5. Pre-Emptive Strike Imperatives 
 
The British-American invasion of Iraq in spring 2003 caused some repercussions among 
India’s political leaders and its foreign policy elite. The debate was triggered by India’s 
External Affairs Minister Yaswant Sinha, who declared that India had “a much better case 
to go for pre-emptive action against Pakistan than the US has in Iraq.”365 His comment was 
followed by then Deputy Prime Minister L.K. Advani, who declared India’s right to attack 
Pakistan pre-emptively by quoting the Iraqi precedent. The U.S. government reacted 
promptly by rejecting India’s claims and negated any existing parallels between the two 
cases. 
 
The idea of considering America’s action against Iraq as precedent for potential action 
against Pakistan was dismissed by a majority of India’s strategic elite. As J.N. Dixit states: 
 
A US attack on Iraq cannot be a model for India primarily because of the 
asymmetry in the military equations between the Iraq and the US. … . Secondly, 
Saddam Hussein was generally considered a pernicious influence by countries of the 
region as well as by the important powers. Thirdly, though there was no consensus 
on the manner in which the military operations were launched by the US against 
Iraq, there was general agreement that Saddam’s regime should be removed. 
Fourthly, no country or group of countries has the capacity to prevent the US from 
carrying out its decisions on the ground. … . Lastly, the Bush administration had the 
will and resources to implement its decision regardless of objections from domestic 
or world opinion. The Indian predicament is exactly the opposite of all that… .366 
 
J.N. Dixit challenges several myths which guided how politicians raised this issue, 
including the overwhelming superiority in power capabilities necessary to conduct a pre-
emptive strike, the consensus among the world community in regard to the Pakistani threat, 
and above all, India’s autonomy from international objections.  
 
Yet, India’s strategic elite repudiated the immediate American objection in their traditional 
anti-imperialist response. In contrast to similar previous instances, particularly during the 
non-proliferation debates of the 1990s, anti-American or anti-imperialist emotions did not 
run high within this scenario. Hussain Haqqani criticises the US policy by saying the 
following:  
 
[A]s the State Department response to Sinha’s first statement affirms, the U.S. 
considers the doctrine of pre-emption exclusively to its status as a global 
hyperpower. India can try to please its own people or embarrass Pakistan in that 
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segment of the global media that has time to pay attention to it. But it cannot 
realistically expect international support for a pre-emptive strike against Pakistan.367 
 
Even those who favoured a strong hand against Pakistan and generally supported pre-
emptive measures in this conflict still reject the politician’s notion of quoting the Iraqi 
precedent. According to Dixit, “[i]f India deems it necessary to take pre-emptive action, it 
need not be linked to the US operations in Iraq. It should be an autonomous exercise based 
on the ground realities and governed by careful and measured calculations.”368 
 
Although the debate on the pre-emptive strike option was only indirectly related to the 
nuclear issue, it nevertheless illustrated a general change within India’s strategic policy 
making with major implications for the country’s nuclear course. The major strategic policy 
decisions throughout the 1990s were backed by a highly emotionalised and lurid debate by 
the strategic community within the media, which in turn, was instrumentalised by the 
political leadership for partisan purposes. These dynamics were, however, no longer in 
place in 2003. Even the hawkish section of the strategists favouring a tough line against 
Pakistan was not willing to jump on the bandwagon. Without the strategists’ public 
backing, the issue soon lost its appeal to the political elite. Defence Minister George 
Fernandes, who had supported Sinha’s idea at first, reconsidered his view shortly thereafter.  
His actions were subsequently followed by most other members of the government.  
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10. The China Factor in India’s Strategic Thinking 
 
 
10.1. The Emergence of Sino-Indian Strategic Relationship 
 
Throughout the 1950s, India’s foreign policy elite perceived Indo-Chinese relations as a 
natural partnership of two major Third World countries. Despite several unsolved frictions 
on the exact border demarcation and sympathetic feelings among Indian elites towards the 
Tibetian liberation movement, Jawaharlal Nehru followed a course of reconciliation with 
China, which came to be known as Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai. 
This phase of Indo-Chinese friendship ended in 1959, when the dispute over the territory of 
Aksai Chin emerged. In the same year, the bilateral relationship further deteriorated after a 
Tibetian uprising and the resulting Chinese repression caused the Dalai Lama and many 
thousand of his followers to flee and take refuge in India. China accused the Indian 
government of conspiring with the Tibetian movement. Despite these disturbances in 
bilateral relations in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the outbreak of the Indo-Chinese war in 
1962 caught Nehru as well as the greater part of India’s foreign policy elite completely 
unprepared. The course and outcome of the war revealed several shortcomings: First, the 
Indian armed forces were insufficiently prepared to defend the borders. This was 
particularly true for high altitude warfare in the Himalayas. Second, the military command 
proved to be ill-prepared, overstrained, and lacked a comprehensive strategy. Third, the 
political leadership was blamed by many among India’s strategic elite for pursuing a highly 
naive foreign and security policy while ignoring the realistic nature of international 
relations. Jawaharlal Nehru witnessed the ruin of his vision of a peaceful world order 
guided by factors other than military strength.  
 
Immediately after the war, the government launched an intense programme to strengthen 
India’s military capabilities. However, this effort did not include the nuclear programme, 
seen as a competitor of the conventional arms build-up, in the allocations for the limited 
defence budget. Nevertheless, the Sino-Indian war of 1962 had several indirect implications 
on India’s nuclear build-up. First of all, the monopoly of Nehruvian thought in Indian 
foreign and security policy discourse was broken, though truly differing opinions were still 
limited to a few strategic analysts, certain parts of the media, and opposition politicians. 
Secondly, the overall debate on security issues intensified. 
The close cooperation between China and Pakistan, which was confirmed in 1963, further 
increased India’s threat perception towards China and its feeling of being surrounded by a 
hostile neighbourhood. 
 
On October 16th, 1964, a nuclear dimension was added to Sino-Indian hostilities when 
China conducted its first nuclear test. The Chinese nuclear programme had been initiated in 
1955, and made rapid progress due to large-scale Soviet technology transfer, including a 
blueprint of a nuclear explosion device. In strategic terms, China’s newly developed 
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nuclear capabilities aimed at deterring its two major rivals: the USA, which had introduced 
nuclear weapons into its confrontation with China through an assistance pact with Taiwan, 
and the Soviet Union. India, on the other hand, played only a minor role in China’s 
strategic calculus. Nonetheless, China’s nuclear breakthrough alarmed India’s strategic 
community, which was still in a state of dismay after the humiliating debacle of 1962. In 
the eyes of many Indian strategic analysts, the only way to deter China from future military 
aggression or blackmail was to acquire nuclear weapons as well. The perception of the 
country’s strategic and technological inferiority vis-à-vis China further increased when 
China conducted its first test of an H-Bomb on May 9th, 1966.  
 
While the strategic implications of the Chinese nuclear tests on India’s security 
environment caused deep concern among strategic analysts, the broader public as well as 
most parts of the political class were occupied with its non-strategic implications. Prior to 
the Chinese tests, India’s political leadership and public considered its nuclear programme 
well ahead of that of China. With Soviet assistance, China had surpassed India within a 
short range of time. Additionally, the tremendous funds allocated by the Chinese 
government as well as the sacrifices borne by its people were only possible because of its 
authoritarian regime. Indian disappointment was further aggravated by the mainly positive 
reactions to the Chinese tests by other developing countries. Subsequently, China 
effectively played the nuclear card in order to gain international prestige and improve its 
status. 
 
In retrospect, the Chinese success in using its nuclear achievements for political ends made 
a much greater impression on the participants of the nuclear debate in India than its mere 
strategic implications. The use of nuclear devices in gaining international prestige and 
advantage was valued much more highly by India’s elite then during Nehruvian times. 
However, in contrast to the expectations of most Western analysts, the effect of the newly 
emerged Chinese nuclear threat on India’s security perception as well as on the Indian 
psyche was not strong enough for India to change its course and openly embark on a path 
towards nuclear weaponisation. 
 
The successive events of 1959, 1962, 1963, 1964, and 1966 had reversed Indo-Chinese 
relations from Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai to a bitter strategic rivalry. This deep-rooted dislike 
was slightly alleviated by two events in the early 1970s. In 1971, both the South Asian 
strategic landscape and the Asian balance of power fundamentally changed. The Indo-
Pakistani war of 1971 and the subsequent disintegration of Pakistan were perceived as a 
major victory for India as well as a great success for Indira Gandhi’s foreign policy. India 
emerged as the undisputed regional power in South Asia. Simultaneously, the Sino-US 
rapprochement and the concurrent signing of the Indo-Soviet friendship treaty altered the 
Asian balance of power system. In its strategic relationship to China, India was able to 
significantly improve its position, firstly by breaking the Sino-Pakistani axis in the east, and 
secondly by encircling China through a strategic alliance with the USSR in the north. India 
did not win the power game completely, however, as the USS Enterprise was dispatched 
into the Bay of Bengal at the height of the war. This move was perceived by India’s 
strategists, who had expected America to stand by the democratic India, as an open attempt 
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at blackmail. The fact that this event had such an impact on the psyche of India’s elite 
illustrates its almost naive misperception of the dynamics in international affairs. As in the 
1962 war, India’s elite reacted to the Enterprise incident with indignation and a deep sense 
of humiliation. 
 
Three years later, India tested its first nuclear device. The subsequent rhetorical exchange 
between India and China reveals the dilemma caused by the various symbolic meanings of 
the nuclear issue. India’s elite adopted the official position and emphatically stressed the 
peaceful intentions behind the explosion. In its official response, the Chinese government 
explicitly followed suit: “China responded to the Indian PNE with conscious aloofness, 
reporting the event without comment. Subsequently, Chinese officials suggested that the 
PNE had no military significance”369. India’s elite, in turn, perceived China’s reaction as an 
insult of its achievement. Overall, the test did not have much strategic implication for 
China, as India lacked the delivery systems to threaten Chinese targets. Furthermore, it 
largely failed to boost India’s international standing to the degree of China’s 1964 test. 
 
 
10.2. Elite Perception and the Chinese Threat 
 
10.2.1. Rajiv’s Policy of Rapprochement 
 
In late 1988, Rajiv Gandhi became the first Indian Prime Minister to visit Beijing since the 
war of 1962. The chances to end 26 years of hostility appeared to be good for several 
reasons: First, the Brasstacks crisis had directed the attention of India’s strategic thinkers 
almost exclusively to Pakistan; second, India’s military build-up along its Himalayan 
border to China had reversed the local balance of power to India’s favour, precluding a 
repetition of the 1962 defeat.  
The lack of interest in Indo-Chinese strategic relations among most policy makers and the 
public left the issue to a very small circle in India’s strategic community, as well as to the 
anti-Chinese section of the foreign policy elite. While the latter grossly overstated the 
Chinese nuclear threat (allegedly emerging from large scale Chinese missile deployments 
in Tibet), the former, most prominently K. Subrahmanyam, preferred to describe China as 
India’s future competitor for supremacy on the Asian continent.  
 
The strategists concerned with the Chinese threat considered the lack of conflicting national 
interests irrelevant. Following their Realist logic, a tangible motive to threaten India was 
unnecessary, the mere capability to do so was enough incentive for India to build-up a 
nuclear arsenal of its own. Interestingly enough, most of those analyses positing India’s 
nuclear build-up as a counter to China were published as a reaction to assessments by 
Western (read: American) strategists370 that negated any Indian strategic need for the bomb. 
Both sides, however, limited the scope of their assessment to their half of the truth. Any 
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balanced and realistic threat assessment would have had to acknowledge some basic 
realities: First, since the late 1980s, a repetition of the Sino-Indian war was no longer a 
realistic scenario. Due to its conventional build-up along the shared Himalayan border and 
major improvements in its high-altitude warfare capabilities, India was able to establish 
conventional superiority along the border. More notable than the Indian build-up was the 
fact that China continuously avoided balancing India’s efforts through proportional 
reinforcements. China’s restraint and its tacit acceptance of a modest imbalance was a clear 
signal to India’s policy makers.  
 
Secondly, neither the Chinese air force, nor the Chinese navy posed a severe threat to 
India’s security or territorial integrity. Any penetration of India’s air space by China’s 
limited and obsolescent fleet of nuclear capable strike aircraft could easily be intercepted 
by India’s air defence. Despite alarming reports on co-operation between the Chinese and 
Burmese navies in the Indian Ocean, China’s limited power projection capabilities did not 
pose a credible threat to India’s interests in the Indian Ocean. China had the capability, 
however, to target India with its nuclear missiles. This fact was the main argument for 
Subrahmanyam et. al. to call for India’s nuclearisation. 
 
The lack of a substantial conflict in national interests that would provide an incentive for 
China to target India is matched only by the weak strategic implications of the China-
argument , rather cast doubts about the sincerity of those emphasising it. If one accepts the 
Chinese nuclear threat as being acute, it would have been imperative for India to build-up 
delivery systems capable of reaching Chinese strategic targets in order to create a credible 
nuclear deterrence against the Chinese threat. Most of India’s strategic thinkers, however, 
were rather unconcerned with this strategic necessity in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The 
fact that most strategists suggested China by ‘going nuclear’ (where ‘going nuclear’ defined 
as assembling a nuclear device and declaring itself a nuclear weapons state) indicates the 
strategists’ preoccupation with status considerations, not with the acquisition of a credible 
nuclear deterrent. The debate on the Chinese nuclear threat remained largely restricted to 
academia and expert circles outside the mainstream. 
 
10.2.2. The Changing Image of China in the 1990s 
 
Between 1991 and 1996, the focus of China’s South Asia policy gradually shifted away 
from Pakistan towards India. The incentive for this change did not come from changes in 
the strategic balance of power, but rather from economic reforms India initiated in 1991 
that made its domestic marked attractive for Chinese goods and services. Beginning in 
1991, China adopted a much more restrictive stance on its missile exports to Pakistan. 
Further, China joined the NPT in 1992, thereby accepting its strict provisions on nuclear 
technology transfers. The same year, it principally agreed to (without signing) to the 
Missile Technology Control Regime. In 1993 and in 1996, it signed two treaties with India 
on the demarcation of its disputed border, ruling out military action. Finally, in 1996, on his 
trip to India and Pakistan, Chinese Prime Minister Jiang Zemin called on both sides to 
solve the Kashmir dispute on a bilateral basis. Though disguised beneath banal diplomatic 
rhetoric, both sides understood the message: While India had always insisted on a bilateral 
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solution of the conflict, Pakistan continuously attempted to internationalise it. Prior to 
Jiang’s visit in 1996, China adopted Pakistan’s position and demanded an international 
approach. In this context, the declaration of 1996 marked a fundamental paradigm shift in 
Chinese foreign policy.  
 
The nuclear discourse in India remained largely unaffected by these positive developments. 
A broader debate on China’s motives and moves was virtually nonexistent in the editorial 
and opinion sections of India’s dailies. In most nuclear related articles of the early 1990s, 
the Chinese nuclear threat was taken as an axiomatic fact unworthy of further scrutiny. The 
first recorded attempt to correct this shortcoming was done only in 1994, by A.G. 
Noorani371. Consequently, Noorani starts by lamenting the ignorance of India’s media and 
academia towards this issue:  
 
India’s stress on reckoning with China as a powerful nuclear-weapon State in any 
discussion on a nuclear-safe Asia is perfectly justified. But what is inexplicable is 
that it is only its index finger, pointing east, that is engaged. India has not asked 
China for a discussion on the subject. It has not sought to engage China in a 
meaningful exchange of views. That attitude is reflected also in the media and 
academia’s indifference to China’s views on disarmament.372 
 
The author subsequently outlines the Chinese policy in favourable words, emphasising the 
consistency of both countries’ (then held) positions on major issues like the desirability of a 
global and comprehensive test ban agreement -- “a pledge by all nuclear-weapon States not 
to use nuclear weapons at all“373 -- and the ultimate goal of creating a nuclear-weapon free 
world. 
Noorani ends by stating that “India could well endorse China’s stand, in so far as it accords 
with its own, and press for a dialogue on a nuclear-safe Asia without prejudice to its stand 
that this is essentially a global question and many other States are also involved, not least, 
Israel”374. 
 
Noorani’s analysis does fall short of giving a comprehensive overview of China’s strategic 
thinking. By focusing exclusively on China’s stance towards the Western nuclear weapons 
states as well as the international non-proliferation debate, he actually confirms what he 
initially criticises: The ignorance of India’s elite towards China as an independent actor in 
the nuclear arena. While the overall supremacy of the ‘India-against-Western 
discrimination’-theme is inherent to Noorani’s look at China, he nevertheless departs from 
the mainstream view with regard to China’s position within this framework. In his 
perception, China is not a part of the exclusive, discriminatory ‘nuclear club’, but instead 
on India’s side as a leading member of the Third World community. This revival of 
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traditional Nehruvian thoughts had not gained much popularity among India’s strategic 
elite since the 1962 war. 
 
In April 1995, a Chinese notion forwarded to the Geneva Conference of Disarmament 
triggered an alarmist newspaper analysis one week later by Brahma Chellaney375. The 
content of the Chinese notion was a specification of its no-first-use declaration of 1982. 
Therein, China unambiguously declared that “at no time and under no circumstances will 
China be the first to use nuclear weapons, and that it undertakes unconditionally not to use 
or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon countries and nuclear-free 
zones”376. The Chinese declaration had two major aims: Firstly, it aimed at avoiding the 
emergence of a nuclear arms race with other nuclear weapons states by declaring a no-first-
use policy; secondly, it aimed at avoiding nuclear proliferation among non-nuclear weapon 
states by giving them guarantees not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against 
them. Furthermore, the 1995 specification closed a loophole in China’s 1982 declaration by 
stating that those countries that acquired nuclear capabilities but were not officially 
recognised as nuclear-weapon states by NPT should not enjoy the security guarantees 
granted by China to non-nuclear weapon states. Brahma Chellaney quite rightly interpreted 
this statement as targeted against India. Many strategic policy makers and analysts in India, 
among them Brahma Chellaney himself, maintained that India had acquired nuclear 
capabilities at least by 1974, while at the same time expecting Chinese security guarantees 
as long as India was not officially recognised as nuclear weapon state. 
 
China issued the amended declaration in 1995 after it had become apparent to Chinese 
policy makers that India had taken the irreversible path towards a full-fledged nuclear 
arsenal. In the new declaration, it stated that the 1982 declaration “naturally applies to non-
nuclear-weapon states parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons or 
non-nuclear weapon states that have undertaken any comparable internationally binding 
commitments not to manufacture or acquire nuclear explosive devices”377. The 1995 
declaration left no room to manoeuvre for Indian proponents of nuclear ambiguity, as it 
gave India the choice of either committing itself to a binding moratorium of its nuclear 
programme, or losing its non-nuclear weapon status. The second part of the declaration, 
which stated that “comparable internationally binding commitments” (i.e. any other 
bilateral or multilateral agreement on nuclear non-proliferation) would also satisfy China’s 
terms, was an implicit acceptance of India’s rejection of the NPT on principles of non-
discrimination. This annex was ignored by Brahma Chellaney. 
 
The Chinese move was considered by Chellaney as an implicit threat against India:  
 
Behind the nuclear powers’ casual disregard of world opinion for legally binding 
assurances without caveats lies a subtle but important shift in China’s position -- a 
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shift that is of direct consequence for India. The change can be construed as an 
implicit nuclear threat against India.378 
 
He subsequently relativised his threat assessment by stating that “India could not be the 
target of a Chinese first strike but of a nuclear intimidation and blackmail”379. 
Additionally, he questions the importance of any Chinese declaration -- no matter how 
explicit, for India’s security policy: “The shift in the Chinese nuclear posture need not 
unnecessarily be viewed as a serious development because even earlier, when Beijing’s 
assurances were unconditional, India could not have relied on its unilateral, non-binding 
declaration”380. Although this downplaying of the relevance of Chinese declaratory 
diplomacy dampened the alarming tone of Chellaney’s prior stance, it was nevertheless in 
line with the traditionally sceptical position of India’s strategic elite on the reliability of 
international agreements or treaties.  
 
In sum, the Indo-Chinese rapprochement in the years from 1991 to 1996 had the opposite 
effect one might have expected. The prospect of friendly relations and cooperation with 
China added an element of urgency to the nuclear apologists’ demand for the bomb. 
Knowing that Chinese nuclear capabilities were the only strategic threat with which India 
could credibly justify its nuclear build-up, each Chinese step towards reconciliation implied 
the weakening their position. 
 
10.2.3. Redefining Sino-Indian Relations after the Tests 
 
In the aftermath of India’s nuclear testing in 1998, several members of the cabinet agreed to 
earlier statements by Defence Minister George Fernandes that named China’s as the main 
cause for India’s nuclear programme. China reacted with outrage to these statements. 
India’s newspaper commentators generally agreed to the government’s assessment of the 
Chinese threat, but considered such open declarations to be diplomatically clumsy. 
An account illustrative of the general disposition of India’s strategic analysts towards the 
issue was given by V.V. Paranjpe two weeks after the tests381. His account starts with the 
praise typical of the overwhelming majority of newspaper commentaries in the immediate 
aftermath of the tests:  
 
Pokhran ’98 was undoubtedly a great achievement for India and every Indian is 
proud of the Indian scientists who made it possible and look so simple, natural and 
easy. … . While the credit for the nuclear tests goes to the scientists, the credit for a 
bold decision goes to the BJP government.382 
 
                                                 
378 Chellaney, Brahma: op.cit.. In: Indian Express, April 15th 1995. 
379 ibid. 
380 ibid. 
381 Paranjpe, V.V.: “Fall-out of nuclear tests on Sino-Indian ties”. In: The Hindu, May 25th 1998. 
382 ibid. 
 216
Like most commentators at the time, Paranjpe was overwhelmed by pride. These emotions 
reflected the total identification of the observer with his subject: Paranjpe generally refers 
to ‘we’ and ‘us’ when assessing the government’s actions, calling the nuclear tests “our 
achievements”. 
 
Generally, commentary on the nuclear issue in the spring and summer of 1998 bore a 
resemblance to a football commentary, in which the national team scores against a 
seemingly unbeatable rival team. But while the goal scorer, i.e. the nuclear scientists, was 
heaped with praise (to continue with the football metaphor), some of the head coach’ 
decisions were criticised. According to Paranjpe,  
 
[t]he BJP publicity suffered from two blemishes: giving explanations and 
mentioning names. 
Explanations imply a sense of guilt and we need have none. As the advice goes: 
‘Don’t explain, don’t complain’. We owe no one an explanation, least of all to the 
powers in the ‘nuclear club’ -- they have done much worse and got away with it. It 
is our legitimate right to strengthen our security in every possible way.383 
 
As with nearly all supportive commentaries in the aftermath of India’s nuclear tests, 
Paranjpe does not give any analysis of how the tests strengthened India’s security, but 
prefers to leave the interrelation of nuclear testing and ‘strengthening our security’ as a 
given.  According to Paranjpe, the most severe mistake of the Indian government, had been 
the naming of China as India’s threat number one. Those members of government who 
named China were criticised as ‘rabble-rousers’: 
 
But once in the Government, Ministers will not only be rousing the ‘rabble’ but 
Republics. And that is exactly what has happened. China has been openly named as 
the source of our concern. If it is only a guess, better not mention it. If we have 
enough evidence, even then it is better not to let the enemy know what we know. By 
all means take firm action, but use mild language. That is the art of state-craft. 
Today we have only succeeded in rousing Chinese anger, when China was trying to 
be friendly. We have unnecessarily queered the pitch. On the one hand, the 
Government has been trying to improve relations with China and on the other we 
are engaged in a mud-slinging match, giving the impression that one hand of the 
Government does not know what the other is doing. This is a repetition of 1959. We 
then unleashed an anti-China campaign which spread misinformation and /based on 
that) many misconceptions about China. China has a much larger and richer 
diplomatic tradition. China did not say much but it acted to teach us a lesson! -- and 
again smiled. Barking has no value, unless you can bite. If we create that ‘biting’ 
power, that is all for the good. But we must refrain from a ‘bark’.384 
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While V.V. Paranjpe generally agreed that China was a major threat to India’s security, his 
criticism focused less on the substance of this claim than on the form in which it was 
announced: the Indian government publicly treated China as punching bag.  
 
While Paranjpe’s criticism of India’s poor diplomatic handling of the post-Pokhran 
situation might be explained by his background as former ambassador, those commentators 
with a military background were much less concerned with diplomatic conventions, and 
many of them expressed their support for Fernandes’ blunt rhetoric. Brijesh D. Jayal, 
retired air marshal, started his analysis of Sino-Indian nuclear relations after the tests by 
stating that “[t]he Armed Forces ought to be delighted that in George Fernandes they have 
at long last a minister who is willing to provide the much needed leadership”385. Jayal then 
criticised the mainstream position of media commentary on Fernandes’ forthright approach: 
 
Strangely, little media attention has focussed on this very positive aspect of the 
Defence Minister’s business-like and dynamic approach. Instead, volumes have 
been devoted to statements made by the minister with regard to China being 
considered the primary threat and allied issues. A majority of media comments have 
been critical of the minister’s outspoken comments.386 
 
Jayal’s view of China as a dangerous and hostile neighbour reflects the deep humiliation 
that was still very much present in large sections of India’s military 36 years after the lost 
war. These sentiments are further outlined by Jayal: 
 
While the general refrain is to treat the Chinese with kid gloves, it is being forgotten 
that the Chinese believe in dealing with others from a position of strength and any 
weakness that they perceive in their adversary is converted into their advantage. 
That they also happen to be sitting on large areas of our sovereign territory only 
makes their resolve stronger. All this leaves the Armed Forces somewhat confused, 
not with their minister personally, but with the system of governance and the 
intelligentsia. China today occupies tens of thousands of square kilometers of Indian 
territory and lays claims to hundreds of thousands more.387 
 
According to Jayal, the frictions within the government were caused by the opaque, 
secretive mode of strategic policy making, which made the need for a reform of the 
decision making structures apparent. Jayal calls for a shift of power away from the MOD 
into the hands of the military leadership: “Today, the service chiefs are accountable for the 
performance of their forces without having the necessary powers. Those in the MOD 
wielding the authority, however, are not accountable. Little wonder that India is the only 
democracy following this archaic model”388. 
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Many strategic thinkers called for an increased involvement of the military in strategic 
policy making in order to improve the expertise therein; Accordingly, the Security 
Advisory Board was established soon after the tests. But the increased role of the military 
was carefully limited to advisory functions, for the allocation of executive powers in the 
policy process was still considered taboo. The open call for a shift of political power into 
the hands of the military by Jayal, himself a retired military officer, was a rare infringement 
of the self-imposed code of India’s military. Jayal subsequently recommended the 
immediate establishment of a Chief of Defence Staff as well as a radical reform of India’s 
ineffective system of defence PSU’s and Ordnance Factories389.  
 
The most sophisticated assessment of the strategic implications of the tests with regard to 
Indo- Chinese relations was made by C. Raja Mohan390. In his view, China’s changing role 
after the end of the Cold War, according to Mohan, was the key cause for the revival of the 
nuclear debate in India: 
 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, the emergence of China -- once India’s peer -- as 
the second most important power in the world, the consequent disorientation of 
India’s foreign policy and the fear that India will forever be marginalised in the 
Asian and global geopolitics forced New Delhi to reconsider its nuclear policy in 
the 1990s.391 
 
Mohan’s position reflects the mainstream view of the academic section of India’s strategic 
community, which was mainly trying to explain India’s nuclear policy through an analytic 
assessment of geo-strategic dynamics. These approaches necessarily centred on the China 
factor as the most plausible incentive for India’s nuclearisation. Even so, some of the 
factors given by Mohan to back up the plausibility of the China factor appear grossly 
overstated. Above all, his claim that China had become the ‘second most important power 
in the world’ by the 1990s is questionable at best. 
 
Even more fragile is Mohan’s reasoning that China’s alleged domination was the main 
incentive for its neighbours to develop nuclear weapons. As evidence, Mohan notes the 
North Korean nuclear programme, as well as Taiwan’s and Japan’s flirtation with the 
nuclear option. This logic appears flawed, as North Korea’s nuclear efforts were not 
triggered by China, but rather aimed at deterring the superior conventional weaponry of 
South Korea, Japan, and the USA. A stronger China would probably have decreased North 
Korea’s incentives to proliferate. Taiwan, on the other hand, had rejected the nuclear option 
in the midst of the Cold War. 
 
Japan appears as the strongest case for Mohan’s argument. His claim that “the nuclear 
weapon option remains an important sub-text in Japan’s long-term strategic thinking”392 
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and his indication that Japan was developing scenarios in which nuclear weapons contribute 
to its efforts to balance China’s power, in the case of an American pull-out of the region, 
was a well documented fact. Yet it is important to stress the long-term character of this 
scenario. The Japanese did not sense the urgency that guided India’s nuclear testing,  its 
self-declaration as nuclear weapon state, and Mohan’s premature classification of China as 
the world’s second largest power. 
Beyond the specific cases cited by Mohan, his model of nuclear balance in Asia faces one 
fundamental problem: according to his logic, the incentives to build-up nuclear weapon 
capabilities applied not only to the three cases mentioned (plus India) but also to several 
other states in South East, South, Central, and Western Asia. The essential question is 
thereby whether an Asian strategic set-up comprised of at least a dozen nuclear weapons 
states would really be in the best interests of India’s security.  
 
Essential to the changing Asian balance of power was the developing Sino-US relationship. 
According to Mohan, neither the emergence of a new Cold War between the US and China, 
nor a Sino-US axis would be in the interest of India and other Asian nations. In his view, an 
independent foreign policy allowed India to maintain well-balanced relations with both 
powers, despite their resentments after the revelation of India’s nuclear capabilities. 
According to Mohan,  
 
[i]n the short-term, this [the tests] has tended to reinforce the convergence of 
interests between Washington and Beijing to limit the Indian nuclear potential and 
prevent it from emerging as an important factor in the Asian balance of power. Both 
have rejected, for different reasons, India’s claim to be a nuclear weapon power and 
demanded an end to India’s nuclear and missile programmes. Washington is driven 
by reasons of defending the global nuclear order and China is compelled to act on 
the grounds of realpolitik. 
China’s position is understandable, although it is not acceptable to New Delhi. No 
great power likes to see the rise of a challenger in its neighbourhood. China’s 
current approach to New Delhi is no different from that of Russia’s attitude towards 
Beijing when it went nuclear in 1964.393 
 
Far from depicting China as the evil empire, as with some of the more hawkish sections of 
India’s strategic elite – particularly among retired military officers since 1962 – Mohan’s 
arguments were basically systemic. This understanding of the structure of the Asian 
strategic environment was inherent to Mohan’s concluding policy recommendations:  
 
India needs to proceed rapidly to complete the development of a medium range 
missile which is the missing link in its proposed minimum nuclear deterrent. The 
longer range Agni-II is essential for India to gain strategic parity with Beijing and 
reinforce its claim to become an indispensable element of Asian geopolitics. This 
does not mean, however, that India needs to pursue anti-China policies. The balance 
of power is not about defining enemies but about seeking stability through a rough 
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equality of capabilities among major powers. Nuclear India’s interest lies in 
reaching out to improve relations with both Washington and Beijing, once they get 
out of their current pique.394 
 
Mohan’s call for an extension of India’s medium-range ballistic missile capabilities for 
strategic parity is only valid when one assumes that China’s nuclear capabilities are 
designed as deterrent devices against India. Mohan thereby ignores the fact that China 
postponed its medium-range ballistic missile programme in favour of its long-range and 
inter-continental ballistic missile programme, clearly signalling its strategic orientation 
towards its American rival. Surely, one might argue that the Chinese long-range ballistic 
missiles also threaten medium-range targets like India (as well as most other Asian 
countries). Due to its complexity and extreme costs, however, a deployment of Chinese 
inter-continental missiles against medium-range targets is unrealistic.  
 
Much more plausible is the second clause in Mohan’s explanation, denoting the acquisition 
of medium and long range missiles as necessary for India in order to “reinforce its claim to 
become an indispensable element of Asian geopolitics”395. This clause insinuates a 
significance of the nuclear bomb not in terms of security in the narrow sense, but rather in 
terms of international standing and leverage. Mohan furthermore implies that “the fear that 
India will forever be marginalised in the Asian and global geopolitics forced New Delhi to 
reconsider its nuclear policy in the 1990”396. The idea that India’s nuclear achievements had 
significantly bettered its international standing was reflected in Mohan’s interpretation of 
China’s negative reaction: “No great power likes to see the rise of a challenger in its 
neighbourhood”397.  
 
A similarly elaborate assessment of Indo-Chinese strategic relations after the tests was 
offered by K.N. Ramachandran398, a member of the Institute for Defence Studies and 
Analyses. While he considered the reactions by Chinese officials to be largely modest and 
adequate, one of the major achievements of the tests was that India finally displayed on 
China’s strategic landscape: “To sum it up, the fact that India has declared itself a nuclear 
weapon state will indeed be included as a variable in China’s overall nuclear doctrine, but 
China’s position on no first use has perhaps not changed”399. The analytic style of his 
analysis was only abandoned when it came to China’s position on the oft-protested NPT 
and CTBT regimes: 
 
One cannot accept with equanimity China’s call to India to accept the NPT and 
CTBT regimes which are blatantly discriminatory. China became a party to the 
CTBT after 45 tests and for a quid pro quo from the US without jeopardising its 
strategic assets. It may be recalled that in the Sixties and early Seventies, China 
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justified its nuclear weapons programme as a drive to smash the nuclear monopoly 
of ‘imperialism and revisionism’, that is, the US and the then USSR. Having 
become a member of the nuclear club, it seeks to blackmail other aspirants. It is like 
Casanova extolling the virtues of abstinence.400 
 
The controversy over the international non-proliferation regimes was, according to 
Ramachandran, only temporary in nature, as China was expected to give up its blackmail 
attempt in the near future. Similar to Mohan, Ramachandran expected Indo-Chinese 
strategic relations to develop positively once India’s nuclear capabilities were recognised 
by its China as an irreversible matter of fact. 
 
India’s nuclear weapons are defence-oriented, as indeed China’s weapons are. On 
the basis of this reality the two countries should proceed to abide by, and carry 
forward, the agreements reached in the last ten years, beginning with the China visit 
of Rajiv Gandhi in 1988. The two most populous nations of Asia who share a 
common border -- a geo-strategic reality -- have shared goals to pursue in meeting 
the challenges of the twenty-first century.401 
 
An interesting contribution to the debate on deterrence and the Chinese threat was done by 
A. Gopalakrishnan in November 1998402. He bases his account on two premises: First, 
India’s nuclear capabilities were directed against China as its major strategic rival. Second, 
the nuclear option was only expedient if it comprised a credible second strike capability. 
Anything less than such capabilities would damage India’s security interests more than 
lacking nuclear capabilities at all. 
 
Gopalakrishnan, himself a former Chairman of the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, starts 
his account by disproving two myths maintained by the nuclear scientific establishment: 
First, he rejects the scientists’ notion of the effectiveness of India’s multiple testing. 
Second, he substantiates that the yield of the tests was about 12.5 KT, and not the 58 KT 
claimed by the scientists. He concludes that “[a]ll this raises a fundamental question about 
Pokhran-II. What was the great hurry in conducting what surely appears to be a 
scientifically ill-planned series of tests over a 48-hour time span?”403 The simultaneous 
multiple testing was criticised by Gopalakrishnan as a spectacle guided by self-portrayal 
and prestige thinking: it was largely useless in technical terms. In his view, it would have 
been necessary to “carry out a large number of single-explosion tests”404 within a time span 
of one and a half years, assuming that establishing a suitable deterrent consisting of fission 
and fusion bombs against China was the sole purpose of the tests. He then expands this 
technical critique into an ideal political scenario: 
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[t]he associated political decision could have been to declare at the outset that India 
is embarking on a planned series of 10-15 tests, after which we shall seriously 
consider the signing of the CTBT unconditionally. This would have also made it 
clear that India is not going to be a stumbling block in the way of the CTBT coming 
into force in 1999. In that case, I do not believe that we would have faced much 
more international condemnation and economic sanctions compared to what we are, 
in any case, facing today. At least, we would then have gone through the hardship, 
knowing that we have achieved proven weapon designs which can be rated as 
adequate ‘minimum deterrents’ against a nuclear weapon power like China. Today, 
instead, we have data from just one thermo-nuclear device of very low and 
questionable yield, and out DAE and DRDO advisers are recommending that India 
can go ahead and sign the CTBT because they have collected ‘all the data’ they 
would ever want. The entire episode does not make scientific or political sense. 
Consider the position of strength from which a nation like China is amusingly 
watching the recent sabre-rattling of India”405. 
 
Gopalakrishnan’s criticism is based on the following premises 1) nuclear weapons were 
exclusively military-strategic devices 2) that they were mainly directed against China 3) 
that the scientists’ and politicians’ sole objective should have been to establish a credible 
and adequate deterrent as effectively and quickly as possible, and that 4) India’s reason for 
rejecting the CTBT was because it would have prevented the country from achieving these 
objectives. However, none of these premises conforms to reality. Gopalakrishnan is wrong 
in concluding that the testing episode ‘does not make any scientific or political sense’; for 
neither the scientists’ quest for public recognition nor the partisan motives of the political 
leaders depended on the effectiveness of the tests themselves.  
 
With regard to China, the introduction of nuclear weapons, no matter how imperfect the 
deterrence value was in technical terms, did generate some attention and undoubtedly 
reinforced India’s “claim to become an indispensable element of Asian geopolitics”406.  
In this light, the range of India’s future policy options outlined by Gopalakrishnan appeared 
incomplete: 
 
In short, we are faced with broadly two options. One is to hold on to the position 
that nuclear weapons, delivery systems and all the associated paraphernalia, of a 
credible performance level, must be developed and productionised, so that India can 
have a ‘minimum deterrence’ capability against neighbours like China. Or else, we 
can consider all that happened since May 11, 1998 as a bad dream and try to steer 
our policies in a saner direction, without escalating any further conflict with the rest 
of the world and save the country from a steeper economic downslide in the name of 
‘strengthening’ it.407 
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10.2.4. Indo-Chinese Relations in the Post-September 11th World 
 
While the nuclear tests, and particularly their subsequent justification by the government, 
attracted some attention to Indo-Chinese strategic relations, this attention was short-lived.  
Only in late 2002 did the China factor re-emerge in two very different analyses, one 
published by Jasjit Singh in The Indian Express408, and the other on the 40th anniversary of 
the Indo-China war by Brahma Chellaney in the Hindustan Times409. 
Jasjit Singh’s analysis of Post-September 11th changes in China’s strategic position 
followed the mainstream view of India’s strategic community; namely, now that India was 
a major, nuclearised Asian power, it could confidently deal with China at eye level. In 
Singh’s view, China had finally accepted India’s greater role, thereby opening the chance to 
establish strong and peaceful bilateral relations: 
 
China’s approach to bilateral relations with India has undergone near dramatic 
changes after 1998, in spite of the hiccups in the weeks after the Indian nuclear 
tests. Since then the pace of change toward deeper and stronger relations has 
intensified. An increasing number of bilateral high level visits has helped to deepen 
mutual understanding although the resolution of some of the problems ‘lest over by 
history’ seems very remote. China’s aim appears to be to keep progress on them in 
slow motion while building its own comprehensive power. This in no way should be 
seen to signal negative implications for India. In fact we would do well to adopt the 
same philosophy of building comprehensive national power while strengthening 
bilateral relations with China and maintaining peace and tranquillity on the 
borders.410 
 
Singh’s subsequent outlook on the development of Indo-Chinese strategic relations reflects 
the enormous gains in self-confidence among India’s strategic elite after the nuclear testing. 
The enthusiasm over India’s ostensible new role in the world was generally supplemented 
by a great deal of overstatement about the appreciation of India’s nuclear achievements in 
foreign capitals. According to Jasjit Singh,  
 
[t]he increasing acknowledgement of a greater role for India in world affairs is 
implicit in the twin strands of multilateralism and the question of strengthening the 
UN. Many in China now emphasise the importance of India qua India, while 
concluding that it was not a good thing for the UN Security Council to have only 
one solitary developing Asian country as a permanent member. An increasing 
number of responsible people in Beijing seem to be arguing for the need to bring 
India into the UN Security Council as a permanent member so as to recognise 
geopolitical realities and strengthen the UN. This does not, however, necessarily 
mean that the government is ready to support this view. Meanwhile, a wider support 
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for the idea of a China-Japan-India co-operative triangle based on strengthening 
bilateral as well as trilateral co-operation seems to be growing.411 
 
Singh’s suggestion that India’s nuclear tests would cause China to support India’s demand 
for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, as well as his vision of a Japan-China-
India strategic and economic triangle, is a gross overestimation of India’s newly gained 
leverage. 
It nonetheless reflects the sharply increased self-confidence of India’s elite and its 
eagerness to play a respected and responsible role in world affairs. 
 
While this gain in self-confidence caused a broadening of mainstream elite opinion towards 
a more balanced and comprehensive perspective on world affairs triggered mainly 
revanchist sentiments among the anti-Chinese section of the strategic community this 
perceived empowerment. The analysis of Brahma Chellaney falls into this category. 
Maintaining the old legacy about the true Chinese motives in the war of 1962, Chellaney 
states that “[t]he first political objective was to humiliate India, China’s Asian rival. … . 
Such have been the long-lasting effects of the humiliation it imposed that China to this day 
is able to keep India in check, despite transferring weapons of mass destruction to Pakistan 
and opening a new strategic front through Myanmar”412. Within Chellaney’s worldview, 
relations between states are first defined through transcendent factors like national pride 
and national honour, or, for that matter, national humiliation. The dynamics of this 
international system, are quite simple: Brave, noble India stands in the centre of Asia, 
surrounded by a sinister and evil-minded China in the north, and its satellites Pakistan and 
Myanmar in the West and East. Following this logic, the 1962 war can be viewed as the 
culmination of China’s long-term strategy to suppress India’s aspirations and establish 
itself as Asia’s dominant power. Chellaney explains India’s economic and military 
inferiority as a direct outcome of the war: 
 
India continues to pay for the 1962 debacle. The war not only ended India’s 
aspirations to be a credible rival of China in Asia, it also shrunk India’s strategic 
space, confining it to the subcontinent -- a box from which the nation has yet to 
come free. Such was the humiliation inflicted that decades later India still plays a 
diminished role on the global arena, a nation that few believes speaks with the 
weight of the one-sixth of the human race domiciled on its territory.413 
 
Chellaney continues by comparing the recent Indo-Chinese border talks (fruitless as they 
“serve as a cover for China to pursue containment of India with engagement”414) with the 
border talks between Mao and Nehru before the 1962 war.  Noteworthy in this context is 
Chellaney’s interpretation of the motives for India’s nuclear build-up: 
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Four decades later, India has not forgotten the central lesson it was taught by Mao. 
India’s rise as a military power with independent nuclear and missile capabilities is 
the consequence of a lesson learned. However, with foreign policy still being 
shaped by personal predilections and idiosyncrasies rather than by institutional 
processes, India continues to repose faith in adversaries and then cries foul when 
they deceive it, as Kargil showed.415 
 
Similar to the analyses of Singh et al., Chellaney’s deliberations reflect the increased self-
confidence among India’s strategists after the nuclear breakthrough. Chellaney does not, 
however, appreciate India’s increased political role in world affairs, but instead “India’s 
rise as a military power” vis-à-vis its immediate, threatening neighbours. Ironically, his 
views mirror those attitudes among India’s strategic elite that he criticises: the narrow 
outlook of India’s regionally confined foreign policy, India’s hostile relationship to its 
neighbours, its idiosyncratic policy formulation, and its habit of crying foul when the 
neighbours react to this idiosyncrasy negatively. 
 
Chellaney’s recommendations about how to deal with China in the future contain a hidden, 
but nonetheless blunt threat: 
 
India continues to display the symptoms of a ‘battered victim.’ syndrome. It 
probably may never recover from 1962 until it is able to stand up to China. Some 
may even contend that India would come of age as a nation-state only if avenges 
that humiliation. 
But that would be expecting too much from a nation that cherishes its heritage of 
benign and humane civilisation, with its wealth of philosophy and its spiritualised 
and romanticised worldview -- a nation that has never retaliated to its neighbours’ 
proxy war.416 
 
Chellaney concludes his account by giving an idiosyncratic interpretation of the 
forthcoming event that again brought Indo-Chinese relations back onto the agenda of 
India’s public: Prime Minister Vajpayee’s visit to Beijing in the summer of 2003. In 
Chellaney’s view, “India’s innate strength lies in its enduring ability to accept ‘evil for 
good’ -- and let bygones be bygones. Knowing that, today’s Chinese leadership had urged 
Atal Behari Vajpayee to pay an official visit to Beijing in November, coinciding with the 
40th anniversary of the conclusion of Mao’s humbling of India”417. 
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11. India’s Self-Image as Emerging Power 
 
 
11.1. Elite Perception, Nuclear Weapons and International Status  
 
According to the main hypothesis of this study, India’s nuclear course was strongly 
determined by motives of status-seeking. The policy of prestige, or the demonstration of 
power, was thereby the means by which India sought to gain international status.  
 
Chart 11.1. delineates the relative frequency by which nuclear-related accounts addressed 
issues specifically linked to India’s status seeking. These articles are structured into three 
main categories: first, accounts directly addressing India’s international status; second, 
accounts addressing the nuclear nonproliferation policy of the USA, India’s main adversary 
within the status competition; and finally, the category of articles dealing with the fora 
provided by the international nuclear nonproliferation regime.418  
 
Chart 11.1.: Frequency of Articles on Issues Related to the International Nuclear 
Order (in % of total sample) 
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The empirical evidence presented in chart 11.1. suggests that within India’s discourse 
during the crucial period of its nuclear programme from 1991 to 1998, the pros and cons of 
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such weapons for India’s security were only marginally discussed. Instead, the debate 
largely focused on the role of nuclear weapons for the country’s international status and 
prestige.  
 
The share of status-oriented accounts among the overall reporting on the nuclear issue 
sharply increased from about 20 percent before 1986, to 70 percent in the 1991 – 1996 
period, and to 73 percent in the 1996 - 1998 period. After the nuclear tests of 1998, its share 
dropped again to 35 percent in the period of consolidation from May 1998 to 2003, and 
finally to only 20 % after 2003. 
The overwhelming attention the international nuclear nonproliferation regime received 
during the crucial years is also remarkable. The dominance of this issue in the mid-1990s, 
which was mainly caused by both the debates on the indefinite extension of the NPT, 
completed in 1995 and the conclusion of the CTBT in 1996, suggests a strong causality 
between the Geneva negotiation process of 1995 and 1996 and India’s nuclear tests of 
1998.  
 
Within the following three chapters, an attempt is made to describe the dynamics that had 
been fundamental for the strong status-orientation of the nuclear debate among India’s 
strategic elite until 1998. The main objective is hence to explore if the policy of (nuclear) 
prestige was viewed as a means to pursue higher national interests, such as security or 
economic progress, or if status enhancement had become an end which in itself justified the 
acquisition of nuclear weapons.  
 
 
11.2. The Emerging Debate  
 
The general debate on reforming India’s foreign policy away from Nehruvian values 
towards a foreign policy led by power politics gained momentum after India’s debacle in 
the war of 1962. But even after the first Chinese nuclear tests in 1964, few strategists 
suggested that the acquisition of nuclear weapons should be a part of India’s efforts to 
strengthen its power capabilities. It was only after the Bangladesh war of 1971 that the 
nuclear question again came into the focus of India’s foreign policy elite. Among 
academics in the field of strategic studies, these dynamics are considered one of the major 
puzzles of India’s nuclear build-up. Deterrence Theory suggests that a country acquires 
nuclear capabilities as soon as its neighbouring adversary does so. This understanding 
suggests that India should have become a nuclear weapons power soon after 1964. After the 
split of Pakistan in 1971, India emerged as the uncontested regional power. In this context, 
the basic paradigms of Deterrence Theory suggest that the pressure to proliferate nuclear 
weapons decreases if a country is able to establish a conventional superiority within its 
region, as India did in 1971. This paradox of India’s nuclear development is explained by 
most scholars with the technical advancement of the nuclear programme. India tested its 
nuclear device not in the mid 1960s, as the argument goes, because it was technically not in 
the position to do so until 1974. This argument, however, lacks empirical evidence. It was 
less technical immaturity that caused this delay but more the lack of political will to 
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proceed with the preparations for testing. As the following analysis of elite opinion will 
show, the Bangladesh war drove the debate towards a direction favourable to nuclear 
testing. This appears paradoxical to those trying to explain India’s nuclear arming efforts 
with security considerations only. But to India’s strategic elite in the 1970s, playing the 
nuclear card after 1971 was only consequential: having established itself as the uncontested 
regional power, India should now corroborate its increased status, which it felt still 
deprived from internationally, by adding the nuclear dimension to it.  
The debate of the 1970s underwent three phases. During the first phase which lasted to the 
Bangladesh war, analyses on the nuclear issue were rare and largely dismissive to the 
nuclear option.419 
 
The second phase commenced in the aftermath of the Bangladesh war in 1971 and ended in 
spring 1974 when India exploded its nuclear device in the Pokhran desert. In this period, 
the nuclear issue was largely dealt with in the larger context of India’s newly emerged 
regional supremacy as one possible option among others to increase its status. The 
departure from the Nehruvian, post-colonial legacy towards a more self-confident 
definition of India’s international role is best illustrated by D.K. Palit420 in 1973. Referring 
to the post-colonial era prior to the Bangladesh war of 1971, Palit states: 
 
From the point of view of international relationship, therefore, South Asia grew into 
a community of dependent minor ‘powers.’ It was in the interest of the old colonial 
powers from whom the United States took over the colonial baton – which this state 
of affairs should continue. India, the only ex-colonial nation that possessed both the 
political and administrative background and the geographical and demographic 
potential to assume regional leadership, was effectively stifled. Pakistan was 
deliberately set up as a counter measure to offset India’s power-potential. … . 
Consequently, between 1947 and 1970 India, in spite of her power potential, 
remained a minor power barely able to manage her own internal and external 
problems.421 
 
Palit’s deliberations show several elements that dominated the nuclear debate for the next 
three decades. First, he considers India’s regional supremacy as natural due to its size and 
its political and administrative institutions. Further, his deliberations reflect a deeply 
engrained feeling of being humiliated by colonial forces, which deprived India of its major 
power status. Third, in his view, the United States replaced the European countries in acting 
as the symbolic place of the colonialists. Fourth, he does not consider Pakistan as a state in 
its own right but as minion of the colonialists who intended to repress India’s emergence as 
major power. Fifth and most strikingly, in renunciation of the Nehru legacy, Palit explicitly 
considers increased defence production as the best strategy for India to achieve its merited 
status. 
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These ideas formed the cornerstones within which the future nuclear debate in India would 
take place. Yet, two crucial elements of the future debate still remained unmentioned: first, 
the international non-proliferation regime as the epitome of the above expressed colonialist 
and discriminatory order, and second, nuclear weapons as the embodiment of India’s 
opposition to this order. Palit avoids explicitly mentioning nuclear weapons but vaguely 
refers to ‘sophisticated weapons’ instead: 
 
We shall first have to achieve the aim of integrating national development and 
defence production and successfully strike an ‘optimal balance’ between the two 
before we can hope to start aiming towards self-sufficiency, sophisticated weapons 
and then acquire major power status and the confidence for independent decision-
making in global strategic matters.422 
 
After the nuclear test on May 18th 1974, the analyses of the strategic community abruptly 
became much more explicit about the relationship between India’s nuclear achievements 
and its quest for major power status. Between May and December 1974, several opinion 
articles and analyses aimed at redefining India’s enhanced position in the world. These 
articles largely centred on one major theme: the perceived discriminatory and colonialist 
attitudes of Western countries, particularly the USA. The discriminatory outlook of the 
newly created NPT was perceived as the major instrument through which Western 
countries attempted to maintain the colonialist world order and therefore became the main 
target for the strategists’ battle for justice. This perception was brought to the forefront in 
an article in The Hindu shortly after the nuclear test: 
 
The NPT is one of the most unequal international treaties ever signed, because 
while it prohibited the nuclear have-nots from acquiring nuclear capability, it left 
the haves free to add to their arsenals. The exclusiveness of the so called nuclear 
club which was sought to be preserved through the NPT has now been ended by 
India which, incidentally, is not a signatory to the treaty.423 
 
The appreciation of the 1974 test followed the same leitmotif as the strategists’ approach to 
the 1998 tests. This leitmotif – nuclear testing as a symbolic act of opposition against a 
colonialist world order that denied India its merited status and was manifested in the NPT – 
differed between 1974 and 1998 with only one detail: in 1974, most analysts adopted the 
official government line that the test was exclusively done for peaceful purposes. 
Scepticism on the peaceful nature of the explosion was largely repudiated as unfounded 
allegations by those Western critics who tried to preserve the existing order: 
 
Despite the Prime Minister and other official spokesmen repeatedly saying that 
India has no intention to go in for atomic weapons and its experiments are meant 
solely for putting the atom to peaceful use, the suspicion is bound to exist in the 
outside world that India will secretly make the bomb. This cannot be helped. The 
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history of the last 25 years has shown that Indian intentions have often been suspect 
in certain foreign eyes.424 
 
While doubts about the peacefulness of the test were, in the author’s view, unfounded, the 
test nevertheless created an option for future military applications if the need for them 
would arise. The author asserts:  
 
At the same time, [the Indian government] cannot renounce nuclear weapons for all 
time to come, considering there are other armed with such weapons, not all of them 
well disposed toward our country. This makes it necessary for India to keep its 
options open, even while concentrating on using its new power for peaceful 
purposes only.425 
 
These deliberations expressed what would become India’s official declaratory policy until 
1998 — the policy of ‘keeping the nuclear option open.’ At the same time, a major 
inconsistency within this concept became visible: while maintaining a moral distinction 
between India’s peaceful nuclear intentions and the alleged Western aggressive use of this 
technology, it bases the Indian military’s use of nuclear technology on the existence of a 
nuclear armed neighbour, which was ‘not well disposed’ toward India. This condition was, 
however, already met, as the existence of nuclear armed China was already well known at 
the time when this concept became commonly accepted among India’s elite. The ambiguity 
between the repudiation of any doubts about the peacefulness of the test on one side, and 
the implicit acceptance of the military option on the other, was further aggravated by the 
fact that none of the authors on this issue (with V. Venkateswaran as the only exception) 426 
actually mention the kind of peaceful applications nuclear explosion could potentially have.  
 
In his account on civilian applications of nuclear explosives, V. Venkateswaran puts forth 
ostensible projects in Nevada, in which nuclear explosions were used to cut mountains, dig 
canals, highways and railroads, as well as in Tadzhikistan, in which this technology was 
ostensibly used to construct a rock fill dam. Venkateswaran concludes:  
 
[T]he explosion of underground bombs has vast scope for advancing the economic 
and industrial progress of India. The bombs can be used for constructing new 
highways through the country’s long mountain ranges, for constructing new dams 
avoiding wastage and time lag and last but not least for exploring new mines and 
tapping oil and gas source. Production of a nuclear bomb does not mean that the 
country is going the whole hog for stockpiling atomic weapons. There is a gulf of 
difference between tapping nuclear energy for peaceful and destructive purposes. … 
. Having gained the know-how and the experience of it, the nuclear scientists should 
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break new ground in this field for lifting the country from its present economic 
backwardness.427 
 
By stressing the importance of the nuclear scientists as the lead for India’s path towards 
industrialisation, welfare, and modernity, the author again revives the Nehruvian nuclear 
myth.  He thus ignores the contemporary wisdom on the dangers of nuclear technology that 
had significantly changed the appreciation of nuclear technology among the international 
public in the 1970s, as compared to its uncritical view in the ‘Atoms for Peace’ era. In the 
international nuclear discourse of the 1970s, the suggestion to use nuclear explosions for 
the construction of highways appeared naive. 
 
With the exception of Venkateswaran, all the articles published in the aftermath of India’s 
first nuclear test that related the nuclear issue to India’s international standing, considered 
the actual applicability of nuclear explosions, being either peaceful or military, as only of 
secondary relevance. In these accounts, the nuclear test appeared justified because it was a 
symbol of opposition against perceived Western dominance and discrimination. In the eyes 
of India’s elite, this alone was reason enough for testing. As such, most of these accounts 
did not focus on India’s action but instead on Western reaction. The ambiguity of this logic 
– doing something purely in order to oppose those who tell oneself not to do it – became 
most visible in a May 31st 1974 article in The Times of India.428 Therein, the author drew an 
alarmist scenario of a nuclear proliferated Western world, in which “any determined and 
resourceful group of gangsters can get hold cities and governments to ransom. Worse, 
deranged individuals in possession of this deadly material can even destroy whole 
cities.”429 After having highlighted the great danger of nuclear technology, the author 
concluded that in view of India’s nuclear test, “gone are the days when have nations [sic.] 
could perpetuate their monopoly. Either they should begin to disarm in all earnestness or 
face the risk of further dissemination. Neither voluntary abstention by India nor attempts to 
blackmail it can stop the drift in that direction.”430 
 
The question of whether the international audience acknowledged the symbolic meaning of 
India’s test was answered differently among India’s strategic writers. Some argued that 
other nuclear weapons states slowly accepted India’s enhanced status, as “[e]arly 
disapproval, which was most pronounced in the US, after the Pokhran test two months ago, 
is changing to a readiness to admit India to the club.”431 Others still perceived an 
unchanged discriminatory and colonialist attitude among the members of the ‘nuclear club.’ 
V. M. Nair asserts: 
 
India’s now familiar assertions of its determination to exploit the nuclear know-how 
for exclusively peaceful purposes apparently fell on deaf ears and only one country 
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out of the host of its so called friends openly came to its support. Yugoslavia stood 
by India, but understandably Belgrade’s espousal carried little weight.432 
 
Commentary on international reaction to India’s test generally showed two common 
features. First, the frequent use of the expression ‘club’ to label those countries that had 
acquired nuclear weapons were now trying to keep India out. The perceived exclusivity of 
this ‘club’ was considered likewise provocative and appealing.  Becoming a member of this 
club had turned into an end in itself, regardless of the actual use of membership. Second, 
the analyses of international reactions further reflected a strong inward looking mindset, 
and accordingly, a deep lack of comprehension about the dynamics of international opinion 
shaping. In this context it is quite remarkable that throughout the 1970s, not a single article 
tried to explore the motivation of those countries that had a civilian nuclear programme but 
abstained from developing nuclear explosives.  These countries actually outnumber the 
nuclear weapon states by a large degree. This lack of understanding became most visible in 
a Statesman article of December 1974:  
 
Hopes that misgivings in other countries about the nuclear explosion in the 
Rajasthan desert would soon be dispelled have not been fulfilled. … . It is 
unfortunate that even a country like Sweden whose views on world affairs have so 
often been similar to India’s, should fail to see the logic behind India’s nuclear 
policy or be unwilling to accept New Delhi’s assurances regarding its aims.433 
 
The fierce rejection of the nuclear weapons programme by the government of Morarji 
Desai (1977 – 1979) did not, as many scholars contend, disrupt the nuclear debate among 
India’s strategic community, nor did it lead to any significant change in its general outlook. 
On the contrary, Desai was considered to have carried on Indira Gandhi’s nuclear policy 
without disruption. The basis for this view was Desai’s decision to leave the core issue of 
India’s nuclear debate untouched—he continued to strongly object to any concessions to 
the nuclear nonproliferation regime. This firmness was appreciated by India’s strategists, as 
commentary by G. K. Reddy illustrates: 
 
The firm stand that the Prime Minister, Mr. Morarji Desai, has taken on the question 
of nuclear safeguards has enhanced his prestige in the Third World by 
demonstrating that he is capable of resisting pressures from both the United States 
and the Soviet Union. It has also served as a striking example of the country’s 
determination to pursue a policy of genuine non-alignment in the sense that India 
has refused to sacrifice a principle for the sake of convenience by submitting itself 
to a highly discriminatory form of international controls on its nuclear 
programme.434 
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Parallel to Morarji Desai’s symbolic pacifism, the newly elected Carter administration 
followed a much sturdier approach to nuclear disarmament by passing strong non-
proliferation legislation as a new guideline for American foreign policy. This created a new 
area of conflict with the effect that, in the perception of India’s strategic elite, the USA 
emerged more than ever before as the sole ringleader of the colonialist countries. The 
sentiment towards American non-proliferation efforts among India’s elite was best 
illustrated in the account of Nani A. Palkhivala in 1978, who stated: 
 
[W]e are impressed by the genuineness of President Carter’s concerns and share his 
vision of a world free from the threat of possible abuses of nuclear energy. India has 
always willingly considered participation in any measure aimed at genuine non-
proliferation and disarmament. But there are good reasons for India’s difficulty in 
accepting some of the provisions of the recent U.S. legislation. … . Nothing would 
be so detrimental to the cause of non-proliferation as the evolution of a system 
which divides the world into nuclear weapons and second-class countries which 
penalises non-weapons countries by placing discriminatory restrictions on their 
peaceful developmental aspirations; which motivates countries to accelerate their 
efforts to achieve nuclear self-reliance at any cost; which underestimates the forces 
of nationalism, pride and self-respect in other countries merely because they are 
today poor or vulnerable; and which ignores the energy needs, philosophical 
traditions, international record, and geopolitical contexts of individual countries by 
seeking to clamp, one uniform regime of restrictions, on all non-weapon powers.435 
 
Among all analyses on the nuclear issue, Palkhivala’s article stands out as one of the very 
few that explicitly relates the nuclear question to nationalism, in disguise of national pride 
and self-respect (while these dynamics were only implicitly innate to most other articles). 
Also exceptional was the wide range of meanings assigned to the nuclear issue by 
Palkhivala, ranging from the country’s development to its ‘philosophical traditions.’ 
 
Finally, Palkhivala neglects the excessive attribution of various meanings to nuclear 
weapons in his prior deliberations and expresses his discontent about the exaggerated 
international reactions to the nuclear test that in his view, clearly overshot the mark.  He 
says, “[f]our years ago this May, India exploded a nuclear device in the Pokhran desert in 
Rajasthan. That explosion created political and psychological reverberations around the 
world which were far out of proportion.”436 
 
 
11.3. From Prestige to Security and Back Again 
 
During the 1970s, the insistence of the strategic elite on the peaceful nature of the nuclear 
programme prevented the emergence of a wider debate on its security aspects. The prestige 
oriented discourse changed in the late 1970s and early 1980s, when rumours about the 
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progress of Pakistan’s nuclear programme made a deep impression on the way the nuclear 
issue was debated among India’s elite. The security component, which had largely been 
ignored before, suddenly came into focus. Articles relating the nuclear issue to India’s 
standing in the world, which had been published in India’s major English speaking dailies 
before, largely stopped, suggesting the existence of a certain trade-off between security and 
prestige within the nuclear discourse among India’s strategic elite.  
 
In contrast to the 1970s when the peaceful character of the programme was a largely 
accepted pretence, the 1980s introduces it as a vehemently contentious issue. Opinion on 
this topic was largely split among India’s opinion leaders into two different positions:  
The defenders of India’s traditional nuclear rhetoric still maintained the stance that India’s 
nuclear programme continued to be peaceful in nature. As Sureshwar D. Sinha explains:  
 
India had rightly given up the nuclear option, and has till today resisted the 
temptation to produce nuclear weapons, despite provocation to do so from both 
China and Pakistan. Whilst the former regularly carries out nuclear tests and fires its 
test missiles over our country into the Indian Ocean the latter agreed to develop the 
‘Islamic bomb’ at the instance of Libya and reportedly some other Arab countries. 
In this it has been assisted by China and through covert sales of critical items made 
to it, also by several developed European countries despite laws to prevent such 
sales.437 
 
After all, this orthodox position of India’s moral superiority had lost much of its credibility 
in the course of the Brasstacks Crisis and gradually lost much of its relevance thereafter. 
 
The second group of opinion leaders claimed that India had proven its nuclear weapon 
capabilities already with the Pokhran test in 1974, thereby implicitly or explicitly stating 
that India’s nuclear programme had a military component already since at least 1974. 
Among these authors, S. Mulgaokar states: 
 
India has proven nuclear weapons capability, a capability that was demonstrated to 
the world as early as in 1974 with the underground explosion at Pokhran, India then 
said that the underground test of a nuclear device was for peaceful purposes. This 
was widely doubted and we may as well accept that there has been no follow-up in 
the 13 years since Pokhran to investigate the peaceful potential of contained nuclear 
explosion. But it is good to remember that India at the same time foreswore the 
intention to build nuclear weapons. That promise to the world, which India was 
under no overwhelming compulsion to make, has been scrupulously kept until today 
while evidence mounts not only of Pakistan’s capability to build nuclear weapons 
but also of Pakistan’s preparations actually to translate that capability into 
weapons.438 
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This position was a refinement of the previously developed concept of ‘keeping the nuclear 
option open.’  The concept of nuclear option in the 1970s basically denoted India’s 
willingness to convert a genuinely peaceful nuclear programme into a military programme 
if the need for it may arise.  In the late 1980s, however, this option was no longer between 
‘peaceful’ and ‘military’ applications but between ‘military in principle’ and ‘weaponised.’ 
The threshold of when to actually exercise the option was thereby gradually lowered. It 
then continued to be marginalised throughout the 1990s and was finally dropped altogether 
in 1998. 
 
This lowering of the threshold produced two new problems. First of all, it had the smell of 
self-defeat, considering the fact that Pakistan’s nuclear efforts were basically a reaction to 
India’s 1974 test. As S. Mulgaokar remarked, “Pakistan may finally be deterred from going 
over the brink but the possibility that it may not has to be taken into account by India. It is 
the event of such a nuclear intervention by Pakistan that India is more or less committed to 
exercise the option of making a nuclear response.”439 According to this logic, India had 
created a nuclear option to which Pakistan reacted by equally developing nuclear 
capabilities. Now that Pakistan had progressed, India would have to actually exercise their 
nuclear means even if Pakistan was itself deterred. Mulgaokar subsequently identifies this 
paradox: 
 
There is another truth that we have refused to accept. It is that we could have 
stopped Pakistan from any thought of going nuclear. Pakistan has always 
proclaimed the willingness to sign NPT if India signed it. Our objection to such a 
course we made a matter of principle. In the result we have placed ourselves in a 
situation where at Pakistan’s dictation we will cede the moral ground on which we 
stood in not joining the nuclear race though we had the capability to do so.440 
 
The second problem caused by the rhetorical redefinition of the nuclear option was a loss of 
credibility with regard to India’s morally principled stance on the nuclear issue, particularly 
in view of its rejection of the international non-proliferation regime. Considering the 
mounting international pressure to finally joint the NPT, Mulgaokar concludes that India 
had no choice but to accept these security related compulsions of realpolitik and should 
finally swallow its pride and sign the NPT: 
 
Such a consideration [to sign the NPT] would invalidate the argument used by India 
of discrimination between the nuclear and non-nuclear powers for not signing the 
NPT. Seen in this light the NPT is of course discriminatory. But the treaty can only 
avoid discrimination in conditions where the nuclear weapon has been totally 
abolished. Ergo, in that happy situation there will be no need for the NPT. We in 
India and the rest of the non-nuclear countries are condemned to live in a world as 
we find it. Certain unfortunate events have cast a doleful shadow on the world. We 
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cannot therefore ask that history should go into reverse. Nuclear history has passed 
India by as it has passed all but five countries in the world.441 
 
The above distinction between India’s security driven nuclear policy towards Pakistan and 
its prestige oriented policy towards the international community, was widely made among 
India’s mainstream strategists.  
 
In contrast to this approach, prestige thinking remained the dominate motivation among the 
nuclear scientific community in its appreciation for Indo-Pakistan relations, causing a 
general downplaying of Pakistan’s nuclear achievements by the scientists. As Amalendu 
Das Gupta notes, “[l]acking political direction, the atomic establishment rationalized its 
inaction by assuming a superior posture: what, after all, could the industrially and 
scientifically backward Pakistanis do that India had not already done?”442 
 
The phase of ambiguity that was caused by the clash of the carefully maintained myth of 
India’s peaceful nuclear endeavour was made with the reality of Pakistan’s weapons 
programme, and India’s elite was thus split over the question whether the country had a 
civilian or military nuclear programme.  This division ended in the late 1980s as a wide 
consensus among India’s mainstream strategic thinkers was reached on a commonly 
accepted approach to India’s nuclear policy. This consensus among the opinion leaders was 
most explicitly expressed by K. Subrahmanyam.443 In his view: 
 
The USSR, Britain, France, China, Israel and Pakistan all had to gatecrash into the 
nuclear club and once that happened the U.S. was prepared to live with it. The same 
is true of missile technology. There is a lesson for India in this. If India were to go 
ahead ignoring U.S. protests and posturing, they will accept ‘Agni’ and even Indian 
nuclear weapons.444 
 
Subrahmanyam continued to maintain the traditional, seemingly paradox stance that the 
acquisition of nuclear weapons was the only way for India to achieve global nuclear 
disarmament: “India can play an effective role in multilateral nuclear disarmament at the 
global level only when the world comes to believe that India is a nuclear weapon power and 
therefore it is not an ignorable factor in respect of disarmament negotiations.”445 This 
recurring view, which became particularly popular in the course of the heated NPT and 
CTBT debates in the mid-1990s, was considered among outside observers as a paradox at 
best and highly hypocritical at worse. It was, however, a compelling logic within the 
framework of the basic parameters set by the various normative values attached to nuclear 
weapons by India’s elite. 
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Subrahmanyam’s analysis ended by ruling off once and forever the myth of India’s 
peaceful nuclear programme: 
 
The unilateralism that India’s nuclear programme is entirely peaceful should be 
given up. It is not suggested that there should be a public declaration that we have 
become nuclear weaponised. India’s declaratory policy should become increasingly 
ambiguous. In future the answer to the question whether India intends to go nuclear 
or has gone nuclear should be that India’s policy is adjusted to the international 
realities and takes into account multilateral interactions.446 
 
 
11.4. Axiomatic Arguments 
 
In the early 1990s, the parameters of the nuclear debate were set and remained basically 
unchanged until the May 1998 nuclear tests. India’s opinion leaders believed the country to 
be on a mission to crush the discriminatory, neo-colonialist international system led by the 
USA, and, in turn, enhancing India’s status and position among the community of states.  
 
In the period from the take-over of the Narashima Rao government in mid-1991 to the 
nuclear tests in May 1998, 71 percent of all editorials, opinion articles and analyses on the 
nuclear issue published in India’s major daily newspapers devoted themselves to India’s 
stance to either the international non-proliferation regime, American non-proliferation 
efforts, or India’s status and prestige seeking in general. The focus was on possession of 
nuclear weapons, not on its use. With few exceptions, these articles generally agreed on the 
perception that nuclear weapons were effective devices to enhance India’s security but 
abstained from actually discussing security aspects in detail. This peculiarity of the expert 
and public discourse had the effect that, despite excessive reporting and the intense debate 
on the nuclear issue prior to the tests, India had neither a nuclear doctrine nor any 
deployment strategy at the time when the government decided to test and to declare India a 
nuclear weapons state. 
 
In the perception of India’s strategic elite, the country’s nuclear course of the 1990s was a 
symbolic act of emancipation against the discriminatory world order dominated by Western 
countries, above all the USA. This leitmotiv was not common only among advocates of the 
bomb but also to most of its critics. In his call for abandoning the nuclear option, Bharat 
Wariavwalla outlines the structural imbalances of the international system: 
 
The United States, speaking on behalf of all the present nuclear haves, except 
perhaps China, wants us to surrender the nuclear option. … . It is not that the Soviet 
Union ever endorsed our stand on the NPT or approved in the slightest our ‘peaceful 
nuclear explosion’ of 1974, but it did not publicly come out against them for cold 
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war considerations. Now Russia is a junior ally of the United States, ever ready to 
help America construct a new world order.447 
 
Ironically, Wariavwalla explicitly excludes China from the countries discriminating and 
thereby pushing India towards nuclearisation, despite the fact that China was, in the 
perception of many strategists, the only true security-related motive for India’s nuclear 
weapons programme. Wariavwalla’s account on the first Iraq war, which had taken place 
few months before, indicates the stereotypes that underpin the perception of Western 
behaviour by large sections of the strategic elite. He writes: 
 
Saddam Hussein was savagely punished by the West, not just because he had the 
concealed capability to make nuclear weapons but also because he was the symbol 
of the strategic defiance of the Third World of the West. The symbol had to be 
crushed to demonstrate to other third world countries that they can only have limited 
strategic autonomy.448 
 
More noteworthy than the omission of key factors such as the Iraq’s annexation of Kuwait 
and the participation of several Third World countries in the coalition against Iraq is the use 
of the ‘Third World’ as the stereotyped category of the subdued in contrast to the ‘West’ as 
the subjugator.  
 
The self-image of India as the head of the Third World had been one cornerstone of 
Nehruvian foreign policy. However, for India’s mainstream foreign policy thinkers of the 
1990s, this self-image was rather ambiguous. On one side, it was perceived as a disturbing 
factor in India’s quest for joining the major powers in their exclusive club. On the other 
side, it was inherently part of its campaign against the discriminating order. India’s nuclear 
strategists tried to maintain the country’s self-image as primus inter pares of the majority 
of have-nots. Nikhil Chakravartty assessed the discriminatory world order in The Hindu in 
September 1994 along these lines: 
 
In fact, the case of nuclear weapons and missiles, a monopoly club appears to have 
been set up which patently divides the world community into the nuclear haves 
which have the authority to dictate, and the vast number of the nuclear have nots, 
who are sought to be bound down to an inferior status of subservience to the nuclear 
bosses. 
It is the insidious game of nuclear hegemony that the entire world attention is 
sought to be focussed on the perceived danger of an Indo-Pak nuclear conflict, 
while the world community has to acquiesce in the more definite danger of 
entrusting history’s largest stockpile of nuclear weapons – sufficient to destroy the 
entire human civilisation – to the very power which alone has the unenvied record 
of having used the atom bomb. It is for India to raise its voice against this grotesque 
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discrimination in the field of nuclear threat. We have to declare, straight and clear 
that to make the world safe from the danger of nuclear war, it is for the U.S. along 
with the other members of the nuclear club, to disgorge their entire nuclear 
stockpiles, and only then should others, including Pakistan and India, follow suit.449 
 
While being an extreme case of raged rhetoric, the article reflects the general mood among 
India’s opinion leaders in the mid-1990s. The rage in which the writer held his (or, as he 
perceives it: India’s) position, reveals the strong emotionalisation and polarisation of the 
nuclear debate in the mid-1990s. It further hampers the proper appreciation of the 
inconsistencies, among them the basic contradiction between Chakravartty’s demonisation 
of nuclear weapons as abysmally insidious weapons in the hands of Western countries, and, 
at the same time, his emphatic insistence that India should have them by all means. 
Also noteworthy is Chakravartty’s implicit suggestion that Pakistan and India should join 
hands in crushing the discriminating order by developing nuclear weapons. This 
suggestion, similar to Wariavwalla’s above cited remark on China,450 highlights the 
contradiction between the symbolic value of nuclear weapons for India’s struggle against 
global discrimination and the security aspects of India’s nuclear weapons programme. 
 
Within the broader debate on the nuclear issue, the nuclear scientific establishment 
followed its own variant of the general leitmotiv of status and prestige seeking. According 
to the scientists, the most discriminating aspect of the international order was its focus on 
the military applications of nuclear technology and its disregard of India’s civilian nuclear 
achievements.  This accomplishment, in their account, had a much longer and more 
successful record than the Chinese civilian nuclear programme. This view was exemplarily 
expressed in an Indian Express article by O.P. Sabherwal in August 1995.451 After 
specifying India’s past nuclear achievements, he concludes that “[a]ll this, and much more 
the Indian scientists achieved admirably during the last four decades, giving this country a 
robust indigenous nuclear capability that outstrips attainments anywhere except the top four 
nuclear powers.”452 
 
Different from the mainstream opinion leaders’ trend during the mid-1990s to display the 
nuclear issue as a battle over principles between India and the US-dominated Western 
countries, Sabherwal aims at placing India in fifth position ahead of China in terms of 
international standing,: 
 
India on the other hand while developing nuclear capability on a sound base – ahead 
of China except in the limited domain of weaponisation – lagged behind in staking 
its claim as a nuclear weapon capability power on the world stage. The crime for 
which India’s nuclear status is sought to be downgraded is (a) giving first priority to 
peaceful application of atomic energy and a lower priority to developing weapon 
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capability; (b) in not conducting a number of tests after Pokhran to demonstrate its 
proven and transparent weapon capability. And yet the NPT is supposed to work for 
reducing atomic weapons. … . But the question which the West should examine is 
whether discrimination against India in pushing it to the wilderness of nuclear have-
nots can be fruitful? Whatever the present-day official postures, it would be puerile 
to expect the Indian nation and its scientific community to succumb to the 
unacceptable stand which places a premium on weaponisation and belittles Indian 
nuclear attainments so as to deny this country its rightful status as a nuclear power 
with weapon capability.453 
 
Sabherwal’s deliberations show all elements of the nuclear scientists’ general 
understanding: the heroic achievements in India’s civilian nuclear realm; the genuinely 
peaceful character of these achievements; and the international non-proliferation regime as 
a perceived instrument to ‘downgrade’ India’s nuclear status. Sabherwal explicitly stated 
that the nuclear issue was about international status and that its practical application, either 
civilian or military, was without relevance for achieving this status.  
 
In a follow-up article three months later, Sabherwal highlights his perception on the true 
meaning of India’s nuclear achievements. Similar to his earlier article on “India’s right to 
nuclear status,” his understanding of India’s nuclear motives became visible in the title of 
his November 1995 article on “India’s nuclear achievements: A matter of pride.”454 He 
summarises the structure of the non-proliferation regime by applying key expressions like 
“nuclear colonialism,” “American-dominated cartel of nuclear weapon powers,” and the 
“wilderness of nuclear have-nots.” Sabherwal’s deliberations continue to reveal the 
dilemma between the dual contradictive objectives of displaying the nuclear programme as 
peaceful and gaining maximum status by stressing its military potential. The latter objective 
becomes apparent in Sabherwal’s praise of the 1974 nuclear test:  
 
Let it also be said to the credit of Indian scientists that the first test at Pokhran was a 
resounding success yielding higher explosive power that the percentage reached in 
the first few atomic tests by the US or Russia. … . First and foremost, the 
underplaying of India’s nuclear capability must end. The world must be given a full 
picture of the attainments of Indian nuclear institutions and the status of India’s 
nuclear capability. Tell the world the facts, for India has nothing to hide. Having 
attained weapon capability as early as 1968-70, the fact that India has refrained from 
conducting a series of tests is no crime.455 
 
Sabherwal finally concludes that “India’s place in the NPT, if that treaty is to play its 
declared role of ending the spread of nuclear weapons, can only be as a weapon power, the 
status given to the five others, irrespective of its arsenal or stock of weapon-grade 
                                                 
453 Sabherwal, O.P.: op.cit.. In: Indian Express, August 25th 1995. 
454 Sabherwal, O.P. “India’s nuclear achievements: A matter of pride.” In: The Indian Express, November 25th 
1995. 
455 ibid. 
 243
plutonium.”456 This conclusion, which was inherent in most accounts focusing on nuclear 
weapons and India’s standing in the mid-1990s, weakened the morally-driven rhetoric 
against the NPT because it implied the recognition of the NPT as the framework of the 
global nuclear order if India would be accepted as nuclear weapons state. Once again, the 
pragmatic quest for international status and prestige clashed with the moralist principles 
attached to India’s nuclear policy. 
The ambiguity of accepting discrimination as soon as one’s own position shifts from the 
discriminated to the discriminating was recognised by few among India’s opinion leaders.  
As an example of this ideology is that of Amrita Abraham who writes: “Even though the 
nuclear powers cannot, in fairness, object to an Indian test on their own account, they are 
duty bound to do so on behalf of 165 other nations, among them close allies, who have 
foregone nuclear weapons by signing the NPT.”457 
 
After the conclusion of the CTBT in mid-1996, the escalating debate on the perceived 
unfairness of the international order focused on nuclear testing as the ultimate way to 
express India’s objection to it. In an account published in September 1996, K. Sundarji 
considers nuclear testing necessary to increase India’s standing against the pressures from 
nuclear ‘haves’ (although he refers to the term ‘self-confidence’ rather than ‘standing’).458 
Sundarji foresaw that India’s nuclear tests would be followed by Pakistan’s own nuclear 
testing.  But he accepted these dynamics, saying “[t]his should not worry us, for Pakistan 
has the same right to cater to its self-defence as we have.”459 Beyond Pakistani tests, he also 
anticipates international repercussions:  
 
The U.S. will organise world wide protests and create a furore, but I am convinced 
that there would not be any effective or long lasting repercussions, political, 
economic or technological. Unfortunately, we have continued to nurse the 
inferiority complex of colonial subjects even after Independence as the protection 
offered by non-alignment in a bipolar world did not force us to develop a backbone. 
With the disappearance of the Soviet Union, and the greatly augmented bullying 
power of the U.S., we seem to have lost what little self-confidence we developed 
during the Cold War era. We are the only country in the world that has voluntarily 
abstained for 22 years after a first test even in the face of live nuclear threats, in the 
vain hope that the world would move towards universal nuclear disarmament. If we 
need to test now, to establish or re-establish the credibility of our nuclear deterrence 
capability, let us do so without any moral qualms or exaggerated fears of 
repercussions. Soon enough the doomsday scenarios of some economists and others 
would be shown up to the myths that they are. As a result, I hope that at long last, 
Indian self-confidence will come age.460 
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Sundarji’s predictions proved to be largely consistent with the events of 1998. 
This consistency is also an indication of the strong influence the analyses of Sundarji et. al. 
had on the government’s nuclear policy.  
 
The dynamics of the debate compelled the political decision-makers, who were rather 
uninformed on details of strategic and foreign policy making but quite sensitive in 
capturing public sentiments, to follow the strategists’ rationale.  
The strategists’ success in shaping public opinion on the nuclear issue rested on their ability 
to describe India’s interaction with other powers in the global nuclear order simplistically 
and as a great game between the righteous and the evil. The often overdrawn 
characterisation of the actors involved frequently referred to stereotypes rather than 
nuanced portrayals.  
 
This section has so far revealed how great an influence the dynamics of the debate on 
nuclear weapons and India’s international standing had in determining India’s course 
towards nuclear breakthrough in 1998.  
Also significant are those aspects that were widely ignored by analysts. During the final 
years before the nuclear tests of 1998, not a single account of the nuclear issue addressed 
possible motives of the large majority of nuclear ‘have-nots’ to forego nuclear armament 
and to join the international non-proliferation regime as official non-nuclear weapons 
states. While the non-proliferation regime was unanimously considered unacceptable to 
India’s pride and dignity, the question whether a vast majority of the other countries in the 
world had lower standards in terms of national pride was not raised. Accordingly, K. 
Sundarji praised India’s voluntary 22-year abstinence from nuclear testing as evidence of 
India’s moral superiority but ignored the fact that all but six countries did not conduct any 
tests at all.461 Most strategists considered the voluntary acceptance of the status of non-
nuclear weapons state by most countries as a self-defeating policy. 
 
 
11.5. Joining the ‘Nuclear Club’ 
 
In the months before May 1998, most nuclear related articles called for India to ‘join the 
nuclear club’, which became a fixed expression and was used as a synonym for conducting 
nuclear tests. The strategic elite was aware of the fact that this ‘joining’ could only be done 
by force (i.e. by establishing nuclear facts), and that India would not be formally admitted 
by its members (the five nuclear weapons states recognised by the NPT provisions). 
Immediately after the testing on May 12th 1998, the opinion leaders’ attitudes towards the 
international nuclear order changed from its categorical rejection on moral grounds to a 
much more favourable position. This abrupt change in attitude becomes apparent in an 
analysis by C. Raja Mohan published one day after the testing: 
 
As it gate-crashes into the nuclear weapons club, New Delhi is signalling that it is 
ready for a nuclear bargain with the United States. The Indian objective is to limit 
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the damage and ensure a modus vivendi between India and the international nuclear 
order that New Delhi has now shaken to the core. … . With this package India is 
communicating to the United States that as it becomes a formal nuclear weapon 
state, New Delhi is prepared to undertake the full responsibilities of a great 
power.462 
 
This statement points out two pillars of India’s redefined self-perception after the tests. 
First, India’s major power status was deduced from its self-declaration as a nuclear 
weapons state.463 Second, bargaining on India’s new role within the international system 
was considered a matter between India and the USA. In a follow-up analysis one day later, 
Mohan rejects the negative repercussions particularly from Australia, Germany and Japan 
as hypocritical due to their status as mere satellites of the USA, who enjoy protection under 
the American nuclear umbrella.464 Most of the status oriented accounts published in the 
immediate aftermath focus on the reactions by the USA, other members of the ‘nuclear 
club,’ and on their ‘proxies,’ who are countries allied with nuclear powers, most notably 
Japan and to a lesser extent Germany and Australia. Reactions from most countries that had 
neither nuclear ambitions nor enjoyed protection from a nuclear power were widely 
excluded. 
 
Negative repercussions from nuclear weapons states or their ‘proxies’ were generally 
dismissed as hypocritical and often commented on with unacknowledged gratification. As 
K. P. S. Menon remarks, “[n]uclear weapon powers see their cosy little world of nuclear 
supremacy dissolving before their eyes. They react with the petulance of a spoilt child 
deprived of its toys.”465 
Japan’s negative reaction to India’s nuclear tests was more rhetorically explicit and drastic 
by means of imposing sanctions. The reason for this harsh reaction – with Japan as the only 
victim of a nuclear attack – was largely rejected by India’s commentators.  They pointed to 
United States’ security guarantees, including nuclear deterrence protection, and to Japan’s 
own nuclear achievements, which ostensibly included military applications. C. Raja Mohan 
concludes: 
 
Japan has resolved its short-term security problems by reinvigorating its alliance 
with the U.S.  But caught between China, a large rising nuclear neighbour, and the 
U.S., a fickle and distant ally, Japan cannot but quietly contemplate the acquisition 
of nuclear weapons in the future. India can easily empathise with the Japanese 
nuclear dilemma. It cannot, however, accept the political hypocrisy of Japan that 
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relies on nuclear weapons for its own security but preaches the virtues of non-
proliferation to New Delhi.466 
 
By comparing Japan’s nuclear ambitions to its rising nuclear neighbour of China, Mohan 
implicitly draws a parallel to India’s strategic situation.467 
 
The most structured analysis of international reactions to India’s tests was provided by J.N. 
Dixit.468 Dixit begins his account by citing Winston Churchill: “‘it is better to be alone in 
the deciding what is right and relevant than being part of a crowd going downhill in every 
sense of the term.’”469 Subsequently, Dixit subdivides the international reactions into six 
categories: 
 
The first category could be described as macro-level strategic and political 
pressures. These consist of official statements by the nuclear powers individually 
criticising or condemning India. … . The second category is of sanctions by leading 
G-8 countries, specially the USA and Japan. … . The third category of pressures is 
even more pernicious and is an exercise in psychological warfare. These are 
propaganda exercises laced with pseudo-technical arguments. Pakistani scientists 
and some of their American friends put out information that India’s nuclear devices 
were not indigenous, that vital technical components were supplied by the Israelis, 
and were in fact operated by them in the tests. Some Pakistanis have even 
descended to personal attacks on the credentials of scientists in charge of India’s 
nuclear tests. The fourth type of pressure is the propaganda that Indian claims of 
nuclear, thermonuclear and sub-critical tests were not valid and that they were 
exaggerated. … . The fifth sort is to convey to India that it would not be legally 
acknowledged as a nuclear weapon… . The sixth category is the accusations 
levelled against India that its nuclear tests were the sole trigger for the latest 
proliferation phenomenon which may result in spread of nuclear weapons in South 
and West Asia.470 
 
Dixit’s structured account circumvents the critique of international strategists questioning 
the positive effect of nuclearisation to India’s security, as well as the critique by 
economists, who point to the enormous costs of the nuclear programme. Additionally, 
Dixit’s assessment of reactions to the sixth category appears questionable, as he ostensibly 
invalidates the negative effects on regional proliferation. While a vast majority of 
international comments acknowledged the negative effects on regional proliferation, only 
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very few of them purport this as being the ‘sole trigger for the latest proliferation 
phenomenon,’ as Dixit insinuates.  
 
Ironically, after having ignored international scepticism about the security benefits of 
India’s bomb in his analysis, Dixit concludes that “the world at large should also take note 
of Indian security and strategic concerns if it desires to overcome the present impasse.”471 
The notable feature of Dixit’s account was its illustration of how international reactions 
were perceived among India’s mainstream analysts rather than its applied analytic 
framework. While international criticism focused upon security or economy was largely 
overlooked, those repercussions aimed at the symbolic value of the nuclear tests for India’s 
prestige and standing were dealt with in detail. 
 
Two days after the tests, Shekhar Gupta commented in the Indian Express on India’s new 
international role.472 Gupta put the nuclear tests into the context of the India’s 50 years of 
experience in foreign policy matters. By quoting the precedent of Indira Gandhi’s short 
lived boost in popularity after the victorious Bangladesh war of 1971, Gupta warned the 
government about conducting emotional politics without a solid strategic policy or 
doctrine: 
 
That is the problem with mixing emotion and partisan politics with strategy and 
national interest and that is precisely what this government needs to guard against. 
The masses would always cheer any tremor at Pokhran but unless you build on it 
and give evidence of a clear strategic thought that strengthens the foundations of the 
national interest beyond the issue of earning international prestige, the euphoria 
could be short-lived and the same voters could turn around and ask uncomfortable 
questions.473 
 
According to Gupta, after having achieved the status of a nuclear weapons state, the 
responsibility of India’s leadership had increased with regard to its foreign policy 
formulation: 
 
The signals that go out from India now, the posture of our leadership and diplomats, 
need to reflect the mind of a mature, self-assured and powerful nation and not the 
reactions of a defensive, jingoistic and shaky establishment. The world by and large 
is not pleased with us. Today, there isn’t even the old Third World lobby of drum-
beaters unless a Castro, Gaddafi or Saddam decides to embarrass us by rising in our 
support. … . The intention behind the tests can only be to see that India is embraced 
back on the world’s centre-stage as a stronger power rather than be consigned to the 
sideline as some nuclear rogue.474 
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While mainstream opinion leaders were trying to accommodate the traditional patterns in 
which the international order was perceived to the changing conditions, the fundamental 
paradigm shift in India’s nuclear policy also created space for some analysts to question 
these patterns. Shekhar Gupta’s assessment of India’s redefined international standing 
avoided the emotional inclination inherent to conventional reporting on the issue and 
deliberately adopted a critical aloofness to the subject. His account was part of a growing 
number of elite explanations that reflected increased national self-assurance without 
adopting the nationalistic undertone of the general debate. These analyses were still 
exceptional in the emotionally heated aftermath of the tests, but they increased in number in 
the period of nuclear consolidation. 
 
Gupta’s critical appraisal of the public’s adulation was unique in the post-testing period. 
Most commentators unconditionally welcomed the wave of public enthusiasm and national 
pride. In J.N. Dixit’s view, this wave of national pride was less an outcome of short-lived 
partisan politics, but it rather showed that “the decision [was] being backed by informed 
public opinion,” which constituted an “important requirement … especially in a democracy 
like ours.”475 He asserts: 
 
There are elements in political circles and the media who have genuine doubts on 
whether these tests, which have attracted worldwide negative reaction, are 
necessary. While respecting that diversity of opinions is imperative in a democracy, 
the point is that between 87 and 89 per cent of Indian citizens have endorsed the 
tests in public opinion polls. A general feeling of self-confidence and national pride 
has been generated by the tests. It is in this context that India should fashion its 
policies in dealing with the problems and pressures that have arisen.476 
 
These contradicting estimations of the role of public opinion on the nuclear policy 
addressed by Dixit reflect two fundamentally different approaches to the dynamics of 
India’s democratic processes: the first approach unconditionally affirms the positive effects 
of democratic structures to India’s foreign policy outcomes, while the second approach 
critically assesses the effects of certain dynamics of India’s mass politics on its foreign 
policy formulation.  
 
The status-oriented comments in the immediate post-Pokhran period generally considered 
nuclear weapons as increasing, or at least not harming India’s security. Possible discord 
between the goal of enhancing India’s status and its quest for security remained 
unaccountable. The resulting ambiguity became visible in Manvendra Singh’s appreciation 
of India’s new role in the international system.477 In Singh’s view, China’s negative 
reaction to the tests showed a growing concern among the Chinese government that India’s 
nuclear build up posed an increasing threat to its security. Astonishingly, he welcomed 
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Chinese apprehension as a major achievement of the tests, as this showed that China was 
finally taking India’s activities seriously. 
Describing the pre-testing situation, Singh claims: 
 
Anybody who thought Indian concerns were taken seriously internationally, or even 
regionally, suffers from self-delusion. While recognising India as its main adversary 
of the future, the People’s Republic of China attached a rider – India would have to 
do something drastic to change its power equations in order to become the threat 
that it is capable of becoming. … . The reaction of the conservative communo-
capitalist ruling in Beijing is, therefore, the most satisfying. If the People’s Republic 
is forced to call for international action against India it means they have understood 
the magnitude of the technologies involved in Shakhti ’98.478 
 
Singh’s satisfaction with the negative reactions from China ignored the nuances of Indo-
Chinese interaction in the immediate aftermath of the tests: China’s immediate reaction to 
India’s tests was modest at best, signalling its intention to tacitly accept the new situation. 
Only after the leaking of Prime Minister Vajpayee’s letter to President Clinton, calling the 
Chinese threat the true reason for the tests, China was coerced to react in a more resolved 
declaratory policy. Chinese criticism, however, was not primarily aimed at the nuclear tests 
as such, but at India’s undiplomatic handling of the post-test situation. 
 
A recurring aspect of the analyses of Indo-Chinese relations was the still omnipresent 
humiliation of 1962, particularly among those comments made by the military-strategic 
section of India’s elite. Retired Major-General K.K. Ganguly started his summary of the 
changes of Sino-Indian relations after the nuclear tests by highlighting the paramount role 
of the USA in shaping Asian strategic competition. According to Ganguly: 
 
[A]s the sole global power, America’s interest is in ensuring no powerful voice 
emerges to question its hegemony. China was a potential threat. But the US have 
bought Chinese support by conceding their every demand and by admitting her in 
the group of global ‘haves’. India cannot be allowed to emerge, in this situation, as 
yet another potential challenging voice. So despite the American interest in the huge 
Indian market, the US Administration cannot accept India’s assertion of its nuclear 
option. Further, India’s defiance of the unjust global nuclear order has resulted in a 
severe loss of face for America as far as the world community is concerned. It is for 
this reason that the US is refusing to recognise India as a nuclear weapon state 
despite the fact that she has nuclear warheads as well as their means of delivery.479 
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Ganguly’s view that American non-proliferation policy was guided not by its concerns 
about nuclear dangers but rather by its wish to maintain its global supremacy was 
commonly accepted among India’s elite.480 
His position reflects disappointment about the international refusal to formally accept India 
as a nuclear weapons state. This formal recognition was expected by most commentators in 
the immediate days following the nuclear tests. With regard to China, Ganguly assumes 
that Chinese official statements were guided by two motives: first by security concerns, 
particularly along its common border in the Himalayans and second, in a broader sense, by 
the fear to lose its supreme status in Asia. In Ganguly’s view: 
 
Possessing both the status of a ‘legitimate’ nuclear weapon state as well as the 
permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council, China would have 
definitely liked to see India remaining a non-nuclear weapon state. Chinese long 
term interest would have been best served had India been forced to sign the CTBT 
and NPT. China knows India is the only country with the potential to be not only a 
regional Asian rival but also a contender for global status in the 21st century. With a 
nuclear weapon monopoly in Asia, China would have always been able to blackmail 
India in case the latter sought to regain lost Indian territory including areas gifted 
away to China by Pakistan. Thus India’s emergence as a nuclear weapon state has 
considerably jeopardised Chinese calculations.481 
 
Inherent to Ganguly’s suggestion is that India should attack China and seize ‘lost Indian 
territory,’ as China was no longer in the position to react to such an attack with ‘blackmail.’  
This is an alarming product of the overflowing nationalistic hype among large sections of 
India’s elite and public in the aftermath of the tests. 
His analysis focused on China as India’s direct competitor within the international status 
competition and on the USA as the dominator of the international nuclear system which had 
just been crushed by India. In Ganguly’s view, Pakistan played only a minor role in the 
status competition. This view was guided by his disbelief about Pakistan’s ability to test: 
 
The world is aware of the manner in which Pakistan has been trying to attain 
nuclear capability. The time has now come to call Pakistan’s bluff about her nuclear 
weapon status. … . Pakistan’s interests will be best served in maintaining the 
ambiguity to give the impression that it has refrained from nuclear testing only to 
honour the requests made by powerful friends like the US and China and obtain 
maximum mileage from the same in terms of international support, concessions, 
funds and weaponry. This will safeguard her status as an undeclared nuclear weapon 
country. Is it surprising that Pakistan could claim, and convince the world of, parity 
with India in all fields despite vast differences between the two countries in terms of 
size, population, resources and potential?482 
 
                                                 
480 This view is shared by strategic elites in other countries as well. 
481 Ganguly, K.K.: op.cit. In: The Statesman, May 28th 1998. 
482 ibid. 
 251
Ironically, Ganguly’s lack of confidence in Pakistan’s capacity to test was published in The 
Statesman on May 28th 1998, the same day that Pakistan conducted its first nuclear test in 
response to India’s testing two weeks earlier. 
 
An interesting contribution to the debate on India’s standing in the world, and its 
competition with China and Pakistan, was Saeed Naqvi’s glossary “Maybe a bomb for the 
front pages.”483 In his sarcastic account complemented by several anecdotes, he complains 
about the great attention China was receiving in the American capital of Washington due to 
its military might.  At the same time, India was pushed to the side lines together with 
Pakistan, on the margins of public and political attention. Naqvi concludes: 
 
Of course, this is all part of the global imbalances, but the scale on which these 
imbalances manifest themselves on the Indian mind says something of our general 
sense of uncertainty of where we stand in world affairs. For a country of our size 
and depth with an abiding though sometimes sullen self esteem, the uncertainty as 
to where we were going to be slotted in the family of nations was disconcerning. 
The consequent neurosis was in some measure at the bottom of caste, communal, 
regional tensions. It would be silly to imagine that a bomb is the ultimate answer. 
But it could be a beginning. At least it might be an insurance against our being 
relegated to the next lower slot.484 
 
The main theme of the glossary mirrors the general mood of India’s elite in the post-
Pokhran phase.  However,  the degree of self-doubt and the soft language, exemplified by 
phrases including ‘global imbalances’ instead of ‘discrimination’ and ‘family of nations’ 
instead of ‘international regime,’ was quite exceptional in this period. 
 
Once the dust on the Pokhran test site had settled, the previously emphatic repudiation on 
any criticism on the part of Western countries changed into a more careful assessment of 
the overall international reaction. This process of reappraisal was initiated by two articles in 
The Hindu in early July 1998.485 K.K. Katyal identifies a window of opportunity in some of 
the more balanced reactions among the major powers: “[n]ot all of the terms set by the 
nuclear powers and their proxies (their beneficiaries of the nuclear umbrella) are acceptable 
to India, but most of the points, made by them, have served as the basis for a dialogue with 
a promise of positive results.”486 Beyond this, reactions by India’s South Asian neighbours 
were perceived as even more promising for improved future relations: “New Delhi has 
reasons to be satisfied with the reactions in the neighbourhood (apart from Pakistan which 
is in a different category).”487 Pran Chopra identifies a similar window of opportunity but 
stresses the need for improved efforts by India itself: 
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Taken together, [the international reactions] suggest that some significant countries 
might pay more attention to India’s future nuclear policy if it is set out firmly and 
clearly, with the stamp of a national consensus upon it, and behind it a will, all the 
more steady for being calm, free of the bellicosity which some of us mistook to be 
proof of our patriotism in the heady days immediately after the Pokhran tests and 
free of the bombast which made it appear more ambitious and more 
uncompromising than in fact it is.488 
 
The views among India’s strategic elite on which course the country should adopt in the 
nuclear field oscillated between those favouring a clear path towards the development of 
applicable nuclear weapons capabilities and those maintaining that the value of nuclear 
weapons for India was purely symbolic. These two diverging positions are illustrated 
within two exemplary accounts. In the first article, Jasjit Singh makes the case for 
recognition of security seeking as the sole motive for the build up of India’s bomb, while 
emphatically neglecting any prestige value.489 In the second article, Pushpa M. Bhargava 
calls for a shift in India’s declaratory policy to make clear to the world that its intentions 
were purely aiming at the symbolic value of nuclear weapons.  As such, they do not pose 
any security threat to other powers.490 
 
Jasjit Singh laments that the exchange of bellicose rhetoric between Indian and Pakistani 
leaders after the tests had obscured the true intentions of India’s nuclear programme: 
 
The verbal duels between the leaders of the two countries are likely to continue. But 
there is a need to pragmatically assess the direction in which we are heading. First, 
there is a need to rethink why India needs nuclear weapons. The only reason is to 
provide insurance against nuclear threat (‘blackmail’ or hegemony, as the Chinese 
describe it) and possible use. We do not need them for power or prestige. India’s 
status in the final analysis will be governed by how successful we solve our 
problems. This, no doubt, has been the basis of the four-decades-old consensus that 
we will not commit to being non-nuclear, at least not until the nuclear weapons 
states give up these horrendous tools of coercion and destruction.491 
 
Singh presents the classical view of India’s security-oriented strategic thinkers on nuclear 
weapons: the prime role these weapons played for India was the fending off of any 
potential blackmail attempt by other nuclear weapons states. According to Singh, 
preventing nuclear blackmail would have been ideally achieved through global 
disarmament, but after India had accepted that this was not feasible, it had to acquire the 
bomb as its second best option.  
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One major inconsistency within the ‘blackmail’ theme was the question as to why only 
India was in need of protection against nuclear blackmail, while a vast majority of the 
world’s countries did not feel such a need and therefore avoided the developing nuclear 
weapons. Singh carefully circumvents this pitfall by claiming that “instead of moving 
toward disarmament the international community, led by the five nuclear weapons states, 
has shifted the focus instead to ‘non-proliferation.’ Measures have been increasingly 
deployed to tighten the non-proliferation stranglehold, especially to India.”492 While India 
had been perceived by its strategic elite as the leader of either the Third World countries, 
or, for that matter, the ‘community of nuclear have-nots,’ Singh’s statement reflects a 
changed self-image. India was no longer perceived as representing the nuclear have-nots, as 
these countries had now joined forces against India together with the ‘nuclear haves.’ 
According to the widely accepted view among India’s strategists, India now played the role 
of the lonely moralist struggling against the unjust world order. This changed ‘all-against-
one’ theme became dominant during the negotiations to the NPT extension in 1995, when 
India finally ceased being the only major country voting against it.  They persisted up to the 
period of nuclear consolidation.  
 
Jasjit Singh rejects the concerns of a looming nuclear arms race with Pakistan by raising the 
following question: “do the events of the past six weeks indicate that we are now well set 
on an ‘arms race’? The answer is a categorical no. There is no requirement for an arms 
race. Deterrence is not dependent on matching weapon to weapon, but on the ability to 
retaliate with a residual capability.”493 
 
In sum, Singh’s assessment of the post-Pokhran situation was a reminder to India’s policy 
makers, opinion leaders, and public at large, to bring the nuclear issue back into the realm 
where it, belonged: in the field of national security and strategy. 
The assessment of Pushpa M. Bhargava, on the other side, contrasted sharply to Singh’s 
security-oriented approach. First of all, Bhargava tackles the question of why India had to 
acquire the bomb while other, more advance countries did not: 
 
We should not forget in this context that Japan and Germany have not wasted their 
resources on nuclear armament – in fact on any kind of armament. Indeed, they do 
not have to, as their capabilities are recognised the world over and their contribution 
to world economy is far too important for anyone to think of waging any war, leave 
aside a nuclear war, against them. Wouldn’t that be a better example to emulate, 
rather than nuclear powers such as the U.S.?494 
 
This approach differed remarkably from the conventional explanations that pointed to the 
USA’s nuclear umbrella under which Japan and Germany were positioned. The rationale of 
economic prowess as a natural protection against any military attack appeared, however, 
somewhat naïve, and was surely not convincing to security-oriented analysts like Jasjit 
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Singh. This rational was bound to a very peculiar understanding of nuclear weapons as 
symbols of modernity and technical sophistication, which, according to Bhargava, was the 
true currency (in contrast to military power) of the competition among states. This view, 
which was genuine to a large section of India’s nuclear scientific community,495 is 
illustrated in Bhargava’s further deliberations: 
 
Our scientists and technologists are surely not less capable than their counterparts in 
the nuclear powers, Japan or Germany. We know that but it is important that this be 
demonstrated to the rest of the world…. . In no other country in the world, 
dishonesty and corruption increase exponentially with affluence as they do in ours. 
Therefore, unless we demonstrate that we can make nuclear weapons, test them with 
finesse, and do it all in a way that has never been done before, no one will believe 
that we can do so – and that we can do so totally by ourselves, without the help from 
outside.496 
 
While this view on the symbolic meaning of the bomb was implicit in many other 
assessments on the nuclear issue in this period, Bhargava’s deliberations were nevertheless 
remarkably explicit on this symbolism. 
 
Similar to Jasjit Singh, Bhargava calls for a clear identification of the raison d’être of the 
nuclear programme. His suggestion as to how this should look greatly contrasted with 
Singh’s ideas. According to Bhargava: 
 
[T]he nuclear explosions need to go along with a tenable raison d’être for it: that we 
have done it only to show that we can do it and act responsibly afterwards; that is, 
give a guarantee (that no traditional nuclear powers ever gave at the first 
weaponisation of their nuclear programme) that we would never, absolutely never, 
stockpile or use nuclear weapons even though we can. We should have made it 
absolutely clear that we have not carried out the nuclear explosions for security 
reasons as nuclear arms in today’s world do not provide any security whatsoever, on 
the contrary they lay the foundation for an extended and avoidable world conflict. 
We should have stated, along with the news of the explosion, that the purpose of the 
explosion was not defence or offence or to build a nuclear arsenal, but to 
demonstrate the absurdity of the NPT and CTBT in their present form, and to show 
that a sense of responsibility is not the prerogative of the developed nations or the 
existing nuclear powers alone. By voluntarily giving up the right to further nuclear 
tests and to stockpile nuclear weapons, even while possessing the ability to do so, at 
the time of the first announcement of the explosion, we could have set an example 
and used the explosion for building solidarity among the developing and non-
nuclear nations, and among thinking, responsible, and peace-loving individuals 
around the world, cutting across national boundaries of every hue and colour.497 
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He assumes that if India would have negated any military relevance of its tests, it would 
have been admired by the world as a responsible and peace-loving nation.  He believes that 
this would thereby generate a wave of solidarity among the developing and non-nuclear 
nations. Bhargava’s approach reveals a rather incomplete understanding of the dynamics of 
world affairs and the way India’s nuclear achievements were perceived by the international 
audience.  
 
Bhargava nevertheless concludes his account by highlighting scientists’ deep understanding 
of the field of politics. In his view, “responsible scientists may find it difficult to negotiate 
the corrupt and murky terrain of today’s politics, at least in our country, but they 
understand politics a great deal more than politicians (including scientist politicians) 
understand science and technology.”498 
 
 
11.6. India as Emerging Power: Prepared Grounds 
 
Once the patriotic hype in the immediate aftermath of the tests abated, accounts on India’s 
new status in the global arena decreased in number.  Other aspects of the nuclear issue, 
such as its relevance for Indo-Pakistan relations and aspects of doctrine formulation, came 
to the fore. 
 
Between late 1999 and early 2002, prestige and standing in relation to nuclear weapons 
became almost an anathema. It was addressed in greater detail only in May 2002 on the 
fourth anniversary of the tests. In an account on India’s success in consolidating its claims 
as an emerging great power, V. R. Raghavan draws a rather grim picture:  
 
Four years after the nuclear tests of 1998 is a good time to assess India’s stock as a 
regional and global strategic player. Great power status and consolidation of India’s 
claims to it were claimed to be the primary aim of the tests. The ‘resurgence of 
India,’ which the tests were supposed to herald, seems today some long distance 
away.499 
 
According to Raghavan, the main reason India was unable to transform its nuclear 
ambitions into increased international standing was its failure to incorporate its newly 
created nuclear capabilities into a credible and responsive defence structure:  
 
The nuclear doctrine of the nation hangs in limbo, with neither its authors not the 
Government claiming it to be official, legitimate or authoritative. There is no known 
nuclear command authority; the chain of command is unclear to both friends and 
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adversaries. There is no nuclear risk reduction dialogue among the Indian, Chinese 
and Pakistani Governments.500 
 
However, Raghavan claims that India’s nuclear policy was nevertheless successful in 
generating attention by the international community of states: “It is not as if no successes 
were gained by the BJP-led Government which went in for the tests. The tests moved India 
from being a covert nuclear weapons possessor to an overt one. It certainly made the major 
powers take note of the new boy on the block.”501 Raghava’s analysis reflects the aloofness 
that came to dominate the accounts on the nuclear issue in the period of nuclear 
consolidation.  These sharply contrast the bellicose, agitating rhetoric of the immediate pre- 
and post-test period.  
 
Since the year 2000, few aspects of the nuclear issue were able to trigger heated and 
passionate responses within India’s media. Among these were the fears of a nuclear 
escalation that were expressed in the international media during the Indo-Pakistani standoff 
along the LoC in Kashmir during 2002.  These fears were also fuelled by the war rhetoric 
of officials in both countries’ governments. These internationally expressed fears were 
largely dismissed by offended Indian commentators. As Sevanti Nina asks, “[w]hat is the 
basis for the incredible nuclear war hysteria that the Western media built up through the 
latter half of May? … . Are white nuclear superpowers more responsible than brown 
nuclear states?”502 Nina’s remark reflected the deep seated sense of victimisation that had 
guided the elite’s rhetoric prior to 1998 against the discriminatory international order, and, 
in 2002, was directed against Western concerns about the nuclear dangers that in the elite’s 
view was largely motivated by racist attitudes. 
 
Allegations of racism by the ‘Western’ world were frequently made in both directions. The 
‘West’ was blamed for not paying enough attention to India, but then as in the 2002 crisis, 
was blamed for paying too much attention. As evidence in support of his allegations of 
‘Western’ media, Ninan cites articles from The Wall Street Journal, The Washington Post, 
The New York Times, and USA Today, thereby indicating the general focus of India’s elite 
on America as the epitome of the stereotyped concept of the ‘West.’ 
 
Next to the escalating situation in Kashmir and international reactions to it, one might 
expect another event in 2002 to have revived the debate on nuclear weapons and 
international standing: the self-declaration of North Korea as a nuclear weapons state. 
However, reactions in India to the emergence of the ninth nuclear power were minimal. 
One of the very few analyses on this development was made by Jasjit Singh, who raises this 
question:  
 
What does a nuclear North Korea mean for the region and the world? … . In the 
absence of any move toward disarmament, North Korea acquiring nuclear weapons 
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in violation of treaty obligations is likely to increase the incentives for other 
countries to acquire such weapons increasing the prospects of further 
proliferation.503 
 
Jasjit Singh’s assessment on nuclearised North Korea and the significant lack of further 
commentary on this issue indicates the pitfall that the North Korean case posed for the 
apologists of India’s nuclear course. India’s acquisition of nuclear weapons was justified 
above all as an act of emancipation against a discriminatory nuclear order. This logic would 
have suggested that the apologists’ justification would endorse North Korea’s 
achievements, as well. However, it did not. In this context, Jasjit Singh’s argument that 
North Korea’s nuclear achievements cause instability in Asia and increase the prospects of 
proliferation because it was done illegally by violating international law appears rather 
weak. North Korea had joined the NPT but then left it (in accordance to the treaty’s 
provisions), while India had never done so. Beyond this subtle distinction, Singh was 
unable to present any more substantive argument as to why nuclear proliferation was 
destabilising, dangerous, and illegal for North Korea, but conversely, an act of 
emancipation and a responsive quest for security for India. 
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12. The “Colonialist” Stereotype: Indo-US Relations 
 
 
12.1. US Non-Proliferation Pressures and Indian Sensitivities 
 
Within the perception of India’s elite, the USA epitomised the forefront of the 
discriminatory order well before it emerged as the sole superpower in the course of the 
1990s. When referring to the ‘West’ as the oppressor of the poor, developing, or, for that 
matter ‘nuclear have-nots,’ India’s elite were actually referring to the USA. Similarly, when 
blaming ‘Western media’ for an imbalanced coverage of India’s action, India’s opinion 
leaders quoted American newspapers. Reasons for this almost exclusive focus on America 
and the wide indifference to other Western countries, the Soviet Union / Russia, or even 
China, were manifold. First of all, American officials pushed forward their non-
proliferation objectives more explicitly and directly than, for example, the EU. Secondly, 
the USA was perceived to be the direct successor of colonialist Europe, thereby allegedly 
adopting similarly colonialist and discriminatory attitudes.504 Thirdly, thanks to English 
language, American media was directly accessible to India’s elite. Fourthly, America’s 
policy towards South Asia carried several inconsistencies, particularly with regard to 
alternating military assistance and military sanctions to Pakistan,505 thus giving the 
impression that South Asia was little more than a playing field for global US power 
politics. Sixthly, the USA, as the perceived leader of the exclusive club to which India so 
passionately sought admission, proved to represent a compelling archetype for the hopes 
and visions of India’s elite for their own country. This dimension of India’s relationship 
with the USA explains the high degree of passion in the commentary that not only reflects 
disgust about the perceived discrimination, but also some degree of admiration.  This was 
regularly transformed into reverse feelings of indignation each time the USA denied India’s 
quest for admission to the club of the world’s leading powers.  
 
The strong cognitive bias in India’s perception of America’s non-proliferation policy was 
further aggravated by the often insensitive rhetoric applied by American policy makers. 
Their recurring call to ‘cap, reduce and eliminate’ India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear 
capabilities was frequently brought forward in a paternalist mode. According to Stephen P. 
Cohen:  
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It is harder to imagine a formulation that was more threatening to the vast majority 
of Indian security experts, whose chief goal was to retain the option, not to exercise 
it or to abandon it. Incredibly, senior U.S. officials continue to use this formulation 
in public speeches, ensuring that the bomb lobby’s interpretation of a malign U.S. 
policy will remain dominant for the foreseeable future.506 
 
Commentary on the allegedly misguided American non-proliferation efforts was most 
frequent during the height of the non-proliferation debate in the mid-1990s. However, the 
recurring features of the debate were already present in the 1970s. In an Indian Express 
editorial of May 1979, the author comments on the American efforts to establish a nuclear 
weapons free zone in South Asia by giving India and Pakistan security guarantees against 
any form of nuclear threat or blackmail by the existing nuclear weapons powers. As the 
author observes: 
 
The U.S. Government continues to show a blind obstinacy and lack of 
understanding in its continuing attempts to force this country to accept full scope 
international inspection of its nuclear facilities. The latest attempt … is even more 
unintelligent than some previous moves. It envisages a nuclear free zone in South 
Asia, with a guarantee from the U.S., USSR and China that they would not threaten 
the countries of this region – principally India and Pakistan – with nuclear attack.507 
 
In security terms, the suggested nuclear weapons free zone formally guaranteed by the 
nuclear powers would solve almost all of India’s concerns: it would stop Pakistan’s nuclear 
programme before it could pass the threshold; it would mitigate the Chinese nuclear threat; 
it would cement India’s regional supremacy, established in 1971; and, most importantly, it 
would fix India’s conventional superiority towards Pakistan. The American proposal was 
nevertheless widely rejected by India’s elite, because it deprived India of the crucial interest 
attached to its nuclear programme: international standing. This shortcoming was 
subsequently expressed by the Indian Express article:  
 
Anyone who has followed India’s nuclear policy would realise that such a proposal 
does not go an inch forward to meet its objections to international arrangements that 
seek to give a handful of countries the right to manufacture and deploy nuclear 
weapons while denying it to others. … . Just because India has shown restraint in its 
nuclear programme, and in fact has unilaterally vowed not to make nuclear weapons 
does not mean that it will accept an inferior status to countries that have no such 
scruples. That would be to turn international morality upside down.508 
 
The leitmotif of a perceived morally superior India fighting against a discriminatory world 
order, in which its peaceful intentions were defied, was inherent to most commentary on 
Indo-American nuclear relations for the following two decades. Finally, the author referred 
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to yet another recurring feature of the debate, that is, the double standard applied by India’s 
elite with regard to the status of India and Pakistan. The Indian battle against discrimination 
– even if it was done so in the name of all ‘have-nots’ – did not include Pakistan.  
According to the mainstream perception among India’s elite, Pakistan could not 
legitimately claim the same status India was claiming for itself. The author writes: 
 
If the big powers are anxious to stop further proliferation of nuclear weapons 
technology, surely it is Pakistan that should be persuaded to abandon the path. If 
guarantees are required, India would be happy to join other nuclear powers in 
pledging that it will never threaten Pakistan with nuclear weapons; in fact, this 
promise should carry more weight because it has no such weapons. But this country 
is already a nuclear power in the sense of having demonstrated the indigenous 
capability to explode a nuclear device. If it is to be equated with another country 
that country should obviously be China rather than Pakistan.509 
 
These remarks reveal three other features of the debate. First, the phrase “[i]f guarantees are 
required, India would be happy to join other nuclear powers in pledging that it will never 
threaten Pakistan”510 illustrates the widely adopted attitude of the opinion leaders on 
foreign policy issues to speak for their government in an ‘us-against-them’ pattern. This 
style often foreclosed any critique of the government’s action. It stemmed from the 
generally inward looking nature of the debate.  
 
The remarks also illustrate the complex semantic distinctions from which both, India’s 
perceived moral superiority and its nuclear status, were derived. The author calls India a 
‘nuclear power’ in terms of status because it has proven its nuclear weapons potential in the 
1974 test, but he negates this status when it comes to the immorality of nuclear weapons. 
This distinction was derived from official statements, declaring the 1974 test as a ‘peaceful 
nuclear explosion.’ This semantic quibbling was inherent in mainstream analyses on the 
nuclear issue. Finally, the author explicitly equates India’s status with the one from China, 
not Pakistan. This was in line with the elite’s general refusal to accept Pakistan at an equal 
level, and, in turn, their perception of China as India’s true competitor. 
 
Throughout the 1980s, the view of India’s elite towards US American non-proliferation 
efforts was determined by the American administration’s continued assurance that Pakistan 
did not embark on a nuclear weapons programme. This certification was the legal 
prerequisite for American military aid to Islamabad. In regards to Pakistan’s obvious 
progress in developing nuclear weapons that became apparent in the late 1970s, this 
continued certification was viewed by India’s foreign policy elite as an act of Realpolitik, 
motivated by America’s interests in Afghanistan. Finally, President Bush (sen.) refused to 
certify that Pakistan did not possess nuclear capabilities in October 1990 after the Soviet 
Union had left Afghanistan, and in compliance with the Pressler Amendment, US military 
and economic assistance was immediately suspended. Officially, the Bush administration 
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based its decision on U.S. intelligence reports in which Pakistan was alleged to have 
manufactured rudimentary nuclear devices in the late 1980s. 
 
Surprisingly, India’s strategic elite did not unanimously welcome this shift in American 
non-proliferation policy towards Pakistan. Instead, the implications of America’s policy 
shift were interpreted by India’s opinion leaders in diverse ways. Following, two 
fundamentally different positions on this issue are analysed in detail, namely Pran Chopra’s 
account published in November 1990,511 as well as the response to Chopra by K. Sundarji 
two weeks later.512 
 
Chopra begins by expressing worries about a possible nuclear arms race: “[o]n the face of it 
the U.S. is taking steps which should help to keep South Asia free of both Indian and 
Pakistani nuclear weapons. The result, paradoxically, might turn out to be to hasten both 
countries down the nuclear path and into a nuclear arms race”.513 Reason for this 
pessimistic prediction was the fact that American refusal to certify the non-existence of 
Pakistani nuclear capability would be taken as proof of its existence, which would increase 
public pressures on the Indian government to go ‘down the nuclear path.’ According to 
Chopra: 
 
[O]f course if the U.S. converts suspension into cessation, it will be seen as clear 
confirmation that the U.S. now fully shares India’s long standing conviction that 
Pakistan is not only at the nuclear threshold but has crossed it. In either case one can 
expect to see powerful pressures exerted by public opinion upon the government of 
India that it must respond to Pakistan in kind; that if India does not have a nuclear 
weapons programme yet, it must begin one now; and if India has a covert one it 
must be made public so that the right kind of message goes to Pakistan before that 
country launches some adventure in the expectation that it will catch India at a 
nuclear disadvantage. … . The government of India might also decide, as it seems to 
have done in 1974, that some suitable nuclear demonstration might give it some 
relief from current political pressures.514 
 
Chopra expected that such arming efforts by India would cause Pakistani reactions and 
accelerate the spiral towards a nuclear arms race. The chances that an Indo-Pakistani accord 
such as the suggested mutual no-first-use agreement, would materialise, were considered by 
Chopra as rather slim. K. Sundarji dismissed Chopra’s critical assessment on four points. 
The first incorrect assumption, according to Sundarji, is as follows: 
 
[O]nce countries like India and Pakistan go overtly nuclear, they are in for an 
unending nuclear arms race… . The question is not who has more and who has less, 
but whether in the event of nuclear deterrence failing, can a country do 
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‘unacceptable damage’ to the other in retaliation, with ‘unacceptable damage’ 
sensibly defined. As has been said, more is not better, if less is enough… . Nuclear 
arms racing therefore, would not be axiomatic. Further, missiles do not become 
obsolescent as soon as a later and better type has been introduced by the 
adversary.515 
 
Sundarji’s second dismissive point is that Chopra’s “implicit assumption that if India takes 
legitimate steps to defend itself against nuclear blackmail, and to deter China, it is 
committing a somewhat shameful if not immoral act,”516 is not convincing. Thirdly, 
Sundarji rejects Chopra’s belief that India was unable to catch up with China in the nuclear 
field. Fourthly, K. Sundarji concludes: 
 
Mr. Chopra feels that there is not much hope in the proposal that India and Pakistan 
make a ‘no first use’ declaration, because this would also be considered 
discriminatory like the NPT. I am afraid he has not understood the proposal. Any 
country which believes that nuclear weapons are only useful for deterrence, 
implicitly thinks only in terms of retaliatory use in the second strike mode, and is 
foreswearing a first strike option.517 
 
The last remark illustrates the dilemma of Sundarji’s course of argumentation, and, in 
retrospect, proves to be the reason why his predictions largely failed to materialise. The 
assumption that the use of nuclear weapons as a deterrence device would automatically lead 
to a no-first-use doctrine proved to be erroneous. On the contrary, Pakistan was forced to 
maintain its nuclear first strike option in order to establish a credible deterrence situation 
vis-à-vis India’s overwhelming conventional superiority. Also problematic is Sundarji’s 
implicit claim that India was self-evidently a “country which believes that nuclear weapons 
are only useful for deterrence.” His prediction on the non-emergence of an arms race 
explicitly rests on this understanding of what nuclear weapons were about, and more 
importantly, of what they were not about. It shows the general difficulties that military-
strategic thinkers including Sundarji have accepting the existence of non-security driven 
forces behind arming decisions. Sundarji correctly claims that orthodox deterrence theory 
suggests that a limited number of devices would suffice to maintain India’s security, but he 
proves to be wrong in concluding that this insight would cause India’s prestige-oriented 
strategic policy makers and mainstream strategic elite to accept any inferior nuclear arsenal 
vis-à-vis Pakistan.  
 
In sum, the accounts of Chopra and Sundarji encompass the full spectrum of opinion on 
this issue illustrate the general attempt by India’s elite to redefine Indo-American relations 
after America’s fundamental shift in its non-proliferation policy in 1989 and 1990.  
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12.2. The USA and the International Non-proliferation Regime 
 
Since 1991, the appraisal of Indo-US relations among India’s strategic elite became 
increasingly determined by the emerging debate on the international nuclear non-
proliferation regime. The portrayal of the international nonproliferation discourse in India’s 
media frequently rested on a simplified worldview, in which the world was basically split 
into the rich industrial ‘haves,’ led by the USA, and the community of discriminated Third 
World ‘have-nots,’ led by India. This pattern became increasingly predetermined in India’s 
mainstream public opinion, leaving no room for the appreciation of nuances. 
 
While this general pattern remained intact until 1998, some of the explicit arguments 
changed in the course of the evolving international debate on the NPT and the CTBT. In 
1991, India’s still favourable position towards the CTBT was considered part of its moral 
strength, while the initial rejection of the test ban by the USA was perceived as one of its 
major contradictions. Brahma Chellaney explains: 
 
The central contradiction in US policy is getting more pronounced: The world’s 
most powerful country insists on testing and producing more advanced nuclear 
weapons and maintaining the first-use doctrine in order to meet its security needs, 
but it wants other nations to forgo nuclear arms in the interest of world security. 
India can provide the intellectual leadership to the Third World on global 
disarmament issues. Having pursued a consistent and principled policy on 
disarmament since the Nehru years, India has the right credentials to spearhead the 
cause of global arms control.518 
 
Chellaney’s remarks show the great inclination elites have towards the idea that India is the 
leader of the poor and deprived. This theme is further reflected in Chellaney’s subsequent 
prediction on the outcome of the NPT negotiations: 
 
Getting a majority vote of all the parties for its extension may not be a simple 
matter, as was underscored by the failure of the 1990 NPT Review Conference to 
produce a final document due to dissensions over a CTB. Nonaligned nations inside 
the NPT regime are expected to demand a ban on testing of nuclear weapons, 
production of nuclear materials, and modernisation of weapons as a price for 
supporting the treaty’s extension.519 
 
In retrospect, these predictions were obviously on the wrong track, as the exact opposite 
occurred: the extension of the NPT received an overwhelming majority, with India as its 
isolated opponent; the demand of a ban on testing was fulfilled, but again India emerged as 
the isolated opponent of the CTBT; and finally, India turned into one of the most outspoken 
opponents of any agreement on banning the production of nuclear materials, the 
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modernisation of weapons, or any other agreement which would curtail its nuclear 
development. 
 
India’s isolation in the negotiations on NPT and CTBT became explicit in the voting on 
both regimes in 1995 and 1996 and caused some degree of confusion among India’s 
strategic elite with regard to the popular claim to represent the larger number of states, 
being the ‘Third World,’ the ‘nuclear have-nots,’ or the community of nonaligned states. 
The underlying misjudgement was caused by the above illustrated simplifies patterns in the 
elite’s perception of the international system. 
In 1992 the USA launched a new non-proliferation initiative for South Asia by suggesting a 
regional solution to this problem to be negotiated in a five-power conference. Prime 
Minister Narashima Rao first cautiously welcomed the initiative but later condemned it, as 
did India’s opinion leaders. In February 1992, C. Raja Mohan commented optimistically on 
the American proposal: 
 
India’s traditional emphasis on nuclear first principles and its refusal to engage in 
discussion on nuclear issues, except in a global context, had made New Delhi’s 
nuclear posture rigid and out of tune with the current international realities. … . 
India’s readiness to talk about proliferation and security issues even in a preliminary 
way should help bring the discussion down from the propaganda plane to the 
realistic one.520 
 
A chief obstacle to the constructive position of the Rao government was, according to 
Mohan, a dismissive public opinion. In his view, the “success of the new direction of 
India’s nuclear diplomacy rests on New Delhi’s ability to create a political consensus 
within the country. Given the change of nuclear course, an intensive public debate is 
absolutely essential.”521 In a follow-up article one month later, Mohan stated that the 
negative shift in Rao’s position on the American proposal was caused by the dismissive 
public opinion. Taking reference to his earlier article, Mohan states: 
 
[T]he Indian Government feels constrained in making any radical departures from 
its traditional nuclear policy, behind which there is a solid national consensus. 
Having effected fundamental economic reforms and risked the opprobrium of 
selling out to the IMF and World Bank, New Delhi can ill afford to be seen as 
compromising India’s sovereignty on the nuclear policy.522 
 
The negative effects of populist and partisan considerations on a constructive nuclear policy 
by the government were only implicitly indicated by Mohan, who abstained from giving 
any explanation on how this ‘solid national consensus’ had been reached and by whom it 
was shaped. Instead of addressing these negative effects in detail, he blames American 
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ignorance of the peculiarities of India’s domestic polity as the true reason why the 
negotiation initiative finally failed: 
 
The United States needs to show greater sensitivity to the imperatives of the 
domestic Indian consensus on the nuclear policy as well as the logic of its external 
security environment. It should be obvious to the Bush Administration that no 
Indian Government can give up its right to make nuclear weapons and expect to 
survive the domestic political onslaught.523 
 
The shortcoming of Mohan’s account, which follows the pattern among India’s opinion 
leaders to simply shift the blame to outside - preferably Western - powers instead of 
addressing the dynamics behind the government’s persistence on a purely destructive 
nuclear policy due to public pressures, was tackled by Achin Vanaik in May 1992.524 In his 
assessment, in which he takes a generally dismissive position on India’s nuclear weapons 
programme, Vanaik addresses some nuances of Indo-US relations by stating that “[a]fter 
all, the USA is not simply telling India to sign the NPT it is also saying that if this is 
unacceptable, India should propose something else to get the nuclear disarmament ball 
rolling.”525 Vanaik continues to declare that any kind of disarmament process was in India’s 
interests, thereby negating any value of nuclear weapons for India: “India missed the 
nuclear bus long ago. It has lived comfortably with the Chinese bomb. China has never 
attempted nuclear blackmail (the US has unsuccessfully) 526. … . The bomb as a currency of 
international power and prestige is a thoroughly devalued currency.”527 Vanaik refrains 
from further elaborating upon evidence in support of his claim of nuclear bombs being a 
‘devalued currency.’ He therefore fails to persuade the majority of India’s elite and public, 
who indeed consider the bomb as a valuable currency for the country’s international power 
and prestige.  
 
Vanaik subsequently drops the nuanced approach to US non-proliferation policy and 
instead refers to the stereotyped patterns of thought: 
 
If a South Asian NWFZ is the longer term goal there is much that the two countries 
can do in the short run to undercut US pressure and force it on to the defensive, 
diplomatically and politically. … . [I]t is the US that should be doing much more 
than it is to disarm itself if it is preaching disarmament to others. … . With the end 
of the cold war the US has less justification than ever for not acceding to a CTBT 
for fear of hurting its “Star Wars” ambitions. Washington should be put under 
pressure on this issue by linking India/Pakistan behaviour to US behaviour in this 
regard.528 
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As the perception of US non-proliferation policy as an instrument of discrimination had 
been a major psychological motive for the proponents of a nuclear arsenal in India’s 
discourse, Vanaik’s attempt to make a case for nuclear disarmament by appealing to similar 
sentiments failed to have any significant impact on India’s nuclear discourse. 
More substantial than this emotional approach was Pran Chopra’s critical stance on India’s 
nuclear policy, particularly with regard to its relations with the USA within the NPT 
negotiations. In his view: 
 
India’s position on the present NPT is also flawed by contradictions. The present 
treaty is indeed discriminatory. But how would it become less discriminatory if, as 
is urged by the best known among Indian enthusiasts of the bomb, India were 
allowed entry as well as the doors of the club were closed after that? Those then 
excluded would cry ‘discrimination’. … . Nor does India’s case make any more 
sense at its other extreme, that India will abandon its nuclear option only when 
everyone who has the bomb destroys it. That would end discrimination. But it 
would also end all hope of ending proliferation, because there is no earthly chance 
of universal nuclear disarmament by any date which has any relevance to any policy 
maker unless he is sitting on some other planet. Nor is it a realistic policy aim for 
India any longer (it might have been two decades ago) to become a nuclear weapon 
power on a par with China, or sufficiently close to par to reduce China’s nuclear 
arsenal to irrelevance through deterrence alone.529 
 
Chopra’s critique on India’s nuclear policy was supplemented by a plausible blueprint for a 
more effective policy. In Chopra’s view, the discriminatory nature of the ‘nuclear club’ 
could not be overcome by “letting India in and then shutting the door,”530 as most of India’s 
international relations specialists suggested, instead he supports conducting a policy that 
aims at devaluating the nuclear club’s privileges and responsibilities. To achieve this goal, 
Chopra suggests two major steps.  The first is as follows:  
 
[B]asing the club, and the responsibilities, privileges and restrictions of 
membership, and a phased equalisation of the rights of all members, on rules which 
should be negotiated afresh, in the light of present-day realities, on more universal 
principles, through more universal processes. That means they must be devised 
more openly, more through the U.N., more clearly within the final jurisdiction of the 
most universal body which exists today, namely the General Assembly, than 
happened when the present NPT was made.531 
 
The second step Chopra suggests is to conduct negotiations on disarmament on a bilateral 
level with those countries concerned, most prominently China. 
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Chopra’s suggestions faced several obstacles, particularly with regard to a strengthened 
U.N. involvement. He refrains from tackling the structural problems of the U.N. in which 
the five recognised nuclear weapon states had veto power. Further, the IAEA as the main 
institution in charge with nuclear affairs was largely discredited in India due to its 
safeguard regime. Despite such obstacles, Chopra’s approach was nevertheless one of the 
most constructive and convincing approaches towards a revised, more effective nuclear 
policy in the crucial years of India’s nuclear course in the 1990s. 
 
 
12.3. The Strobe Talbott Mission 
 
In the early and mid-1990s, several additional non-proliferation initiatives were launched. 
Next to the negotiations on the indefinite extension of the NPT as well as the creation of the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, efforts were made to achieve an agreement to control the 
spread of fissile material. Similar to the CTBT negotiations, India initially signalled its 
consent towards a possible fissile material cut-off treaty but withdrew its approval as soon 
as the negotiations were underway. Within India’s political party competition, those who 
advocated the benefits of such a regime for India’s security were soon displayed by populist 
political rivals as unpatriotic agents of Western neo-colonialist interests. The most 
comfortable way for political leaders to avoid such allegations was to simply say ‘no’ to 
any international agreement that would restrict India’s sovereignty. Under these 
circumstances, several initiatives launched by international non-proliferation bodies, as 
well as by the Clinton administration, failed.  
The Clinton administration in late 1992, and particularly the launch of several initiatives by 
the energetic U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott, starting in April 1994, 
stimulated the search for a new base of Indo-US nuclear relations.  
 
In 1994, the U.S. government also tightened its non-proliferation legislation by passing the 
Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act, known as the Glenn Amendment. In addition to the 
cancellation of military and economic assistance, it provided financial sanctions to those 
countries suspected of developing nuclear capabilities.  
Talbott’s innovative negotiating strategy had two components: he formally maintained the 
US American commitment to the idea of non-proliferation while at the same time signalling 
the willingness to tacitly accept India’s nuclear capabilities as a given fact, and he no longer 
insisted on demanding strict non-proliferation, which would de facto mean unproliferation 
in the Indian case. The strategy behind this was to strike a deal that would allow India to 
keep its secret nuclear capabilities without fearing international pressures, and, in return, 
officially commit to the international nuclear non-proliferation regime rather than blocking 
it. Realising that nuclear unproliferation in South Asia was unrealistic, Talbott thought that 
this pragmatic deal would benefit all parties.  It would allow India to use its capabilities 
effectively as existential deterrence devices, while at the same time would save the 
international regime from collapsing and continue to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons 
in other parts of the world. The main flaw of this strategy was that it missed the crucial 
point, as it was diametrically opposed to India’s non-security interests. India’s main 
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international objective was to gain recognition and prestige and to enjoy equal status to 
other major powers, especially within the nuclear field. A deal that would provide India 
with security but would withhold the benefits in terms of status and prestige was not 
acceptable to India’s strategic elite. The American bargaining leverage was significantly 
weakened by the fact that both the Bush (sen.) and Clinton administrations declared nuclear 
bombs as crucial component of the American arsenal to deter nuclear, biological and 
chemical attacks by ‘rogue states.’ Moreover, France and Britain continued to see their 
nuclear capabilities as prestigious devices, and important leverage to defend their privileged 
positions as permanent members of the UN Security Council. The unwillingness by the 
nuclear weapons states to reduce the political value of nuclear weapons proved to be a 
strong incentive to India’s quest for the bomb.  
 
Paradoxically, the more the Clinton Administration’s pragmatic approach opened up new 
windows of opportunity for India to solve the nuclear question, the more the proponents of 
a nuclear India felt the urgency to push forward and create irreversible nuclear facts. 
The discomfort of the nuclear bomb lobby with the Talbott initiative became visible in an 
analysis by Atul Aneja one week before Talbott’s first visit to New Delhi.532 The idea of 
allowing verifications of Pakistani and Indian nuclear sites by international inspectors as a 
first confidence building step was dismissed by Aneja on the ground that it would destroy 
the benefits of India’s nuclear ambiguity: “Since, nuclear ambiguity (whether India has a 
bomb or not) arguably increases deterrence, any evidence of dispossession can prove 
counterproductive. It can encourage hostile neighbours, who may be in clandestine 
possession of a bomb, to launch the first strike.”533 This argument contradicted the fact that 
India already possessed rudimentary nuclear devices, which was well known among India’s 
strategists in 1994. 
Further, Aneja dismisses the proposal to curb production of fissile material. In his view:  
 
Ending fissile production will encourage NPT crusaders in the American 
establishment and academics to increase pressure on India to take the next step of 
eliminating the existing plutonium stockpile. Roll-back will mean accepting NPT 
through the backdoor for it will be another route to eliminate India’s capability to 
produce weapons.534 
 
The rationale behind this argument was clear: while ostensibly applied to restrictions of the 
production of fissile material only, Indian acceptance of these restrictions would decisively 
weaken its opposition against further restrictions, such as provided for in the NPT. As the 
only way to avoid this pitfall, Aneja considers any restrictions on ‘India’s capability to 
produce weapons’ unacceptable per se, as they would mean accepting discrimination. In 
fact, the categorical nature of this position was the ultima ratio of India’s negative policy 
towards any international non-proliferation effort.  
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Finally, Aneja dismisses the proposal to curb the development of ballistic missiles: “Media 
reports suggest that Mr. Strobe Talbott will ask India not to deploy ballistic missiles (the 
Prithvi and the Agni). But the Indian counterview that it would reduce its potential missile 
arsenal, if the rest of the world does so, may not necessarily be seen as utopia.”535 This all-
out argument followed a similar logic as the aforementioned position on the fissile material 
cut-off. Along this logic, India would accept restrictions on ballistic missiles only if the rest 
of the world does so, too (which, after all, was truly utopian). In effect, it allowed India to 
fend-off any initiative and continue unrestricted development of ballistic missiles. 
Aneja concludes his account by stating that the only way in which the USA could 
contribute to the security of South Asia was to accept the nuclearisation of India as a matter 
of fact: 
 
Based on the acceptance of India’s capability to make nuclear weapons, New Delhi 
and Washington can explore ways of preventing a nuclear war from breaking out in 
the subcontinent. … . Recognising that insecurity may prompt India and Pakistan to 
go in for weapons, some ‘nuclear managers’ believe that the U.S. can play an 
activist role after India and Pakistan are declared nuclear-weapon States. The U.S. 
can assist the two countries in building safe and stably configured small arsenals. 
Know-how for efficient command and control systems, which reduce the risk of 
accidental nuclear war, can also be provided.536 
 
In sum, Atul Aneja’s assessment of India’s nuclear options illustrates all facets of the bomb 
lobbyists’ line of argument. It created a logic in which any reconciliation became per se 
subjugation under a discriminatory regime, and in which anything short of a full-fledged 
nuclear arsenal would be unacceptable for India on grounds of moral principles. Within this 
logic, the precondition of any constructive US American involvement was its acceptance of 
India as a member of the nuclear club. 
 
Paradoxically, it was the reconciliatory policy of the Clinton Administration that asserted 
this position and made it commonly accepted by India’s mainstream opinion leaders and, 
subsequently, by India’s public at large.  
 
The Strobe Talbott initiative became the main focus of further commentary on Indo-US 
nuclear relations. Commentators expressed more fear than hope that the persuasiveness of 
the initiative might cause India to give too much in, and would force it to accept any 
solution short of full-fledged nuclearisation.537 India’s mainstream opinion leaders thus 
faced the difficulty of having to accommodate two diverging, commonly held attitudes: any 
concession would be seen as an unacceptable limitation of India’s sovereignty and second, 
the lip service to international non-proliferation and arms control had to be made in order to 
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maintain India’s moral standing and avoid international isolation. The ambivalence of these 
two positions became visible in C. Raja Mohan’s analysis on the matter:  
 
India must hold firm in the pursuit of advanced nuclear and missile capabilities, 
while demonstrating good faith in working for cooperative arms control worldwide. 
As the Prime Minister, Mr. Narasimha Rao, prepares for his visit to the United 
States, New Delhi should make it clear that there is no question of the country 
compromising on its nuclear sovereignty. At the same time, it should reiterate that it 
is prepared to enter into any non-discriminatory arrangement on non-proliferation 
and arms control.538 
 
As any such arrangement - discriminatory or not – was connected with some loss of 
sovereignty, both attitudes appeared to be incompatible. The more initiatives towards these 
arrangements were made, the more India’s opinion leaders stressed the maintenance of 
‘nuclear sovereignty’ as India’s top priority.  
 
Mohan criticised the inability of the U.S. Administration to acknowledge India’s negative 
stance on any agreement as a matter of principle: 
 
Like the Carter administration which over-estimated the readiness of the Janata 
Government to compromise on the nuclear issue, the Clinton administration too 
may have misread signals from New Delhi on the room for compromise the 
Government of Mr. Rao has on the nuclear issue. The Governments in the U.S. 
appear determined to make the same mistake over and over again. But it is time 
Washington understood that given the solid national consensus on the nuclear issue, 
it cannot just hustle India into a nuclear deal that runs against New Delhi’s national 
security interest.539 
 
Mohan euphemistically refers to ‘the solid national consensus on the nuclear issue,’ when 
describing the negative dynamics of the process of opinion formation in India, which 
excluded any position by India’s government other than ‘no.’  
Within this debate, the fiercest opposition against the US initiative was again brought 
forward by the nuclear scientific section of India’s nuclear policy elite. Their objection was, 
however, not based on India’s status seeking in terms of power and military strength but on 
the inter-state competition defined in terms of excellence in the field of high technology. 
 
The most outspoken proponent of the scientists’ approach was O.P. Sabherwal.540 He 
states:  
 
India’s nuclear policy – that related to its status on weapons capability and nuclear 
non-proliferation treaty – is getting entangled in a political and technological web 
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laid out by the West. The Western attempt is to ward off a possible threat to its 
supremacy in the nuclear realm. … . Unfortunately, India’s growing nuclear 
capability has gone well with the West, in particular with the United States, which 
views the Indian advance as a potential competitive challenge in an area of frontier 
science and technology. It is not low-investment weapons capability but recent 
Indian advances in sophisticated areas – reactor design and construction, fuels and 
plutonium technology – that are an eyesore to the US. If it were weapons production 
alone that called for the US concern, then China’s with arsenal many times more 
than India’s potential, would have created a far bigger reaction.541 
 
By portraying the international non-proliferation initiative as an act of jealousy by an 
America envious about India’s outstanding nuclear achievements, Sabherwal offers a rather 
naïve attempt to understand American motives behind its non-proliferation policy. The 
rationale behind this explanation nevertheless proved to be highly appealing to the nuclear-
scientific section of India’s debating elite.  
 
Sabherwal further praises India’s large bomb arsenal, demanding proper appreciation from 
the USA, who should finally recognise India’s nuclear weapon status. Ironically, after 
having grossly exaggerated the size and efficiency of India’s nuclear weapons arsenal, he 
identifies the peacefulness of its nuclear programme as the main reason why India was 
deprived of this merited nuclear status. Along this logic, he declares: 
 
[T]he stance adopted by the US towards India on NPT and nuclear non-proliferation 
issue is not only inequitable, discriminatory but even worse – it lacks consistency 
and keeps on shifting. A recent US intelligence study on behalf of Congress puts 
India’s nuclear bomb arsenal at 50. So be it! But can a country having developed as 
many as 50 bombs on its own (without resort to the art of smuggling) be described a 
threshold power? Can a country which detonated a device as far back as 1974 
(before the NPT came into effect), be bracked with non-weapons capability nations? 
… . By this logic, it is a crime not to push ahead with established and proven 
weapon capability, not to conduct a large number of detonations and tests, but rather 
give priority to developing peaceful applications of atomic energy, as India has 
done. The preposterous nature of this proposition is self-evident, and no power 
should be allowed to push India into a lower status under any acceptable non-
proliferation regime that is equitable and that may be refashioned through the 
forthcoming round of NPT discussions.542 
 
This rejection of any agreement which would push India ‘into a lower status’ was 
underpinned by Sabherwal with a strong warning to India’s policy makers that any 
concessions in this respect would be considered as betrayal and could not be tolerated, as 
“[w]hat to be realised is that dithering and weak-kneed policies and postures encourage the 
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US to pursue and persist with the most illogical propositions in relation to India.”543 The 
most ‘illogical’ aspect of the American initiative was, according to Sabherwal, the missing 
distinction of India and Pakistan in terms of their respective nuclear status: 
 
It is this factor – the threat of the Pakistani bomb and the lurking devastation of an 
Indo-Pakistan nuclear war – that is being used by the US to push India into an 
inferior status in the non-proliferation regime that has to come. No one can 
contemplate to permit a situation to develop that leads to an Indo-Pakistan nuclear 
conflagration. But equally foolish would be not to see through the political games 
the US is playing by employing the Pakistani factor to beat down India vis-à-vis the 
NPT. In the first place, it is preposterous to allow a game of parity between India 
and Pakistan in relation to their status, either in terms of nuclear capability or the 
non-proliferation regime, even in the case of existing NPT inequitable as it is. 
Secondly, one has to take a balanced view, keeping off politically-motivated 
publicity, of Pakistan’s real achievements in terms of nuclear capability and bomb 
making. There is little doubt that Pakistan’s weapons capability has been blown out 
of all proportion – with a purpose – to scare India. A good bit of responsibility for 
this scare build-up lies with the West, and the rest with Indian credulous fears.544 
 
In sum, Sabherwal’s account reflects the position of the scientific-strategic elite within 
India’s nuclear debate. The socially constructed norms underlying the perception of the 
international nuclear arena and India’s role therein largely detached these accounts from 
real events in the international non-proliferation discourse. 
 
The purpose of nuclear technology was greatly distorted by the ascription of several 
symbolic meanings to nuclear weapons and particularly by Sabherwal’s absolute and 
unconditional acceptance of nuclear technology as the ultimate currency of the international 
competition for national prestige.  As such, these were unique elements that influenced 
India’s idiosyncratic nuclear discourse. It left no space for India’s nuclear scientific 
community to appreciate other aspects related to this technology , such as the decades-long 
critical debate on the dangers of nuclear technology and the increasing doubts about nuclear 
weapons as a legitimate means for power in international politics since the end of the Cold 
War. 
 
Sabherwal’s policy recommendation for India’s government on the nuclear issue 
consequentially followed this logic: “[t]he on-going preparatory round of talks for building 
afresh a nuclear non-proliferation regime through international negotiations in 1995 should 
be seized by Indian policy-makers to rectify the deplorable weakness in their policies and 
postures on Indian capability.”545 
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12.4. From Non-proliferation to Test Ban 
 
After the international community had reached agreement on the indefinite extension of the 
NPT in 1995, the debate inside and outside India shifted towards a possible agreement on a 
comprehensive test ban. India’s mainstream opinion leaders reversed their attitude from 
supporting a tentative CTBT until 1993, towards its rejection since 1994 and 1995. In the 
following section, the opinion formation dynamics are illustrated through the analysis of 
two articles published in January 1996 in The Indian Express: “The Indian dilemma” by 
J.N. Dixit546 and “Crucial test for India” by Brahma Chellaney.547 In their respective 
accounts, both authors followed the rationale commonly accepted by India’s elite, 
according to which the tentative CTBT was, similar to the just concluded NPT, basically an 
instrument of the USA to prevent India’s nuclear breakthrough.  
 
J.N. Dixit was aware of the credibility gap India’s elite had manoeuvred themselves into by 
reversing their understanding of the tentative CTBT since 1993. In his view, “[o]ne point of 
recent criticism has been that India made a mistake in joining the US in sponsoring a 
resolution at the UN in 1993 to bring about comprehensive test ban arrangements. A further 
criticism is that we are now backing out of our commitment.”548 According to Dixit, this 
fundamental policy shift was justified after it became apparent that India was the prime 
addressee of US non-proliferation pressures. The perceived one-sided US policy was 
ostensibly caused by two factors:  
 
The first is based on concerns about the maintenance of regional stability in South 
Asia. The second emanates from the anxiety that India and Pakistan should not 
become nuclear weapons or missile weapons capability states. Especially, India 
should not acquire such capacities so that it does not fulfil the latent hegemonism in 
its foreign policy, a hegemonism which is an abiding perception about Indian 
intentions in US foreign policy and strategic think tanks. We have to contrast this 
political paranoia about our nuclear intentions with the predicament that we are in, 
though in comparative terms we can count ourselves among the advanced countries 
in the sphere of nuclear technology and its uses.549 
 
After having rejected American incentives as discriminatory, Dixit points to the alleged 
consensus among India’s public not to make any concessions to these and calls the 
government to take these public sentiments seriously:  
 
Our attitudes and policies at the political as well as their operational transmutation 
to our nuclear and missile development programmes have to be responsive to 
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parliamentary and public opinion in India which, as experience has shown, is 
acutely and accurately sensitive about the country’s security interests.550 
 
The escalating public debate in 1996 was highly emotional and occurred largely detached 
from any security considerations.  Many strategists including Dixit continued to add fuel to 
this fire; his reference to the sensitivity of India’s public opinion towards the country’s 
security interests thus appears questionable. 
 
Dixit concludes that America’s unjust manoeuvres left no choice to India but to increase its 
efforts in the nuclear field: 
 
Should India abjure for ever, and that too prematurely, its established capacity to 
acquire deterrent strategic nuclear power on the basis of self-reliance because the 
existing nuclear weapons powers wish to perpetuate their technological and political 
superiority on the basis of the pretended moral objective of non-proliferation, an 
objective to which they are not themselves willing to make a time-bound 
commitment. It is my view that instead of just talking about ‘keeping our option 
open’, we must give some proof that our potentialities are not just conceptual 
claims, but are operationally concrete, which should be taken note of by other 
nuclear weapons powers. The possibility of India and the US reasoning together 
again on non-proliferation matters will be entirely dependent on the US being 
responsive to our sensitivities about our strategic interests and security concerns.551 
 
These remarks illustrate two major features of the debate on the CTBT. The Talbott 
initiative and the NPT negotiations had created a feeling of urgency in the mainstream 
opinion, demanding that India should end its official policy of nuclear ambiguity and 
declare itself a nuclear weapons state.  The emerging debate on the CTBT then served to 
finally add the urgency of conducting nuclear tests as the ultimate and necessary 
manifestation of India’s nuclear outing. Dixit’s reference to the expression of India having 
to ‘give proof’ of its capabilities was an implicit call for nuclear testing. The second feature 
was the USA acceptance of India as a full-fledged nuclear weapons state as the necessary 
precondition for any agreement between the two countries.  
 
This demand was again only implicitly brought forward by Dixit, stating that “the 
possibility of India and the US reasoning together again on non-proliferation matters will 
be entirely dependent on the US being responsive to our sensitivities about our strategic 
interests and security concerns.”552 The implied view that the only way for India to 
cooperate on non-proliferation issues is based upon its admission to the official ‘nuclear 
club’ became inherent in most mainstream analyses on the issue in the mid-1990s.553  
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According to Brahma Chellaney, India’s policy on the CTBT in 1996 was conditioned by 
two prior developments; first, the conclusion of the indefinite extension of the NPT one 
year before, and second, the technological breakthrough of the nuclear weapons powers 
with regard to computer simulated nuclear tests, making actual nuclear explosions largely 
redundant. In his view:  
 
Political and military power in the world will continue to be determined by nuclear 
might. … . It is against this background that US-led efforts now confront major 
challenges in fashioning a CTB as a technical fix to prevent the rise of new nuclear 
powers and cap the capabilities of the existing threshold states, particularly India, 
the only threshold state not to receive tested warhead designs from external sources. 
… . The United States’ abounding enthusiasm for a test ban derives from the fact 
that it has reached a stage technologically where it can underpin a permanent 
nuclear force through hydronuclear experiments and virtual-reality simulations 
without the need for fullscale underground testing.554 
 
Chellaney’s remarks again illustrate the common perception of the CTBT as one further 
device to prevent India from becoming a new rising nuclear power. By referring to India as 
‘the only threshold state not to receive tested warhead designs from external sources,’ 
Chellaney hints to the popular belief among India’s elite that Pakistan had received 
substantial technological know-how on warhead design from China. In this context, the 
technological ability to simulate nuclear tests by the advanced nuclear weapons powers 
turned the tentative CTBT, which only banned underground nuclear test, but allowed 
computer simulations, into a discriminatory device exclusively benefiting the nuclear 
haves. According to Chellaney: 
 
The central issue is whether the world will get a treaty that comprehensively 
outlaws all forms of testing or one with comprehensive loopholes for the select 
benefit of the nuclear powers. … . There can be no credible CTB without India’s 
backing and participation. Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao has clearly 
articulated India’s stand on the issue, saying the NPT’s permanent extension voided 
the goal of complete disarmament and his Government can now only back a 
loophole-free CTB linked to a binding disarmament timetable.555 
 
Chellaney’s speculation that the CTBT would allow the advanced nuclear powers to press 
home a technological advantage was supported by some evidence. Instead of leaving it as 
such, however, he then formulated two unrealisable conditions through which India could 
still join the treaty. Firstly, verification of computer-based simulations was technically 
impossible, turning his demand of a ‘loophole-free CTB’ obsolete.  Secondly, his call for 
an agreement on total nuclear disarmament was equally unrealistic, despite its recurring 
dialectic instrumentalisation by the hawkish section of India’s strategic elite.  
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While Dixit’s and Chellaney’s analyses attempt to explain India’s shifting position on the 
CTBT, most of the many accounts on the CTBT did not make the distinction between NPT 
and CTBT. In the authors’ view, the textual distinction between the treaties was marginal, 
as, in their perception, both served the same goal on the part of America to subdue India. 
This perception becomes visible in Amalendu Das Gupta’s account on the issue: 
 
Seldom has India been under such severe pressure to accept the American plan to 
perpetuate the existing nuclear monopoly as in the past few months. That most 
nations have fallen into line should not obscure the U.S. role at every stage of the 
imposed consensus. Indian reluctance to sign a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
(CTBT) has thus turned into a test of this country’s capacity to resist a combination 
of U.S. advice, admonition and threat.556 
 
After the conclusion of the CTBT, which again largely isolated India from the international 
community, India’s elite felt the urgency to finally conduct nuclear tests and then declare 
itself a nuclear weapons state. Their hope was that once India had exploded a nuclear 
device, its nuclear capabilities would be taken as an irreversible fact, thus ending the 
pressures from continued US nonproliferation diplomacy. In C. Raja Mohan’s view: 
 
New Delhi has two choices. One is to step onto the slippery of slow 
denuclearisation. The other is to take the final and long-delayed steps to transform 
India into an open and unambiguous nuclear weapon power. Unless New Delhi can 
convince the U.S. that India’s status as a nuclear weapon power is formal and 
irrevocable, it will remain one of the principal targets of the American strategy of 
counter-proliferation. If India does not move forward in its nuclear posture, there is 
a real danger that the American counter-proliferation policy will push it 
backward.557 
 
The ostensible two choices conceded to India’s government, the first clearly being 
identified by Mohan as the inferior one, did not exist in reality. India’s foreign policy elite 
had come to the conclusion that nothing less than nuclear testing was acceptable for India 
to counter American pressures. In the period between the conclusion of the CTBT in mid 
1996 and the testing in May 1998, the question was not if but only when India would 
conduct the tests. 
 
 
12.5. India-US Relations after the Tests 
 
When India tested its nuclear devices on May 11th 1998, the immediate American reaction 
was determined by two factors: the failure of American intelligence to detect the 
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preparations, causing some confusion among American policy makers when news of the 
tests spread, and the surprise of American policy makers after noticing that many of their 
Indian counterparts were similarly caught unprepared. The amateurish handling of the 
immediate post-Pokhran situation by India’s officials increased American concerns, which 
were frequently expressed with insensitive wording. Three days after the tests, the 
American Senate issued a statement demanding India’s denuclearisation. This move, which 
inevitably caused an outcry from India’s government, its elite and public at large,558 
exposed the extent to which American policy makers had failed to comprehend the 
sensitivities among India’s elite and the dynamics behind its nuclearisation. Along with 
these declaratory statements, the US administration imposed economic sanctions and 
restricted India’s access to the international loan market.  
 
India’s opinion leaders generally dismissed the economic sanctions as unjust, but 
considered their impact as minimal. Their stance on this issue was brought to the point by 
Saubhik Chakrabarti, who raises the question: “Will economic sanctions following Pokhran 
affect India? Yes. Will they seriously affect her? No.”559 
In a reflection on the legal aspects of the nuclear issue, V.S. Mani concludes that while it 
was legal according to international law for India to conduct nuclear tests and acquire 
nuclear weapons, the subsequent imposition of sanction was illegal.560 Mani starts his 
account by addressing four questions: “(1) Has India violated the international law by 
conducting the Pokhran tests? (2) Is India a nuclear weapon state? (3) Can India legally use 
nuclear weapons in a conflict situation? (4) Do the U.S. and others have a right to impose 
‘sanctions’ on India?”561 The first question was tackled by claiming that “India is a party to 
the Partial Test Ban Treaty 1963 and the Outer Space Treaty 1967 and the tests have not 
violated these either.”562 
 
The second question was motivated by the general displeasure of India’s elite and public 
regarding the international community’s reluctance to automatically grant India the status 
of a nuclear weapons state. According to Mani: 
 
International law does not define a nuclear weapon state. The Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, 1968 defines a nuclear weapon state as one which had tested 
nuclear weapon devices before 1968 but the treaty does not apply to India, a non-
party. It is a basic rule of international law that a treaty does not, as a general rule, 
bind a country which is not a party to it. Nor can it create international law rules 
applicable against a persistent objector. It is well known that India has been 
consistently opposing the NPT. So only a commonsense definition would apply: a 
state which has nuclear weapons is a nuclear weapon state.563 
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The logic applied by Mani appears questionable. He quite rightly claims that except in the 
provisions of the NPT, no other document of international law defines the status of a 
nuclear weapons state. The NPT gives two necessary conditions for a country to fall under 
this category: first, the respective country tested before 1968 and second, it is a member 
state of the NPT. In this regard, Mani’s suggestion that India should be given the status of a 
nuclear weapons state because these conditions do not apply due to its non-membership 
appeared flawed. In his final remark, Mani claims that, given the fact that the term ‘nuclear 
weapon state’ had no legal dimension at all, but only a political one, India had the right to 
call itself a nuclear weapons state, because “a state which has nuclear weapons is a nuclear 
weapon state.”564 This conclusion is self-evident. 
 
The third question was, according to Mani, the trickiest one. First of all, he pointed to the 
general and universal right of any country to defend itself. As India declared to use the 
bomb exclusively in self-defence, this right would surely apply. However, Mani questions 
the legality of the concept of deterrence: 
 
A threat of use of force directed against the territorial integrity or the political 
independence of another state or in any manner inconsistent with the Purpose of the 
United Nations is forbidden under the modern international law – 50 years of 
India’s foreign policy have contributed to this perspective of international law in no 
small measure. It is ironic that all the above legal postulates were sharply articulated 
by India in its Written Pleadings before the ICJ in 1995. India is now stopped from 
making a volte-face.565 
 
Finally, Mani assesses the legality of the international sanctions imposed on India: 
 
The U.S. has invoked its domestic law, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act 1994, to 
impose ‘sanctions’ on India. Germany and Japan have decided to cease their 
economic assistance programmes… . India’s conduct in developing nuclear 
weapons was not a legally wrongful conduct; nor was it directed against the U.S., 
Germany or Japan. Therefore, these countries have no legal right to resort to 
countermeasures… . The U.S., Germany and Japan cannot legally impose on India 
their foreign or nuclear policies. Thus the so-called ‘sanctions’ violate a range of 
pre-emptory principles of international law – peaceful settlement of disputes, 
sovereign equality, non-intention and non-interference in the internal and external 
affairs of a state, good faith fulfilment of international obligations and freedom of 
international trade. They vidate agreements of economic cooperation and assistance, 
if any, concluded between these countries and India [sic.].566 
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Mani’s attempt to approach the political question of India’s nuclear status in purely legal 
terms has several inconsistencies. First of all, his claim that the cutback of many countries’ 
economic assistance programmes was illegal according to international law lacks much 
substance. Secondly, economic sanctions were not illegal per se, as Mani suggests. His 
claim that the ‘U.S., Germany and Japan cannot legally impose’ their foreign policy on 
India was a bizarre argument, as it is in the nature of the ‘foreign policy’ of any country to 
be directed towards another country.  
 
In sum, Mani’s attempt to justify India’s nuclear policy with legal provisions of 
international law and simultaneously revoke the legality of the sanctions towards India, 
faced the problem of placing genuinely political questions into the realm of international 
law. This attempt, despite being dubious in juristic terms, illustrates the strong pressures 
perceived by many of India’s elite to develop appropriate apologetic arguments to the 
events. 
 
In his account on the ambiguous legality of the sanctions in terms of free trade provisions, 
Eric Gonsalves concludes that “[t]he World Trade Organisation could be a useful ally 
against the sanctions not a hindrance.”567 Gonsalves thereby suggests a much more 
pragmatic approach to deal with the sanctions, as compared to Mani:  
 
The U.S.’ efforts to impose sanctions and universalise them are unfair. But they 
provide a welcome opportunity to take unpleasant decisions at home to correct the 
populist policies which have brought the Indian economy to its knees. The budget 
unfortunately went too much in the opposite direction.568 
 
Gonsalves’ position reflects a growing understanding among India’s opinion leaders that, 
now that India’s nuclear capabilities were an irreversible fact, their prime objective should 
be to look forward. Generally, the willingness to engage other states, especially the United 
States, in a more reconciliatory dialogue increased remarkably after the dust of the Pokhran 
tests had settled.  This was only providing that India’s irreversible nuclear status was 
accepted as its basis.  The Clinton administration contributed to this development by 
signalling an easing of its strict sanctions regime. 
 
 
12.6. Paradigm Shift in Indo-US Relations 
 
The nuclear tests proved to be a catalyst for India’s emotionally overloaded nuclear debate 
between the years 1995 and 1998. Once the patriotic hype of the immediate post-Pokhran 
period calmed down, a process of fundamental rethinking began. The simplistic world 
view, according to which India had the moral obligation to fight against the discriminatory 
regime of the nuclear haves in the name of the have-nots, had to be revamped for obvious 
reasons. The pragmatists among India’s foreign policy specialists soon put India’s decade-
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long struggle against the discriminatory nuclear order to rest and instead suggested to 
preserve the nuclear order by joining the nuclear club and then closing the door behind 
themselves.  Others continued to maintain India’s moralistic stance and maintained that its 
self-declaration as a nuclear weapons state was an act of solidarity for all nuclear have-nots.  
 
Between these two poles, several analysts used the new parameters of India’s standing to 
develop innovative and nuanced approaches to the nuclear issue. Above all, the role of the 
USA in South Asia was re-evaluated, dropping several prior held taboos like US mediation 
in Kashmir or Indo-US cooperation in the military-technological realm. 
One of the first articles that jettisoned the emotional compulsions of the earlier debate was 
an analysis of US mediation attempts by Gopalji Malviya and W. Lawrence S Prabhakar.569 
The authors initiated their re-evaluation of Indo-US relations by claiming: 
 
The rationale for an American mediation and a crisis management strategy in South 
Asia emerges from the Indian and Pakistani refusals to adhere and accede to the 
NPT; accept the indefinite extension of the NPT; refusal to sign the CTBT; and 
more importantly the overt nuclear weaponisation process resorted to by both the 
states. These have provided the U.S. grounds to ‘pontificate’ on the dangers of an 
accidental nuclear war given the ‘Flashpoint in Kashmir’. The divergence between 
India and the U.S. over the CTBT is well known. The ongoing India-U.S. strategic 
dialogue (the Jaswant Singh-Talbott talks) seems to indicate some progress, with the 
U.S. realising India’s security concerns.570 
 
These deliberations sum up three major conditions determining Indo-US relations 
subsequent to the tests. First, the introduction of the nuclear dimension to the Kashmir 
question internationalised this conflict. As nuclear weapons were considered to be global 
weapons in the sense that their potential use would imply global consequences, India’s 
long-held principle of handling Kashmir strictly bilaterally (as against Pakistan’s policy of 
internationalising the issue) became contested. Second, the policy of the Clinton 
administration to continue its nuclear talks with India on the basis of a tacit recognition of 
India as a nuclear weapon state, was appreciated by India’s elite. The third and most 
important feature was the awareness that the nuclear issue had brought South Asia onto the 
map of global strategic importance. South Asia, according to the authors, “was an ‘area of 
strategic vacuum’ until recently (the May 1998 nuclear test explosions).”571 “Given all 
this,” the authors conclude, “the issue of American mediation and peace-building in South 
Asia deserves a whole new rethink that should depart from the prevalent biases and 
stereotypes.”572 Considering that an appreciation of American mediation attempts had been 
a withheld until 1998 or even 1999, this conclusion marked a significant shift in Indo-US 
relations in early 2000.  
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President Clinton’s visit to India in March 2000 was most successful in accelerating the 
process of rethinking among India’s elite. However, the search for new approaches did not 
have much effect on the persistent world view among the nuclear scientific section of 
India’s strategic elite. In a May 2000 analysis on the alleged insincerity of American 
mediation efforts, M.R. Srinivasan starts by pointing to the huge American nuclear arsenal: 
 
Yet India is hectored day in and day out how nuclear weapons are bad and how the 
country would be a more responsible state if it gives up its very limited quantity of 
weaponry… . No one has asked the U.S., which claims that it has tirelessly worked 
for global peace for the past 50 years or so, how much of global resources was 
wasted on building the enormous arsenals of nuclear weapons, missiles, submarines, 
aircraft etc... . We may reflect on the proposition what the impact on eradication of 
global poverty would have been had the wealthy countries utilised the funds wasted 
on armaments for poverty elimination and job creation in the poor countries.573 
 
To back his perception of American immorality, Srinivasan claims that US wealth was 
based on the exploitation of India by the British: “Among all countries that were 
colonialised, none lost so much of its wealth as India. … . The surplus wealth from imperial 
Britain went into the building up of the U.S.”574 Whatever the historic substance of this 
allegation was, Srinivasan’s attempt to use historic events of the 18th century to discredit 
American mediation attempts on Kashmir in the 21st century appears rather far-fetched. 
Srinivasan’s further deliberations continue to follow the traditional pattern of the nuclear 
scientists’ Weltanschauung. Srinivasan praises India’s outstanding achievements in the 
civilian nuclear sector and its reluctance on the weapons front and concludes his account by 
displaying India as the leader of the developing world.  
 
In sum, Srinivasan’s article illustrates the deadlocked nature of the perceived worldview 
among the nuclear scientific section of India’s nuclear policy elite. Their views were deeply 
embodied in a perception of the world which was widely detached from reality, and which 
had remained largely unchanged since Nehruvian times. Their ever recurring course of 
argumentation continued unchanged without being affected from outside events. The static 
nature of the normative value system underlying the scientific-strategists’ approach to the 
nuclear issue was one of the reasons why their overall influence on India’s nuclear 
discourse had gradually declined since their monopolist position in the late 1960s. In the 
period of nuclear consolidation, this section of India’s strategic elite was more or less 
marginalised.  
 
The counterparts of the group adhering to old patterns of thinking form the pragmatists 
among India’s strategists, who were rather indifferent to the moral underpinning of the 
nuclear issue.  
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In an evaluation of the new conservative nuclear policy by the Bush Jr. administration, P.S. 
Suryanarayana criticises Washington’s transgression of the CTBT: 
 
Although India has over time expressed serious reservations about both the NPT 
and CTBT, New Delhi cannot afford to see with equanimity or unconcern any 
future American transgression of these agreements. The reason is not far to seek. 
Washington’s growing disenchantment with the CTBT may catalyse India’s own 
plans, if any, for transforming its notional nuclear deterrence into a reasonably 
realistic one over time. However, India cannot embrace a morally controversial idea 
which is implicit in the Pentagon’s reported thinking that favours nuclear strikes 
against those without the proven means to retaliate in a like manner.575 
 
While Suryanarayana’s view was considered a cynical expression of Realpolitik by the 
defenders of India’s moral exceptionalism, a growing number of strategists nevertheless 
saw it as the consequential next step for India to take. India had acted as driving force 
behind the CTBT in the early 1990s, when the treaty was thought to be an effective device 
to contain the exclusive nuclear club. When America unexpectedly adhered to the idea of 
the treaty, India’s commentators had a hard time explaining why India had to reverse its 
policy and take a strict anti-CTBT position as a matter of moral principle. This radical shift 
became a major incentive for its nuclear tests and self-declaration as a nuclear weapon 
state. Now that India had become a member of the nuclear club, Suryanarayana et al. 
intuitively sought to close the club’s entrance as well as exit doors. America’s transgression 
of the CTBT was perceived as its attempt to leave the club behind and achieve a superior 
status. Suryanarayana expresses this fear by reintroducing the metaphor of the ‘nuclear 
monopoly:’ “[w]ith the old U.S.-Soviet bipolarity having disappeared, the U.S. is now in 
quest of a qualitative nuclear monopoly that can be consistent with the changing security 
paradigms of the space frontier and cyberspace.”576 
 
In June 2002, mounting tensions along the LoC triggered several alarmist reports in 
international media, causing the reduction of staff in foreign embassies in New Delhi and 
Islamabad. These international reactions were seen as insensitive by many of India’s 
opinion leaders, who implied racist motives behind this perceived ‘Western hysteria.’ As 
Vandita Mishra comments: 
 
India may restate its no-first-use nuclear doctrine. The General may proclaim the 
insanity of even contemplating a nuclear war. But the US and British media aren’t 
listening. Anxious dispatches from correspondents in New Delhi and Islamabad 
have painted the two nuclear rivals sweltering in full battle gear, itching to begin a 
war they do not understand, much less control… . The western media has a 
diagnosis – it’s part Nuclear Illiteracy, part Nuclear Denial.577 
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The speculations of commentators on the motives behind Western concerns marked a 
revival of the old anti-Western reflexes that had dominated the nuclear debate until 1998. 
Many commentators saw an orchestrated American strategy behind the international 
reactions. This view is illustrated in Jyoty Malhotra’s questioning:  
 
Did the West use the threat of imminent nuclear war between India and Pakistan to 
pull most of their citizens – embassy staff, businessmen, tourists – out of India, so 
as to put economic pressure on New Delhi? Worse, did the big powers pass on their 
fears to allies, like Japan, so as to appear to speak in one voice against India’s 
coercive diplomatic ways? The jury’s still out on all these questions. In fact, we 
may never know the real truth.578 
 
An emphatically critical but nevertheless nuanced assessment of American concerns about 
the developments in Kashmir was made by J.N. Dixit.579 On the major objectives behind 
the US policy, Dixit suggests: 
 
The rationale of this policy appears unexceptionable: one, India-Pakistan tensions 
on the Kashmir issue should not escalate into a military conflict leading to a nuclear 
war; two, the India-Pakistan stand off should not disrupt the anti-terrorism 
campaign of the US; three, the resolution of the Kashmir issue through political 
dialogue is essential for long-term stability in South Asia which is an objective of 
US security and economic policies in this region; four, while the US accepts that the 
resolution of this problem is to be achieved primarily by bilateral interaction 
between India and Pakistan, it is increasingly of the view that this bilateral process 
must be facilitated by third parties led by the US.580 
 
While Dixit generally considered American foreign policy as guided by selfish national 
interests, he nevertheless accepts American involvement in the Kashmir issue on these 
grounds. In his view, India would have to bite the bullet as a consequence of the emerging 
nuclear dimension of this conflict. Dixit infers that by accepting Pakistan as its major 
partner in its anti-terrorist struggle, the US policy endangered the good relationship with 
India that in his view began after India’s reconciliatory policy since 1999. Dixit concludes 
his account by suggesting a much more aloof Indian policy towards the USA: 
 
Indian political circles and public opinion have been progressively disappointed by 
US policy stances on J&K and Pakistan’s involvement in the state. This is partially 
due to excessive expectations following India’s declaration of full support to the US 
after September 11. At a deeper level, it is time for the US to realise that an 
important ingredient in the rationale of India’s pro-US policies since 1999, is now 
subject to question – that despite the decade-long effort of establishing closer Indo-
US equations, US remains inhibited about giving full support to Indian interests and 
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concerns. This is so because Indian policy-makers ignored the fundamental reality 
that foreign policies of countries, particularly of great powers, are primarily 
structured within the framework of their own perceived interests. Perhaps it is 
necessary to nuance our foreign policy taking this elemental reality into account.581 
 
Dixit’s deliberations remained vague about what other than a state’s ‘own perceived 
interests’ should guide its foreign policy and why great powers are guided more by their 
respective interests than other powers. 
 
Dixit’s predictions relating to strained Indo-US relations were soon proven false. The tenor 
among India’s foreign policy elite on US mediation in Kashmir remained pro-American, 
while tension concerning the American Kashmir policy and its alliance with Pakistan in its 
‘war against terror’ were perceived as temporary phenomena. The long-term strategic 
relationship was generally considered to be on a reconciliatory path. As Mohan claimed, 
“President Bush’s intent to elevate the relations with India to a strategic level was matched 
by India’s own enthusiastic support to the controversial American initiative on missile 
defences. India and the U.S. appeared on the verge of an unprecedented convergence of 
worldviews.”582  
 
In contrast to Dixit, Mohan’s assessment of U.S. policy towards South Asia during the 
2002 crisis was generally positive, despite some persistent caveats: “[t]he Bush 
Administration’s decision to lift the nuclear sanctions imposed on India after May 1998 
without any conditions, the acceleration of cooperation on counter-terrorism and the 
resumption of arms sales to India seemed to expand the basis of Indo-U.S. engagement.”583 
In Mohan’s view, the US alliance with Pakistan did not pose a stumbling block for Indo-
U.S. relations, as Dixit had suggested, but rather constituted a ‘new complexity’ that could 
be smoothened out. In his view: 
 
The events of September 11, however, have introduced new complexities into Indo-
U.S. relations. India, which eagerly supported the American war on terrorism, found 
the U.S. moving towards a renewed partnership with Pakistan. The Bush 
Administration has, indeed, worked hard to limit the fallout from the rediscovery of 
Pakistan on the relationship with India… . The jury is out on the results from 
American nudging of Pakistan, but there is no question that the nature of the U.S. 
policy towards Indo-Pak. relations and the Kashmir question has begun to alter 
visibly.584 
 
The Indira doctrine, which held that South Asian strategic affairs should be handled on the 
intra-regional level only, had been held to by a consensus among India’s elite for three 
decades. Mohan departs from this and accepts American involvement in Sri Lankan and 
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Nepali security affairs but only on the condition of prior, recognized consultation with New 
Delhi.  He writes: 
 
India and the U.S. need to build on the emerging convergence of interests in 
promoting South Asian stability. Both in Sri Lanka and Nepal, they have similar 
objectives in defeating the forces of extremism and promoting peace. But as the 
Bush Administration steps up its involvement in the internal conflicts of India’s 
smaller neighbours, it is important that there is more intensive consultation and 
coordination between New Delhi and Washington in the management of South 
Asian security.585 
 
The generally positive attitude among India’s elite towards US American involvement in 
South Asian affairs, as illustrated by C. Raja Mohan’s analysis, would have been 
unthinkable until 1998. In 2002, however, this position had already been accepted by 
India’s mainstream opinion leaders. The change in attitude was based on one crucial 
precondition: The USA had to continue the strategic dialogue with India at eye level. This 
Indian sensitivity and its incidental negligence by the USA marked the major obstacle for 
long-term Indo-US convergence. Mohan averts the significance of this factor in an involved 
manner:  
 
Finally, the worm of non-proliferation is beginning to turn again and has the 
potential to poison Indo-U.S. relations. The U.S. restrictions on technology transfers 
remain and the habit of describing India as a non-proliferation concern has begun to 
resurface in Washington… . If New Delhi and Washington do not quickly settle the 
outstanding differences on the nuclear issue, it will return to haunt their bilateral 
relations.586 
 
After some scepticism in the early days of the Bush Administration, a majority among 
India’s strategists appreciated the Republican government’s policy for its greater sensitivity 
towards India’s status seeking than the previous Democratic government, which was 
traditionally more focused on non-proliferation issues. As Pramit Pal Chaudhuri explains, 
“[u]ltimately, India’s main cheerleader will be US President George W. Bush. Bush and his 
foreign policy team ardently believe in a new strategic doctrine based on a small nuclear 
arsenal with an overarching missile defence shield.”587 
 
A test case for India’s self-assured nuclear policy emerged in 2002 when America reacted 
sharply to North Korea’s nuclear proliferation efforts. Until 1998, the leitmotif of India’s 
quest for the bomb was its struggle against the discriminatory nuclear regime. This 
lingering claim proved to be problematic, as it was eventually asserted not only by India, 
but by other countries as well. After the tests, India’s strategic elite confined the argument 
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by referring to India’s exceptionalism, to avoid this disturbing logic. According to the 
argument, the mere size, its strategic environment (particularly its proximity to nuclearised 
China) as well as its democratic tradition, gave India a certain natural legitimacy to acquire 
nuclear weapons. This refined perception of India’s exceptionalism no longer defined as the 
spokesman of the Third World but as a primus inter pares among Third World countries, 
became obvious in the elite’s largely negative comments on North Korea’s acquisition of 
nuclear capabilities. The ambiguity of this argument arose from the underlying view of the 
international system as being divided between states that have the legitimacy to own 
nuclear weapons and those that do not have this legitimacy. This distinction appears most 
problematic considering India’s traditional struggle against global discrimination. 
 
India’s strategic elite reacted with ease to the clear rhetorical distinction applied by US 
policy makers with regard to North Korea’s illegitimate nuclear programme on one side 
and India’s accepted arsenal on the other. In Pramit Pal Chaudhuri’s view, this tacit 
acceptance of India’s privileged status as legitimate nuclear weapons state was caused by 
the emergence of new threats by ‘rogue’ states like North Korea or non-state actors like Al 
Qaeda. Chaudhuri raises the following question:  
 
Why have things changed? India was a latecomer to the atomic club, detonating a 
nuke roughly a decade after the five established nuclear powers. By that time, the 
club was refusing new members and had set up numerous obstacles to keep out 
newcomers. Dubbing the entire nuclear nonproliferation regime ‘discriminatory’, 
India became an atomic dissident. Then along came missile defence. Faced with a 
new nuclear order where threats come not from great powers but little menaces like 
North Korea or al Qaeda, the US began shifting to a new nuclear doctrine of 
maximalist shields and minimalist arsenals. The membership rules of the atomic 
club were being rewritten. And this time India was going to be the first with an 
application form at the club door.588 
 
These deliberations illustrate the fundamental turnaround of the nuclear discourse among 
India’s elite. The mainstream perception in 2002, as expressed by Chaudhuri, reflected 
attitudes similar to those in the established nuclear weapon states’ discourse: by stating that 
the nuclear threat was not coming from great powers but from small, renegade states like 
North Korea, Chaudhuri obviously considers India to be in the first category. He then 
comments with great satisfaction that the US non-proliferation policy should not target 
India but North Korea and others.  This closes the door of the nuclear club but not in front 
of India. America’s readiness to (tacitly) accept India as a member of this club was, 
according to Chaudhuri, greater among Republicans than Democrats. In his view:  
 
India also has to keep an eye on the Democratic party. There are still plenty of 
Democratic leaders, like Senator Joe Biden, who still hope to resuscitate the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the entire system of multilateral 
nonproliferation agreements. The Indian foreign ministry says it is not too bothered. 
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A senior Indian government official said, ‘Clinton was a Democrat. He came around 
to our viewpoint.’. New Delhi is adamant about only one thing. ‘The US needs to 
accept India as a de facto nuclear power. We are prepared to keep waiting until they 
do, ‘said an Indian official in August.589 
 
J.N. Dixit describes in similar words this positive shift in US nuclear policy but points to 
one major catch: the USA would only continue to endorse India’s enhanced status if India 
itself continued to accept the “regional order envisaged by the US policy planners.”590 He 
states: 
 
The Bush administration not only continued but expanded the positive orientation 
towards India initiated by Bill Clinton in the last year of his tenure… . The US 
seems to reluctantly acknowledge India’s nuclear weapons status and, more 
importantly, India’s capacities to function as a responsible nuclear weapons 
power… . This prospect is, of course, subject to the overall strategic stipulation that 
India’s policies do not radically contradict or challenge the global and regional 
order envisaged by the US policy planners. The extent to which India can conform 
to the American world view in the context of Indian interests constitutes a challenge 
for India’s foreign policy planners.591 
 
American intervention in Iraq in 2003, which was officially done in the name of preventing 
the spread of weapons of mass destruction, had some mixed repercussions in India’s 
newspapers. While some commentators revived old anti-American reactions, many others 
showed remarkable understanding. One of the most outspoken comments of the first 
category was Brahma Chellaney’s Hindustan Times editorial.592 Chellaney begins by 
raising a rhetorical question: 
 
Which country poses a serious threat because of its established links with 
international terrorism, proven weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programme, 
and close ties with other dictatorship in WMD-related matters? To an Indian, the 
answer may be obvious: Pakistan, bristling with dangerous extremists inside and 
outside its armed forces and engaged in covert WMD cooperation with the 
communist regimes in Beijing and Pyongyang. But to President George W. Bush 
and several of his advisors, the answer is Iraq, a starving, humbled country reeling 
under oppressive international sanctions for 11 years whose WMD projects were 
dismantled methodically by UN inspectors over several years before they were 
expelled for refusing to acknowledge their mission was over.593 
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Chellaney then continues to express his disgust regarding how America is not ready to join 
India in launching a pre-emptive attack against “the Pakistani dictatorship” that “openly 
deploys nuclear terror to shield its export of terror,”594 and which, in his view, continues to 
employ nuclear blackmail against India.  
 
The overall perception of America’s policy on Iraq among India’s elite was much more 
affirmative, with Chellaney’s blatant repudiation as the clear exception. In a commentary 
on the fierce opposition against the Iraq war by some European states, C. Raja Mohan 
brings the fundamental change in India’s elite perception towards the USA to the point: 
 
The current European criticism of the American approach to international relations 
today echoes many of the arguments that India used to employ in the past. That 
should have drawn India and Europe closer on global political issues. But it has not. 
At precisely the moment the Europeans are emboldened to criticise the U.S., India 
believes that it cannot jeopardise the budding strategic partnership with America. As 
a result, India has been far less critical than Europe of the U.S. policy on Iraq and 
less insistent on a multilateral route. At a moment when Europe proclaims that 
power politics is passé, India is beginning to de-emphasise the notion of collective 
security and stressing the importance of comprehensive national strength and 
balance of power.595 
 
When the US government dismissed the objections of some European states and instead 
requested India, among several other countries, to deploy troops in support, a majority of 
India’s strategic elite perceived this policy as an acceptance of India’s increased standing in 
the world.  
 
In accordance with most of India’s foreign policy analysts, Mohan considered the 
Republican government more in line with India’s new foreign policy than the previous 
Democratic government. In his view, “[i]t is not surprising that there is greater convergence 
today between India and the Republican-led U.S. on key international issues stretching 
from common support to missile defence and rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty to the importance of limiting the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court.”596 
 
Finally, Mohan moves one step further by expressing hopes that ‘new India’ could replace 
‘old Europe’ in a new global order that was to be reworked by the USA: 
 
As a rising power, India is more sympathetic to the American effort to rework the 
rules of the global game from which it could benefit. Europe, on the other hand, is a 
staunch defender of the present order. No wonder then those segments of the 
American establishment are questioning the European over-representation in the 
global decision-making structures and demanding a greater say for nations such as 
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India, which is more in tune with the U.S. than Europe. If New Delhi gets its act 
together in the present global crisis, India might be better positioned than ever 
before to alter its standing on the global state.597 
 
Mohan’s account illustrates the extent to which the pragmatists among India’s strategic 
elite had reversed the main paradigms of India’s moralist, principle guided declaratory 
policy since 1998 into opposing ideology within a fairly short range of time. 
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13. The Symbol of “Injustice”: The International Non-
Proliferation Regime 
 
 
13.1. The Emergence of the Non-proliferation Debate 
 
13.1.1. Restrictions on Civilian Nuclear Technology Transfer 
 
Soon after the nightmarish experience with nuclear technology in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 
plans to globally restrict access to this dangerous expertise emerged under the umbrella of 
the newly established United Nations. In 1946, the Baruch Plan suggested the creation of an 
international authority to control nuclear proliferation. Further, in those countries in which 
the research on nuclear technology progressed, domestic debates on export controls gained 
momentum. The debate in Western countries was held on the basis of three fundamental 
considerations: First, the inhumane and devastating nature of nuclear technology, as well as 
its unforeseeable impact on the international power balance, were strong arguments in 
favour of  its restriction. Second, the civilian use of nuclear power was seen as the best 
answer to the world’s growing energy demand, and as such crucial to the world’s economic 
development. The respective national nuclear industries, which engaged in a tough 
competition on shares of this potentially rosy market, set up strong lobby groups. The third 
dimension of the debate on restrictions of nuclear technology was set by geo-strategic 
considerations in the context of the emerging Cold War. The interplay of these three factors 
determined the respective national nuclear export policy, which often proved to be 
inconsistent and volatile. The bigger the potential import market was, and the closer the 
government of the importing state stood to the Western alliance, the lower were the moral 
standards of the exporting Western countries.  
 
While all Western countries had developed their nuclear industry in close co-operation with 
each other, their determination to bulkhead their knowledge off and to instrumentalise it as 
leverage in their relationships to other countries alienated the debarred states. The forced 
isolation of the respective states’ nuclear programmes combined with the value of this 
technology, symbolising modernity and technological supremacy, and predestined the 
development of nuclear capabilities as discipline for inter-state competition,  as such 
greatly fuelling the ambitions of several countries. 
 
India, at that time, was considered by the Western NATO countries as neutral state with 
rather low market potential. Pakistan enjoyed privileges due to its strategic alliance with the 
USA, while China, despite its attractive market potential, was cut off from Western 
technology until 1971 due to its proximity to the Warsaw Pact. 
The adjustment of moral norms to pragmatic economic and strategic considerations, as well 
as the often rude play on the Third World countries’ technological dependency by many of 
the technically advanced countries proved to be one of the main sources of the emerging 
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anti-colonialist feelings among India’s and other Third World countries’ elite. It further 
determined India’s emphasis on self-reliance in the nuclear field. India’s self-declared 
position was based on a clear distinction between civilian and military applications of 
nuclear technology. Within this framework, the restriction on Western transfer of nuclear 
technology and fissile material was perceived as unfair, because it prevented India’s 
civilian nuclear programme from progressing, and thus spoiled the country’s economic 
development.  
 
Among India’s policy-makers, Nehru’s vision of India’s moral exceptionalism and its 
heralding of peaceful co-existence were widely shared. This moral self-appreciation 
clashed with Western doubts about India’s suitability as member of the nuclear club. 
In the early stages of India’s nuclear programme, however, Western export control policies 
were no more than intentions, and economic considerations prevailed. During the 1950s 
and early 1960s, India’s nuclear programme quickly developed under the leadership of 
Homi Bhabha with the help of large scale technological assistance from Western countries, 
particularly from Canada, France, the USA and Great Britain, and later from Western 
Germany. Doubts about the distinctiveness of civilian and military applications of nuclear 
technology rose again during the debate on ‘peaceful nuclear explosions’ (PNEs). Efforts to 
extend a possible nuclear test ban on PNEs met with sharp protest from India’s nuclear 
establishment and Western nuclear industry. Advocates of the PNE stressed the potential 
applications of nuclear explosions in large scale canal digging and mining projects. The 
moral self-appreciation of India’s elite and the sacrosanct pro-PNE position of the nuclear 
scientists foreclose any serious debate on the effectiveness of PNEs in India. After 
authorising India’s PNE in 1974, Indira Gandhi announced the event as breakthrough in the 
civilian use of nuclear technology, and the sharp international reactions took her by 
surprise. The fact that Indira Gandhi and India’s policy-makers at large failed to anticipate 
the international reaction to the nuclear test of 1974 again highlighted the wide gap between 
India’s position in the world and the self-perception of India’s generally inward-looking 
elite. 
 
During the 1970s, several factors made the Western nuclear exports to India increasingly 
problematic. First of all, awareness of the dangers of nuclear technology gradually 
increased among the public in the supplier states, causing increasing pressures on their 
governments to come to terms on restrictive agreements over nuclear technology export 
controls. 
 
After the conclusion of the NPT in 1968, several exporting nations further engaged in 
negotiations to control more effectively the flow of nuclear expertise. In 1975, as a direct 
reaction to India’s nuclear test, leading Western exporters agreed on the creation of the 
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in order to establish binding export control mechanisms on 
sensitive technology and fissile material. The NSG prohibited the supply of those nuclear 
facilities, which were not under full safeguards of the IAEA. In addition, several Western 
countries significantly tightened their legislation on nuclear exports. In 1976, the U.S. 
legislative passed the so called Symington Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 
1951, which provided the cut off from military and economic assistance to those countries 
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with unsafeguarded facilities to enrich uranium or reprocess plutonium. Other countries 
followed with similar legislations. 
 
13.1.2. Negotiations on the Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1968 
 
Since negotiations on a global non-proliferation regime emerged in the mid-1960s, the 
treaty was debated in India largely along normative principles, and less with regard to its 
potential effect on India’s security. In the view widely accepted among India’s strategic 
elite, the nature of the NPT contradicted to the Nehruvian vision of an international order 
based on morality rather than on military power, as it gave certain privileges to those 
countries relying on the military might of nuclear weapons. Further, it collided with India’s 
quest for major power status, as it restricted the official nuclear power status to those five 
states which conducted nuclear tests prior to the implementation of the NPT in 1968, six 
years before India conducted its first nuclear test.  
 
The way in which these two norms determined India’s position during the negotiations on 
NPT and CTBT, was summarised by Ashley J. Tellis as follows:  
 
Indian strategic policy for much of the Cold War period and thereafter focused on 
attaining two sets of objectives. The fist set of objectives – pursued mainly at the 
diplomatic level – consisted of espousing the global abolition of nuclear weaponry. 
These calls for abolition were often couched either in moralistic term drawn from 
indigenous traditions or in the secular language of liberal internationalism, both of 
which by imparting a strong ‘idealistic’ flavour to Indian rhetoric rendered such 
comments misplaced in the highly competitive arena of international politics. ... . 
Because this objective could not be attained, however – thanks both to the logic of 
technology and to political resistance on the part of the established nuclear powers – 
India gradually settled for a fallback option: preventing any external political or 
legal restraints from encumbering its right to formally develop a nuclear arsenal 
when that might be required.598 
 
In the following, Tellis relativises the second objective as a ‘fallback option’ by stating that 
the “desire to maintain India’s autonomy with respect to its nuclear choices existed since 
the beginning of its nuclear program”599. In other words, contrary  to common 
interpretations, the nuclear weapons option had been an integral part of Nehru’s vision for 
India within the community of states right from the beginning.  
 
Among India’s elite, both treaties, NPT and CTBT, became symbols of the discriminating 
nature of the international order, and the indifference of the community of states towards 
India’s international aspirations and its quest for recognition and prestige. These dynamics 
largely foreclosed any pragmatic assessment of how India’s security would benefit if it 
joined these regimes. The negotiations on the NPT in the mid-1960 thus had the paradox 
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effect of  further fuelling India’s nuclear programme, rather than limiting nuclear 
proliferation.  
 
When Ireland, in 1958, put forward the idea of creating a global treaty to prevent nuclear 
proliferation, India, under the leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru, felt morally committed to the 
idea and to actively pursuing the worldwide abolition of nuclear weapons. The more the 
negotiations on the treaty progressed, however, the more did the moral motive shift into the 
background, and other motives came to the fore. The course of India’s policy subsequently 
changed from support towards fierce rejection of the treaty. This shift in policy resulted 
from the fact that the nuclear weapon states refused to contribute to the treaty by 
abolishing, or at least reducing their own arsenals, and used the treaty as a tool to create 
what Indian policy makers would then call ‘a global regime of nuclear apartheid’. 
Apparently, the discriminating nature of the treaty was since then continuously used by 
India as the central moral justification for its quest for the bomb. The designated role of the 
officially recognised five nuclear weapons states enabled India to adopt its ambiguous 
policy of expressing its strong moral aversion against the bomb and, at the same time, 
developing its own nuclear capabilities without losing face. Instead of debating the strategic 
necessity of nuclear weapons for India’s security, many among India’s political elite after 
1968 favoured the development of nuclear capabilities simply because they felt that India 
had the moral right to do so. 
 
The negotiations on the NPT fell into a period of political change in India, in which three 
Prime Ministers successively shaped India’s position along their personal beliefs and 
political circumstances. The personalised, ad hoc fashion in which the Prime Minister 
designed India’s nuclear policy prevented a more effective and consistent pursuit of India’s 
interests in the course of the negotiations.  
 
The nightmarish experience with power politics in the Sino-Indian war of 1962 changed 
Nehru’s foreign policy, and particularly his position on the non-proliferation treaty, in 
several terms. The event painfully showed the weakness of a foreign policy purely guided 
by abstract normative principles. The compulsions of Realpolitik subsequently forced the 
Nehru government to make a more pragmatic assessment of the pros and cons of the treaty 
to India’s security. This policy benefited from Nehru’s unchallenged position and the stable 
political set-up at large, which made the government less prone to pressures from the 
emotionally heated public debate and populist political rivals. When Lal Bahadur Shastri 
became Prime Minister in 1964, India’s nuclear policy faced several obstacles. Shastri was 
a novice in international affairs. Nehru surrounded himself with a non-institutional network 
of loyal advisors. After the change in government, these informal threads of interpersonal 
relationships, which had shaped the process of foreign policy-making in India during the 
Nehru years, were disconnected. Without much deliberation on the nuclear issue, with 
strong opposition from within his own ruling party, and several looming domestic and 
regional crises diverting his attention, Shastri entered into the negotiations on the non-
proliferation treaty. He launched an initiative by picking up on the idea of a comprehensive 
security guarantee by the two superpowers for the non-nuclear weapons states. If a general 
agreement on the immunity of non-nuclear weapons states to any form of nuclear threat 
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would be guaranteed by the two superpowers, as Shastri argued, the motivation of these 
states to acquire nuclear arsenals themselves would vanish. This agreement would then 
create a global nuclear umbrella, under which all states could enjoy the deterrent effects of 
nuclear weapons. The superpowers were not prepared to commit to such a comprehensive 
treaty and rejected the proposal. Shastri’s initiative further met with strong opposition 
among India’s strategic thinkers, as it contradicted the idea of a global regime based on 
equity among the states by causing new dependencies, and, as it was feared, would drag 
India into the Cold War competition.  
 
When Lal Bahadur Shastri died in January 1966, his stay in power had been too short to 
have a lasting impact on India’s position on the nuclear issue. 
Due to the energetic ruling style of Shastri’s successor, Indira Gandhi, India’s interests 
were more vigorously pursued in the final stages of the NPT negotiations in Geneva. At the 
same time, the debate within the American polity between those who accepted India’s 
claims as legitimate and those who wanted the treaty to prevent proliferation in the Third 
World without commitment of the nuclear weapon states, was finally decided in favour of 
the latter. In 1967, the USA and the Soviet Union advanced a draft of the treaty which 
restricted nuclear technology to the five nuclear weapons states. The draft neither provided 
any security guarantees, nor any obligation of these states to reduce the leverage and 
prestige they drew from their own arsenals. The treaty was not meant to reduce the nuclear 
dangers from the existing nuclear arms race of the Cold War, but to simply prevent new 
nuclear competitions from emerging in other, regional set ups. The fierce rhetoric of India’s 
political elite on the nuclear issue heightened international fears of uncontrolled spread of 
nuclear weapons into unstable regions, and  created a strong consensus on the urgency of 
the treaty among the community of non-nuclear weapons states, despite its discriminating 
character. 
 
By condemning the one-sidedness of the draft treaty and demanding binding commitments 
by the nuclear weapon states, India’s representative at the Geneva negotiations, V.C. 
Trivedi, adopted a comfortable position, which allowed him to abstain from any agreement 
while morally passing the buck to the superpowers. The only challenge to his position came 
from the efforts to establish a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing, including PNEs. 
According to George Perkovich,  
 
[t]he PNE issue was extremely delicate for India. As the leading demander of 
nuclear disarmament, India’s decision would have been badly undermined by 
evidence that it was embarked on building its own nuclear weapon capability. At the 
same time, however, Indian diplomats sought to block efforts to proscribe national 
development of peaceful nuclear explosives.600 
 
In the course of the negotiations, India acknowledged that there was no technical distinction 
between nuclear weapons and peaceful nuclear devices. Instead, it elevated the issue to a 
matter of principle. As Trivedi declared,  
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[t]he civil nuclear Powers can tolerate nuclear weapon apartheid, but not an atomic 
apartheid in their economic and peaceful development. ... (T)echnology in itself is 
not evil. Dynamite was originally meant for military use. Aeronautics, electronics, 
even steel fabrication – these are technologies which can be use for weapons as well 
as for economic development. That does not mean, therefore, that only the poor and 
developing nations should be denied all technology for fear they may use it for 
military purposes ... the solution of the problem must not be sought in the 
renunciation of the sovereign right of unrestricted development of (atomic) energy 
by some countries only.601 
 
This negotiation strategy aimed at allowing India to continue its preparations to conduct a 
PNE, which would demonstrate its – civilian and military - nuclear potential, while still 
being able to rhetorically declare it as a peaceful act. Finally, the Non-Proliferation Treaty 
was signed by a vast majority of states on June 12th 1968, with India as its sole outspoken 
opponent.  
 
In the course of the negotiations to the NPT, the interaction between India’s policy-makers 
and the leading powers, particularly the USA, left a deep impact on India’s nuclear 
discourse that set its position on the issue for the next three decades. While many among 
India’s elite maintained their moral aversion to the bomb, the anti-colonialist feelings and 
India’s quest for a world order based on equity dominated their position of ‘keeping the 
nuclear option open’, and rejecting the global non-proliferation regime. Even the most 
bitter opponents of India’s nuclear programme, like Morarji Desai, vehemently spoke 
against signing the treaty. 
 
13.1.3. The Revival of the International Non-proliferation Debate 
 
Until the late 1980s, India’s policy on the nuclear issue featured two taboos: First, India 
would not build nuclear weapons; second, India would not accede to a non-proliferation 
regime without clear disarmament provisions for the nuclear weapons states. This two-track 
formula was most explicitly postulated by then Foreign Affairs Minister Atal Behari 
Vajpayee in the late 1970s: “India will sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty only when 
nuclear-weapon Powers have given convincing evidence of their desire to ban and destroy 
nuclear weapons”602. Vajpayee categorically ruled out any Indian nuclear weapons 
ambitions for the future by stating that India “would never manufacture atomic weapons 
nor proliferate the technology of weapon development. It is our solemn resolve that 
whatever the rest of the world may do, we will never use the atomic energy for military 
purpose”603.  
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Prior to the emergence of the Brasstacks crisis, in-depth analyses of India’s stance towards 
the NPT were rare. As long as the official position adhered to the peaceful nuclear 
programme scheme, the debate was in a state of equilibrium, in which no decision about 
exercising the nuclear option had to be made. In the course of the intensified debate after 
Pakistan’s nuclear threat during the 1980s, there was a unanimous understanding among 
India’s foreign policy elite that the NPT would not pose any hindrance to India in 
exercising the nuclear option if Pakistan would acquire a nuclear arsenal or conduct a 
nuclear test. As H. K. Dua explained, 
 
[f]or several years, India has been sitting uneasily at the threshold, caught in the 
dilemma created by its achievements in the nuclear field and the vow it took many 
years ago that its nuclear programme is for only peaceful purposes. The policy of 
nuclear brahmacharya is, however, coming under severe pressure because of factors 
outside India’s control. They include the attitude the superpowers and nuclear 
‘haves’ towards India’s nuclear programme as well as Pakistan’s known drive to 
possess nuclear weapons.604 
 
This assessment illustrated several ambiguities inherent in India’s nuclear debate. First of 
all, Pakistan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons, which was accepted as a given fact among 
India’s elite already in the 1980s, was eventually considered to be ‘outside India’s control’. 
The interrelation between progress in Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and prior nuclear 
activities of India was ignored. Pakistan’s assurance that it would give up its nuclear 
weapons programme and sign the NPT if India did so was condemned as untrustworthy. 
According to Dua, “Pakistan wants to have the bomb to gain nuclear advantage over India. 
It will test a device or make known that it has the bomb to prove its nuclear macho”605. 
Next, Dua’s stance on the peacefulness of India’s programme illustrated the elite’s rationale 
which had caused some confusion among outside observers. According to this rationale, 
India’s nuclear programme was peaceful because it was officially declared to be peaceful, 
irrespectively whether it developed nuclear devices or not. In fact, India was about to 
assemble its first nuclear device at the time the article was published in 1985.  
 
 
13.2. The Period of Unambiguous Ambiguity 
 
In June 1986, Rajiv Gandhi’s expressed his concerns about the progress of Pakistan’s 
nuclear weapons programme. His declaration marked a major turn in the elite debate on the 
non-proliferation regime. According to G. S. Bhargava,  
 
[t]he Prime Minister’s recent pronouncements on Pakistan’s efforts to acquire 
nuclear weapons and related issues imply a subtle, but significant, shift in India’s 
stance on nuclear proliferation, especially in South Asia. Even if tactical, it is a 
healthy development signifying release of a policy from more than two decades of 
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corrosive rhetoric. India’s opposition to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 
has been as much due to its inequitable provisions as in account of what can be 
called the theology of proliferation, namely that any addition to the existing number 
of five nuclear weapons powers is destabilising.606 
 
While most analysts did not consider India’s repudiation of the non-proliferation regime in 
the name of all Third World countries (including Pakistan) on one hand, and the emergence 
of the Pakistani nuclear threat on the other, as being contradictive, Bhargava was much 
more assertive on this ambiguity. In his view, the Pakistani threat was used as a disguise for 
the nuclear ambitions of the Indian ‘bomb lobby’: 
 
The Bomb lobby in India thrives on the foregoing philosophy of ‘the more the 
merrier’, which however convincing in theory, is disastrous in practice. It uses 
Pakistan’s clandestine nuclear activities as a lever to press India’s case for going 
nuclear, regarding neither of the prospects as unmitigated evils. Its approach, 
therefore, is not to see that Pakistan is prevented or dissuaded from developing 
weapons capability but to use the security implications for India of such a 
development to make a case for the Bomb.607 
 
The fact that India abstained from any serious attempt to come to terms with Pakistan on 
the nuclear issue before and after the Brasstacks crisis gave some evidence in support of 
Bhargava’s claim. Bhargava then continued to examine the nuclear policies of several 
threshold states, which, at that time, had similar reservations about signing the NPT: 
 
The first crop of nuclear weapon powers – the US, the Soviet Union, Britain, France 
and China – was the product of security concerns… . In contrast, the second 
generation of nuclear weapon powers – the NPT has not recognised them as such 
nor have they formally shown their hand – have been adopting the peaceful 
explosions route, even when they have legitimate security reasons for seeking to 
possess the weapon… . Why? If , as claimed by the protagonists of the Bomb, 
nuclear weapons endow the possessor with power and prestige, why should these 
governments be shy of owning it after having tried so hard to acquire the capability? 
Why do they all take recourse to the transparent deception of peaceful uses thus 
draining peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) of whatever credibility they may have 
had? The reason perhaps is a realisation that the benefits of the Bomb have been 
overrated and that the cost of security brought with nuclear weapons is very, very 
high. This raises the fundamental question whether India’s security will be better 
served by acquisition of nuclear weapons in competition with Pakistan than by 
trying, even now, to see that the South Asian region continues to be free of nuclear 
weapons.608 
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The provisions of the NPT, and particularly the sanctions regime attached to it, caused the 
second generation of nuclear weapons states to engage in opaque, rather than overt 
proliferation. Theory suggests that an opaque nuclear arsenal like, for instance,  that of 
Israel, could have a deterrent effect, and therefore enhance a state’s security609. Nuclear 
weapons can endow the possessor with power even if their possession is officially denied. 
Opaque nuclear proliferation was nevertheless inappropriate to enhance the possessor’s 
international status. 
 
Bhargava’s further suggestion that “they all take recourse to the transparent deception of 
peaceful uses thus draining peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs)”610 was misleading, 
because India was the sole state explicitly conducting this kind of camouflaged policy.  
In Bhargava’s follow-up article one day later, he addressed the dilemma of India’s nuclear 
policy, which attempted to deal with an increased nuclear threat from Pakistan and, at the 
same time, rejected those restrictions provided by the international non-proliferation 
regime, which would curtail this threat. In his view,  
 
[t]he Pakistani bomb in the basement is an opportunity more than a threat. India 
should reinforce its peaceful nuclear intentions with concrete measures like a 
bilateral arrangement on the lines of the Treaty of Tlatelolco in Latin America so 
that the Pakistani nuclear installations are exposed to IAEA safeguards and 
international inspections. India will have nothing to lose from a similar exposure 
because the Prime Minister has reiterated that our nuclear policy is geared to 
peaceful purposes.611 
 
Bhargava’s suggestion was unrealistic due to several factors. First, his claim that India had 
nothing to hide because the Prime Minister labelled the programme as peaceful appeared 
quite naïve. Second, already in the 1980s, a consensus among India’s political leaders and 
its epistemic community agreed that IAEA safeguards or international inspections were 
unacceptable to India because they would curtail its sovereignty. Third, Bhargava 
disregarded the China factor. Fourth and most importantly, Bhargava neglected the prestige 
dimension of the nuclear arsenal, which would not allow India to give up its nuclear 
weapons programme unless all nuclear weapons states would do the same.  
 
On December 13th 1985, Pakistan moved a resolution in the UN General Assembly 
suggesting that  South Asia be declared a nuclear weapons free zone. The resolution was 
accepted with 103 countries in favour and 40 countries abstaining612. Only Bhutan, which 
did not conduct a foreign policy independent from India, and Mauritius, which had a 
majority population of Indian immigrants, joined India in voting against the resolution. 
This move showed, for the first time, India’s international isolation on the nuclear issue. 
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Some analysts expressed concern about this isolation. According to Pran Chopra, “the risk 
of isolation in India’s favourite fora is a price that must be taken into account in deciding 
the cost-benefit of a particular course”613. Other members of India’s strategic community 
reacted defiantly to this isolation, thereby creating the myth of India as the world’s sole 
moralist, which would eventually come to dominate the domestic debate on the 
international non-proliferation regime in the years to come. In a move to counter Pakistan’s 
1985 diplomatic success, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in May 1988 presented India’s own, 
much more ambitious plan for nuclear disarmament to the UN General Assembly, 
suggesting a global elimination of all nuclear weapons in three steps until 2010. Despite its 
highly unrealistic outlook, this call for disarmament served India’s foreign policy elite in 
maintaining its normative principle of moral exceptionalism. As Perkovich wrote, 
“(i)ndeed, Indian security pundits and the strategic enclave have called for disarmament 
knowing that the nuclear weapon states would not oblige, thereby giving normative cover 
for India to pursue nuclear weapons”614. 
 
This moral exceptionalism on the nuclear non-proliferation front was outlined in an 
authoritative analysis by K. Subrahmanyam in 1989615. Therein, Subrahmanyam offered a 
terse answer to the question whether India should attend the NPT Review Conference of 
1990 as an observer (as non-signatory state, India was bound to this status) or boycott the 
event. Subrahmanyam outspokenly opted for India’s isolation by stating that,  
 
[i]n this writer’s view not only India’s attendance at the review conference will not 
promote the cause of the true non-proliferation it will be counter-productive. First, 
… India will not have the same rights as other nations and having protested against 
the NPT as an unequal and discriminatory treaty will it behove India’s dignity to be 
a second class participant in that review conference? Our attendance in that 
conference will be deliberately twisted to proclaim to the world that India is finally 
coming round towards acceptance of the NPT in its present form. When such 
propaganda is made in the forum of the conference we will have no right to reply as 
an observer… . Will not our presence in the NPT Review Conference in the second 
grade status confirm to the world that on nuclear issues, India need not be 
considered a serious actor?616 
 
Subrahmanyam obviously feared that by not having the same rights as NPT members, India 
would not have the appropriate forum to respond to any potential ‘propaganda’, and that, as 
a consequence, it might not be considered a serious actor. This argument, however, would 
also apply in case India was not present at the conference at all, a point overlooked by 
Subrahmanyam.  
What made his argument so appealing within India’s ongoing nuclear debate was less its 
content, but its explicit linking of the nuclear issue to the dignity of the Indian nation. As 
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the further analysis of the non-proliferation debate in India will show, it was this peculiarity 
of linking any problems on this issue on higher principles of national dignity, morality or 
prestige, which turned out to be the root cause of the reduction of India’s international 
nuclear policy to categorical refusals of any initiative. For India’s political leadership, 
saying ‘no’ proved to be the much more compelling option compared with engaging in a 
more constructive discourse and thereby risking blame from its domestic audience for being 
insensitive to India’s dignity or prestige617.  
 
Subrahmanyam subsequently summarised the reasons for India’s obligation to reject the 
discriminatory treaty on moral grounds: 
 
The nuclear weapon powers, which sponsored the NPT, have given no indication 
that they are willing to consider any modification to the Treaty as it stands at 
present. Their stand is that they would negotiate arms control measures among 
themselves according to their mutual convenience but the rest of the world should 
continue to accept the subordinate status and discriminatory treatment. They have 
not learnt any lessons from the flaws of the NPT but are attempting to bring in 
another version of the NPT in respect of missile technology proliferation which will 
again discriminate against the have-nots and perpetuate the dominance of the 
haves… . The NPT is a fatally flawed document. It does not condemn the use and 
threat of use of nuclear weapons and make the weapons illegitimate. No legitimate 
weapon can ever be eliminated or limited to the cartelised possession of a few 
countries only.618 
 
Subrahmanyam’s deliberations illustrate several key features of the emerging consensus of 
India’s epistemic community on the international non-proliferation discourse. First, it 
departed from the traditional stance, which considered a non-proliferation regime only 
acceptable for India on the condition that the two superpowers simultaneously engaged in 
substantial nuclear disarmament. By the end of the 1980s, both superpowers were about to 
agree on substantial nuclear disarmament within the framework of INF and START. 
Subrahmanyam saw the pitfall, the superpowers’ reduction of nuclear weapons could have 
for India’s position. He circumvented this trap by claiming that such bilateral negotiations 
“according to their mutual convenience” would be equally unacceptable to India, as it 
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would mean that “the rest of the world should continue to accept the subordinate status and 
discriminatory treatment”619. 
 
Having expressed his disgust about the perpetuated dominance of the nuclear haves and 
their continued policy of discrimination against the have-nots, Subrahmanyam emphasised 
that India did not at all belong to the nuclear have-nots:  
 
Further India is about to enter an era when both its nuclear missile capabilities are 
likely to receive due respect and attention from the international community. Before 
1995 when the NPT is due for reconfirmation and extension India would probably 
have tested missiles of range and accuracy not inferior to those of other powers. It is 
recognised that India, with its expanding civil nuclear power programme, would 
have accumulated more plutonium than China by the year 2000.620 
 
At this point, Subrahmanyam’s adherence to the rhetoric of the ‘civilian nuclear 
programme’ proved destructive to the concept itself: he declared that the plutonium cores 
that were to be mounted on India’s advanced missiles were ‘civilian’. This contradiction in 
terms illustrates the great importance Subrahmanyam et al. were attributing to the 
maintenance of the ‘peaceful nuclear programme’, which was still considered the crucial 
feature for demonstrating India’s moral superiority. 
 
Subrahmanyam ultimately offered a possible way out of the contradiction between India’s 
self-depiction as the spearhead of the have-nots and its increasing nuclear capabilities: 
 
In spite of all these developments the sponsors of the NPT were to reconfirm the 
NPT in 1995 they will be confirming not only the status of the 140-odd nations 
which have subjugated themselves to the iniquitous treaty, they will in reality be 
confirming the status of undeclared nuclear weapon powers as well. Given the 
increasing awareness all over the world of the unwinnability of a nuclear war, one 
need not get to scared of a world of five declared nuclear weapon powers and 
another five or six undeclared nuclear weapon powers.621 
 
These deliberations marked a turn in Subrahmanyam’s line of argument. Having declared 
India’s nuclear programme as ‘civilian’ in the earlier course of his deliberations, he then 
attributed the status of ‘undeclared nuclear weapon power’ to India, a contrast to the 
inferior status of the “140-odd nations which have subjugated themselves to the iniquitous 
treaty”622.  
He suggests that the world should not worry about a couple more nuclear weapons states, 
for most countries are aware of that fact that nuclear wars are ‘unwinnable’. But if these 
                                                 
619 Subrahmanyam, K.: op.cit.. In: The Hindu, October 25th 1989. 
620 ibid. 
621 ibid. 
622 ibid. 
 302
weapons were of no practical value anyway, one might ask, why did Subrahmanyam take 
so much effort in promoting them?  
This distinction, in terms of status, between undeclared nuclear weapons states and have-
nots was a noteworthy anticipation of India’s nuclear policy after its self-declaration as a 
nuclear weapons state. In fact, it already shows what would become more obvious in 1998: 
Despite heralding a nuclear regime based on the equal rights of all states, it was considered 
one of India’s interests to keep the number of nuclear weapons states as small as possible. 
As long as India enjoyed  member status, its aim was to keep the door of the nuclear club 
closed. 
 
In sum, Subrahmanyam’s analysis revealed the major dynamics of the nuclear debate in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, in which the mainstream opinion on nuclear weapons was in the 
process of fundamental change. Reason for the emotional appeal of Subrahmanyam’s logic, 
despite its several contradictions, was its all-embracing nature: India was displayed as the 
world’s nuclear Robin Hood, fighting for the right of the deprived ‘have-nots’ against the 
discriminatory regime of the few ‘haves’. At the same time, Subrahmanyam claimed for 
India the status of an ‘undeclared nuclear weapon power’, one notch above the ‘have-nots’. 
Subrahmanyam claimed moral superiority due to the civilian and peaceful nuclear 
programme while simultaneously emphasising India’s great prowess in terms of missile 
development and plutonium reprocessing. In Subrahmanyam’s view, this prowess placed 
India ahead of not only the 140-odd ‘have-nots’, but most importantly, China. 
 
The international audience perceived India’s nuclear policy as increasingly equivocal. After 
having been almost completely isolated on the nuclear issue in several UN fora, India still 
maintained its claim to speak for all nuclear have-nots. India’s strategic elite rejected the 
nuclear policy of the official nuclear weapon states on moral grounds, particularly that of 
the USA, while at the same time trying to exploit the prestige value of its own nuclear 
achievements. The increasing gap between India’s self-depiction and the image of India 
abroad was amplified by the persistent view, particularly among Western states, of India as 
the country with the world’s larges population of poor. This often orientalist perception of 
India added a moral dimension to Western views of India’s nuclear course. The moral 
objections by the West, perceived as mere colonialism within the Indian discourse, clashed 
with the self-depiction of the domestic elite with regard to India’s moral exceptionalism 
and exacerbated the bitterness of the debate.  
 
Clearly, Subrahmanyam’s emotionally appealing line of argument shut out a nuanced 
approach to the issue. Symptomatically, Subrahmanyam failed to mention a single reason 
why India would need nuclear weapons to improve its security.  
The exploitation of India’s nuclear capabilities for prestige purposes, like Subrahmanyam’s 
claim that India would be ahead of China in 1995, had the ironical effect that, despite 
India’s official claim of not having any weapons capabilities at all, the progress of its 
nuclear weapons programme was domestically and internationally overestimated. This 
effect was addressed by Amalendu Das Gupta: 
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[q]uite conceivably, the Indian capability is still more a matter of potential than of 
something that can be put to immediate or early use. It would be ironic if it were 
significantly less advanced than generally believed, for India would then have paid a 
large price with little to show for it. Its refusal to sign the NPT or accept ‘full-scope’ 
safeguards has cost it valuable technical assistance for the nuclear power 
programme. There has also been political mistrust, and damage to its moral posture. 
Surely, the unsurrendered option ought to have yielded some compensation.  
The Government, of course, can do nothing to dispel any doubt on this score; 
ambiguity is the prescribed course in such situations. Nor can there be any question 
of reversing its decision to retain the bomb option. But New Delhi may have to 
redefine its formal response to international pressures. India’s time bound plan for 
total nuclear disarmament is useful rhetoric; so is lack of a regional agreement 
covering not merely Pakistan but also the Chinese and other nuclear forces close to 
this subcontinent.623 
 
Gupta identified three of the major costs of India’s nuclear policy: First, less technical 
assistance for its nuclear power industry (which, after all, was officially the sole purpose of 
India’s nuclear programme); second, the political mistrust; and third, the damage to its 
moral posture. In Gupta’s view, this prize was worth being paid in order to keep the nuclear 
option open. The author suggests that the only way for the Indian government to deal with 
these international repercussions was to stick to its policy of nuclear ambiguity.  
 
By suggesting nuclear ambiguity, Gupta ignored the source of international political 
mistrust. The instrumentalisation of India’s nuclear weapons capabilities by domestic 
analysts for prestige purposes and the alarmist threat assessments of the nuclear dangers in 
South Asia, particularly from the USA, had the effect of resolving all doubts, 
internationally as well as domestically, about a clear path towards nuclearisation by the 
Indian government. The fact that despite this widespread conviction, the Indian government 
stuck to its principle of nuclear abstinence, was the root cause for international political 
mistrust. The Indian government followed Gupta’s suggestion and continued to adhere to 
its rhetoric of nuclear ambiguity, though there were already few doubters of its impending 
nuclearisation.  
 
 
13.3. Escalating Rhetoric on the International Non-proliferation Debate 
 
13.3.1. The Bomb Lobby and its Challengers 
 
In a move to adjust the official rhetoric of nuclear ambiguity to the progress of India’s 
nuclear weapons programme, the chairman of the AEC, P.K. Iyengar, declared in an 
address to the general assembly of the IAEA in 1991 that “it is clear that signing an 
agreement or treaty by itself is not the recipe for preventing proliferation. What is more 
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important is self-restraint and I am glad to say that India, despite having crossed the 
threshold in nuclear technology, continues to exercise self-restraint”624. This statement 
pushed India’s nuclear discourse one step further: Before 1991, India’s moral 
exceptionalism was derived from its stance of voluntarily abstaining from acquiring nuclear 
capabilities, despite its technical ability to do so. By 1991, according to Iyengar, India had 
acquired nuclear capabilities but continued to exercise self-restraint, in contrast to the 
unrestrained nuclear programmes of the official nuclear weapons powers. This step forward 
meant the end of the moral principle guiding India’s ‘peaceful nuclear programme’ that 
pundits like Subrahmanyam had been adhering to into the early 1990s. But it did not mark 
the end of the principle of ‘keeping the nuclear option open’. According to the modified 
logic, India’s reputed self-restraint implied the existence of a nuclear option, despite the 
fact that no member of the political leadership or the epistemic community seriously 
considered rolling back India’s nuclear programme in 1991. 
 
In the same month that Iyengar gave his address to the IAEA, two new initiatives were 
launched to prevent the emergence of a nuclear arms race in South Asia. The first initiative 
was launched by US Secretary of State James Baker, who pressed India to finally sign the 
NPT. The second initiative was launched by Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, who 
revived Zia-ul Haq’s idea of a nuclear weapon free zone in South Asia. India’s responses 
again reflected the ambiguity of its nuclear diplomacy. The Indian government rejected 
Baker’s proposal by stating that, in addition to its discriminating character, the NPT would 
not provide enough security against India’s regional nuclear threats from China and 
Pakistan. It then rejected Sharif’s proposal by stating that nuclear weapons were not a 
regional but a global problem which could only be addressed in a global framework. While 
both statements were assessed independently by India’s strategic pundits, the contradiction 
between them remained unnoticed. On the Baker initiative, C. Raja Mohan commented: 
 
India of course reiterated its traditional position that NPT is discriminatory and its 
security concerns about nuclear weapons in China and Pakistan. Clearly there are 
growing external and internal demands on New Delhi to recast its nuclear 
diplomacy. A restructuring of the Indian policy on nuclear weapons and arms 
control is necessary, but not because there are pressures from outside.625 
 
In Mohan’s view, the end of the Cold War opened up new windows of opportunity for 
creating a nuclear free world. He nevertheless misconceived India’s international position 
by pointing to its successful mobilisation of international public opinion. Furthermore, 
Mohan suggested a comprehensive list of measures India should take to push the two 
superpowers towards total nuclear disarmament:  
 
[India] must demand that the nuclear weapon powers stop the deployment of 
nuclear weapons… . There are other proposals which India could make: One is to 
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reiterate the call for a global freeze on the production of all nuclear fissionable 
material… . The other is to call for shifting nuclear weapons out of national control 
to the control of the United Nations.626 
 
Mohan’s catalogue of demands stemmed from a certain overestimation of India’s 
international leverage and the international mortal authority arising from its self-perceived 
moral exceptionalism. It further reflected the inclination of some strategists, like C. Raja 
Mohan, to raise absolute demands – irrespective of their enforceability – as rhetorical 
elements of discourse strategies.  
 
In a critical assessment of India’s negative position on Sharif’s initiative for a NWFZ, G.S. 
Bhargava again recalled Zia’s old plans: 
 
Pakistan had made five suggestions to avoid the nuclearization of the region: that 
(1) India and Pakistan jointly sign the NPT, (2) prepare a bilateral version of the 
NPT as Brazil and Argentina have done, (3) create a nuclear weapon free zone in 
South Asia, (4) bilaterally accept the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
safeguards on all their nuclear installations, and (5) jointly renounce the acquisition 
and use of nuclear weapons.627 
 
Bhargava continued to reject the objections against this proposal one by one: 
 
India would not let any of these proposals get off the ground. The alibis are well 
known. Nuclear proliferation is a global problem and not a regional one, although in 
ministerial rhetoric against weapons of mass destruction, it is highlighted that it is in 
the interest of India and the region that the superpowers should agree to do away 
with their nuclear arsenals. Secondly, South Asia is not a region but the whole of 
Asia including China. How this can be squared with India’s active participation in 
SAARC is anybody’s guess. Finally, Pakistan is not trustworthy and so there cannot 
be any bilateral agreement with it on the nuclear issue. What about the agreement 
entered into by Rajiv Gandhi with Mrs Benazir Bhutto in 1988 on mutual avoidance 
of attacks on each other’s nuclear facilities?628 
 
Bhargava tackles the general suspicion that India’s elite had developed of any agreement 
with Pakistan per se. However, in his account of the benefits a NWFZ would have for 
India, Bhargava neglected the China factor. Indeed, a NWFZ in South Asia not involving 
China would be of little strategic value for India. India’s enthusiasm for SAARC was 
lukewarm at best, and could not serve as a counter argument here.  
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In a move to acknowledge the relevance of the China factor for India’s strategic calculus, 
Nawaz Sharif supplemented his proposal with the idea of a five-powers conference, 
including China, in addition to the five points originally suggested by Zia. This would have 
opened the chance for the Indian government to at least try to include China in any form of 
the NWFZ agreement. Whether China would have been ready to give security guarantees, 
or any other commitments, at a tentative conference is a matter of speculation, as India 
categorically rejected the idea of one.  
Subsequently, Bhargava touched on international discontent about India’s destructive 
nuclear policy, which was even criticised by friendly states: 
 
There were hints that Moscow would favour a five-power meeting, like the one 
suggested by Mr. Nawaz Sharif. If the Soviet Union did not formally welcome the 
Pakistani initiative, like the USA and China, it was out of diplomatic deference to 
New Delhi’s weak case. More particularly, the Soviets were chagrined by India’s 
failure to send an observer to the NPT review conference which was held in Geneva 
in August 1990… . The Soviets, for their part, have been supporting not only the 
principle of nuclear weapons free zones but have also been advocating the 
establishment of such a zone in South Asia. As long ago as in 1986, Moscow had 
got over its shyness to speak out on the subject lest the Indian Government should 
be embarrassed.629 
 
Bhargava’s comprehension of outside criticism of India’s nuclear policy was exceptional in 
the early 1990s. In support of his call for a South Asian NWFZ, Bhargava presented the 
cases of five NWFZ that were all working under different circumstances. 
 
In sum, the idea of a NWFZ, as suggested by Pakistan, would have improved India’s 
security significantly should China have been involved in some form. The reason why India 
nevertheless rejected the idea was that, while enhancing its security, it would have deprived 
it of the enhanced status attached to nuclear weapons. Or, to apply the dialectics of India’s 
strategic mainstream, it would have preserved the discriminatory international nuclear order 
of nuclear haves and have-nots. 
 
In his assessment on the NWFZ issue, T.T. Poulose refined the conditions under which a 
South Asian NWFZ would be acceptable to India630. Similar to Bhargava, he considered the 
hawk’s general distrust of Pakistan on this issue to be baseless. In his view, it was,  
 
pure blasphemy to suggest that the primitive nuclear devices of India and Pakistan 
would deter each other or India’s first generation nuclear weapons would provide 
deterrence to the longstanding, large and sophisticated nuclear capability of China. 
It is equally erroneous argument that the handful of nuclear devices of India and 
Pakistan or their fissionable materials will be difficult to verify… . Hence, it is in 
the interest of India and Pakistan to come to terms with each other despite their 
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deteriorating political relations, at least on the nuclear question. Nuclear egos should 
not come in the way of moving towards a mutually beneficial stand. It is not 
detrimental to our interest if India, in a spirit of accommodation and as a gesture of 
goodwill, agrees to the conference or consultation of five States (3+2 consultation) 
consisting of the USA, the former Soviet Union, China, India and Pakistan and 
examines the mechanism to create a nuclear-free South Asia… . Only those who are 
afflicted by narrow national chauvinism can argue that regional arms control 
arrangements can be suspended until global disarmament takes place631. 
 
Poulose, in contrast to Bhargava, did not neglect the Chinese nuclear threat in his calculus. 
He clearly formulated the Chinese commitment as the precondition of any NWFZ 
agreement. Referring to the Chinese medium-range ballistic missiles thought to be based in 
Tibet, he stated :  
 
it would have a sobering influence on India if China unilaterally announces its 
intention to dismantle its MRBM bases in Tibet as the Soviet nuclear threat to China 
has lessened. Simultaneously, both countries should agree to delink the nuclear 
issue from other complicated political disputes. The recent visit of the Chinese 
Prime Minister, Mr. Li Peng, provided India the opportunity to assess Chinese 
thinking about the nuclear sites in Tibet, as it was an essential prerequisite to allay 
India’s fears about the Chinese nuclear threat and can facilitate the establishment of 
a nuclear-free South Asia. Much more than the USA and the former Soviet Union, 
China can play a crucial role in transforming South Asia into a nuclear-free area.632 
 
Similarly to Bhargava, Poulose did not consider the policies of Pakistan, China, the USA or 
any other involved country as the main obstacle to establishing a nuclear weapons free zone 
in South Asia, but rather the hawkish domestic bomb lobby. Poulose was nevertheless 
much more explicit in condemning the negative role of this section of India’s strategic elite:  
 
The noisy rhetoric of India’s nuclear bomb lobby has been hijacking this clear-cut 
policy under the rubric of nuclear ambivalence. The nuclear hawks never bothered 
about India’s former nuclear credibility as nuclearism was their material life blood 
and for some the very basis of successful careers. Their opportunistic or selfish 
propaganda for nuclearism is to be differentiated from the nuclear posture of the 
Bharatiya Janata Party which is a politically-motivated nationalistic policy.633 
 
The impact of Poulose’s sharp criticism on the nuclear debate proved to be quite limited. 
Obviously, the prestige-oriented arguments of the ‘nuclear hawks’ were more appealing to 
the interested public and the political decision-makers than Poulose’s demure, security-
oriented line of argumentation. As the further analysis will show, such nuanced 
assessments, like Poulose’s distinction between the unconvincing NPT and the persuasive 
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NWFZ, became increasingly rare in India’s ongoing debate over the international non-
proliferation regime in the mid 1990s.  
 
13.3.2. Hardliners’ Emerging Dominance 
 
By the year 1992, the issue of the emerging international consensus on the nuclear non-
proliferation regime, which would eventually result in the indefinite extension of the NPT 
in 1995, threatened to isolate India even further. These circumstances triggered a high 
number of analyses, most of which vindicated India’s position and called on the 
government to resist international pressures. In the following, the mainstream position on 
the issue will be assessed through the analysis of two exemplary articles published in late 
1992: the first represents the military-strategic realm of analyses, the second the politico-
strategic realm of analyses on the nuclear issue.  
 
The military-strategists among India’s epistemic community were generally rather 
diffident, security-oriented supporters of India’s nuclear course. Their low-key, analytic 
commentary is best illustrated by an Indian Express article published by the former army 
chief general K. Sundarji. He starts his account by carefully noting  that though India did 
have nuclear devices, it lacked a corresponding stringent nuclear policy: In his view, “(t)he 
fact that India is a threshold nuclear weapon power is no secret. As to which side of the 
threshold she is on is a secret, albeit a minor one. The really big secret is that India has no 
coherent nuclear weapon policy options in this regard”634. The lack of a clear nuclear 
course, euphemistically described as nuclear option by many politico-strategists, was 
unmasked by Sundarji as a non-policy resulting from political idleness, not a stringent 
political concept. According to Sundarji,  
 
[c]arrying on in this manner might not have damaged India’s vital interests in the 
past, when ambiguity of nuclear policy used to bestow some benefits. The fact that 
such ambiguity was not planned or orchestrated, but occurred due to drift, was not 
material. I believe that the continuance of an ambiguous nuclear policy from now on 
will be downright dangerous for two cases. The first, due to the possibility of a war 
between India and Pakistan being triggered off through miscalculation of each 
other’s nuclear status, as well as ignorance of the nuclear doctrines that the two 
countries are likely to go by, which would culminate in a tragic nuclear exchange. 
The second, due to the difficulties of ensuring the safety of nuclear warheads and 
the prevention of unauthorised use when in a clandestine state.635 
 
Sundarji showed some scepticism about the benefits of nuclear weapons in the past, but as 
long as the minimum condition of not damaging India’s interests was fulfilled, he approved 
its further development. Now that both India and Pakistan had crossed the threshold, or 
would cross the threshold in the next future, this minimum condition was no longer fulfilled 
due to two emerging dangers: first, the dangers of pre-emptive strike, and second, the 
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dangers of ‘lose nukes’. Next to these two emerging dangers, Sundarji tabulated the 
political costs associated with India’s nuclear ambiguity on the NPT negotiations: “When 
the pressures on us to sign the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) are going to mount, 
we cannot even negotiate to advantage without knowing what our minimal acceptable 
position is, or should be”636. 
Subsequently, Sundarji developed a list of four nuclear policy options, ranked according to 
their ‘toughness’: 
 
India has the following nuclear options arranged in descending order of toughness, 
say from the North Pole to the South Pole: 
• Refuse to sign the NPT, declare a nuclear weapon status and indicate 
willingness to abide by the NPT and the Missile Technology Control Regime 
(MTCR) as a nuclear weapon power. 
• Refuse to sign the NPT as it is discriminatory and insist on the right to continue 
retaining a nuclear option till there is universal nuclear disarmament; continue 
development of missiles; indicate willingness to abide by the NPT and MTCR 
regarding the non-transfer of technology or materials to third countries. 
• Sign the NPT; but retain the right to hold the weapons already fabricated and 
fissile material already stockpiled (capping), and the right to reprocess the 
already held weapons or fissile material to keep them effective; continue to 
develop missiles and abide by the MTCR regarding transfer to third countries. 
• Sign the NPT; declare and destroy all fabricated weapons and fissile material; 
stop development of missiles for military purposes and accede to the MTCR.637 
 
Sundarji dismissed the ‘south pole’ option as it would, in his view, create an unacceptable 
dependency on other countries in defence matters. On the other hand, he considered the 
hardline – in his words ‘north pole’ – option potentially as the best, but only if the impact 
of the expected sanctions would not be too costly. He criticised the government for not 
having done any sound assessment on the costs of sanctions so far.  
Subsequently, Sundarji called for widespread involvement by all major political parties and  
sections of society in India’s nuclear policy decisions: 
 
[a]t the domestic political level, the first need, I think, is for the Government to 
invite all major political parties for a non-partisan, incamera meeting on the nuclear 
issue… . Next, the Government must initiate a public debate on all aspects of this 
issue, and generate a national consensus. In the final analysis, this staunch public 
support will be the bulwark on which any ill-conceived US plans of pressuring or 
bullying India will founder.638 
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In a questionable bid to fend off US pressure, Sundarji attempted to combine a more 
informed governmental nuclear policy (based on experts’ analyses) with an increased 
involvement of public opinion.  
 
Sundarji concluded his assessment by again criticising the policy of the nuclear option, 
which had caused frustration abroad: “The world is increasingly viewing our tirade against 
the NPT for being discriminatory as mere sloganeering to keep our nuclear option open… . 
It is being increasingly felt that we are just being obstructionist without being 
constructive”639.  
 
In her account on the international non-proliferation issue, Aabha Dixit started by 
dismissing the Pakistani initiative on the grounds of ‘atmospheric mistrust’: 
 
New Delhi has never fought shy of participating in regional security talks if they 
deter any single nation from deriving propaganda advantages. It has always opposed 
Pakistan’s suggestion for holding a Two (India and Pakistan) Plus Three (USA, 
Russia and China as external guarantors) exercise because of the greater stress on 
atmospherics than realism… . When such an atmosphere of mistrust of intentions 
exists, which political leader would have the courage to take the first step without 
fearing his falling into a quagmire?640 
 
Dixit’s attestation of ‘India’s impeccable record’ in the international non-proliferation 
debate again illustrated the growing discrepancy between the self-perception of India’s 
mainstream strategic elite, who considered India to be the precursor of global non-
proliferation, and the way India was increasingly perceived by the international audience as 
the main obstructionist to a global accord. Dixit’s rejection – on the grounds that India 
could not trust Pakistan – of the idea of the 2+3 conference appears inadequate when one 
considers that it was initially suggested to overcome mutual distrust between the two 
countries. She also rejected the claim by the two superpowers’ that their progress on 
disarmament would pose an incentive for India to compromise on the non-proliferation 
issue: 
 
It needs to be accepted that regional nuclear issues work in a more or less autarkic 
fashion and there is need to delink them from bilateral issues at the superpower 
level. What is required is a holistic approach to the problem of nuclear proliferation, 
one that links all the regions of the world in a bond of common security. This has 
been the keystone of New Delhi’s nuclear disarmament policies.641 
 
Dixit’s understanding of how this ‘bond of common security’ should look like remained 
vague in the face of the imminent creation of just such an institution within the framework 
of NPT (with India an isolated opponent).  
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In sum, Dixit’s account was a categorical ‘No’ to any possible agreement. She 
unconditionally rejected a regional solution (mistrust against Pakistan), followed this with a 
rejection of the ‘superpower’ solution (unacceptable in terms of security) and finally took 
issue with a global solution within the NPT framework (as a matter of principle). 
 
Subsequently, Dixit addressed the recent agreement between Argentina and Brazil to stop 
and roll back their respective nuclear arms programmes: 
 
The non-proliferationists have been delighted with the Brazil-Argentina agreement, 
which curiously is outside the NPT and indicates the kind of political pressures that 
have been generated in these countries when weighing the pros and cons of joining 
a patently discriminatory treaty. Non-proliferationists would argue that though the 
agreement is out of the NPT, it is better than having none at all. But to apply such 
analogies to South Asia is to remain ignorant of the complex issues at work in the 
region. The historical levels of distrust between India and Pakistan, India and China, 
Russia and China (…) are far deeper and more complicated than in Latin America. 
Brazil and Argentina may perceive threats from each other, but are relatively insular 
to extraterritorial threats.642 
 
In her assessment of the Brazil-Argentina rivalry, Dixit deliberately ignored two facts: 
First, part of their agreement was to sign the NPT in the near future, which both countries 
eventually did two years later; second, the Southern Cone was not at all ‘insular to 
extraterritorial threats’ considering the fact that an outside nuclear weapons power was 
occupying several islands off the South American coast that were claimed by Argentina643. 
Including these two facts would have very much invalidated Dixit’s line of argument. 
 
With regard to the Pakistani nuclear threat, Dixit claimed that,  
 
[i]t is a known fact that Islamabad’s nuclear weapons programme has been smeared 
with a coat of lies, illegal activities, broken promises and shoddy clandestine deals. 
The recent Pakistani statement on the ‘freeze’ of its nuclear weapons programme 
need to be viewed against this background. On the other hand, taken New Delhi’s 
record. In spite of the demonstrable nuclear capability, there has been a deliberate 
decision not to go overtly nuclear.644 
 
Dixit’s definition of India’s moral exceptionalism illustrated the increasingly narrow 
margin in the strategic elite’s distinction between Indian moral position and Western 
immoral positions. While prior to 1992, this distinction was based on technical differences, 
Dixit reduced it to mere declaratory differences, defining India as a country which had 
nuclear weapons but was morally superior because it had not declared them as such. 
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In sum, both military-strategists and politico-strategists had more or less agreed on several 
key aspects of India’s nuclear programme by the early 1990s: First and most importantly, 
both considered India’s nuclear capabilities as an irreversible  matter of fact. Second, both 
sections categorically excluded any conciliatoriness from the present NPT debate, but 
signalled that India might adhere to the treaty after it was accepted as nuclear weapons 
state. Third, both sections of India’s epistemic community considered the current policy of 
nuclear ambiguity as suboptimal to India’s interests. However, this criticism evolved from 
two distinct approaches. While the military-strategists, represented by K. Sundarji, based 
their assessments on a clear payoff-matrix, including several security and economic 
interests, the mainstream politico-strategic thinkers like Aabha Dixit defined India’s 
nuclear interests more in terms of international status and prestige. Their policy 
recommendations differed correspondingly. While Sundarji evaluated India’s nuclear 
options according to their perceived costs and benefits for India’s compound of national 
interests, Dixit categorically opposed any policy that would not award India with a fully 
recognised nuclear status by the international community. 
 
However, suggesting that prestige thinking did not play any role in K. Sundarji’s 
assessment at all would be likewise misleading. In his view, self-reliance in military affairs 
was a necessary condition for any acceptable policy – any dependency on other states was 
to be rejected.. 
In a response to K. Sundarji’s article , Ashok Kapur criticised the call for a public Indian 
nuclear debate: 
 
General Krishnaswamy Sundarji’s plea for a substantive and a public Indian nuclear 
debate that reveals a coherent nuclear policy is timely as is his list of four broad 
options. To be realistic such a debate ought to rest on the practical circumstances 
and the issues that dominate Western and particularly American non-proliferation 
thinking today.645 
 
Kapur did not challenge any of the above mentioned key aspects. Rather, he criticised 
Sundarji for not being explicit enough in postulating them. He dismissed the politico-
strategists’ position by stating than neither India’s struggle against discrimination nor its 
unrealistic call for global nuclear disarmament was internationally credible: 
 
First, with over a hundred countries in favour of a discriminatory NPT, India is no 
longer able to carry the discrimination argument to the world community. It can 
only convince others about Indian interests, not what is good for the world… . India 
has lost the use of the issue of universal nuclear disarmament, because the US and 
Soviet Union / Russia and some of the other republics in the former USSR have 
moved to significantly cut their nuclear arsenals. Of course these are not zero-level 
arms but then the Indian Government is not really concerned about American and 
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Russian arms levels. India’s concerns are regional, not global and these concern 
primarily China and Pakistan.646 
 
In Ashok Kapur’s view, the global nuclear order, dominated by the two major powers, was 
largely irrelevant for India’s narrow security concerns; thus, the domestic debate’s 
emphasis of the on issues related to this global nuclear order, like the ‘discrimination 
argument’ or the ‘universal nuclear disarmament argument’ were misguided. Rather, 
India’s nuclear policy should be concerned with the regional nuclear threats from China 
and Pakistan. Kapur continued to evaluate these threats:  
 
[T]he India-China normalisation is going well and India sees no need to rake up 
controversies with China when Indian intelligence inputs do not indicate a China 
nuclear threat at present… . In the nuclear sphere the dialogue is only between the 
US and India and it is presently inconclusive… . There is no dialogue between India 
and Pakistan on the nuclear issue although the issue is on the table. Between India 
and China the issue is not even on the table because neither country, for different 
reasons, sees the need to raise this issue.647 
 
Kapur brought the major paradox of India’s nuclear policy debate to a point: While the 
nuclear threats to India’s security were regional, it refused to deal with the issue on this 
level, instead addressing almost exclusively the global dimension of nuclear weapons. The 
dialogue on the nuclear issue was, to the exclusion of those two states which actually 
threatened India, almost exclusively with the USA. The failure to address the nuclear issue 
on a regional level was, in Kapur’s view, caused by distrust in Pakistan’s case, and 
disinterest in China’s case. 
 
In his subsequent assessment of Indo-Chinese relations, Kapur dropped his previous 
security-only approach and instead referred to India’s ambitions in terms of status by 
claiming that “China’s ambitions are global. India’s are regional”648. While Kapur had quite 
rightly alluded to the discrepancy between India’s regional security concerns and its global 
nuclear policy, he nevertheless failed to draw the obvious conclusion: India’s global 
nuclear policy emerged out of the fact that, in contrast to its security concerns, its 
aspirations for status in the nuclear realm were global, not regional.  
 
Similarly to Sundarji, Kapur concluded by suggesting an end to India’s nuclear ambiguity, 
an attempt to draw the issue into the limelight and deal with China and Pakistan openly and 
directly: 
 
Is it not time to give China-Pakistan-India relations a nuclear insurance policy for 
all? With this the three countries could get on with the business of developing their 
mutually advantageous relations rather than engaging in sly behaviour. In all this the 
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United States has a role to play by recognising the value of the nuclear insurance 
policy provided it leads to better relations in the subcontinents.649 
 
13.3.3. Mounting Pressures from the Nuclear Scientific Community 
 
Next to the military-strategic and the politico-strategic sections of India’s epistemic 
community, India’s nuclear scientific community proved to be the most intransigent and 
determined lobbyists for the bomb. In the following, their mainstream position is illustrated 
by articles from two former chairmen of India’s Atomic Energy Commission, M.R. 
Srinivasan and P.K. Iyengar, that were published in July and September 1993, 
respectively650. Both authors strongly opposed any agreement which would impose 
restrictions on India’s nuclear programme. Nuclear technology was seen as the currency of 
the global competition for status. Despite India’s security threats being basically intra-
regional, any agreement would have to be negotiated on the global level. According to this 
logic, the NPT was not acceptable because it did not provide all countries with equal 
conditions. As M. R. Srinivasan wrote, “India has refused to sign the NPT as it is 
discriminatory. Pakistan has maintained it is prepared to sign the NPT provided India did 
so. India’s position is that elimination of nuclear weapons is a global problem and not a 
bilateral one or regional one”651. He outlined the terms under which India would consider 
an agreement  as acceptable as follows: 
 
While the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons should be our ultimate aim, we 
have to be prepared for a much longer time-table than the one visualised in the Rajiv 
Gandhi initiative… . There are still certain elements which can find agreement 
among most if not all countries even now. The first is a comprehensive and 
universal test ban. The second element is an agreement on ‘non-use’ of nuclear 
weapons.652 
 
While Srinivasan’s call for total global nuclear disarmament was part of the discourse 
strategy common to many apologetic analyses of the nuclear issue, the possible content of 
an ‘agreement on non-use of nuclear weapons’ remained unclear. Srinivasan’s call for a 
comprehensive nuclear test ban agreement was surprising, as it contradicted his opposition 
of all restrictions on India’s nuclear programme to preserve India’s sovereignty and self-
determination. In fact, every nuclear scientists who has authored articles on this issue since 
1994, including Srinivasan himself, took a negative stance on the CTBT. 
 
In his conclusion, Srinivasan called on the Indian government to resist international 
pressures and not compromise on its nuclear capabilities. In his view, 
 
                                                 
649 Kapur, Ashok: op.cit.. In: The Hindu, January 14th 1993. 
650 Srinivasan, M.R.: “NPT and India’s case”. In: The Hindu, July 10th 1993; and, Iyengar, P.K.: “The nuclear 
issue: Caution against bartering away our capabilities”. In: Indian Express, September 16th 1993. 
651 ibid. 
652 ibid. 
 315
India cannot dismantle the nuclear capability it has built up over the last 40 years 
simply because the U.S. is urging it to do so. This capability is the result of the 
dedicated and selfless work of a large number of scientists, engineers and 
technicians of the country. Our politicians and diplomats must not barter away this 
strength in exchange for useless bits of paper. The country must sustain our nuclear 
capability, including that in the field of nuclear power, and also similarly nurture 
other high technologies such as space and rockets, electronics, special materials, etc. 
The lesson we can learn from our nuclear energy and space programmes is the vital 
importance of developing self-reliance in these sensitive technologies. In the present 
euphoria about liberalisation and globalisation, we may overlook the importance of 
self-reliance. If this were to happen, the country will pay a heavy price later… . We 
cannot accept an abridgement of our sovereign right to pursue these new scientific 
and technological developments653 
 
This conclusion showed several key elements of the nuclear scientists’ rationale. First, 
Srinivasan’s mentioning of the ‘dedicated and selfless work’ of the scientific community 
denoted the scientists’ strategy to create facts, that the reluctant political decision-makers 
would then be pressured to accept. Second, Srinivasan’s urge not to rely on ‘useless bits of 
paper’ reflected the opposition of the scientists to any agreement which would restrict their 
work. This urge exposed his previous suggestions about accepting the CTBT or a ‘no-use’ 
agreement as mere lip service. Third, Srinivasan explicitly called for sustaining ‘our nuclear 
capability’, devaluating the persuasiveness of his previous call for the ‘elimination of all 
nuclear weapons’. Fourth, Srinivasan’s ‘lesson,’ that developing nuclear technology in self-
reliance was of ‘vital importance,’ reflected the traditional myth of modernity attributed to 
nuclear technology. Fifth, Srinivasan’s critique of the policy of liberalisation and 
globalisation reflected a general fear among the nuclear scientific community of opening up 
the nuclear field to outside competitors.  
 
The importance of self-reliance and the challenge posed to it by the process liberalisation 
was also addressed by P. K. Iyengar, who stated that “[e]conomists are confused even about 
fundamental concepts such as self-reliance, indigenous technology and independence of 
action in science, technology, defence, communications, etc.”654.  
Iyengar started his account by highlighting the apologists’ understanding of nuclear 
weapons as an invention tool of the West: 
 
Since then it has been a nightmarish tool of politics for the West. On one hand they 
have sought power through their exclusive possession of such a device, while on the 
other they have sought a world order that could ensure that such a device was never 
used again. This unresolved dilemma has led to the present situation where there are 
designated nuclear ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’, who are sought to be treated differently. 
This distinction is hypocritical because the driving force behind the development of 
such devices, be they nuclear weapons, nuclear reactors or cryogenic engines, lies in 
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the brains of the scientists and engineers who develop them. However poor the 
economic or industrial resources of a country, it may not lack intellectual resources, 
and in the long run, in spite of disincentives that may be place in its path, any nation 
that wants such a device badly enough will get it.655 
 
In a less emotionally heated discourse, Iyengar’s sole focus on the genius of the scientists, 
might have raised questions as to why such large amount of the country’s financial 
resources was allocated to the programme. In India’s discourse in the mid-1990s, however, 
the very nature of the nuclear debate prevented more critical assessments of Iyengar’s 
rationale. 
 
Further, Iyengar indicated that restrictions by Western countries on nuclear technology 
transfers – even for civilian nuclear power programmes – was guided not only by power 
politics, but also by economic interests: 
 
[A]s the United States, under a new administration, enters a new era of activism on 
the nuclear issue, it is critical for us to be able to respond effectively to these 
growing pressures. In the case of the major Western countries, capitalist, free-
market concerns, as well as global power politics, drive them towards restricting the 
spread and use of high technologies in the developing world and the means that they 
employ to achieve their goals may not always be consistent with their otherwise 
high-sounding principles.656 
 
At this point, Iyengar reversed the causal relations. In fact, the countries of the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group had put restrictions on nuclear technology transfers to India despite 
pressures from their own nuclear industries because India had refused to guarantee its 
civilian use. These self-imposed regulations only applied to those countries with 
unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, irrespective of their state of development. In this light, 
Iyengar’s presumption of economic interests behind Western constraints on civilian nuclear 
power programmes in the developing world does not hold up. Iyengar also stressed the 
importance of nuclear technology for India’s development and security: “India needs 
nuclear power for development and has genuine cause to worry about the security of its 
realm. It therefore needs to develop and maintain nuclear technology for various 
applications”657.  
 
Iyengar concluded his account by urgently calling on the government to declare India a 
nuclear weapons state: 
 
I can only conclude by hoping that those who have the power will act with a sense 
of urgency in formulating a nuclear policy, and that they will not lead this country 
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to make a mockery of the concepts of self-reliance which Jawaharlal Nehru 
formulated from his careful study of world civilisation.658 
 
In sum, the scientific-strategic section’s strong and unconditional advocacy of the nuclear 
breakthrough was, in contrast to the other two major sections of India’s epistemic 
community, guided by motives of self-preservation . These motives stood behind their 
uncompromising assertiveness. More than the two other groups, the scientists resorted to 
rhetorical means of oversimplification, demonisation, and the use of stereotypes in their 
portrayal of the international system, particularly the role of Western countries. 
 
13.3.4. Indefinite Extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1995 
 
In the period from late 1993 until the NPT review conference in April/May 1995, the Indian 
debate on the international non-proliferation regime continued to generate a large number 
of comments and analyses in India’s dailies. The content of the debate remained largely 
unchanged throughout this period, with the major arguments recurring in almost every 
analysis. While some analysts still adhered to the concepts of ‘keeping the nuclear option 
open’, including its myth of the civilian nature of India’s nuclear programme659, most 
others moved towards accepting India’s nuclear weapons capability as an irreversible fact. 
The question was less if India should declare itself a nuclear weapon state, but when it 
should do so. 
When negotiations on the NPT ended in May 1995 with a vast majority of states favouring 
its indefinite extension660, India emerged as one of its few outspoken opponents661.  
 
Officially, India’s opposition was based on the same arguments as in 1968 – the division of 
the community of states into haves and have-nots, and the unwillingness of the existing 
nuclear weapons states to commit to the ultimate goal of a global ban on nuclear weapons. 
Neither the two superpowers, nor the three minor nuclear weapons states seriously 
considered total disarmament as acceptable option. The smaller nuclear powers even 
considered a nuclear arsenal as an essential prerequisite for maintaining great-power status, 
including a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. 
 
Several unfavourable factors for India’s negotiation strategy – the advanced state of its 
nuclear programme, the divergence between explicit and implicit negotiation strategies, 
governmental instability, and the unwillingness of the policy-makers to constructively 
participate in the negotiations – prevented any rapprochement on the issue. On the contrary, 
India was increasingly determined to “keep its nuclear option open” and therefore not only 
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rejected any consensus on the NPT, but abstained from raising alternatives. The 
predetermined refusal of all international initiatives to accommodate India through 
concessions, or even to involve India in any form of constructive dialogue, caused 
significant frustration among several other governments. Similar to the conclusion of the 
NPT in 1968, the consensus on its indefinite extension in May 1995 appeared to have 
caused an acceleration of India’s nuclearisation efforts.  
 
After the Geneva conference, India’s policy makers and its elite at large felt a deep 
humiliation about both the perceived ignorance of the nuclear weapons states and the 
disinterest of the non-nuclear weapons states in India’s expressed concerns. Paradoxically, 
it was the determined rhetoric within India’s nuclear discourse which had increased the 
international understanding about the necessity of the treaty. 
 
The renewed determination of many Indian strategists, even those who had taken a rather 
aloof position before, to favour the country’s nuclearisation was best illustrated by the 
extensive analysis of K. Sundarji in the aftermath of the NPT conference662. While 
Sundarji’s had previously delivered nuanced accounts of the pros and cons of the nuclear 
issue, in which he cautiously suggested India’s nuclearisation, the undertone of his writing 
changed radically in mid-1995. In Sundarji’ view, “Indian reaction to the farcical 
permanent extension of the NPT has been thoroughly subdued. The NPT regime would 
continue to be discriminatory and cynical”663. After having been isolated in the course of 
the NPT negotiations, according to Sundarji, India faced potentially severe punitive 
measures if it continued to resist Western coercion:  
 
[p]unitive measures could fall into at least four categories: political, economic, 
technological and military. The political measures might include condemnation by 
the UN, the big and some of the lesser powers, accompanied by threats of dire 
consequences if India does not strip itself of nuclear weapon and delivery 
capabilities. Economic measures could include denial of funds from the IMF, World 
Bank and other multilateral and bilateral aid sources; trade embargoes and even the 
blockade of all exports and imports in the worst case scenario. Technological 
measures could go to the extent of termination of all technology transfers including 
those relating to the spheres of agriculture, health and disease control. In the 
military sphere, there could be threats or the actual use of force, naval blockade, 
selective air strikes on the lines of the NATO air action against the Bosnian Serbs; 
demonstration use of special weapons including nukes; massive conventional air 
strikes and naval bombardement of coastal areas; triphibious operations securing air 
heads and beach heads after massive conventional and selective nuclear preparatory 
bombardement, or of course opting to avoid ground operations altogether and going 
in for conventional-cum-nuclear stand-off attacks, to ‘bomb India into the stone 
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age’ as was attempted somewhat unsuccessfully in North Vietnam, using only 
conventional means.664 
 
K. Sundarji’s doomsday scenario was quite remarkable, especially when one considers that 
he was known as one of India’s most prosaic analysts, and reflected the degree to which the 
dynamics of the nuclear debate had driven India’s strategic elite into the state of 
psychological affect. This escalation widened the gap between Indian reactions to the 
conclusion of the NPT and the reactions of other (formal) non-nuclear weapons states. The 
discriminatory character of the treaty was largely accepted by almost all other states with 
equanimity. The understanding was that the treaty, however imperfect it was, had to be 
accepted as a tool to prevent the global spread of nuclear weapons. As this goal was largely 
considered to be in the interest of all states, the conclusion of the treaty hardly set off 
emotional controversies around the globe. Why was the Indian perception so much 
different? Why did India’s elite react with a panic bordering on paranoia? Why did even the 
most prosaic Indian analysts predict immoderate doomsday scenarios in which India would 
be economically ruined and nuked back into the stone ages as a consequence of this treaty? 
Although not fully conclusive, one answer to these questions was surely to be found in the 
generally insulated, inward looking strategic debate in India.  
 
 
13.4. Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty 
 
The heavy psychological impact of the events in mid-1995 on the strategic community’s 
nuclear debate became visible in its approach to two other issues in the nuclear field: the 
tentative Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), which had been suggested in a UN 
resolution co-sponsored by India in December 1993; and the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty (CTBT), which had been suggested in a UN resolution co-sponsored by India in 
September 1993. 
 
The factors which had caused India to support the UN resolution calling for the creation of 
a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty were threefold: First, the chances of an agreement on the 
treaty were considered marginal. Thus, India would have increased its profile on the non-
proliferation issue without having lost anything. Second, in the unlikely scenario of the 
treaty succeeding, India would still gain from it in terms of security and status. In security 
terms, the treaty would be beneficial for India because it was non-discriminatory, i.e. it 
would cut-off the plutonium stockpiles of the countries threatening India, Pakistan and 
China. In contrast to the NPT, the tentative FMCT would not give advantage to China vis-
à-vis India. Furthermore, the treaty would leave India’s current plutonium stockpile 
unsafeguarded, thought to be enough for a minimum nuclear deterrent capability. 
 
By de facto legalising India’s existing plutonium stockpiles, the treaty would have 
implicitly recognised India’s nuclear status and therefore have tactfully achieved one of the 
most important goals attached to the nuclear programme: The admission of India into the 
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nuclear club. Additionally, the legalised status of its programme would increase India’s 
accessibility to sensitive technology. 
 
In this study it has been argued that India categorically rejected any agreement on the 
nuclear issue because none of the proposed agreements would have given India the status 
and prestige it was hoping to gain from its nuclear capabilities. The tentative FMCT, 
suggested in 1993, was the exception to this trend. Still, the epistemic community, while 
initially showing some sympathy for the treaty, finally insisted on its ever recurring ‘NO’. 
As on previous occasions, the pressures built up by the opinion leaders through their 
extensive commentary and analyses proved to be too compelling for the government, which 
subsequently withdrew its support of the treaty and reverted to its destructive position. 
 
The main argument not to adhere to the FMCT, or to any treaty of its kind, was the 
potential restriction of India’s sovereignty, which was considered unacceptable per se. This 
motive was expressed by C. Raja Mohan: 
 
The so-called ‘cutoff treaty’, the negotiations on which are expected to begin soon 
in Geneva, will in effect put a cap on India’s nuclear programme for the first time 
since it was initiated about five decades ago. It will be the most onerous agreement 
on arms control that India has ever entered into ending the production of 
unsafeguarded plutonium that is at the heart of India’s nuclear weapon option and 
will impose international control on its civilian nuclear programme. For the first 
time since India launched itself on the course of nuclear autonomy – a policy lay 
down by Jawaharlal Nehru and the father of Indian nuclear programme, Homi 
Bhabha – New Delhi has been willing to negotiate active constraints on its nuclear 
programme. Two generations of atomic scientists have overcome great odds to 
sustain and nurture India’s nuclear autonomy and every single Indian Government 
since Independence has preserved it despite unremitting international pressures. 
Given the gravity of the negotiations India is entering into, it is only proper for 
Parliament and the people at large to debate the implications of the cutoff treaty, and 
lay down clear markers.665 
 
Mohan’s attempt to portray the government’s readiness to negotiate on the FMCT as a 
betrayal of Indian history and tradition was misleading and in several aspects factually 
wrong. First of all, neither highly enriched uranium (HEU) nor weapons grade plutonium 
were for civilian use, making Mohan’s claim that its cut-off would impose constraints 
implausible. Second, the fact that Nehru had always objected to any military use of nuclear 
technology invalidated Mohan’s claim that unrestricted production of weapon grade 
plutonium was in line with Nehruvian tradition. 
 
As with the CTBT debate, the strategic elite made an about-face on the FMCT as soon as 
the USA signalled its support. According to Mohan,  
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[c]learly, the nuclear weapon States, the U.S. and Russia in particularly, are awash 
in weapons grade nuclear material. They lose nothing by signing a cuttoff treaty… . 
Why then are the nuclear weapon States so keen now on promoting a cutoff 
treaty?... . The very fact that India is prepared to back a treaty so patently directed 
against itself appears to suggest it is responding well to the American psychological 
treatment of packaging the agreement as ‘nondiscriminatory’. New Delhi’s claim 
that the cutoff treaty ‘will meet India’s global nonproliferation objectives’ needs to 
be questioned.666 
 
This logic showed the extent to which the oversimplified image of the USA as the 
malignant hegemon dominated the strategic discourse among India’s elite in the mid-1990s. 
As soon as the USA signalled its support to any initiative in the nuclear field, even if this 
initiative had been co-sponsored by India itself before, India’s elite became suspicious 
enough to withdraw their support. At this stage, the question of whether the FMCT would 
have been accepted by India if the USA would have shown more scepticism instead of 
support remains a matter of speculation. 
 
The effect of a tentative FMCT on capping China’s nuclear capabilities was also 
overlooked in Mohan’s analysis. Considering that, in the security-oriented strategists’ view, 
China posed the main nuclear threat to India, its omission in Mohan’s account was 
problematic and illustrating the extent to which security considerations had lost their 
significance in the debate of the mid-1990s.  
The role of China in India’s position on the FMCT was outlined by Brahma Chellaney in 
two articles in April 1995667:  
 
India’s position is that it will support a proposal for a fissile cut-off that is based on 
the three principal elements of the UN resolution of being universal, non-
discriminatory and effectively verifiable. The Indian co-sponsorship of the 1993 UN 
resolution, however, may have sent a wrong signal to the world that the resultant 
capping would serve India’s security interests by allowing it to retain a fissile-
material stockpile sufficient for a threshold deterrence capability. With India seen 
by the proposal’s main advocates as target No. 1, any such ban cannot be non-
discriminatory from an Indian perspective, especially since it would formalise the 
Sino-Indian asymmetry.668 
 
Chellaney’s claim that the FMCT was discriminatory because it would ‘formalise’ Sino-
Indian asymmetry ran aground because it ignored the fact that this asymmetry was already 
a given fact and would remain so in the foreseeable future whether the FMCT was agreed 
upon or not. In fact, the FMCT would probably have reduced this asymmetry significantly 
as it would have established formal parity in terms of both countries’ nuclear status.  
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He subsequently invalidated his charges himself:  
 
[d]eterrence, however, is not based on quantitative equality, and a smaller fissile-
material stockpile should not undermine any nation’s deterrence objectives. Nuclear 
activities unconnected with the production, handling or use of new fissile materials 
will remain outside the scope of the cut-off regime. The cut-off will bring India into 
political alignment with the NPT without affecting its option to weaponise.669 
 
It remained unclear whether Chellaney’s last point was aimed at condemning the cut-off as 
an unacceptable accession to the NPT through the back door, or at approving it because it 
would not prevent India’s nuclear breakthrough. It was only in his article on a similar issue, 
published one day previously in the same newspaper, in which his position was 
unambiguously revealed. Chellaney claimed that “a cut-off treaty will impose 
comprehensive safeguards on Indian commercial and research reactors, reprocessing and 
enrichment installations, and fuel-fabrication facilities. The impact will be similar to India 
acceding to the NPT”670. Here, Chellaney was much more explicit in rejecting the FMCT 
on a charge similar as that levelled at the NPT, namely its unacceptable restriction on 
India’s sovereignty. 
 
Chellaney then formulated the conditions under which India would be ready to sign the 
tentative FMCT: 
 
The core concern for India is that a fissile cut-off is not being seen as a measure 
towards nuclear disarmament but as one more technical ‘fix’ to control horizontal 
proliferation. A cut-off ought to be linked to substantial reductions in nuclear 
arsenals, the abandonment of offensive, first-use doctrines, and binding 
commitments to eliminate nuclear weapons within a specific time-frame.671 
 
This statement again illustrated the continuously applied discourse strategy of attaching the 
unrealistic, all-out demand of total global nuclear disarmament as a precondition for India’s 
more constructive participation in the global non-proliferation discourse. 
 
After the finalisation of the NPT negotiations in May 1995, the looming agreement on a 
comprehensive test ban shifted into the focus of the epistemic community, and pushed the 
FMCT into the background until the finalisation of the CTBT in mid-1996.  
The main reason for the scant attention given the FMCT during the nuclear debate in 
1995/96 was the complexity of the issue, which made it difficult even for the fiercest 
apologists of India’s nuclear course to formulate a clear -cut position. 
 
After the conclusion of the CTBT, the possibility of a FMCT was debated in a less 
emotionalised mode than the NPT and CTBT. While the potential benefits of a cut-off 
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treaty were largely accepted, there was a unanimous understanding within the strategic elite 
not to accept any treaty which could potentially buttress the two pillars of the international 
non-proliferation regime, the NPT and CTBT. The frustration over the negotiation 
processes in 1995 and 1996 was too deep-seated to allow India’s elite to develop any more 
constructive approaches for the FMCT. This predetermined position was best illustrated in 
D. Shridhar’s account: 
 
After the conclusion of the CTBT, there has been a growing concern in India, that 
the CTBT, fissban and other measures proposed to be worked through the IAEA in 
Vienna, are part of a larger Western scheme of things to get the NPT through the 
back door. It is axiomatic, therefore, that the political and technical issues raised 
during the CTBT debate would be India’s guiding principles when drawing up a 
coherent strategy with respect to the FMCT. For the moment, it believes that none 
of the so-called disarmament treaties will go beyond the pale of non-proliferation. 
Therefore, it is clearly conceivable that it would insist on seeking a clear time-
bound linkage between the disarmament process and conclusion of the FMCT, to 
offset any moves that might be made to expand the scope of negotiations beyond 
what the UN resolution mandated.672 
 
These remarks illustrated the extent to which India’s isolation from the international non-
proliferation regime foreclosed any constructive participation in the international 
disarmament fora. Ample evidence suggests that India would have continued to support the 
FMCT if its interaction with the key actors in these fora would not have stirred up such 
frustration and humiliation in the epistemic community.  
 
 
13.5. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 1996 
 
Similarly to the NPT negotiations in the mid-1960s, India’s position on the CTBT was 
quite positive in the initial phase of the negotiations, but gradually shifted towards 
unconditional opposition. While India acted as the co-sponsor of a UN resolution calling 
for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) as late as September 1993, it remained 
isolated when it acted as an outspoken opponent of the CTBT in July 1996. 
 
In the period from the conclusion of the CTBT in mid-1996 to the nuclear tests in May 
1998, two thirds of all nuclear-related articles dealt with the CTBT’s consequences for 
India’s nuclear course (see Chart 11.1.). These articles showed a remarkably high attitude 
scale of 0.73. In other words, most accounts of the nuclear issue in this period involved 
calls for India to test nuclear weapons.  
In the following, the dynamics of India’s domestic nuclear policy debate, which had caused 
a radical policy shift in less than three years is analysed in detail. 
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13.5.1. The Domestic CTBT Debate: Dialogue of the Deaf 
 
In 1993, the CTBT was strongly supported by the gradually shrinking group of nuclear 
critics who saw it as an alternative to the discriminatory and discredited NPT. Their 
discourse strategy, which adopted stereotyped concepts similar to those of their pro-bomb 
counterparts, tried to display the treaty as an effective tool to fend off American non-
proliferation pressures and create a non-discriminatory nuclear order. This strategy proved 
to be a complete failure, causing the anti-nuclear section of India’s epistemic community to 
either join the ranks of the CTBT opposition or simply hold their tongues and resume their 
pro-CTBT campaign after the nuclear tests.  
 
To illustrate the credibility gap that the nuclear critics had manoeuvred themselves into by 
trying to adopt the nuclear apologists’ logic, three articles by Achin Vanaik, one of India’s 
most prominent nuclear critics, that were published in February 1993, August 1994 and 
November 1995, are comparatively analysed673.  
In the 1993 article, Vanaik started his account by expressing his disgust over the new 
emphasis of the US Government under Bill Clinton on non-proliferation issues, which 
allegedly foresaw economic sanctions for India in the case of non-cooperation on the 
nuclear issue. This restrictive US policy was masterminded, according to Vanaik, by the 
‘liberal’ pressure group within America’s polity. In Vanaik’s view,  
 
[t]his pressure group is composed of ‘liberals’ who have never before gone as far as 
to demand such aggressive steps. Of course, these ‘liberals’ … have never been 
known for aggressive hostility towards the generally duplicitous nuclear weapons 
policy and behaviour of the US government. They operate very much in the 
mainstream framework of accepting and endorsing American ‘responsibilities’ to 
exercise its nuclear/military power ‘judiciously’ for the ‘larger global interest’. Any 
criticisms that they have made in the past about the slow pace or extent of American 
and superpower disarmament was always within this framework. The collapse of 
the Soviet counterweight which partially protected third world countries is seen by 
these ‘liberals’ as a window of opportunity that must be taken up.674 
 
After having identified the non-proliferation policies of American ‘liberals’ as the root 
cause of the unjust international discriminatory order, Vanaik continued to promote the 
non-discriminatory CTBT as the best tool to counter the liberals’ initiatives. The fact that, 
in the meantime, the CTBT had been absorbed by these American ‘liberals’ as one 
cornerstone of their own non-proliferation discourse was not elaborated on. Instead Vanaik 
described the US government as the biggest obstacle to the conclusion of the CTBT: 
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Both the Indian Government and the opinion shaping elite have virtually abandoned 
even propaganda criticism of the US on the question of accelerating the pace and 
scope of its nuclear disarmament. Furthermore, India can and should link nuclear 
restraint on its part to American nuclear restraint. One important way of doing this 
is to regularly and incessantly press for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) 
to which India (Pakistan is also willing) would be a willing signatory. There is no 
justification for not having a CTBT but it is the U.S. government that is the biggest 
obstacle.675 
 
Considering that a majority of articles on the nuclear issue during the mid-1990s carried 
anti-American undertones, Vanaik’s expressed regret that India’s opinion-shaping elite had 
abandoned criticism of the US appeared far-fetched. In positioning American nuclear 
restraint as the condition of any Indian concession, Vanaik applied the same all-out 
argument used by the pro-bomb strategists in avoiding Indian restraint. This strategy was 
incompatible with his objective of promoting the CTBT. Finally, considering India’s almost 
complete isolation in the international CTBT debate and that the USA emerged as its main 
advocate only two years later, Vanaik’s characterisation of the US government as the 
‘biggest obstacle’ towards an agreement appeared short-sighted. 
 
In an August 1994 article in The Hindu, he criticised the pro-bomb section of India’s 
strategists for their turnaround on the CTBT front. In his view,  
 
[i]t had to happen and it happened. The fundamental intellectual and political 
contradictions within the bomb lobby have now led to the expression of serious 
reservations about the CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty) for reasons that are 
both good and not so good. This lobby has long been crying hoarse about the need 
to counter the ‘China threat’ and therefore the need to keep open the nuclear option 
or exercise it. At the same time, the bomb lobby has also been keen on emphasising 
its commitment to universal measures of disarmament as opposed to regionally 
limited measures. The notion of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is, of course, just 
such a universal disarmament measure. So it is difficult to think of anyone within 
the Indian bomb lobby who has not endorsed such a measure. But now that some 
form of CTBT has become a real and imminent possibility, there are jitters.676 
 
The main flaw of the pro-bomb strategists’ course was, according to Vanaik, their rejection 
of the CTBT because the treaty aimed at ‘capping’ nuclear arsenals instead of ‘rolling back’ 
existing arsenals. This was not compatible with their call for total global nuclear 
disarmament.  
 
Vanaik addressed this inconsistency in his August 1994 account by referring to an analysis 
published by C. Raja Mohan nine days earlier. Therein, Mohan had called for a change in 
India’s CTBT policy for two major reasons:  
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New Delhi needs to put aside its sentimentalism in favour of the CTBT and take a 
close, hard look at the relevance of the treaty in the changed international context. 
India’s support for a CTBT can no longer be reflexive and automatic. A number of 
key questions must be answered before New Delhi continues with its uncritical 
support for a comprehensive test ban in Geneva. Does the treaty serve the objective 
of achieving global abolition of nuclear weapons? The answer is a resounding ‘no’. 
A currently envisaged, the CTBT is a stand alone agreement that does not address 
the question of time-bound global nuclear disarmament. There is another, perhaps 
more important, question that India must address. If nuclear weapons are going to 
be around for a long time, how does a comprehensive test ban affect India’s ability 
to maintain its nuclear option? There are many reasons to believe that a test ban 
could significantly constrain India’s capability, if and when it chooses, to develop 
and deploy nuclear weapons.677 
 
Mohan’s article illustrates the reflexes of India’s bomb advocates, who repeatedly threw 
out their demand for all-out nuclear disarmament as a precondition for any restrictions on 
India’s nuclear programme.  
 
Given that it was quite clear that total nuclear disarmament was an unrealistic demand 
(even at the time of Nehru’s initial proposition) and that it was in the nature of a tentative 
nuclear test ban to restrict India’s nuclear programme, Mohan failed to explain which new 
factor necessitated a change in India’s policy in 1994. Vanaik identified this inconsistency 
in Mohan’s argument by countering that a tentative CTBT,  
 
even at its best, is a ‘stand alone agreement’ which does not address in a time-bound 
way the question of what further steps to take for nuclear disarmament. That is to 
say, it is a ‘capping’ measure rather than a ‘roll-back’ disarmament measure. Since 
this is not an argument that will convince many to oppose a CTBT, other arguments 
have to be found”678. 
 
A further major argument by the ‘bomb lobby’ was tackled by Vanaik in November of 
1995, when he addressed the extent to which the CTBT had become an ‘American’ non-
proliferation effort in the perception of India’s elite:  
 
[...] obviously Washington’s stance also aims to prevent horizontal proliferation on 
nuclear weapons generally. This has been the central focus of criticism of the CTBT 
by the Indian bomb lobby, its fear that it will trap India, for one, from further 
developing its nuclear potential.679 
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The reason why India’s ‘bomb lobby’ supported the CTBT until 1993 was simply, 
according to Vanaik, their misperception about the chances of its success: 
 
Why has the Indian bomb lobby woken up to the ‘danger of the CTBT’ only in the 
last two or three years at the outside? It is not as if there has been any qualitative 
change in the last decade between the status of NWSs and of NNWSs that somehow 
makes the non-proliferation aspect of a CTBT far more pernicious now than it 
would have been had it been in place a decade ago! This ‘puzzling’ behaviour is 
easily explainable. Indeed, the game is given away by the fact that the opposition to 
the CTBT or, what is the same thing, to make Indian accession to it conditional, is 
of such recent vintage. These advocates, despite all their claims to being deeply 
concerned about nuclear disarmament, have always firmly subordinated such aims 
to their more fundamental determination not to allow the nuclear option to be 
foreclosed for India, if it cannot for the time being actually be exercised. As long as 
the CTBT was a distant prospect, the Indian bomb lobby could occupy the moral 
high ground and wax eloquent about its commitment to such ‘universal and non-
discriminatory’ disarmament steps. The moment the CTBT has become a real and 
imminent possibility, it has got a worsening case of the jitters because if India 
accedes to such a CTBT, it will make its own efforts to lobby for establishing a 
‘stable minimum deterrent’ in the future significantly more ineffectual.680 
 
Vanaik garners support by exposing the credibility gap created when many of India’s 
strategists reversed their pro-CTBT stance into unconditional rejection. The impending 
ability of advanced nuclear weapons states to conduct computer simulations of nuclear tests 
was already a well known, if ignored fact in 1993. The positive to negative shift in the 
mainstream opinion of the CTBT that occurred in 1994/95 seemed to be less guided by 
growing awareness of this ‘loophole’ in the treaty, but rather by a mutual consent 
materialising among the community of states that seemed to take India’s strategic thinkers 
by surprise. Throughout the 1990s, a large majority of analysts placed the continued 
development of the nuclear arsenal, euphemistically referred to as ‘keeping the nuclear 
option open’, at the top of India’s priority list. Recurring references to India’s commitment 
to total nuclear disarmament was maintained only as long as it did not endanger its ‘nuclear 
option’. If the moral high ground of total nuclear disarmament was unsustainable, as it was 
in the 1994 CTBT debate, the bomb advocates turned to other all-out arguments like India’s 
endangered sovereignty, or more frequently, charges of discrimination. Vanaik pointed out 
these inconsistencies in the strategists’ line of argument in a most explicit and polemic way. 
Still, his arguments have not proved to be very effective in convincing a larger audience. 
This is partly due to his instrumentalisation of anti-American sentiments, which, after all, 
had already been monopolised by the bomb advocates as a strategy to promote their cause.  
Vanaik’s suggestion that “India can and should link nuclear restraint on its part to 
American nuclear restraint”681, actually intended to promote the cause of the CTBT, had the 
opposite effect, for it was identical to the pro-bomb strategists’ call to oppose the CTBT. 
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In sum, the analysis of Achin Vanaik’s attempts to give India’s public a critical awareness 
of the nuclear issue reveals the extent to which the domestic nuclear debate ceased to be a 
debate, at least in the real sense of the word, in the mid 1990s. Overall, those among India’s 
strategic elite who had adopted a critical stance towards the bomb decreased in number. 
Their arguments remained weak and largely unappreciated until 1998. Instead of being 
‘debated’ among India’s strategists, opinion on the nuclear issue was increasingly reduced 
to the vociferous call for India’s self-declaration as a nuclear weapons state. These calls for 
the bomb were not addressed to domestic rivals, but to international participants of the non-
proliferation discourse, particularly (or better: exclusively) the Anglo-Saxon countries. The 
more India’s domestic debate escalated, the less it correlated reality – the ‘imagined’ enemy 
was defined by stereotypes rather than by actual states. Within this world view, the alleged 
anti-Indian nuclear conspiracy was not necessarily shaped by the factual policies of the 
conspirators, but by the kind of policy decisions expected of them. 
 
The polarising mode in which Achin Vanaik attacked the position of the ‘bomb lobbyists’ 
was criticised by K. Sundarji as counter-productive682. In his critical response to Vanaik, 
published in September 1994, Sundarji gives a rather prosaic assessment of the ongoing 
debate by claiming that there “is so much muddled thinking about nuclear strategy in India 
that very often the result is a lot of sniping at each other by the so-called bomb and anti-
bomb lobbies”683. He then illustrates the flaws in both positions by referencing to the 
articles of C. Raja Mohan684 and Achin Vanaik685 quoted above.  
 
Sundarji rejected Mohan’s claim that the imposition of a nuclear test ban would prevent 
India from developing the capabilities needed for its minimum deterrent doctrine.  
Regarding Vanaik’s support of the CTBT, despite the computer simulation loopholes, 
Sundarji generally agreed with his position but challenged the offensive, trivialised 
criticism of those referred to as the ‘bomb lobby’. In Sundarji’s view,  
 
[c]ategorising every one who believes that we ought to deter Chinese (or Pakistani) 
nuclear threats as a hawk, without effectively debating the proposition, is wrong. 
Grouping all such people in an undifferentiated mass called the ‘bomb lobby’ is not 
only intellectually sloppy, but tends to prevent cogent and objective discussion of 
issues; it degenerates into a diatribe against supposed attitudes. The next step, that 
of attributing motives to the so-called lobbyists is but a short one. Would it be fair to 
all those who are anti-bomb if one were to question their pursuit of idealism or an 
ethical world view and dub it intellectually posturing? Should we call them anti-
national because the so-called hawks feel that they are ignoring national security? It 
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is high time that the Indian nuclear and strategic debate desists from attributing 
motives to caricatured stereotypes.686 
 
This assessment offers an exceptionally rare appraisal of one of the main flaws of India’s 
strategic debate. Sundarji convincingly branded the opposition’s over-simplifying and 
insulting rhetoric as counter-productive. His appraisal was nonetheless half-hearted, as it 
missed out on one of its most striking aspects. Sundarji assessed the way the two positions 
within India’s strategic elite viewed each other but overlooked how stereotyped perceptions 
of outside powers negatively effected India’s nuclear and strategic policy formulation.  
Moreover, he dismissed Vanaik’s suggestion that the bomb might be considered an end in 
itself and blamed Vanaik for “questioning the intellectual honesty of the bomb lobby”687. 
 
With regard to the core issue of the debate, whether India could adhere to a test ban without 
compromising its security needs, Sundarji clearly considered nuclear testing unnecessary: 
 
I strongly believe that we can deter China without the need to test. There is no need 
to keep producing newer, better and more weapons, which would require testing. 
There is no need to match any adversary in the number of weapons, nor yields not 
types of weapons; nor in achieving superiority; as long as there is an assured 
capability of a second strike that can inflict unacceptable damage.688 
 
He concluded his account by formulating the truly relevant questions, which, in his view, 
had been increasingly ignored by the participants of the domestic nuclear debate: 
 
Let us constructively address the issues concerned which are inter-alia: 
Can nuclear threats be credibly deterred by means other than nuclear weapons? 
If nuclear weapons are required, would deterrence alone not do; do we need to 
foolishly espouse nuclear war-fighting? 
If deterrence alone would suffice, would not finite minimum deterrence do without 
going in for an arms race? 
If minimum deterrence would do, what are the outlines of a credible and workable 
doctrine; what would be the force structure that such a doctrine would demand; 
what would be the political, societal and financial costs of such a force; can we 
afford it?689 
 
As the following section shows, these core questions hardly played any role in the 
escalating CTBT debate that emerged after the NPT negotiation in mid-1995. 
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13.5.2. Creating the CTBT Stalemate 
 
After the agreement on the indefinite NPT extension in mid-1995, the CTBT became the 
single dominating issue within media reporting on nuclear policy in India. While the 
absolute number of commentaries on this issue increased significantly thereafter, these 
articles hardly ever raised new arguments. On the contrary: The more the CTBT debate 
heated up, the more commentators referred to well-known arguments, thereby ruling out 
any balanced assessment of the issue. The distinction between CTBT and NPT, which had 
been the basis of India’s pro-CTBT policy in 1993, was now largely disavowed. Rather, the 
CTBT was increasingly regarded as one further device of the USA to establish its global 
predominance. As O. P. Sabherwal commented,  
 
[t]he NPT, CTBT and FMCT form an integral link in the American design. First 
came the NPT review and extension conference, where the United States 
steamrolled its way to indefinite weapon power monopoly for the five privileged 
members of NPT. Now follows the CTBT which will tighten the screws on 
countries like India which have kept out of the NPT and whose weapon status is 
ambiguous. There is also a tertiary American objective in CTBT of perpetuating its 
pre-eminence among the nuclear weapon states themselves… . With these tools, the 
US intends to entrench its dominant superpower status, and with the CTBT in place, 
extend its massive nuclear clout as a reinforcement of economic and political power 
well into the 21st century.690 
 
Comments in favour of India supporting the CTBT almost disappeared. One exception was 
Amrita Abraham’s article favouring a cautious and conditional pro-CTBT policy691. Amrita 
Abraham started by critically assessing the anti-CTBT mainstream opinion: 
 
If people were asked today whether India should sign the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty, the chances are most would say no. Their reason would be similar to those 
of a majority of nuclear analysts in New Delhi who interpret the treaty as a non-
proliferation measure aimed at restricting India’s freedom of action. Domestic 
opposition arises out of outrage over the double-standards of the Western powers 
and their bullying tactics on India’s nuclear and missile programmes. It is also the 
outcome of the belief that universal nuclear disarmament is a mirage and in the 
certain world ahead India has no other choice but to keep its own powder dry. All 
this ties the present Government’s hands and strengthens its negotiating position at 
the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva where it has been made clear that India 
will not support a treaty falling short of its basic objectives.692 
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Abraham pointed to one of the main flaws in India’s nuclear debate: The prevalence of the 
perceived Western, or American, behaviour as a determining factor in the definition of its 
own, national interest. This trend was particularly identifiable in the CTBT debate of 1996. 
Instead of raising the question ‘which policy best serves India’s national interest?’, opinion 
leaders raised the question ‘which policy did America want India to follow?’, and 
subsequently suggested that India follow the reverse policy. This logic might be considered 
a psychological phenomenon behind India’s recurring opposition in international fora693. 
This rationale caused a paradox policy that, though rhetorically justified in the name of 
India’s independence and sovereignty, was fully dependent on the policies of outside 
powers. This dependency remained largely unnoticed. 
Abraham suggested an Indian policy towards the CTBT similar to K. Sundarji’s 
recommendations: 
 
In principle, a comprehensive test ban, which by definition must exclude all forms 
of testing is a disarmament measure since it will cap the arsenals of the weapons 
powers. Therefore, it improves India’s security environment. Secondly, if retaining 
the nuclear option means being able to develop a ‘minimum deterrent capability’, 
that is, a second strike capability based on a limited number of warheads and an 
effective delivery system, it is surely logical to try to reduce uncertainties by 
limiting the arsenals of potential neighbours.694 
 
The closer the date of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament came, the more categorical 
was the mainstream rejection of the CTBT. Within the commonly accepted discourse 
strategy, India’s approval of the CTBT was linked to the all-out condition of global, time-
bound nuclear disarmament. In formulating this condition, the opinion leaders maintained 
India’s moral exceptionalism by claiming that India continued to champion a ‘true’ 
comprehensive test ban. This strategy became apparent in Jasjit Singh’s claim that  
 
[i]n the final analysis, the world needs a good CTBT and India, that has sought one 
for more than four decades, must remain in the forefront to ensure we have a treaty 
without loopholes and with effective international verification system. But above 
all, the treaty must have an unambiguous linkage with commitment to 
disarmament.695 
 
13.5.3. The Lonely Moralist: The Geneva Negotiation Process, Summer 1996 
 
When India’s almost complete international isolation became apparent in the course of the 
Geneva Conference, India’s elite reacted with defiance. A morally superior policy, as the 
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mainstream explanation went, had to be defended firmly even if a majority of others failed 
to appreciate it.  
 
The negotiation process for the CTBT followed similar dynamics as earlier negotiations. 
Western countries, above all the USA, tried to accommodate India by offering rather 
superficial concessions. India declined such moves on principle. The Indian delegation in 
Geneva officially stated that it neither considered nuclear weapons essential to its security 
interests, nor that it had any desire to acquire nuclear weapons. While this position would 
seem to suggest India’s eventual acceptance of the treaty, it nevertheless retained its dogged 
opposition. India’s refusal of any accommodating offers caused negative repercussions in 
the US administration as well as the American strategic elite, which often carried a 
presumptuous undertone. These repercussions then stirred up severe feelings of anti-
colonialism and inferiority among India’s elite, again stalemating India’s intransigent 
position. In the final stages of the negotiations, the consensus on the incompatibility of the 
CTBT with India’s pride and dignity was greater than ever before. Simultaneously, India’s 
reputation among the international community of states was severely damaged. 
 
The accounts on the Geneva Conference in India’s dailies stressed four broad aspects: First, 
the theme of India as the lonely moralist; second, the broad domestic consensus reached on 
the CTBT; third, the emphasis on ‘loopholes’ and flaws in the CTBT’s wording; fourth, the 
theme of ‘discrimination’. 
The first dimension, India’s moral exceptionalism, was expressed in Nikhil Chakravartty’s 
account of the conference: 
 
It is but natural for the Government of a self-respecting country like ours to desist 
from signing the CTBT. It may of course be argued that India should not consider 
itself as the only power with a conscience, and since most of the non-nuclear powers 
seem to have agreed to sign the CTBT why should we choose to be isolated? Such a 
stand goes against the historical role that independent India has generally played in 
international affairs. Immediately after Independence, India took up the cause of 
worldwide decolonisation – a stand which demonstrated that the democratic 
government of this country not only fought for national interest but also took the 
initiative – sometimes singlehanded – in defence of all the other countries fighting 
for independence. India’s isolation at the CTBT conference at Geneva need not 
worry us, because that becomes the symbol of the urges and aspirations for other 
countries as well.696 
 
The idea of India’s moral exceptionalism, manifested in India’s calls for total global 
nuclear disarmament, was most prominently advocated among India’s opinion leaders of 
the first generation (i.e. those who started their careers before or shortly after 
independence) whose Weltanschauung was strongly rooted in India’s struggle for 
independence. Of these, Nikhil Chakravartty (1913 – 1998) was one of the most well-
known journalists. He linked India’s moral exceptionalism to the country’s genuine identity 
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as post-colonial nation that was morally committed to the struggle against any forms of 
neo-colonialism. In his view,  
 
[t]he crux of the matter is that CTBT is much more than the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty, binds down a country to giving up the option of going in for the nuclear 
weapons. In other words, it seeks to enforce the age-old rule that only those who 
possess the weapon are entitled to use it and nobody else. Historically, this has 
throughout been upheld by the handful of powers that have ruled the world, leaving 
the vast majority dispossessed and hence subject to the tutelage of the mighty. 
Colonial powers conquering a country in the past would make it a point to disarm its 
people and impose their variety of demilitarisation so that the people in the subject 
country were kept under the military might of the conquering authority. Ours is the 
first country which stood up, unarmed, against such an iniquitous legitimacy of 
colonial rule. India has contributed in no small measure to the breakdown of that 
colonial raj and ultimately to its dissolution… . Alongside, the big powers with their 
huge arsenals of weapons, but conventional and nuclear, are seeking new devices 
for the physical domination of the world. CTBT is one such device by which the 
nuclear powers seek to lord it over the rest… . It is thus part of a sinister design to 
dominate the world by depriving the others the access to the weapons which the big 
powers have mobilised and have made no commitment to destroy.697 
 
Chakravartty’s focus on the symbolic and metaphoric dimensions of the nuclear issue was a 
general theme of the commentary on the nuclear issue in 1996. The exclusiveness of these 
intangible aspects in his report was nevertheless exceptional.  
 
The second broad aspect of the commentary on the Geneva conference was an appreciation 
of the domestic consensus on the issue. This appreciation was often linked to an explicit 
call for ‘going public’, i.e. the creation of a public consensus, which was considered 
necessary to strengthen India’s position in the negotiation process. The problems of the 
‘going public’-argument were outlined by Pran Chopra: 
 
Once CTBT comes into being in one form or another, India will stand out in the 
eyes of the world, whether in good light or bad, just as it has stood out at Geneva for 
stoutly defending its long-held position. Either it will be seen as a country which 
gave in at the end, or as one which must be really seriously intending to exercise its 
nuclear option, which otherwise it would not have defended so stubbornly against 
such heavy odds… . Either policy will call for a broad consensus, backed by 
manifest public opinion, and at the right time by a parliamentary resolution, so that 
no one may mistake it for a knee-jerk of a government which has yet to find its feet. 
But public opinion can crystalise only if the public can see the main elements of the 
competing policies. All that the people can see at present are gaps in their 
information, and these will inhibit any educative public debate.698 
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The doubts expressed by Chopra about the efficacy of India’s public opinion on nuclear 
decision-making appeared inconsistent with his call for going public. 
 
The third dimension of reporting on the CTBT negotiations was its focus on technical 
‘loopholes’, such as missing provisions on subcritical testing, computer simulated tests, and 
gaps in the verification system. These technical aspects were rarely discussed in detail, but 
again seen in a rather symbolic way. As J. N. Dixit wrote,  
 
[t]he criticism that India’s reservations about loopholes, enabling nuclear weapons 
and other advanced countries to conduct laboratory tests is not valid… . What one 
would call the democratisation of high technology and easy access to it makes our 
reservations on this count pertinent.699 
 
The generally accepted view among India’s elite was that the USA and other nuclear 
weapons states only decided to support a nuclear test ban after it became technically 
possible to advance the development of their respective nuclear arsenals without testing. 
This position had some evidence in support, as the treaty did not clarify whether the test 
moratorium included subcritical testing, nor did it impose any restrictions on computer 
simulations on the basis of data acquired in earlier nuclear tests. These shortcomings, 
according to the interpretation widely accepted by India’s strategic elite, would again create 
a discriminatory divide between the haves and the have-nots, as it would allow the further 
development of nuclear technology only by those states that had conducted sufficient tests 
prior to the conclusion of the CTBT. This criticism was widespread among other non-
nuclear weapons states as well. However, its impact on the other countries’ stance on the 
CTBT differed significantly from that of India. While a large majority of states analysed 
the pros and cons of the CTBT to their national security irrespectively of the NWS’ 
motives, India’s epistemic community saw the allegedly disingenuous motives behind 
America’s support of the CTBT as a compelling reason to reject the treaty. 
 
These dynamics were closely interlinked with the fourth dimension, that the CTBT was 
discriminatory. The theme was pointed out by Madhu Dandavate: 
 
Despite all professions about the ‘equality among nations’ made from various 
international fora, the attitude of the developed countries, particularly the nuclear 
powers, in regard to disarmament, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and 
comprehensive ban on nuclear tests is highly discriminatory… . The nuclear powers 
are allowed to go ahead without restraining their nuclear potential while others are 
expected not to resort to nuclear proliferation.700 
 
This general perception of being discriminated against in the international fora was a theme 
common to a majority of nuclear related articles since the beginning of the 1990s. The 
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prominence given to these charges of discrimination in the reporting on the CTBT 
negotiation was nonetheless puzzling, especially when one considers the fact that the CTBT 
had been supported by India’s elite until 1993 for its non-discriminatory character. As the 
above remarks illustrate, within the 1996 debate little distinction was made between 
disarmament, non-proliferation and a nuclear test ban. 
Dandavate subsequently welcomed the Indian delegation’s refusal to join the CTBT: 
 
Learning from the past experience, India had to take note of the stark reality that the 
main nuclear powers had built up an extremely iniquitous system, which gave a 
privileged position to them and meted out discriminatory treatment to the 
developing countries. The perspective which India has adopted regarding the CTBT 
is in tune with its consistently correct approach. This approach, conveyed to the 
Geneva Conference through the speech of India’s Ambassador Arundhati Ghose, is 
loud and clear. Against the background of India’s unfortunate experience, the 
ambassador giving the quintessence of India’s attitude to the CTBT, unequivocally 
stated: ‘India had demonstrated its resolve in the past. We have refused to accede to 
the discriminatory order of today’s international nuclear regime. This policy has 
been maintained, despite pressures of one sort or another. The same conviction is 
reflected in our stand on the CTBT.701 
 
The semantic distinction between India’s categorical negation of its nuclear weapons 
ambitions, as expressed in the opening speech to the Geneva Conference, and the rhetoric 
endemic of India’s representatives in Geneva, in which India signalled its determination to 
‘keep its nuclear option open’ (justified by charges of discrimination), was little understood 
by the international audience. This credibility gap further increased when knowledge of 
India’s possession of an arsenal of rudimentary nuclear devices spread. India’s blocking 
and delaying strategy in the course of the CTBT negotiations was widely interpreted as 
being motivated by the technically advanced state of its preparations for nuclear testing.  
 
Within India’s domestic debate, the prevailing sentiments of defiance and moral conviction 
overshadowed any nuanced appreciation of India’s declining international reputation. 
Among India’s epistemic community, a consensus endorsed India’s rejection of the treaty 
as well as the blocking manoeuvres of the Indian delegation. As Raja C. Mohan wrote, 
 
[i]n blocking the passage of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty at Geneva this 
week, India has shown a rare diplomatic self-assurance… . Despite some strong 
external advice in the recent weeks not to block the CTBT, India has demonstrated 
the political will to stand up and take its principled protest against the treaty to its 
logical end.702 
 
While the analysts focused on moral principles to explain India’s blocking strategy, another 
more technical aspect remained largely unnoticed: By late 1995, India’s scientists had 
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already concluded preparations for nuclear testing at the Pokhran site. In mid-1996, when 
the Geneva Conference took place, there was nothing else to do for the Prime Minister but 
to push the button. Stepping back from the threshold would have nullified these efforts, 
severely frustrated the involved weaponeers and dashed the hopes of the ever growing pro-
bomb strategists. These givens caused an obvious divergence between normative based 
rhetoric and the rather tangible implicit motives at stake. Publicly addressing these motives, 
however, would have been perceived by the opinion leaders as subversion of India’s moral 
principles, and was therefore largely abstained from.  
 
In sum, the dynamics of the domestic debate had again driven India into isolation. Its 
persistence on certain normative principles did not allow India’s policy-makers to 
apprehend the various benefits of the treaty. These negative dynamics of the elite discourse 
in India were summarised by George Perkovich: 
 
Finally, while the treaty did not commit the nuclear weapon states to further steps 
toward nuclear disarmament, it clearly contributed to the goal, as India had 
acknowledged earlier in the negotiations. Banning nuclear tests is a necessary if not 
sufficient measure to end nuclear arms racing, to devalue nuclear weapons, and to 
facilitate disarmament. This was precisely why nuclear weapon establishments had 
fought against the treaty for decades. India faced enormous international pressure to 
sign the treaty but even greater domestic pressure not to.703 
 
The peculiar dynamics of India’s domestic debate were fuelled by the inept negotiation 
strategies of the nuclear weapons states, particularly by the USA. The US government 
followed a dual strategy. It was increasingly determined to prevent the spread of nuclear 
weapons beyond the five official nuclear weapons states, and increased pressures on those 
states which maintained nuclear programmes. On the other hand, it continued to reconstruct 
its own nuclear arsenal and to modify its nuclear doctrines in order to maintain the leverage 
and prestige endowed by its nuclear weapons. Insensitive Western negotiation strategies 
were frequently described in detail by India’s media. Even the nuclear test conducted by 
China in the wake of the final agreement over the CTBT in July 1996, which might have 
been a cogent strategic argument against signing the CTBT in a less emotionalised debate, 
played a rather insignificant role in the heated rally against India’s perceived subjugation to 
Western interests. 
 
When a consensus on the final draft of the CTBT had finally been reached among the 
remaining participants, India prevented a decision by the Geneva Conference on 
Disarmament (CD), which, according to its rules, had to be made unanimously. The 
community of states then decided to bypass the CD and bring the CTBT directly to the UN 
General Assembly. India’s efforts to circumvent this new procedure eventually failed. 
These tricks and dodges deepened India’s almost complete international isolation on the 
nuclear issue.  
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13.5.4. After the CTBT: Cutting the Losses 
 
After the disappointing outcome of the Geneva Conference, the CTBT remained an issue 
for India’s strategic elite, who increasingly demanded, as a retort to perceived injustices, 
that the government to finally conduct nuclear tests.  
In his wrap-up of the Geneva negotiations, Manoj Joshi states that  
 
[o]fficial statements and pronouncements notwithstanding, the brunt of international 
opinion is that no matter what it says, India can no longer, at least in the near term 
retain its claim to a unique status as a leader in the arena of disarmament. So even 
while applause at home and censure abroad has not quite died down, the time may 
have come for India to think through the consequences of standing four-square 
against the CTBT. Analysts at home are already speaking of the enormous pressure 
that the current structure of the treaty will put on India, compulsions which could 
well force it to actually test, reiterate its nuclear weapons capacity and then sign 
up.704 
 
By predicting that India’s tattered international reputation as the ‘leader in the arena of 
disarmament’ and the mounting pressures from the international community might 
contribute to India’s decision for nuclear testing, Joshi correctly foresaw the dynamics 
which would eventually lead to the events of May 1998. Joshi again outlined the legacies of 
India’s self-image: 
 
Indian nuclear strategy, if indeed it can be called that, has been an idiosyncratic mix 
influenced much by Mahatma Gandhi and Nehru’s non-violence and pacifism and 
battered by contrary ground realities. Simply put, this ‘strategy’ was: lead efforts to 
world disarmament, even while building up technical and industrial ‘abilities’ of 
making nuclear weapons and missiles. By demonstrating them at appropriate 
intervals, rather than actually developing and deploying weapon systems, India 
would warn off potential adversaries, save a lot of money, and retain its moral high 
ground.705 
 
These legacies, whatever their true substance might have been, still dominated India’s 
strategic thinking. They caused a large section of India’s strategic community to abide by 
the concept of nuclear ambiguity, euphemistically described as ‘keeping the nuclear option 
open’, even after its flaws were clearly exposed by the events of mid-1996. According to 
Joshi,  
 
[t]he best option for India is to evolve a policy that will periodically, carefully and 
systematically, enhance its ambiguous nuclear and missile posture. In the past, this 
was based on the Pokhran blast, unsafeguarded nuclear reactors, plutonium 
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reprocessing plant and the Agni tests, but their values is now much diminished. A 
policy which seeks to convince potential adversaries that India has a strategic 
capacity it can quickly translate into ‘ability’ without actually doing so, now 
requires a little more investment in the form of physical infrastructure that goes with 
nuclear weapons.706 
 
While Joshi started his assessment by quite rightly detecting a credibility gap caused by 
India’s nuclear course, he misconceived the dominant role the concept of ‘keeping the 
nuclear option open’ had played therein. His suggestion that a continued advancement of 
India’s nuclear weapons infrastructure would ‘enhance its ambiguous nuclear and missile 
posture’ was not convincing, considering the fact that a majority among the international 
audience did not perceive India’s nuclear course to be any ambiguous at all. Rather, outside 
observers realised after the events of 1996 that India had embarked on an unambiguous and 
irreversible nuclear path.  
 
In the second half of 1996, a consensus emerged among India’s elite that now it was time 
for India to finally conduct nuclear tests. This consensus was addressed in Abha Shankar’s 
analysis of the post-CTBT situation: 
 
If the nuclear option is not to corrode and disintegrate, India will have to develop a 
national vision and policy beyond its firm posture on the ‘Comprehensive’ Test Ban 
Treaty. The CTBT posture resulted from a solid national consensus. Never before 
had India witnessed a national debate as intense and focused as the one on the 
CTBT. Now, the nation needs to embark on a strategic plan to secure its long-term 
interests. India spurned the CTBT because not only was it a bogus disarmament 
step, it would have imposed a legal and technical constraint on its nuclear option.707 
 
This introduction illustrated all major features of mainstream opinion on the issue. 
Shankar’s remarks about the unprecedented intensity of the CTBT debate, as well as the 
broad consensus against signing it, were empirically valid. The refusal to join the CTBT 
was, according to Shankar, justified by two major flaws of the treaty: First, its commitment 
to disarmament did not go far enough; and second, it would have put unacceptable 
restrictions on India’s nuclear programme. These two aspects, despite an apparent 
contradiction, were in line with India’s mainstream opinion.  
 
The most noteworthy feature of Shankar’s account was his implicit use of the concept 
‘nuclear option’. As this study has shown, the definition of ‘nuclear option’ had been 
constantly stretched towards the actual development of nuclear capabilities, thereby 
shortening the semantic distinction between ‘keeping the nuclear option open’ and 
exercising the nuclear option. By referring to the expression of India’s ‘nuclear option’ 
when actually meaning India’s nuclear breakthrough, Shankar brought this process to its 
consequential end.  
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Subsequently, Shankar made his case for an Indian nuclear test: 
 
The CTBT aroused deep national concern because it would have deprived us of our 
testing option. The logical follow-up to the CTBT posture should be the long 
awaited nuclear weaponisation… . India can no longer squander time in deciding 
the necessary follow-up. It has the following choices: stay out of the CTBT and yet 
not test; carry out a limited series of tests and then accept the CTBT; test but not 
sign, ensuring the CTBT collapses. The first choice – Uncle Tommed by 
‘multinational leftists’ and ‘buy-me pseudo-nationalists who earlier sought to 
undermine the CTBT consensus – carries only costs and no benefits. It is designed 
to bleed the country’s vital interests. It suggests that a foolhardy India would wage a 
determined battle with the major powers and open itself to their blackmail and 
coercion so that it can have the right to test without the desire or intent to test. The 
CTBT posture leads India in only one direction: an operational nuclear deterrent 
upheld by testing… . As a double-edged tool of deterrence, testing will demonstrate 
the country’s technical competence and prowess and also confirm its political 
resolve and will.708 
 
These deliberations illustrate the difficulties India’s strategic elite had in convincingly 
explaining why the CTBT, which had been supported until late 1993, had emerged as the 
main driving force for its call for India’s nuclear breakthrough.  
 
What caused this 180 degree turn in mainstream opinion? In the perception of India’s elite, 
it was caused by three major factors: a) the CTBT did not include any time-bound 
commitment to total nuclear disarmament; b) the CTBT had a loophole, as it would allow 
computer simulated tests; c) the CTBT would put restrictions on India’s nuclear 
programme. This explanation was dissatisfying because all three factors were already well-
known in 1993. Despite their flaws, these factors nevertheless proved to be highly 
appealing to public opinion, which largely accepted the strategists’ rationale. 
 
13.5.5. The CTBT Debate in the post-Pokhran Period 
 
As the previous section has shown, the nuclear testing of May 1998 was the inevitable 
culmination of the dynamics of India’s strategic debate as catalysed by the CTBT 
negotiations. Once the Pokhran tests were completed, India’s strategic elite started to 
redefine its position on the CTBT according to the new conditions. The leitmotiv of this 
position was that India should now merit the status of a nuclear weapons state. As soon as 
this status was granted by the official nuclear weapons states, India should engage in 
negotiations on acceding to the CTBT. According to Pranab Mukherjee, “[i]f India is not 
recognised as a nuclear weapon state and does not enjoy an equal status with the five 
nuclear weapon states, then signing the CTBT will only impose obligations and it will not 
have any benefit”709. Considering that the CTBT did not define the nuclear status of 
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countries, and, in contrast to the NPT, its provisions did not make any distinction between 
nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states – in other words, it was not 
discriminatory – Mukherjee’s call for India’s recognition as nuclear weapon state as 
precondition for signing the CTBT appeared questionable710. Once again, it reflected the 
lack of distinction made between the contents of the CTBT and NPT among the strategic 
community. 
 
Many analysts suggested that India, having tested and declared itself a nuclear weapons 
state, should now engage in negotiations with the USA about the conditions for India’s 
accession to the CTBT. This course was most clearly outlined by C. Raja Mohan711. In his 
account, Mohan started by giving a remarkable explanation of the clash between Indian and 
US-American negotiating strategies:  
 
For the Americans, deal-making comes naturally; they have no problem in splitting 
the difference between two divergent positions. Making deals and accommodation 
of divergent principles is part of American political life… Political deal-making is 
seen as immoral in India, where the Brahmanical approach has long put ‘principle’ 
and ‘purity’ above pragmatism. Political differences, even minor ones, in India are 
often elevated to the level of irreconcilable antagonism. Political parties cannot stop 
splitting in the name of principle. For many of India’s leaders, ‘purity’ is more 
important than maintaining unity.712 
 
Following this rather primitive explanation for India’s confrontational stance, Mohan 
subsequently dropped this explanation in favour of its opposite: 
 
The U.S. commitment to preserve the non-proliferation regime that it has erected 
over the last three decades is understandable. But no international treaty system that 
is unwilling to adapt to changing political conditions has survived the test of time. 
There is no divine sanction to the decree of the NPT that the world can have only 
five nuclear weapon powers and no more. India, Pakistan and Israel have long been 
in an anomalous situation in relation to the NPT.713 
 
Throughout the 1990s until the nuclear tests, Mohan and most other strategic thinkers in 
India applied fierce rhetoric to express their disgust about the discriminatory nature of the 
NPT, thereby suggesting that India develop nuclear weapons in order to crush the 
iniquitous regime in the name of all nuclear have-nots. Now, two months after India had 
declared itself a nuclear weapons state, Mohan dropped his principle guided position and 
called on the NWS to accept India as a member of their exclusive club while closing the 
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door behind it. He justified his change of heart with the compulsions of Realpolitik, as India 
was forced to deal with Western power politics.  
According to Mohan, India, now part of the nuclear club, should support American efforts 
to prevent new membership: 
 
While [the tests] create a short term problem for the U.S. they have also opened the 
opportunity to complete the architecture of the global non-proliferation regime by 
accommodating India into it in some form… . The Indo-U.S. dialogue will remain a 
meaningless exercise if the Clinton Administration believes that it can roll back 
India’s nuclear and missile programmes and force New Delhi into joining the NPT 
as a non-nuclear weapon state… . India, too, needs to acknowledge the core interest 
of the U.S. in maintaining a viable non-proliferation order in the world.714 
 
These remarks already included the three major features of the newly emerging mainstream 
stance on the international non-proliferation regime that began to emerge during the 
consolidation. First, in Mohan’s perception, India’s nuclear tests and its subsequent self-
declaration as a nuclear weapons state did not, contrary to many international observers, 
deal a major blow to the non-proliferation regime, but offer a chance “to complete the 
architecture of the global non-proliferation regime”715 with addition of India a natural 
member of the ‘haves’. Second, the acceptance of India’s nuclear status by the USA was 
considered the necessary precondition for any negotiations. Third, the nuclear club should 
be kept closed by any means necessary, for India, in Mohan’s sanctimonious rhetoric, 
“needs to acknowledge the core interest of the U.S. in maintaining a viable non-
proliferation order in the world”716.  
 
After outlining the conditions under which India would resume negotiations on the CTBT, 
Mohan continued to estimate the chances of success quite positively. However,  
 
[g]iven the basic asymmetry in the negotiation, and the fundamental change in 
nuclear arms control policy that the Indian Government is trying to engineer, it is 
imperative that the U.S. offers tangible and substantive benefits for India in return 
for signing the CTBT. India will have to show that the global non-proliferation 
regime is buttressed by the deal.717 
 
It is important to note that the CTBT was an international treaty, which, at the time of 
India’s nuclear testing, had been signed by 144 nations718. In this light, the suggestion that 
one country that did not sign it (India) could renegotiate the treaty with another country that 
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did, yet abstained from ratifying it (the USA), appeared rather impractical719. Despite such 
impediments, this idea was widely expressed in the commentary on the issue in the 
immediate aftermath of the tests. It illustrated two tendencies within the immediate post-
Pokhran debate: Firstly, a gross overestimation of the leverage obtained by India’s self-
declaration as a nuclear weapons power, and secondly, a gross overestimation of America’s 
global hegemony. 
 
In his evaluation of the pros and cons of signing the CTBT, Muchkund Dubey recapitulated 
the four major reasons why India had refused to sign the CTBT before May 1998 before 
throwing them all out: 
 
India decided not to be a party to the CTBT in 1996 because it thought that it might 
have to carry out a few nuclear weapon tests in the interest of its security. This 
principal purpose seems to have been served with the recent tests… . Our second 
objection was that the CTBT’s entry into force clause was an infringement on our 
sovereignty, in that it obliged us to sign a treaty which we had publicly declared 
repugnant to our security interests. But once we decide to sign the treaty, this 
objection will no longer remain valid. Our third objection was that the CTBT was 
discriminatory because it permitted certain tests … which only a few nuclear 
weapon states were capable of carrying out. But now that our ability to conduct 
laboratory tests has been convincingly demonstrated… the treaty is no longer 
discriminatory against us. The only remaining objection is the question of the 
linkage of the treaty with nuclear disarmament. Lack of linkage cannot be a serious 
ground for objection because in practical terms a test ban treaty cannot at the same 
time be a treaty for eliminating nuclear weapons.720 
 
Similarly to C. Raja Mohan, former Foreign Secretary Muchkund Dubey showed a 
remarkable pragmatism in adjusting his principle-guided judgments to the new conditions. 
It was only two years earlier in the wake of the Geneva Conference that had Dubey 
expressed his view that the CTBT was discriminatory to Third World countries and more 
importantly, did not carry any reference to nuclear disarmament:  
 
It is a great pity that India became an accomplice in the U.S. volte face on the CTBT 
purely for its own selfish purposes. In co-sponsoring with the U.S. the resolution on 
the CTBT adopted by the General Assembly at its 1993 session, India agreed to 
drop any reference to nuclear disarmament which had figured in all the resolutions 
on this subject sponsored by India in the past and which was the central theme of 
the Rajiv Gandhi Plan of Action.721 
 
It is against this backdrop that Dubey’s conclusion that the CTBT did not discriminate 
against India, now that it was able to conduct subcritical tests, appeared highly 
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questionable. Similarly, Dubey no longer viewed the lack of disarmament provisions in the 
CTBT as a serious problem, because, as he explained, the CTBT was never intended to 
have any. This stance again appeared quite remarkable in light of his 1996 remarks.  
 
Mohan’s and Dubey’s accounts illustrate the pragmatic shift in the general process of 
opinion making among India’s strategic elite’s on the CTBT. This pragmatism was 
addressed by Amrita Abraham: 
 
Post hoc construction of nuclear policy is rich in irony but little else as yet. After 
three years of fighting off the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the strategic 
community has wheeled around in support of it. This development parallels the 
Vajpayee government’s manoeuvres to get aboard the CTBT and is the most 
significant outcome of Pokhran-II so far.722 
 
Abraham subsequently evaluated some realistic conditions under which the Indian 
government might be willing to sign the CTBT, the most substantial being India’s access to 
dual-use technology. The lifting of sanctions, frequently named as a precondition for 
India’s accession, would be the least problematic as it would be an automatic by-product of 
the CTBT signature. The two other demands could be agreed upon within some kind of 
declaratory face-saving device.  
 
Abraham subsequently doubted the belief among the mainstream strategists that the CTBT 
could be renegotiated according to India’s terms: 
 
The CTBT cannot be redrafted without the risk of losing it altogether. Some 140 
non-weapons states believe it secures their interests and cannot be expected to go 
along with that or an unverifiable Indian commitment to abide by the treaty without 
signing it. So it is the 1996 document or nothing.723 
 
According to Abraham, the decision on whether India should sign the CTBT based entirely 
on security considerations. On this premise, India could chose between the non-weaponised 
option, the development of nuclear capabilities without actual weapons deployment, and 
the weaponised option, which would have severe financial and security implications. 
Abraham clearly favoured the first option: 
 
The low-cost option of a declared but non-weaponised nuclear capability is not 
seriously undermined by the CTBT… . Weaponisation and deployment is the high 
cost and self-destructive option. Far from securing India, a heightened military 
stance works like a self-fulfilling prophecy by worsening the external 
environment… . A verifiable ban on explosive testing slows down weapons 
development in countries India regards as potential threats to peace and security, 
and it creates the momentum for the next steps in disarmament. That is the best 
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bargain India can realistically expect. The clinching argument for the CTBT is that 
the country will be spared more reckless adventures.724 
 
Abraham’s recommendation that India should take the first option and abstain from full-
fledged weaponisation remained underappreciated by most strategists. 
 
Next to those pragmatic strategic thinkers like Mohan and Dubey, who had quickly dropped 
their moral pathos and updated their opinions and those strategists who had been 
marginalised before the tests for maintaining a sceptical position on India’s nuclear course 
during the escalating debate of the mid-1990s, like Amrita Abraham, a third group existed 
that was comprised of those authors who had stuck to the traditional principles of the pre-
test nuclear discourse. This group, which had dominated the strategic discourse in the 
months before the tests, still constituted the majority of strategic thinkers in their immediate 
aftermath, but significantly decreased in numbers thereafter. Their rather dismissive 
position on the CTBT was illustrated by J.N. Dixit’s assessment of India’s changed 
negotiating stance: 
 
There are many questions related to our participation in the non-proliferation agenda 
of the nuclear weapons powers led by the United States, needing indepth [sic.] 
consideration by our government. Have we, for example, achieved levels of 
technological development where we really do not need to conduct any more 
tests?... . The second question is whether we have carefully assessed the 
implications of the international inspection system, stipulated in the CTBT and of 
the operational stipulations of the ‘national technical means’. The third question: 
have we carefully considered the implications of the concept of ‘permissive 
activities’? Fourth, is there really a compulsion to sign the CTBT before September 
1999725, especially in the context of the likelihood of US itself and China and Russia 
not ratifying it?726 
 
Dixit left no doubt that these questions were to be answered negatively; thus India should 
continue to refuse joining the CTBT. Implicit in these questions were the underlying 
features which had guided India’s CTBT policy since 1994: The general rejection of any 
major technological restrictions on India’s nuclear programme on grounds of sovereignty 
and national dignity; the denial of inspections on similar grounds; and, the ‘loophole’-
argument on grounds of discrimination.  
 
Finally, Dixit gave a fundamental, overarching reason why India should not sign the CTBT: 
Neither the nuclear weapons states nor India’s neighbours would give up their nuclear 
arsenals in the foreseeable future. In Dixit’s view,  
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[i]t is clear that the international community will remain subject to a nuclear and 
missile-weaponised world. One does not have to go into a detailed analysis of our 
regional security environment… . Basic non-proliferation objectives of the nuclear 
weapons powers, led by the US, have not undergone any meaningful change, 
responding to Indian concerns… . The solution does not lie in confrontational or 
withdrawal symptoms. We should continue the process of engagement. Our aim 
should be to change the negotiating framework, modify the benchmarks to meet our 
strategic concerns. We must also convince the nuclear weapons powers and others 
that, while we have weaponised ourselves due to unavoidable circumstances, we 
remain keen on bringing about a non-discriminatory non-proliferation order in the 
world.727 
 
Unlike Abraham, J.N. Dixit was indifferent towards the impact of the CTBT on India’s 
security. Similarly to many strategic commentators, he accepted a priori that nuclear 
weapons increased India’s security. By considering India’s increased security as a 
necessary effect of its nuclearisation, Dixit perceived any agreement which would restrict 
India’s nuclear programme, such as the CTBT, unacceptable.  
 
While the complexity of the causal relationship between nuclear weapons and India’s 
security was not only outlined by India’s nuclear critics, but also by leading military 
strategists like K. Sundarji, the majority of India’s politico-strategists, represented by J.N. 
Dixit, traditionally abstained from addressing security aspects in detail. In their view, it was 
enough to state that “[o]ne does not have to go into a detailed analysis of our regional 
security environment”728, and that India, while still being morally superior to Western 
countries, was forced to acquire nuclear weapons “due to unavoidable circumstances”729. In 
order to accommodate these two seemingly contradictory views – India’s moral 
exceptionalism and its rejection of any restrictive agreement – Dixit applied the well-
documented discourse strategy of demanding “a non-discriminatory non-proliferation order 
in the world”730.  
 
In mid-1999, the US Senate decided not to ratify the CTBT. This refusal proved to be the 
decisive argument for India’s anti-CTBT analysts. The Indian government, which had 
signalled some willingness to sign the treaty731, though it had actually avoided a final 
decision, now adopted these analysts’ line of argument and abandoned plans to sign it. The 
unalloyed gratification among policy makers about this unexpected solution was evaluated 
by Arvind N. Das: 
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[T]he US Senate itself decided not to ratify the CTBT, thereby making it possible 
for Indian diplomats to paste temporary smirks on their faces and to gloat that their 
stand has been vindicated. Which stand? Surely not the one taken a few years ago 
by the Indian representative, who declared unequivocally, ‘We will not sign the 
CTBT. Not now. Not ever’. Much water flowed down the Potomac since that brave 
statement and only a few weeks ago there was much mumbling by those who 
determine security policy about ‘building a national consensus’ so that India could 
put its mark on the CTBT without too much discord in the political class.732 
 
 
13.6. Joining the Club and Closing the Door 
 
During the period of consolidation, the erstwhile heated debate on the international non-
proliferation regime among India’s strategic elite gradually abated. Only the NPT Review 
Conference in mid-2000 drew some attention. The mainstream stance on the issue shifted 
significantly compared to the immediate aftermath of the tests. While most of the analysts 
in 1998 and 1999 stuck to the pre-test arguments, by 2000 a consensus had emerged to drop 
India’s long-held rejection of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and engage 
in some form of negotiation on India’s possible adherence to the NPT and CTBT. The 
acceptance of India as a nuclear weapons state was thereby considered the crucial 
precondition to any constructive approach. The was again most clearly stressed by C. Raja 
Mohan: 
 
The non-proliferation champions of the NPT insist that New Delhi, if not now, at 
least over the long-term, could be persuaded to join the NPT. If they have their 
way… the conference could urge India to join the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon 
state. Nothing could be more preposterous… . Instead of the empty prattle about 
making the NPT universal, the time has come for the managers of the treaty to 
accept the reality of three nuclear weapons states outside the NPT system and the 
impossibility of getting them into the treaty without modifying it. No multilateral 
treaty or a legal system can survive the test of time if it does not have the ability to 
adjust to changing circumstances… . Once the treaty managers accept the ground 
reality, it should be easier for the NPT system to seriously explore ways of finding a 
modus vivendi with the nuclear weapon states outside the treaty. A genuine 
accommodation between the NPT and the nuclear hold-outs would in fact complete 
the architecture of the global non-proliferation regime and enhance international 
peace and stability.733 
 
While Mohan had been one of the first opinion leaders to propagate a 180 degree shift in 
India’s NPT policy in mid-1998, his rhetoric became much more explicit two years later. In 
his view, demand for a universal NPT was nothing more than ‘empty prattle’. This again 
                                                 
732 Das, Arvind N.: “India and the CTBT debacle: Did the dog learn French?”. In: Indian Express, October 
21st 1999. 
733 Mohan, C. Raja: “Nuclear India & the NPT “. In: The Hindu, April 27th 2000. 
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contrasted sharply to the consensus of India’s strategists (including Mohan himself) until 
1998, which involved rejecting the NPT for its dearth of universality and global equity.  
 
While the member states of the non-proliferation regime were reluctant to give India 
official status as a nuclear weapons state for fear that it might set a precedent for other 
countries with nuclear ambitions, these concerns went unacknowledged by Mohan and his 
peers. Behind the strategists’ inattentiveness was their implicit perception of India’s natural 
right to this status (in contrast to other states). This commonly held view derived from what 
this study refers to as India’s moral exceptionalism. 
 
After vigorously demanding India’s acceptance into the nuclear club, Mohan argued that 
this right should only be granted to India, that the door of the club should be closed 
thereafter: 
 
India alone among the nuclear hold-outs is in a position to initiate a political 
reconciliation between the NPT and those outside it. On matters nuclear, Israel’s 
strategy is low-key and Tel Aviv has no desire to fall into the trap of a diplomatic 
confrontation with the Arab states in multilateral for a that address nuclear issues. In 
any case, the U.S. is there to take care of Israel’s nuclear interests. Pakistan has 
never had an independent line on global nuclear issues.734 
 
Once again, this view strongly contrasted to the dominating rhetoric of the pre-1998 period, 
which divided the world into ‘nuclear haves’ and ‘nuclear have-nots’. 
 
In fact, both Israel and Pakistan kept a low-profile within the international debate on the 
non-proliferation regime. Both countries were preoccupied with vital security concerns – 
Israel surrounded by hostile Arab states and Pakistan facing a conventionally superior 
adversary on its eastern border – and therefore proved to be rather disinterested in the status 
aspects of the treaty735. Thus, India was truly the only state to vehemently claim the 
superior status ostensibly attached to the possession of nuclear weapons. 
Mohan continued to trivialise India’s ‘discrimination’- argument: 
 
To be able to explore reconciliation with the NPT system, India will have to discard 
much of the nuclear mythology that it has created over the last three decades. Take 
for example the Indian litany that the NPT is an ‘unfair’ and ‘discriminatory’ treaty 
and therefore it will have nothing to do with it. The Indian argument against the 
NPT in the framework of the North-South divide insults the intelligence of those 
nations from the South who have joined the treaty in such large numbers.736 
 
When the NPT review conference started in May 2000, India again decided not to send an 
observer to Geneva. Then-Minister of Foreign Affairs Jaswant Singh sent an address to the 
                                                 
734 Mohan, C. Raja: op.cit.. In: The Hindu, April 27th 2000. 
735 in the case of Israel even officially denying the possession of nuclear weapons.  
736 Mohan, C. Raja: op.cit.. In: The Hindu, April 27th 2000. 
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participants categorically declaring that India would not adhere to the NPT as a ‘non-
nuclear weapon state’. Some of the major participatory states responded by forwarding a 
statement rejecting India’s recognition as a nuclear weapon state. This stalemate had few 
repercussions on India’s domestic debate, and the strategic elite soon withdrew its attention 
from the non-proliferation issue and turned to other fields, such as Indo-US bilateral 
relations. 
 
The North Korean nuclear crisis wrung very little attention from India’s strategic 
community. The few commentaries mainly focused on the question of how the nuclear 
dangers emerging from North Korea could be contained. The fact that North Korea 
assumed a similar rhetoric about the discriminatory NPT and the unacceptable restrictions 
on its sovereignty by IAEA safeguards remained largely unappreciated. North Korea’s 
nuclear course was mainly interpreted as yet another proof of the flaws in the NPT. As 
summarised in an Indian Express article in January 2003,  
 
[o]bviously the issue goes far beyond North Korea. The provision of withdrawal in 
the NPT always represented the Achille’s heel of the non-proliferation regime so 
assiduously built up over the decades. Withdrawal from the NPT by North Korea 
and the acquisition of nuclear weapons may well lead to the unwinding of the 
nuclear order with unpredictable consequences. India, which has had serious 
reservations about the NPT, has always cautioned the international community of 
the goal of pursuing non-proliferation without corresponding progress on global 
nuclear disarmament. India itself was unlikely to have gone nuclear if nuclear 
disarmament had been accorded even some priority after the Cold War ended.737 
 
As the author quite rightly stated, India had always refused to sign the NPT because it 
lacked disarmament provisions. His assumption that India would have foregone nuclear 
weapons if disarmament would have been taken more serious after the Cold War was 
nevertheless a bold speculation. Evidence presented in this study suggests that India short 
of an expedited and unrealistic total nuclear disarmament, would have gone the nuclear 
path even if an agreement on disarmament could have reached. Further, this study has 
presented substantial evidence that it was the unrealistic nature of the claim itself that made 
it so attractive for the elite’s discourse strategy. It allowed India’s elite to categorically 
refuse any non-proliferation agreement and still maintain its moral high-ground. 
 
The commentary on North Korea’s nuclear programme further illustrated the extent to 
which India’s status as a nuclear weapons state was already taken for granted as part of 
India’s self-depiction in 2003. As Manpreet Sethi commented,  
 
[w]hile the US perceives greater national interest in devoting its resources and 
energies to taming Iraq, India must forcefully highlight the nuisance value of North 
Korean nuclear brinkmanship and press upon the international community to 
                                                 
737 N.N.: “Nuclear Pandora’s box”. In: The Indian Express, January 11th 2003. 
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resolve this crisis so that others do not reappear. Let not other countries conclude 
from this episode that nuclear brinkmanship works.738 
 
Sethi’s remarks illustrate the degree to which India’s strategic community had already 
accepted India’s membership in the nuclear club as a given fact after more than three 
decades of nuclear brinkmanship. A paltry five years after its self-declaration as a nuclear 
weapon state, one of the main tasks of India’s nuclear policy was, according to its strategic 
community, to ‘press the international community’ not to allow aspiring countries to 
engage in nuclear brinkmanship, and to keep the door of the nuclear club closed.  
 
In sum, the international nuclear nonproliferation regime was the crucial issue determining 
the course of India’s nuclear debate. During the decisive years in the mid-1990s, two thirds 
of all nuclear related accounts addressed this issue. The extensive content analysis of these 
accounts has clearly shown the close causal relationship between the commentary on the 
Geneva negotiation processes on the NPT and CTBT in the years 1995 and 1996, and the 
Indian decision to openly go nuclear in 1998. Next, the fact that the strategic elite almost 
exclusively focused on the implications of the nuclear non-proliferation regimes for India’s 
international standing, while the regimes were a priori considered detrimental to India’s 
security without any evidence validates the core assumption of the model defining status 
seeking as a national interest in its own right, which does exist independently from other 
national interests such as security.  
These findings lead to the following syllogism: 
• A causality exists between the focus of the nuclear discourse on the international 
non-proliferation regime, and India’s nuclear breakthrough. 
• A causality exists between the dominance of status seeking over security within the 
national interest composition, and the focus of the nuclear discourse on the 
international non-proliferation regime. 
• Therefore, India’s nuclear breakthrough was caused mainly by status 
considerations, and less by security considerations. 
 
                                                 
738 Sethi, Manpreet: “Running with the bomb”. In: The Indian Express, March 4th 2003. 
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Explaining India’s Decision to ‘Go Nuclear’ 
 
By dropping the conventionally made assumption that security considerations alone matter 
in strategic policy making, and instead include a variety of further national interests, this 
study is able to present a comprehensive explanation to the rationale behind India’s nuclear 
policy making. The study has shown that certain socially constructed normative values 
attributed to nuclear weapons made them particularly attractive for India’s struggle for 
international recognition. The quest for international status is the decisive factor in the 
national interest composition that determines India’s nuclear course. 
 
 
Elite Perception and the Peculiarities of India’s Strategic Policy Making 
 
Elite opinion and status thinking 
The value attached to nuclear weapons in the country's quest for status was defined by a 
relatively small section of India’s elite, referred to as the ‘strategic elite’. This group of 
strategists, which was able to monopolise the strategic discourse on nuclear weapons, 
exercised administrative power through their direct advising of organisational position-
holders as well as through communicative power – shaping public opinion and generating 
public pressures on the government.  
 
Their overriding influence benefited from three major structural features of the framework 
in which the nuclear discourse was embedded. First, throughout most of India’s nuclear 
course, clear institutional policy-making structures were missing, allowing the strategists to 
influence the country’s nuclear course through personal relationships and informal 
networking. Several reforms between 1998 and 2003 gradually lifted the institutional 
shortcomings in the realm of strategic policy making, but were not yet fully able to change 
the predilection of India’s policy elite for impulsive, ad hoc strategic decision-making.  
 
A second, strongly interrelated feature of India’s nuclear policy making structures was the 
lack of clear political directives. which became particularly apparent during the crucial 
years of India’s nuclear programme in the 1990s, in which formal nuclear decisions were 
continuously made post hoc only after the nuclear scientists and the strategic elite had 
created facts that limited the decision-makers’ room to manoeuvre.  
 
The third feature setting the framework of India’s nuclear policy making was the role of 
public opinion. India’s public generally proved to be rather preoccupied with domestic 
affairs and was largely disinterested in the nuclear issue. According to a post-poll survey 
conducted by the Delhi based Centre for the Study of Developing Societies in 1999, one 
year after the nuclear tests, 53.5 percent of India’s electorate had never heard of the nuclear 
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tests. Moreover, 35.6 percent of the respondents had never heard of China, India’s main 
nuclear rival and only 13.1 percent viewed Indo-Chinese relations negatively.  Despite its 
disinterest in international affairs, India’s public proved to be highly sensitive to issues that 
stimulated sentiments of national pride or national status. The role these public sentiments 
played in India’s nuclear discourse largely accounts for the strong emotionalisation of the 
debate in the mid-1990s, particularly with regard to issues related to the international non-
proliferation regime.  
739
However, this emotionalised public opinion was highly volatile, as became apparent in the 
aftermath of the nuclear tests in both 1974 and 1998, in that it set off short-lived waves of 
patriotic enthusiasm.  These subsided as the public became preoccupied with the more 
tangible problems of everyday life.  
 
The central means by which the strategic elite exercised its communicative power was their 
extensive publishing in India’s print media, primarily in English-language dailies. The 
analysis of a random sample of 705 articles (expressing views on the nuclear issue by the 
strategic elite) in India’s five major newspapers proved to be effective in tracking down the 
trends and dynamics of India’s nuclear discourse.  The articles also served to highlight the 
causal relationship between the strategists’ discourse and both public opinion formation and 
formal nuclear decision-making. 
 
Who are the strategic elite? 
Within India’s strategic elite, three broad sections can be distinguished: a) strategists 
reflecting the views of the armed forces, mainly comprised of retired officers b) strategists 
reflecting the views of the nuclear scientific community and c) those strategists referred to 
as the ‘politico-strategists’ with political, administrative, academic, or journalist 
backgrounds.  
 
Until the late 1980s, the military-strategists’ position on nuclear weapons was diffident at 
best, reflecting the military’s comparably low appreciation of status thinking. As long as 
the nuclear programme was more concerned with showmanship than with the development 
of deployable weapons systems, India’s armed forces were rather disinterested in the 
matter. 
 
The implications of the Brasstacks Crisis of 1986 and 1987 on India’s strategic thought as 
well as the progress of India’s missile programme in the late 1980s gradually shifted the 
military’s attitude, and the need to acquire nuclear weapons for the country’s security 
became increasingly accepted. The leading figure of the military-strategists during the most 
decisive period for India’s nuclear course was K. Sundarji. The significance of Sundarji’s 
extensive publishing was twofold. First, it greatly enhanced the nuclear debate’s 
sophistication in terms of strategic expertise – a clear weakness in most previous nuclear 
accounts. Second, Sundarji’s involvement in political affairs during active duty broke the 
military’s self-imposed taboo of non-involvement and had a significant impact on the 
country’s civil-military relations in general. 
                                                 
739 National Election Survey 1999, conducted by the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, Delhi. 
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While comprising the most heterogeneous section of India’s strategic elite, the politico-
strategists’ views were nevertheless based on one major common paradigm: The 
understanding that India’s position in the world was underrated and that its elevation had to 
be one of the prime objectives of India’s foreign policy. Disagreement existed only with 
regard to the means India should apply to achieve status gains, including what role nuclear 
weapons should play.  
 
India’s most important strategic think-tank, the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses 
(IDSA), took an intermediate position between the military-strategic and the politico-
strategic sections. The IDSA, and particularly K. Subrahmanyam, created the strategic 
debate in the late 1960s and early 1970s that has continued since to occupy the central 
position in the strategic elite’s nuclear discourse.  
For three decades, Subrahmanyam, who was arguably the single most influential expert on 
the issue, defined the mainstream position of India’s strategic elite on nuclear weapons, 
including the symbolic, often contradictory values for India’s status and prestige.  
 
In three decades after the civilian nuclear programme began in the 1940s, nuclear scientists 
were able to exercise a significant amount of administrative power that allowed them to 
shape India’s nuclear course with little political interference. Right from the beginning, the 
scientists saw themselves in a competition with their Western counterparts for ‘mastering 
the Atoms’. These motives account for their predilection for depicting their achievements 
as intrinsic parts of the nuclear programme.  
 
Until the late 1960s, scientists held a monopoly in public opinion leadership on the nuclear 
issue, enabling them to bind the nuclear competition with the normative values that 
determined India’s image of itself as a proud and powerful nation. Whereas the politico-
strategic section followed a heterogeneous, normative approach that implied values of 
equity and justice, the nuclear scientists’ position was intrinsically nationalistic in its vision 
of a morally and culturally superior India. In their understanding, India’s nuclear 
achievements should be aimed at displaying their country’s supremacy. 
 
The nuclear scientific section generally took the most uncompromising and determined 
position on India’s nuclear course. The scientists’ dominant role in shaping public opinion 
has gradually weakened since the 1970s. During the 1990s, scientists were clearly sidelined 
by the two other sections of India’s strategic elite and were eventually marginalised after 
1998. Their normative ideas regarding the role of nuclear technology nevertheless proved 
to be persistent and remained a common theme throughout the 1990s. The appeal of these 
ideas only abated in the period of nuclear consolidation.  
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Detaching Strategic Thought from Security 
 
Inadequacy of security oriented approaches 
Of the total sample of 705 published accounts on the nuclear issue740, less than one third of 
the authors identify security-seeking as the main motive behind India’s nuclear course, 
while the majority of the publications focus on either domestic factors or aspects relating to 
India’s international standing.  
 
In the central phases of India’s nuclear programme, the weight given to security further 
declined to about one sixth in the 1991 to 1996 period, and to only one tenth in the 1996 to 
1998 period. After India’s nuclear tests in 1998, the relative number of security-related 
articles gradually increased, accounting for more than half of the accounts on the nuclear 
issue addressed by 2003. In other words, while the causes of India’s nuclear build-up were 
not primarily driven by security considerations, its consequences were. 
 
This evidence suggests that security was not the dominating motive behind India’s nuclear 
armament behaviour. Consequently, neither security-oriented explanatory models, nor 
threat-oriented explanatory models appear adequate. Instead of balancing power, or even 
threats, states pursue their national interests in the international system with broadly 
defined ‘national interests’. 
 
As the structural condition of the international system, the relative power distribution is 
permissive but is not imperative to India’s nuclear arming behaviour. That is to say that 
India did not acquire nuclear weapons because it considered them necessary to improve its 
security, but acquired them to satisfy other interests under the premise that they would not 
harm its security.  
 
By considering security as a permissive, rather than imperative motive of state behaviour, 
this model departs from conventional explanatory concepts. Ever since Baruch de Spinoza 
introduced self-preservation as the determining motive of (individual and collective) human 
behaviour in his general social model741, its pre-eminence over further motives became 
accepted by most theorists in the fields of sociology and political science. The idea of self-
preservation (or security, for that matter) as the overriding motive was most radically 
maintained in the field of International Relations. However, Spinoza himself was already 
aware of its inadequacy to exclusively explain individual behaviour within society or state 
behaviour in the international arena. Next to self-preservation, he added the strive for 
perfection as a motive inherent to individual and collective human behaviour. Furthermore, 
impulsive decision making caused by ‘affective imbalance’ might prevent men from 
pursuing these two objectives effectively. Analogous to Spinoza’s concept of ‘striving for 
perfection’, this study introduced the quest for status as the second dominating motive of 
                                                 
740 on the probability of the population parameter according to the law of large numbers, see Appendix A. 
741 Baruch de Spinoza: Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata (1677). 
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state behaviour, next to security. Instead of referring to ‘affective imbalances’, it added 
psychological biases as intervening variables to the model. 
 
The impact of nuclear weapons on India’s relative power equation with its main strategic 
rivals, Pakistan and China, was ambiguous. With regard to China, the strategic conditions 
for India’s nuclear rationale were set in the 1960s. China emerged as a major threat to India 
after the 1962 war. In 1964, China’s first nuclear weapons test provided the strategic 
compulsion for India to build-up its own nuclear arsenal.  
 
While the strategic incentives for India’s nuclear build-up in the 1960s were unmistakable, 
India’s actual course circumvented them in several ways. First of all, when India declared 
itself a nuclear weapons state in 1998, it had no delivery systems that could threaten 
China’s power centres. The existence of such delivery vehicles, however, was necessary to 
establish a credible deterrent against China. India’s nuclear declaration was thus 
counterproductive, as it increased deterrence instability between the countries. Furthermore, 
China’s cautious conventional arming behaviour along its border with India, as well as the 
political process of reconciliation initiated in 1988, had significantly reduced the 
immediacy of the Chinese threat in India’s strategic calculus. 
 
In its strategic relationship with Pakistan, the equalising effects of both countries’ 
nuclearisation reduced India’s superiority in terms of its conventional power capabilities. 
The introduction of nuclear weapons enabled Pakistan to threaten India’s heartland for the 
first time. The prospect of a nuclear-armed Pakistan, frequently named as one major 
incentive for India’s nuclear proliferation during the 1980s, neglects the fact that it was 
India that initiated and continuously pushed for the nuclearisation of South Asia. This 
rationale would have recommended India’s acceptance of Pakistan’s offer to establish a 
Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in South Asia, which it did not. 
 
In sum, the introduction of nuclear weapons reduced but did not reverse India’s superiority 
vis-à-vis Pakistan. With regard to China, nuclear weapons harmed India’s strategic position 
in the short-term but could improve if it develops long-range ballistic missiles and second-
strike capabilities.  
 
If security considerations alone had determined India’s nuclear course, it would have 
followed one of three possible approaches (ranked according to their benefits for India’s 
security): 
a) India would have foregone nuclear weapons, fostered its conventional capabilities along 
its northern and western borders, engaged in alliance building, and negotiated security 
guarantee agreements with the nuclear weapons states. 
b) India would have conducted a nuclear test as soon as possible after the Chinese test of 
1964 and subsequently developed appropriate delivery vehicles. 
c) India would have developed long-range ballistic missiles and second strike capabilities 
first, only afterwards declaring itself a nuclear weapons state. 
The strong deviation of India’s nuclear course from these suggested patterns can be 
explained by the existence of other national interests and the limited relevance of security 
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considerations as permissive, rather than imperative determinants of India’s strategic 
policy. 
 
Theory and ideology 
Despite the deviation of the nuclear course from security-centred approaches, the simplistic 
mainstream explanatory approaches, equating power-seeking with security-seeking, were 
nevertheless popular among the defenders of India’s nuclear policy among the elite.  
 
The popularity of these approaches can be explained by their dual function in explaining 
and legitimising a state’s foreign policy. In other words, more than in explanatory power, 
security-centric approaches themselves become instruments of political power to those 
who, in Pierre Bourdieu’s words, have the power to impose the principles of the 
construction of reality. India’s nuclear build-up epitomised this ambiguity. The epistemic 
community’s use of systemic approaches to legitimise India’s arming behaviour is best seen 
in its estimation of Chinese missile capabilities. That China can target India with nuclear-
capable long range and intercontinental ballistic missiles is beyond doubt – the strategists 
considered this alone compelling enough to call for India’s nuclearisation. Their security-
centric argument, demanding India’s preparedness for any imaginable threat scenario, was 
very much in line with the systemic approaches based on the Balance-of-Power theory. For 
the same reasons, China’s declaration that it would not threaten non-nuclear weapons states 
with its arsenal was rejected as a paper tiger.  
 
This approach prevented any more nuanced assessments of the Chinese nuclear threat, as it 
neglected several contradicting factors. First of all, deploying intercontinental ballistic 
missiles to medium rage targets in India, despite being technically possible, would be 
strategic folly for two reasons: the excessive costs and weakening of its deterrence 
credibility towards the USA (considering its limited arsenal of ICBMs in the 1990s). China 
had abstained from developing nuclear capable medium-range ballistic missiles in Tibet in 
order to circumvent proliferation pressures on India. Furthermore, the systemic approaches 
were not able to appreciate the political dimension of China’s no-first-use declaration. Any 
violation of this principle would entail far more damage within the international community 
than whatever was gained through a nuclear threat or ‘nuclear blackmail’ (an expression 
frequently applied by India’s strategic elite), especially considering the states’ few 
conflicting interests. By declaring itself a nuclear weapons state in 1998, India lost the 
relative protection provided by its non-nuclear status while inadequately replacing this loss 
with a credible nuclear deterrent.  
 
 
Nuclear Weapons and India’s International Status 
 
Status-seeking as national interest 
In the 1990s, nuclear weapons’ ambiguous contribution to India’s regional security 
environment took a back seat to the global aspects of India's nuclear course, namely the 
role of nuclear weapons for India's international standing, Indo-US nuclear relations, and 
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India's position on the international non-proliferation regime. The USA was not perceived 
as a nuclear threat to India's security, but as a threat, via its non-proliferation policy, to 
India's aspirations. Similarly, India's strategic elite largely abstained from assessing the 
international non-proliferation regime in the context of Indian security (which surely would 
have caused India to sign both the NPT and the CTBT), instead favouring to stress how the 
regime provided superior status to five powers.  
The share of status-related accounts in all nuclear reporting increased from about 20% 
before 1986 to more than 70% in the period from 1991 to 1998, declining thereafter to 35% 
during the nuclear consolidation and to about 20% after 2003.  
 
In India's nuclear policy formulation, status-seeking became a basic national interest in its 
own right. In contrast to security-seeking, which generally aims at increasing the state’s 
(relative) substance of power, status-seeking aims above all at increasing the state’s 
reputation of power by means of displaying it (referred to as ‘policy of prestige’ by Hans 
Morgenthau).  
 
The nature of the international status competition raises questions about which normative 
values actually constitute ‘status’ and who defines them. Conversely, the more tangible 
conceptualisation offered by the conventional balance-of-power system differs significantly 
with its measurable, substantive military power capabilities. The perception of the status 
competition was also prone to the psychological biases underlying its normative 
construction. 
 
Though they often contradicted each other, numerous socially constructed values were 
allocated to the policy of prestige and status-seeking. For example, the ‘equity’ norm, 
according to which the distinction between ‘nuclear haves’ and ‘nuclear have-nots’ has to 
be lifted, contradicted the ‘nationalist’ norm, by which India has to join the upper ranks of 
the major powers in the ‘nuclear club’ and close the door behind it to enjoy its exclusive 
status. Despite these contradictions, all normative values had one thing in common: their 
inherent acceptance of nuclear weapons as the currency in which the international status of 
states was measured. 
 
Status competition and the nuclear order  
In their quest for improved status, India’s strategic elite identified those countries as India’s 
main competitors that held the status India was aspiring to – the members of the ‘nuclear 
club’. 
The status competition, as perceived by India’s strategic elite, is illustrated in Chart 13.1.. It 
shows the degree of status attributed to the various states from left (low status) to right 
(high status). By acquiring nuclear weapons and refusing to sign the NPT as non-nuclear 
weapons state, India was thought to have outstripped all those countries which accepted 
their inferior position as ‘nuclear have-nots’ in status terms. However, as long as it is not 
formally accepted as a nuclear weapons state, it is perceived to be confined to an inferior 
status as compared to the five officially recognised nuclear weapons states.  
While being formally defined as those five states officially recognised by the Nuclear Non-
proliferation Treaty, the term ‘nuclear club’ was often used somewhat metaphorically by 
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India’s strategists. While Russia was usually seen positively and exempted from all the 
alleged negative attributes of the ‘nuclear club’ – its discrimination, colonialism and, more 
generally, its immorality – France did not play any role at all. As Great Britain was largely 
perceived as satellite of the USA, it was America that epitomised the supreme status holder 
and main suppressor of Indian aspirations. This role helps explain the tremendous attention 
US American nuclear policy received among India’s strategic elite during the 1990s. While 
being a formal member of the ‘nuclear club’, China’s position was carefully distinguished 
from the others. In the nuanced rhetoric of India’s strategic elite, China was thought to have 
adopted a somewhat passive membership: Though admitted by the creators of the club, it 
was unable to make decisions over new memberships or changes in the rules. The 
strategists’ frequent use of the term ‘the West’ – more of a metaphoric than a geographic 
specification – aimed at denoting the states that heralded the discriminatory order. 
 
Chart 13.1.: Nuclear Status Distribution in the Perception of India’s Strategic Elite 
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Within India’s nuclear calculus, Pakistan and China were perceived as threats to its security 
as well as being factors in the international status competition. In India's efforts to improve 
its status through the acquisition of nuclear weapons, Pakistan played a rather ambiguous 
role. After that of China, the Pakistani threat was considered the major security factor 
behind India’s nuclear build-up. Particularly after the Brasstacks Crisis in the late 1980s, 
the fears of a nuclearised Western neighbour gave a major impetus to India’s nuclearisation 
efforts. However, during the mid-1990s, when the nuclear issue was most intensely debated 
regarding its role in Indian status, Pakistan largely disappeared from the radar of India’s 
strategic elite. Pakistan’s acquisition of nuclear capabilities was largely written off, as 
would (probably) fail to elevate Pakistan to a higher rank in the international status 
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competition, as it would in India’s case. Pakistan was instead considered the major obstacle 
for India’s rise beyond the South Asian region.  
 
Pakistan emerged as the test case for India’s strategic elite to incorporate national interests, 
security-seeking as well as status-seeking, into a single explanatory concept for India’s 
nuclear course. The pitfall of the Pakistan argument was its contradictory assumption that 
though Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities were advanced enough to pose a severe threat to 
India’s nuclear security, they were not enough to qualify for nuclear status. The inferior 
status of Pakistan’s nuclear programme was, according to this rationale, due to its imported 
nature (in contrast to India’s indigenously built nuclear arsenal). Throughout its accounts of 
Pakistan’s nuclear programme, the country’s massive foreign aid, both financial and 
technological, has always held a key position. While charges of Chinese assistance and the 
illegal acquisition of nuclear expertise from Western countries, both of which had factual 
evidence in their support, were commonly raised after the Brasstacks crisis, speculations of 
a ‘Western’ master plan to subdue India through secret nuclear technology transfers to 
Pakistan gained some followers during the escalating nuclear debate in the mid-1990s. 
Furthermore, the idea of an ‘Islamic bomb’, developed with the financial assistance of Arab 
countries, also recurred throughout the 1980s and 1990s.  
While some strategists, like K. Subrahmanyam, devoted a substantial number of articles to 
the Pakistan rationale, most members of India’s strategic elite in the 1990s were rather 
indifferent to Pakistan’s nuclear status. 
 
The trade-off between status-seeking and security-seeking in India’s nuclear policy making 
became even more obvious when one considers China’s role. On the one side, the Chinese 
nuclear threat was perceived by many strategists as the only strategic incentive that could 
credibly legitimise India’s nuclearisation. While the China issue was only rarely addressed 
by India’s strategic elite, these accounts nevertheless came out in favour of the bomb for all 
nuclear-related issues. In other words, among those few strategists who concerned 
themselves with the Chinese threat, a large scale consensus existed that India should 
counter with its own nuclear arsenal.  
 
One general inconsistency in these accounts was the authors’ suggestion that India should 
respond to the Chinese threat by ‘going nuclear’, i.e. declaring itself a nuclear weapons 
state. The mere symbolism of this act, without the prior development of the delivery 
systems necessary to create a credible nuclear deterrence, would have been 
disadvantageous for India’s security vis-à-vis China. Implicit in these suggestions was the 
perception of China as India’s main competitor for status, which as member of the ‘nuclear 
club’ and as veto power in the UN Security Council, had already achieved the international 
standing to which India aspired. The success with which China had used its nuclear 
capabilities since the mid-1960s proved to be a compelling incentive for India’s nuclear 
programme. Furthermore, Chinese foreign policy, while being increasingly accommodative 
towards India’s security needs since the late 1980s, carefully distinguished between the two 
countries’ international status, leaving little doubt about Chinese superiority. This attitude 
helps to account for the persistently negative image of China among India’s strategic elite 
despite substantial improvements in the countries’ security and economic ties.  
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Two events are illustrative of how the elite perceived China. After the nuclear test of 1974, 
India’s strategists emphatically supported the government’s official claim that the test had 
been a ‘peaceful nuclear explosion’. While many international observers doubted this 
claim, the Chinese government officially accepted the peaceful nature of the test, and 
responded to it modestly. Other than might have been expected, India’s strategists did not 
appreciate China’s sensitivity towards India’s moral distinction between peaceful and 
military applications, but reacted largely negative by decrying Chinese arrogance. Different 
dynamics were in place after the nuclear tests of 1998. As in 1974, the immediate Chinese 
reaction was rather aloof. Only after the Indian government had named the Chinese threat 
as the main incentive for its nuclear testing did the Chinese government react sharply. Its 
main criticism, however, was not the nuclear tests as such, but the declaratory policy of the 
Indian government in its aftermath. Although the undiplomatic rhetoric of the Indian 
government might have damaged its security interests, a majority of Indian commentators 
expressed satisfaction about China’s reactions: China finally took India seriously.  
 
The events of 1974 and 1998 indicate that security considerations may have been seen as 
the permissive frame in which Indo-Chinese interaction took place. The interaction as such, 
however, appeared to have been largely guided by the elite perception of China as a 
competitor in India’s quest for international status. 
 
 
Nuclear Weapons and India’s Image of itself 
 
The dual norms of India’s image of itself: Between moral exceptionalism and military 
prowess 
Within India’s nuclear discourse, the normative values that posit nuclear weapons as the 
underlying currency of the (socially constructed) definition of international status are 
complex, and often discourage a clear and direct course towards nuclearisation. Due to this 
complexity, the relationship between nuclear weapons and international status is not 
monocausal (the more nuclear weapons, the higher the international status). For example, 
the value placed in indigenous development frequently delayed India’s nuclear course, yet 
was nevertheless considered essential in status terms.  
 
The most decisive factor in India’s nuclear course was the friction between the two main 
normative values inherent in the status thinking of India’s elite. The first norm, deeply 
rooted in India’s independence struggle and closely connected to Mahatma Gandhi and 
Jawaharlal Nehru, was India’s quest for social recognition as a morally superior 
international actor, an example of ‘moral exceptionalism’. Nehru’s definition of this 
concept involved the negation of power as a means of foreign policy despite the fact that it 
thus contradicted the second major normative value attributed to nuclear weapons: the quest 
for social recognition as a military power. Since the initiation of India’s nuclear 
programme, these two norms set the parameters of the corresponding debate by the 
strategic elite. In an attempt to accommodate the contradictions, the strategic elite 
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developed the concept of the ‘nuclear option’. This term was, however, technically 
meaningless, as ‘to develop the nuclear option’ implied the development of nuclear 
capabilities. But with regard to the two underlying norms, it was essential. Even after the 
emergence, in the mid-1990s, of a broad consensus among India’s strategic elite for the 
unveiling of the nuclear programme, many strategists still preferred ‘the nuclear option’ to 
claiming the status of a nuclear weapons power openly.  
 
The definition the ‘nuclear option’ became popular among the strategists in the 1970s; it 
denoted the technical ability to convert the civilian nuclear programme into a military 
programme should India’s hand be forced by external pressures. Until the late 1980s, the 
programme’s peaceful nature was emphatically defended despite the fact that it had already 
produced rudimentary nuclear devices. About the late 1980s and early 1990s, the nuclear 
option theme was modified to the new international conditions. The degree of confusion 
among the strategists during this period of transition can be seen in the confusion of K. 
Subrahmanyam’s accounts – he simultaneously emphasised India’s moral exceptionalism 
with regard to its nuclear self-restraint and, at the same time, praised the sophistication of 
India’s nuclear weapons capabilities. Ostensibly for status reasons, he even claims that the 
plutonium cores, which India could mount on its advanced missiles, were part of India’s 
‘civilian nuclear programme’.  
 
Subsequently, the ‘option’ concept no longer denoted the question of whether India should 
be ‘keeping the nuclear option open’, but whether India should exercise it. The choice was 
no longer between ‘peaceful’ and ‘military’, but between ‘military in principle’ and 
‘weaponised’. Throughout the 1990s, the semantic distinction was further marginalised. In 
the period from 1996 to May 1998, many among the strategic elite derived India’s moral 
superiority from the mere fact that, while having acquired nuclear weapons capabilities, 
India had so far restrained itself from openly declaring them.  
 
Strong evidence suggests that, at least since the early 1990s, the nuclear option concept had 
already been reduced to a rhetorical device, as from that time on it had not presented 
political decision makers with a real choice (if it ever had). Since then, most strategists 
ceased to discuss the pros and cons of nuclear weapons. Instead, their analyses applied the 
scholastic method: While the need for India to acquire nuclear weapons was determined a 
priori as a fixed outcome of the analysis, the task was to develop rigorous lines of 
reasoning. The general outlook of the nuclear discourse was no longer characterised by the 
clashing of advocates and critics, but by the competition between bomb advocates for the 
most conclusive line of argument in favour of India’s nuclearisation. The dynamics arising 
from these changing patterns significantly contributed to the increasingly emotionalised and 
biased nuclear discourse in the mid-1990s. 
In the semantics of its strategic elite, India ‘exercised its nuclear option’ in May of 1998.  
 
India’s perceived victimisation 
One further effect of India’s moral exceptionalism was the strong tendency by India’s elite 
to perceive themselves as victims. This sensitivity explains the charges of discrimination 
that dominated India’s discourse on the international non-proliferation regime and its 
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relations to Western countries. Until the present day, this strong sense of victimisation has 
prevented India’s strategic elite, with very few exceptions, from discerning any pro-active 
role India might have played in the development of its nuclear arsenal. This perception was 
closely interrelated with the concept of the ‘nuclear option’, according to which India 
would -- in J. N. Dixit’s words -- ‘acquire nuclear weapons if unavoidable circumstances’ 
forced it to, being Western discrimination, Chinese blackmail, or Pakistani aggression.  
 
The equity norm as a socialist variant of status-seeking 
One further normative value, which determined elite perception of the international nuclear 
competition, was the idea of equity. Similar to the idea of moral exceptionalism, the 
importance of this idea in the Indian context originated from the struggle for independence 
and was deeply rooted in India’s post-colonial, multi-ethnic society. The equity norm was 
the cornerstone of Nehru’s foreign policy and its main source of legitimisation.  
 
The reason why the idea of equity played a particularly prominent role in the nuclear realm 
was the explicitness of the nuclear order’s inequality as laid down in the Nuclear Non-
proliferation Treaty of 1968. Furthermore, the vigour with which the United States of 
America – until then perceived by India’s elite as the main promoter of global democratic 
and equity values – pushed the treaty through caused severe consternation. Since then, 
virtually every account on the international nuclear order published by India’s strategic elite 
took note of the discriminatory character of this order, which divided the world into 5 
‘nuclear haves’ and 140 odd ‘nuclear have-nots’. In this context, the term ‘nuclear club’ 
was most frequently used to denote the exclusivity of those states that owned nuclear 
weapons. To use the resemblance to British social clubs, the more exclusive the admission 
was, the more appealing it became for outsiders to seek membership as well as to express 
their indignation should admission be turned down. The metaphorical reference to an 
‘exclusive club’ was particularly appealing in the Indian context, as the existence of British 
clubs in pre-independence India, in which admission was restricted to white people, had 
become symbols of the Indian nation’s humiliation under colonial rule. The parallel 
between India’s struggle, beginning in 1968, against the nuclear order and India’s struggle 
for freedom prior to 1947 was a recurring theme in commentary during the Geneva 
negotiations in the mid-1990s. 
The only way to overcome this ‘global regime of nuclear apartheid’ was to force the 
nuclear weapons states to abolish, or at least significantly reduce their arsenals. The call for 
total nuclear disarmament became a recurring demand of India in the international fora. 
 
Since the 1970s, India’s struggle for an equity-based international nuclear order has come 
under increased scrutiny. In 1971, Indira Gandhi explicitly defined the South Asian 
strategic set-up in unequal terms by claiming a superior position for India. Perhaps as a 
result, most Third World countries did not, as expected, welcome India’s nuclear test in 
1974 as they had with the Chinese tests in 1964, but reacted with indifference or even 
criticism. This weakened India’s image of itself as the spearhead of the Third World. 
Despite this setback, many strategists maintained the idea that India developed its nuclear 
capabilities in the name of all ‘nuclear have-nots’.  
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In the early 1980s, due to both sharp increases in the arsenals of the five nuclear weapons 
states and their continued use of nuclear weapons as leverage in the international arena, 
many among India’s strategic elite came to the conclusion that India had to acquire nuclear 
capabilities in order to force them to take global nuclear disarmament seriously. This logic 
was little understood internationally.  
Instead, it showed how fuzzy the idea of equity was in the context of India’s nuclear build-
up: Does a nuclear system with 5 ‘nuclear haves’ and 140 odd ‘nuclear have-nots’ become 
any less discriminatory if the number of ‘nuclear haves’ is increased to 6? In the 1990s, this 
question was increasingly raised by strategists like Pran Chopra and Ashok Kapur.  
 
Though still frequently raised by the proponents of India’s nuclear weapons build-up, the 
call for total nuclear disarmament largely degenerated to an empty phrase that was only 
applied as a strategy to legitimise India’s quest for the bomb. After the nuclear tests in May 
1998, the idea of equity gradually reversed, with more and more strategists suggesting that 
India’s main objective should be to keep the door of the nuclear club closed.  
 
The “Lonely Moralist” 
In late 1985, Pakistan launched an initiative in the UN General Assembly to create a 
Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in South Asia. This initiative was mostly welcomed, with a 
majority of UN member states voting in its favour and the rest abstaining. India and Bhutan 
emerged as its lone opponents. This isolation on the international scene, particularly among 
Third World countries, had a deep impact on India’s nuclear discourse. The idea of equity 
had triggered a momentum within the domestic debate, in which India was perceived as the 
spearhead of the Third World, and had developed its ‘nuclear option’ in the name of all 
‘nuclear have-nots’. The voting behaviour of the international community in late 1985 
confronted the strategic elite with a different reality. While India’s isolation concerned 
some strategists, a majority defiantly maintained this view and created the myth of India as 
the ‘lonely moralist’ that stood firm against the pressure from the ‘nuclear haves’.  
 
In a move to regain its reputation as an advocate for global nuclear disarmament, India 
supported joint initiatives to establish global treaties on a comprehensive test ban and on 
the fissile material cut-off in 1993.  
The test ban initiative was surprisingly successful, with a large majority on states, including 
the USA, supporting it. India’s strategic elite, however, withdrew its support in 1994/95 
and forced the Indian government to oppose its implementation. While the reversal of their 
position was also justified by changing technical prerequisites, nuclear critics like Achin 
Vanaik suggested that it had more to do with the bomb advocates’ underestimation of the 
treaty’s chances of success. While both explanations have evidence in their support, they 
fail to explain the subsequent dynamics of India’s nuclear debate comprehensively. The 
materialising agreement was fiercely condemned in a substantive number of exceedingly 
emotional accounts that firmed India’s resolve to declare itself a nuclear weapons state. The 
debate that escalated from 1995 to 1996 detached itself from the real events at Geneva and 
resists explanation through either technical aspects or the clash of divergent normative 
values attached to the nuclear issue. Essential to the debate are the psychological momenta 
within India’s idiosyncratic, inward looking discourse.  
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Several unfavourable factors contributed to the escalation of the debate. The first was the 
very short interval between the two negotiation processes in Geneva: One on the indefinite 
extension of the NPT, concluded in mid-1995, and the other on the Comprehensive Test 
Ban Treaty, concluded in mid-1996. While India’s strategic elite rejected the NPT outright 
as discriminatory, many of the commentators were unable to make a distinction between 
the two treaties and rejected the CTBT on similar grounds. This was ironic considering the 
fact that India had originally supported the CTBT initiative in 1993 by virtue of its non-
discriminatory character. Another factor was related to the governmental instability in India 
during the mid-1990s that lent the nuclear debate renewed attractiveness as a political tool. 
For the fragile government, the (rather destructive) ‘No’ to any tentative agreement in the 
international arena was the best option to avoid the exploitation of the nuclear issue by 
domestic political rivals.  
 
Yet another unfavourable factor was the emergence of a negative feedback process between 
India’s strategic elite and the international audience. The increasingly acrimonious debate 
in India heightened international fears about nuclearisation in South Asia, which in turn, 
increased the bitterness of the Indian debate.  
 
Finally, the debate on the international non-proliferation regime coincided with the US 
American non-proliferation initiative, further heightening elite perception of international 
pressures against India and adding a sense of urgency to go nuclear.  
While India’s moral exceptionalism was the central thread in the heated debate over the 
international non-proliferation regime, the other major normative value of the nuclear issue 
– India’s quest for status through military might – was equally pervasive. In the 
interpretation most prominently advocated by K. Subrahmanyam, the official acceptance of 
the non-nuclear status by most states automatically elevated India to a status superior to 
them. India’s negotiation strategy of categorical opposition was, in Subrahmanyam’s view, 
quite successful in serving both normative values and the non-nuclear weapons states’ 
accession to the NPT was perceived as self-defeating policy. In the period between 1996 
and 1998, Subrahmanyam developed a 3-rank model of international status distribution, 
with the non-nuclear weapons states in the lowest rank, the official nuclear weapons states 
in the highest rank, and India, as an ‘undeclared nuclear weapons power’, somewhere in 
between. Pakistan failed to make an appearance. After the nuclear tests, this concept had to 
be modified only marginally, with India as ‘unofficial’ nuclear weapons power.  
 
The Nationalist – Joining the Nuclear Club and closing the door 
Right from the beginning of India’s nuclear programme, the scientists involved perceived 
their work as part of a competition with Western countries for scientific excellence. The 
main quality of the work was thereby thought to be its indigenous nature, which explained 
the strong emphasis of the scientists on self-reliance. The idea of equity played no role in 
this perceived competition. Correspondingly, the scientists’ rejection of the international 
non-proliferation regime was not guided by normative principles of equity. Instead, they 
considered the unequal NPT provisions as acceptable in principle on the condition that 
India would be member of the ‘nuclear club’. 
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Immediately after the nuclear tests of May 1998, the pragmatists among India’s strategic 
elite, like C. Raja Mohan, adopted the scientists approach to the international nuclear order, 
and started to appreciate the benefits of the existing international nuclear regime for India’s 
status. In the pragmatists’ view, India’s (self-) declaration as nuclear weapons state 
‘completed the architecture of the nuclear order’, which therefore became acceptable to 
India.  
 
Subsequently, an increasing part of the strategists considered the preservation of this order 
as one of the most important objectives of India’s nuclear policy. This created the paradox 
situation that India supported the international non-proliferation treaties without being their 
member. A tentative accession to both treaties, NPT and CTBT, was based on the 
precondition of India’s official acceptance as nuclear weapons state. 
 
Implicit to this pragmatic appreciation of the nuclear order after the tests was the general 
understanding of India’s elite that India had a natural right to the superior status associated 
with the possession of nuclear weapons due to its mere size, its cultural heritage and its 
democratic achievements (the latter being of particular relevance as distinguishing feature 
to China and Pakistan). This intrinsically nationalistic approach was inherent to India’s 
nuclear debate since the beginning, but remained largely hidden behind the morally defined 
normative values attributed to the nuclear issue prior to 1998.  
 
The reorientation of India’s debate on the security aspects of the nuclear issue in the period 
of consolidation increased the strategists’ understanding that it should be India’s prime 
objective to prevent non-nuclear weapons states from acquiring the bomb. 
 
 
Psychological Bias in India’s Strategic Discourse 
 
The study has pointed out the complexity of the interrelated, socially constructed normative 
values that define the compound of national interests that determined India’s nuclear policy 
and its quest for international status. However, the policies often lead to a suboptimal 
pursuit of India’s national interests through the violation of its underlying norms. This 
performance goes back to a persistent misperception of the nature and motives of relevant 
actors in the international arena. 
 
Inward looking debate 
Seeking international status through the acquisition of nuclear weapons is by no means a 
strategy confined to India. However, several of the normative values attached to this 
strategy, particularly within the realm of morality, were deeply rooted in India’s post-
colonial, multi-ethnic society. As such, the social construction of these norms was 
genuinely Indian. The unique significance of these values for the nuclear discourse caused a 
deviation from the dynamics of the international debate. It is therefore important to 
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supplement the analysis of the Indian strategic elite with those aspects of the international 
debate absent from the Indian context. 
 
When the ‘Atoms for Peace’ programme was launched by Dwight D. Eisenhower in the 
1950s, a global consensus existed that nuclear technology had the potential for solving 
many global problems, above all growing energy demand. In the 1960s, the enthusiasm for 
nuclear technology gradually abated and its supposed benefits became increasingly 
controversial. In India, the nuclear scientists successfully prevented the public debate from 
becoming more critical, despite the fact that the performance of its civilian nuclear energy 
production was poorer than in other countries. The impact India’s growing environmentalist 
movement had on the nuclear debate was marginal until 1998, when a more committed 
discussion emerged over the hazards of the nuclear industry. 
 
While the ‘Atoms for Peace’ programme at first promoted peaceful applications of nuclear 
explosions, the PNE issue was soon dropped from the international agenda, as the idea of 
using nuclear explosions for mining or canal digging proved to be impractical. 
Furthermore, it became increasing obvious that peaceful nuclear explosions were 
technically indistinguishable from those produced by warheads. As a result, India became 
the only nation to launch a PNE programme exclusively. Despite these developments, most 
of India’s strategic elite remained unaware of why the peacefulness of the 1974 test was 
questioned internationally.  
 
The case was similar in the nuclear weapons realm. Virtually all values attached to the 
nuclear weapons issue, with the exception of the nationalistic motive – that India had a 
natural right to possess nuclear weapons and the superior status thus afforded – should have 
motivated India’s strategic elite to ask themselves why other countries in similar strategic 
positions forewent the development of nuclear weapons. This debate, however, did not 
materialise. India’s strategist brushed aside the willingness of almost all official non-
nuclear weapons states to accept the unequal provisions of the NPT as a self-defeating 
policy. The resolution with which most countries backed the indefinite extension of the 
NPT in 1995 was backed by elite discourses in their respective domestic policy arenas. The 
positive dynamics of these debates remained unnoticed by the Indian elite. 
 
The nuclear debate in the other major states that abstained from signing the NPT extension, 
Israel and Pakistan, fundamentally differed from the Indian discourse. Israel’s strategists 
viewed the country’s nuclear arsenal as essential for its self-preservation in a genuinely 
hostile strategic environment. The status dimension of nuclear weapons was a non-issue in 
Israel’s low-profile public debate. While the main focus of Pakistan’s nuclear discourse 
remained tied to security aspects, the participating elite valued its contribution to the 
country’s status and prestige as well. In contrast to India, however, the status competition 
was not defined globally, but almost exclusively by its relationship to India. Overall, India 
emerged as the only country to reject the Geneva negotiations for status reasons. India’s 
strategic elite largely abstained from thoroughly assessing why international debate on the 
non-proliferation issue almost invariably turned out contrary to the Indian position. 
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The official statements by the Indian government to the Geneva negotiations reflected the 
strategists’ position by maintaining that India had no intentions to develop nuclear 
weapons, but was willing to pay any political and economic price to ‘keep its nuclear 
option open’. The underlying logic remained largely inscrutable to the international 
audience, illustrating the discrepancy between the international non-proliferation discourse 
and India’s isolated nuclear debate until 1998. 
 
The “Occidentalist” view and the “West” stereotype 
In the years from 1995 to 1998, the escalating nuclear debate became dominated by the 
elite’s desire to ‘teach the West a lesson’. This was perceived as an end in itself, and as 
such enough to justify India’s nuclear breakthrough. The often insensitive rhetoric used by 
the international non-proliferation movement, particularly US policy makers, to convey 
their demands to India aggravated Indian sensitivity to alleged colonialist attitudes. Anti-
colonialist reflexes alone, however, cannot comprehensively explain the escalation of the 
debate fifty years after India’s independence.  
Next to the aversion to alleged colonialist attitudes, the nuclear programme was also guided 
by a strong strive to emulate the West, expressed in the desire to ‘join the nuclear club’.  
 
The patterns which determined elite perception of ‘the West’ emerged from a cognitive bias 
that had produced a stereotyped world view in which Western interactions with India were 
not assessed as they were, but as India’s elite expected them to be. 
Oversimplification, intrinsic to any stereotype, moulded the perception of ‘the West’ as a 
monolithic bloc with the USA at the top. The diverging policies among Western states as 
well as the controversies within their polities remained largely unacknowledged. Within the 
boundaries of ‘moral exceptionalism’, ‘the West’ figured as abstract, demonic antagonist to 
India. This study has suggested the word ‘occidentalism’ to refer to the cognitive bias that 
effectively reverses the ‘orientalist’ charges frequently levelled against perceived Western 
discrimination. 
 
One pattern of the escalating nuclear debate in the mid-1990s was that its arguments were 
not addressed to other participants within India’s strategic community, but directed against 
an imagined Western antagonist. A majority of the accounts addressing the nuclear issue at 
the time took the form of a defence against alleged Western malice. The major reason for 
the marginalisation of criticism on India’s nuclear course between summer 1995 and May 
1998 was the explicit acceptance of the western stereotype by  nuclear critics, who 
themselves based their arguments on the moral divide between India and ‘the West’. 
 
‘The West’ was largely equated with the USA. This emphasis was due to the country’s 
status as the most powerful Western nation and the explicitness of American non-
proliferation rhetoric; thus, a credibility gap arose from the juxtaposition of the rhetoric and 
America’s reliance on the world’s biggest nuclear arsenal (not to mention the frequent 
inconsistency of American South Asian policy in the past). Next to these tangible factors, a 
strong emotional affinity existed in the relationship of India’s elite to America. In many 
ways, America’s image of itself as the leader of the free world resembled what India’s elite 
envisaged for their own country, the world’s largest democracy and leader of the 
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underprivileged world. The normative value of moral exceptionality and the corresponding 
sense of mission plays a prominent role in both countries’ political discourses. These 
underlying similarities explain the undercurrent of admiration in many commentaries on 
America’s nuclear policy. They further explain the high emotional value of these accounts, 
particularly when they address America’s perceived betrayal of moral values through 
ruthless power politics.  
 
The strictly anti-Western patterns of India’s nuclear debate in the mid-1990s had the 
paradoxical effect of causing the negative dependency of India’s nuclear course on Western 
non-proliferation policy, despite its official justification in the name of India’s sovereignty.  
 
The changing US foreign policy towards South Asia in the early years of the Clinton 
Administration, particularly the Strobe Talbott initiative, posed a major challenge to the 
elite’s perception of the international non-proliferation discourse. In many ways, the 
innovative approach of the initiative contradicted the traditional image of America’s self-
serving, neo-imperialist power politics. The short-term effect of this initiative, however, 
was the opposite of what the US government had hoped for, as it added a strong sense of 
urgency to go nuclear to the Indian nuclear debate. Its medium-term effect, on the other 
hand, was a general appreciation of America’s nuanced approach during India’s nuclear 
consolidation and opened up new windows of opportunity for American mediation on the 
Kashmir issue. In the unanimous view of India’s strategists, the fundamental precondition 
for American involvement was its (at least unofficial) recognition of India as a nuclear 
weapons power.  
 
This general trend to overcome the cognitive bias in India’s nuclear discourse was 
occasionally disrupted by anti-colonialist, or ‘occidentalist’ reflexes triggered by 
(perceived) insensitive Western behaviour.  One such case was the US Senate’s call to ‘cap, 
reduce and eliminate’ India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities. Another was the decision 
by many Western (and non-Western) governments to reduce their missions’ personnel in 
the course of growing tensions between India and Pakistan in 2002.  
 
Despite these sporadic resentments, the overall trend towards overcoming the strategic 
elite’s traditional us-against-them understanding of the international structure remained 
intact. This trend could be observed during the quarrel between the governments of the US 
and several European nations over the Iraq intervention in the spring of 2003. When the US 
government decided to ignore the objections of ‘old Europe’ and turned to new allies, 
America’s request to the Indian government for troop deployment was appreciated by 
India’s elite with great ease. Although the American request was eventually turned down, 
many commentators saw the US-European divide and the formation of new international 
alliances as an indication of the emergence of a new global order – one in which it was 
hoped that India would play a major role. Nuclear weapons were thus seen as India’s 
leverage to consolidate its enhanced status. 
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Outlook 
 
Once the hype that followed India’s self-declaration as nuclear weapons state eased up, the 
patterns of the nuclear debate among its strategic elite gradually began to change. Status-
seeking, the main national interest guiding India’s nuclear build-up prior to the tests, 
changed into efforts to consolidate the increased status. Several of the normative values 
attached to nuclear weapons that had previously defined India’s quest for status either 
ceased to exist, like the equity norm, or fundamentally changed in outlook, such as the idea 
of moral exceptionalism and the nationalist norm. The cognitive bias that had distorted elite 
perception of the international non-proliferation discourse and its major actors lost much of 
its intensity. In a further development security seeking, though marginalised from 1995 - 
1998, began to re-emerge along the changed strategic conditions of India’s regional 
environment. 
 
This overall trend in the Indian elite’s discourse on nuclear weapons, referred to as ‘nuclear 
consolidation’ in the present study, is likely to continue in the years to come barring an 
unforeseeable event, such as a major nuclear accident, that could abruptly change the 
socially constructed normative values attached to the nuclear issue in India’s elite and 
society at large. 
 
The nuclear rivalry between Brazil and Argentina in the 1980s, the only comparable case of 
an emerging regional nuclear build-up, might suggest that the system of values attached to 
the nuclear issue can change from within the society. In fact, the early termination of the 
South American nuclear competition was caused by the weapon’s shift in meaning from 
symbols of national pride to symbols of authoritarian abuse of power that occurred after the 
democratisation of both countries in the early to mid-1980s. This kind of fundamental shift 
is unlikely to occur in the Indian case. In contrast to Brazil and Argentina, the meaning of 
nuclear weapons as symbols of national pride and greatness was not imposed from above, 
but grew from within – a complex feedback process of opinion shaping that originated from 
the country’s political elite. 
 
The complexity of the underlying value system and its firm establishment in the strategic 
mind of India’s elite speaks against attempts to label India’s nuclear weapons programme 
as a ‘Hindu bomb’ (i.e. suggesting that the nuclear breakthrough was caused by the rise of 
the Hindu-nationalist BJP to power). The BJP’s playing of the nuclear card in its election 
campaigning in 1996 and 1998 did not create the nationalistic rationale behind India’s 
nuclear build-up, but rather instrumentalised such pre-existing normative values for 
partisan political ends. This instrumentalisation becomes particularly visible in the political 
motivations of the BJP’s leading figure, Atal Behari Vajpayee. In 1979, then-Foreign 
Minister Vajpayee categorically ruled out India’s future acquisition of nuclear weapons. 
Little more than a decade later, Vajpayee, now in the opposition, emerged as one of the 
most outspoken advocates of nuclearisation in Indian politics. His about-face was not 
caused by a reassessment of India’s strategic environment (the strategic incentives for India 
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to build-up nuclear weapons had actually decreased over time), but by a fundamental 
change of heart towards the bomb among India’s strategic elite and, consequentially, 
among India’s public at large, which made pro-bomb advocacy politically attractive.  
 
The prediction about the continued relevance of nuclear weapons for India’s image of itself 
and the relative stability of its underlying value system rests on the general insight in the 
peculiarities in which nuclear policy is made by the group of strategic elite in India’s 
democratic set-up. Basic institutional reforms within the realm of strategic policy making 
between 1998 and 2003 generally stabilised the process of nuclear policy making, and 
significantly increased its predictability as well as its underlying strategic expertise, but it 
did not curtail the overall dominant position of the strategic elite. Reason for this is the still 
existing monopoly over public opinion by the elite, which continues to be maintained 
through extensive publishing in India’s dailies.  
 
While the proneness of the nuclear issue to partisan considerations within India’s political 
party competition was reduced by the government's relative stability in the period of 
consolidation, in which the BJP-led coalition government was able to complete a full term 
in office from 1999 to 2004, the high sensitivity of India’s political leadership to public 
opinion, and as a result, the great deal of power wielded by those that control public 
opinion, remains a decisive structural feature of India’s strategic policy making. 
 
This proneness to public opinion will cause India’s policy makers to continue favouring the 
policy of prestige, i.e. to base strategic policy making on demonstrations of power, such as 
the development, and testing of advanced missiles. The policy of prestige’s demand for 
regular flashy demonstrations of power is likely to keep some momentum in the South 
Asian nuclear arms competition, making a complete stop of the regional arms race, which 
many of India’s strategic thinkers predict, unlikely to materialise. 
 
While neither stagnation, nor a reversal of the nuclear build-up appears to be a realistic 
scenario in the short to medium term future, an escalation of the nuclear arms race between 
India and Pakistan, or India and China, is also unlikely. The reason for this is the 
dichotomous character of the status attached to nuclear weapons: mere possession of 
nuclear weapons determines one’s place in the status competition – the number and quality 
of the nuclear arsenal is thereby only secondary. This perception significantly reduces the 
pressures on the Indian government to embark on a nuclear arms race defined in numbers 
of devices similar to the Cold War nuclear competition. 
 
Further, it limits the effectiveness of nuclear weapons as devices to increase India’s 
international status beyond the level it had reached by its self-declaration as a nuclear 
weapons state in May 1998. Apart from some public attention by sporadic missile testing, 
the nuclear issue appears to have been exhausted, and is unlikely to generate future waves 
of enthusiasm and patriotism similar to the hype of 1998.  
 
This raises the question about other areas in which India’s strategic elite could satisfy their 
ambitions in terms of international status and prestige. While the debate on the acquisition 
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of a Russian aircraft carrier in 2003 had some elements of the nuclear debate in the 1990s, 
it failed to generate a similarly passionate discussion among the elite, as it lacked much of 
the symbolic meaning of nuclear weapons.  
 
Much more promising with regard to status-seeking as an element of India’s national 
interest composition is its space programme. Similar to the nuclear programme, the 
scientists had launched India’s space programme without much attention by the political 
leadership and the public. And similarly to the first Chinese nuclear test in 1964, it was the 
launch of the first Chinese manned space flight in October 2003 that brought the issue into 
the focus of India’s elite.  
Chinese comments and media analyses on the launch of the Chinese space craft showed 
several remarkable parallels to the Indian media coverage of the nuclear tests in 1998.  
Similar to India ‘having joined the nuclear club’ in 1998, Chinese editorials in 2003 
enthusiastically claimed that China had “joined the international space club”742.  
While many other governments congratulated China for its achievements, the Indian 
government abstained from any official reaction. Instead, the scientists presented an 
ambitious space programme with the aim of bringing the first Indian citizen into the orbit 
by an indigenously built Indian space craft. Commentary by India’s opinion leaders on this 
programme indicated already the emergence of dynamics similar to the decade long nuclear 
discourse.  
 
                                                 
742 e.g. Zhang Qingwei: “Comments on China’s manned space-engineering achievements and prospects of the 
industry“. In: People’s Daily, October 15th 2003. 
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Appendix A: Note on Methodology 
 
 
Sample Units 
 
Nuclear-related opinion articles published in India’s major daily newspapers by individual 
members of India’s strategic elite were the sample units for the quantitative, as well as 
interpretive analysis. 
The random sample of 705 articles was drawn from the following 5 English written 
newspapers: 
The Hindu: print edition (until 1999, published in Chennai); online edition (since 1999). 
The Hindustan Times: print edition (until 1999, published in Delhi); online edition (since 
1999). 
The Indian Express: print edition (until 1999; published in Mumbay); online edition 
(since 1999). 
The Statesman: print edition (published in Kolkata) 
The Times of India: print edition (until 1999, published in Delhi); online edition (since 
1999). 
The large size of the probability sample is representative for the universe, allowing for 
basic methods of quantitative analysis (the interpretive analysis is based on purposive, 
cross-sectional selection). 
 
 
Construction of Variables 
 
The 705 collected articles are classified according to the main issues addressed within the 
larger field of India’s nuclear path. Eleven major issues are thereby identified which 
comprise the eleven explanatory variables for the combination of motives behind India’s 
nuclear course. 
These variables are: 
1. Institutional Framework (Nuclear Authorities) 
2. Science and Engineering / Nuclear R+D / Self-Reliance (Nuclear Science) 
3. Domestic Policy Arena (Nuclear Politics) 
4. General and Regional Security Threats 
5. India’s Nuclear Doctrine 
6. Threats from Pakistan  
7. Threats from China 
8. India’s Status 
9. US American Non-Proliferation Initiatives 
10. NPT (Extension) 
11. CTBT 
The set of 11 variables is divided into three main groups  
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GROUP   VARIABLES 
1. Domestic Factors 
1. Institutional Framework (Nuclear Authorities) 
2. Science and Engineering / Nuclear R+D / Self-Reliance 
(Nuclear Science) 
3. Domestic Policy Arena (Nuclear Politics) 
 
2. Regional Security 
4. General and Regional Security Threats 
5. India’s Nuclear Doctrine 
6. Threats from Pakistan  
7. Threats from China 
 
3. The International Nuclear Order 
8. India’s Status 
9. American Non-Proliferation Initiatives 
10 NPT (Extension) 
11 CTBT 
 
 
Construction of Scales and Indices 
 
Within the quantitative analysis of the randomly collected sample of 705 nuclear-related 
articles, three different measures are introduced that are aimed at:  
a) measuring the general attitude of the author towards the bomb (attitude scale),  
b) measuring the variance of the general outlook of the nuclear debate over time (time 
series analysis), and  
c) measuring the degree to which the debate within India’s elite was polarised, or, reversely 
expressed, the degree to which a consensus existed among India’s elite on the nuclear issue 
(polarisation index). 
 
a) The Attitude Scale 
A property, defined as a qualitative characteristic of the object, is attributed to each of the 
705 entries. The property, designated as the attitude score, has three different possible 
values. Value 1 is attributed to the property of those articles in which the author expresses 
his or her unambiguous opinion in favour of the bomb. Value 0 is attributed to the property 
of those articles in which the author takes either a neutral opinion on India’s nuclearisation 
or the expressed opinion is not applicable to the dichotomous anti-/pro-bomb scheme. 
Value -1 is attributed to the property of those articles in which the author expresses his or 
her unambiguous objection to India’s nuclear build-up. 
The attitude scale is defined as the mean of the values attributed to the property of a sample 
of articles. The samples of articles are defined as variable-wise, group-wise, or sequence-
wise, or, as a combination of all three, as figure for the total sample of articles collected. 
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The attitude scale (AS) is defined as: 
AS = ∑  
=
n
i n
Xi
1
 
where 
n = number of unit in the sample 
Xi = attitude score from each sample unit 
 
The range of possible values for the attitude scale is between the minimum of -1 (a 
consensus among the authors against India acquiring / maintaining the bomb) and the 
maximum of +1 (a consensus among the authors in favour of India acquiring / maintaining 
the bomb). The value of 0 marks the equilibrium of indetermination among the authors’ 
aggregated attitude. 
 
b) The Time Series Analysis 
The time series analysis aims at measuring the arrangement of a series of observations (for 
example, the number of articles observed) of a variable (or group of variables) in the 
sequence of their occurrence at successive points of time (as defined in section 4.2). 
Measurements are made at irregular time intervals ti (with 1 ≤ i ≤ 4). 
The main objective of the time series analysis is to illustrate the change of the outlook of 
India’s nuclear debate over time.  
 
c) The Polarisation Index 
The polarisation index is defined as the standard deviation of the attitude score (-1 ≤ X ≤ 
+1) of the sample. It aims at providing an indication of the average amount by which the 
scores deviate from the mean (termed as the attitude scale) of the distribution. 
 
The polarisation index (PI) is defined as: 
PIx = 
1
)²(
1
−
−∑
=
n
XXi
n
i  
 
where 
n = number of units in the sample 
Xi = attitude score from each sample unit 
X  = sample attitude scale  
 
The range of possible values for the polarisation index is between the minimum of 0 (a 
consensus among the authors exists) and the maximum of +1 (the number of authors is 
equally divided between bomb advocates and bomb opponents, the discourse is entirely 
polarised). 
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